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Abstract 
This doctoral project explores the ways in which European small states’ approaches 
to peacekeeping have been affected by the changing nature of peace missions. The central 
objective is to explain the choices made by small states’ governments to participate in 
missions which no longer fit traditional peacekeeping models. The increasing need for 
comprehensive and robust responses to international crises characterised by intra-state 
violence has challenged small states whose elites and publics have been accustomed to 
deploying troops to low intensity missions tasked to separate parties. Throughout the Cold 
War and beyond, traditional peacekeeping developed along the norms of non-use of force, 
impartiality and consent. Identifying positively with the objectives and normative 
underpinnings of traditional peacekeeping, small states have actively committed their armed 
forces based on a perception of themselves as international norm entrepreneurs. This thesis 
challenges the notion that small states’ governments commit material and human resources 
to new types of peace operations motivated by such self-images. Transformations in the 
practice of peacekeeping are forcing foreign policy agents in small states to rethink the 
function(s) that their states should play in the international system towards peacekeeping. 
Three questions are considered: I) what new or existing roles are small states adopting in this 
evolving peacekeeping system? II) through what political processes do these roles emerge? 
and III) how do these roles affect decision-making on peacekeeping deployments? Small 
state research cannot effectively answer these questions nor comprehensively explain what 
small states do in international affairs because it lacks analytical tools to link structure and 
agency. A theoretical approach grounded in role theory is better suited to understand the 
foreign policies of small states and re-evaluate their peacekeeping credentials. A model 
depicting the interaction between role socialisation and domestic role processes is 
constructed to guide four empirical analyses of recent peacekeeping decisions taken by 
Austrian and Belgian governments. This theoretical foundation allows the contention that 
small states’ changing self-perceptions do not necessarily originate from internal ideational 
factors, as the norm entrepreneur argument suggests. Each case study traces how the 
interplay between external role demands and domestically conceived ideas about the state’s 
position in an evolving peacekeeping system informs Austria’s and Belgium’s adjustment to 
new peace missions. Austria’s decisions to withdraw from UNDOF in 2013, and to 
participate in EUFOR Chad 2007-2008, are telling cases of a small state adapting to new 
forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. This thesis also investigates the 
roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian governments towards the 
Malian crisis, 2012-2013 and the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. This project contributes to 
small state research by showing that these actors fulfil a broad range of functions in the 
international system. It also improves the way we explain small states’ foreign policy actions 
by providing a dynamic framework capturing the relationship between structure and agency, 
and by delving into the decision-making processes of small states. Additionally, it adds to the 
peacekeeping literature by providing an original account as to why states, and in particular 
small states, contribute troops to missions operating under evolving conditions. Finally, 
inputs are made to the scholarship on role theory by exploring how state size influences role 
conceptions and investigating how role socialisation and domestic role dynamics interact to 
affect the roles and decisions of an under-studied category of states. 
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Lay Summary 
This doctoral thesis deals with small countries in international politics. There is a 
consensus that small countries display different behaviours than more powerful states. For 
example, small states are believed to undertake activities seen as ‘good’ international 
behaviour because it improves their international image and enhances their voice on the 
international stage. This includes activism towards the economic development of low- 
income countries, disarmament and/or the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This project 
revaluates the claim that the governments of small states willingly send military personnel to 
peacekeeping operations whenever a violent crisis or conflict erupts, and the international 
community decides to act. While small states have been substantial contributors of 
peacekeeping personnel during the Cold War because of their image as neutral, impartial and 
non-violent actors, the increasing need for more robust responses to international crises has 
challenged small states whose elites and publics have been accustomed to deploying troops 
to low intensity missions tasked to separate parties. Thus, changes in the practice of 
peacekeeping are forcing governments in small states to rethink whether their countries 
should continue to contribute military troops in dangerous operations. This project seeks to 
answer two key questions: I) what roles are small states playing in this evolving context? 
And II) when and how governments in small states decide to participate in peacekeeping 
missions which are increasingly resembling war-like situations? To help answer these, this 
project relies on the notion of role. In the same way as individuals play different roles in 
everyday life, including the role of parent, teacher or mentor, states also adopt certain roles 
which help politicians in charge of foreign policy make decisions. This project argues that 
the roles small states come to play have important consequences for the decisions they take 
to participate in peacekeeping missions. An important objective of this project is to examine 
how small states come to acquire these roles. For this, it focuses on both the demands 
coming from other international actors such as France, the United States and/or the United 
Nations, on the one hand, and the ideas generated domestically by small states themselves 
about the state’s position vis-à-vis peacekeeping, on the other hand. This dual process, and 
how it informs adjustment to new peace missions, is observed on two small countries; 
namely Austria and Belgium. Austria’s decisions to withdraw from UNDOF in 2013, and to 
participate in EUFOR Chad 2007-2008, are telling cases of a small state adapting to new 
forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. This thesis also investigates the 
roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian governments towards the 
Malian crisis, 2012-2013 and the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. This project contributes to 
small state research by showing that these actors fulfil a broad range of functions in 
international affairs. This implies that small states are not necessarily ‘good’ international 
actors at all times. This thesis also improves the way we explain small states’ foreign policy 
actions by providing a framework capturing the relationship between international 
constraints and decision-makers’ ability to innovate, and by delving into the decision-making 
of small states. It adds to the peacekeeping literature by providing an original account as to 
why states contribute troops to missions operating under new conditions. Finally, inputs are 
made to the scholarship on role theory by exploring how state size influences role 
conceptions, and how the dual process affects the roles and decisions of an under-studied 
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On 1 July 2013, Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ resonated in the streets of Zagreb, the 
capital of Croatia, as the country of 4.4 million citizens joined the European Union (EU) 
twenty years after gaining independence from Yugoslavia (The New York Times, 1 July 
2013). It was deemed a ‘landmark’ for both a Union in crisis and Croatia on its path to 
recovery after experiencing Europe’s last conflict (Independent, 30 June 2013). On 17 
December 2014, the front page of the Washington Post read ‘The Cold War Died’ after 
United States President Barack Obama announced the decision to normalise relations with 
Cuba, signalling America’s engagement in the region and the end of Havana’s international 
isolation (Washington Post, 17 December 2014). On another revealing note, newly-elected 
US President Donald J. Trump ‘shoved’ Montenegro Prime Minister Dǔsko Marković during 
a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) meeting in May 2017 partly dedicated to 
welcoming this country of less than one million citizens into the Alliance (The Guardian, 26 
May 2017). These recent episodes underscore the integral parts that small states1 play in the 
international system by interacting with other actors and participating one way or another in 
major political developments. 
This doctoral project contributes primarily to our understanding of small states in 
International Relations (IR) by focusing on their foreign policy decisions to participate in 
international peacekeeping. Small states have captivated the attention of practitioners and 
observers since the Peloponnesian War (Maass, 2017). However, it was not until after the 
Second World War that efforts to systematically analyse their foreign policy behaviours have  
 
 
1 The matter of defining a ‘small state’ has been widely discussed. See Maas, 2009; Kassimeris, 2009, 
Steinmetz and Wivel 2010. For a concise review of the definitional issue, see Thorhallsson and Wivel, 
2006. For a more recent and critical take on it, see Long, 2017. Because the theoretical framework 
presented below gives weight to both states’ material capabilities and leaders’ own interpretations in 
the process of role location, small states are defined here using material and perceptual elements. As 
the framework also includes a significant interactional element, it is appropriate to consider a small 
state as ‘the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship, which is unable to change the nature or 
functioning of the relationship on its own’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; 
Wivel, Bailes and Archer, 2014). This definition brings into focus the distinction between small state 
size and weakness. Starting from the perspective of the international system, scholars have often 
equated small size with weakness. Yet, the example of Switzerland’s leverage in the financial sector 
shows that a state may be small but not necessarily weak depending on context. Handle (1981) 
advances a definition of weakness comprising several criteria, including population, area, economy, 
military power and influence. This author further argues that state weakness is dependent on historical 
periods and geographical areas (p.5). Patrick (2006) adds a governance element arguing that weakness 
‘can be measured by a state’s ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods 
associated with statehood’ (p.29). Research on asymmetrical relationships also relies on weakness, but 
in the contexts of power differentials (Womack, 2016; Long, 2017). This literature classifies Mexico 





gathered pace. Ever since, analysts have tried to understand the foreign policy predicaments, 
objectives and instruments of small states towards a range of phenomena and processes from 
war and peace, to regional integration and multilateral economic negotiations (Narlikar, 
2016). It is commonplace to highlight that small states have been overshadowed by an IR 
bias towards great powers to the detriment of the overall discipline (Gvalia et al., 2013; 
Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Lamoreaux, 2014). That is partly accurate. As large states 
dominate the international system by shaping its forces and structures, there is an 
understandable preoccupation for the geopolitical, economic and military dynamics amongst 
great and emerging powers. Research is also driven by academic and popular audiences’ 
interest in the isolationist and interventionist tendencies of the United States, the ups and 
downs of Franco-German cooperation, the United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU, or in 
China’s expansionist claims in East Asia. The extensive interest, displayed at international 
conferences and in university courses, in emerging powers as new players to be reckoned 
with is testament to this ongoing trend. 
This should not eclipse the fact that research on small states has grown rapidly 
owing to systemic shifts such as decolonisation, the Soviet Union’s collapse, and 
globalisation, which have generated major implications for small states (Neumann and 
Gstöhl, 2006). Scholars have dedicated significant efforts to developing a definition of ‘small 
state’ using a range of quantitative and qualitative criteria, although the issue remains highly 
contested (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:652). In behavioural terms, small states have been 
credited with a tendency to ally with a dominant power allowing them to alleviate their 
vulnerability vis-à-vis great powers’ demands and aggression (Walt, 1987:25). There is also 
an understanding that small states seek to join multilateral institutions to pursue security and 
foreign policy goals (Wivel, 2005). Under anarchy, small states may also aim to evade direct 
participation in power relations, choosing to ensure their survival and maintain their political 
independence through neutrality or non-aligned strategies instead (Goetschel, 2011:314). 
They have also been shown to emphasise internationalist principles, international law, and 
other ‘morally minded’ ideas (Ingebritsen, 2002; Céu Pinto, 2014). In terms of foreign policy 
instruments, small states favour diplomatic and economic, as opposed to military, tools (Hey, 
2003:4). 
This thesis begins from the notion that, despite significant conceptual, theoretical 
and empirical progress, effective knowledge accumulation about what small states do in 
international relations, how they achieve their foreign policy objectives and the factors that 
affect their behaviours, has recently stagnated. Recent scholarship points to potential reasons 
for this, including the absence of consensus around a definition, contradictory findings 
(Long, 2017), a lack of critical inspection and diversity (Lamoreaux, 2014:565), as well as an 
excessive emphasis on Western small states (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). This project 
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emphasises the failure to recognise that small states perform wide-ranging foreign policy 
behaviours, thereby obscuring the contradictory nature of some the conclusions drawn over 
the years. IR scholars have uncritically included small states’ bandwagoning tendencies, 
preference for multilateral institutions, normative aspirations and independent course of 
action all under the title of “typical small state behaviour”. These findings reflect the ebb and 
flow of (neo-)realist, liberal and constructivist interpretations of small state behaviours. 
While they have individually shed light on important aspects, be it vulnerability, 
multilateralism or small state identity, they reinforce the one-size-fits-all approach to the 
study of small states. Because small states have in common their size, conclusions about 
their foreign policy behaviours have been overarching and have concealed significant 
differences in the perceptions, interests and external strategies of small states. Research on 
the influence of domestic politics on small states’ foreign policies has been a positive 
development, but it has, unfortunately, remained unconnected to our understanding of the 
ways in which small states position themselves in, and contribute to, the international 
system. Thus, there is a need to reconcile inconsistencies through new frameworks designed 
to bridge different strands of the scholarship. A more nuanced approach to understanding the 
foreign policy actions of small states must be devised to explain the conditions under which 
small states behave in a particular way and their motivations for doing so. 
To overcome these challenges, the focus of this thesis is placed on analysing the 
decisions that the governments of small states take regarding the deployment and 
contribution of national resources to peacekeeping operations. This is for two reasons. First, 
small states have actively participated in the peaceful resolution of conflicts as a ‘major 
avenue’ through which to maintain international security (Krishnasamy, 2003:24) and pursue 
foreign policy objectives. As Anderson (2007) notes, ‘the decision to participate in peace 
support operations (PSOs) represents a political statement at the strategic level and is a part 
of the making of security policy and by extension also foreign policy’ (Anderson, 2007:477). 
Second, and relatedly, the policy-area of peacekeeping has been the focal point for many 
researchers to argue one of the most pervasive theoretical claims about small state behaviour: 
the norm entrepreneur argument (Ingebritsen, 2002). Therefore, if one seeks to critically 
evaluate key tenets of the small state literature, investigating their evolving relationship with 
peacekeeping is an essential starting point. While the peacekeeping literature is vast, 
addressing a range of issues around the actors, strategies, effectiveness and ideological 
underpinnings of peace operations, this project focuses on peacekeeping as a foreign policy 
matter from the perspective of small European troop-contributing countries (TCCs). 
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1.2 The Engagement of Small States in Peacekeeping Operations: Behavioural Patterns 
and Existing Explanations 
The concept of peacekeeping generally refers to ‘the deployment of international 
personnel to help maintain peace and security’ (Fortna and Howard, 2008:285). As it will 
become clear, this project necessitates a broad definition of peacekeeping which includes, 
but is not limited to, traditional function of party separation undertaken by the United 
Nations (UN) with the host country’s consent. Peacekeeping is also defined here as a 
multidimensional activity incorporating peace-making and peacebuilding initiatives 
performed by a wide range of actors using all necessary force if necessary and authorised 
(Autesserre, 2014:493; Beardsley, 2011:1052). The generic term of ‘peacekeeping’ will be 
used throughout this project unless otherwise stated. 
An assessment of small states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations reveal an 
ambivalent pattern. There is little debate that small states have ‘formed the backbone of 
peacekeeping operations’ during the cold war (Goetschel, 2013:267). The Nordic countries 
of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark led the way in ‘punching above their weight’ in a 
bipolar system dominated by military power and alliances, through substantial contributions 
to peacekeeping missions (Jakobsen, 2007:458). This trend extended beyond Scandinavia to 
other small and middle Western states including Canada, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands which ‘played pivotal roles in the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping’ and 
made large contributions to the ONUC (Congo, 1961), UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1972), or 
UNIFIL (Golan Heights, 1974) (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:40; Goetschel, 2013:267). 
These contributors became known as ‘Western internationalists’ in reference to their support 
for the UN system and their determination to enhance the organisation’s ‘capacity to act as a 
relatively independent and impartial arbiter of international disputes’ (Bellamy and Williams, 
2009:42). The surge in peacekeeping troop contributions from small Western states during 
the cold war followed the widespread perception that great powers were unsuitable providers 
of peacekeeping troops because of extensive national interests in the theatres of deployment. 
Forces from great powers were not seen as sufficiently impartial to effectively maintain the 
peace between conflicting parties. Conversely, small states’ limited interests and evolving 
policies of neutrality and non-alignment meant that belligerents could trust that their troops 
would not be politically motivated when keeping the peace. Participation in peacekeeping 
operations became a significant component of small states’ foreign policies and a key feature 
contributing to their self-definition in the international system (Bellamy and Williams, 
2009:40). However, not all small states punched over their weight through peacekeeping 
activism. In fact, it appeared to be a Western trend as small states from other regions did 
not engage as extensively as those in Europe or the West during the cold war. Even amongst 
small Western states, there were some noticeable absences, exemplified by the low 
peacekeeping engagement of New Zealand, Portugal, Greece and Switzerland. 
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Further variations can be identified when we consider the peacekeeping 
contributions of small states after the cold war ended. While small European states initially 
sustained high levels of peacekeeping engagement in post-cold war operations, they recorded 
a sharp decline by 2000, leaving a gap filled by non-Western counterparts. Out of the forty- 
nine states reported by Findlay (1996), which since 1989 have participated in a UN 
peacekeeping mission for the first time in their history, thirty-two can be considered small 
(p.4). Twenty-two of these small states were non-Europeans. Table 1 shows a similar pattern 
whereby small European states fell out of the top ten UN contributing countries (Austria, 
Finland and Ireland) in the early post-cold war period. They were replaced by small states 
from other regions including Bangladesh, Jordan and Nepal. This is confirmed by Bellamy 
and Williams (2009) who report that the combined contribution of Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland and Ireland declined from 25% of all UN troops during the cold war to 
only 5.4% by December 2000 and 1.6% by December 2001 (p.43). Yet again, a retreat from 
UN peacekeeping by small European states is not necessarily a pattern that applied across the 
whole category. The post-cold war setting provided other small states like Portugal 
opportunities to step up their engagement (Céu Pinto, 2014:390). At a global level from 
1991, between five and six small states have consistently remained in the top ten countries 
contributing to UN operations. These observations indicate significant quantitative 
differences in the contributions that small states make to peacekeeping operations across and 
within regions as well as over time. It is evidence of the inadequacy to consider small states 
as a unified category displaying similar foreign policy objectives and behaviours, especially 
when it comes to evaluating their peacekeeping commitments. This project aims to explain 
why small European states differ in their patterns of peacekeeping contributions given that it 




Table 1   Top Ten Troop-Contributing Countries to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1991 – 2015 





















































Data for the period 1991 – 2005 were obtained from on Heldt (2008:25) based on information from 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) website. Data for the period 2006 -2015 are 
from monthly summaries of contributions to peacekeeping operations obtained from the UN 
Peacekeeping Website accessed at http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. 
 
Research seeking to explain why states provide peacekeeping troops has identified a 
number of political, economic, security, institutional and normative motivations (see Finlay, 
1996; Sorenson and Wood, 2005; Daniel, Taft and Wiharta, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 
2009; 2010; 2012). At a political level, a state may engage in peacekeeping because it 
enhances the country’s prestige, image and standing on the international scene (Meiske and 
Ruggeri, 2017:14; Beswick, 2010; Findlay, 1996; Krishnasamy, 2003). Involvement in 
peacekeeping may be rewarded with a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, 
greater leverage over the conduct of the operations, and more influence in international 
institutions, as well as on matters of international security (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:3-4). 
States may also be motivated by economic and financial considerations. By contributing to 
peacekeeping operations, some governments hope to receive additional aid in return, while 
UN compensation payments can benefit national budgets, security sectors, and individual 
soldiers as well as their families (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:4). Another strand of the 
literature contends that states contribute to peacekeeping because it helps maintain 
international peace and security. Some scholars argue that states seek to provide a public 
good by deploying peacekeeping troops because ‘the end of a conflict and increased stability 
not only favour the contributors to the peacekeeping mission but also promote the security of 
non-contributing countries’ (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Meiske and Ruggeri, 2017:18). Others 
place a greater emphasis on the private dimension of peacekeeping arguing that states offer 
troops because it is ‘in their national security interests’ (Findlay, 1996:8), or because it 
maintains the status quo (Neack, 1995). Another explanation suggests that peacekeeping 
participation is influenced by civil-military bureaucratic relations inside governments 
(Velázquez, 2010) and by institutional considerations over the role, posture, experience and 




been claimed that states actively engage in peacekeeping out of a desire to act for the greater 
good which, as a result, also promotes an image of themselves as good international citizens 
(Brysk, 2009). It should be noted that such a normative consideration is closely connected to 
political motivations for influence and status. 
This last claim has been the basis on which Ingebritsen’s (2002) norm entrepreneur 
argument developed and became the dominant understanding of why small European states 
partake so actively in peacekeeping operations. At its core is the notion that Scandinavia 
possesses inherent geopolitical and economic features generating a particular identity which 
drives Nordic countries to shape international standards of appropriate behaviour 
(Ingebritsen, 2002:13). The Nordics gained ‘a global reputation as trustworthy and effective 
negotiating partners’ which became ‘the cornerstone of Scandinavian diplomatic relations’ 
(Ingebritsen, 2002:13). This approach to foreign policy translated into ‘bridge-’ and 
‘confidence-building’ initiatives designed to alleviate the risk of wars between the great 
powers during the cold war (p.16). In the field of peacekeeping, it gave rise to the ‘Nordic 
model’ which closely followed the UN approach to peacekeeping defined by impartiality, 
consent and limited use of force (Jakobsen, 2006; 2007). The model involves the creation of 
institutionalised channels of cooperation between Nordic governments on peacekeeping 
issues, joint UN peacekeeping training and the formation of national standby forces 
(Jakobsen 2006:382). Its last element includes ‘a high willingness to provide personnel for 
UN operations’ influenced by: 
‘common interests emanating from cultural, historical, social and political 
similarities and their [the Nordics] common fate as small states whose security in 
the final instance depended on the great powers. This naturally resulted in foreign 
policies whose long-term objectives aimed at strengthening the rule of law and 
promoting the peaceful settlement of all disputes’ (Jakobsen, 2006:383). 
 
This PhD project begins with the assumption that the norm entrepreneur argument, and 
its application to peacekeeping, should be re-examined. It asks to what extent small states see 
themselves as norm entrepreneurs and whether such self-perception continues to motivate 
them to engage in a range of peacekeeping operations. To be sure, the norm entrepreneur line 
of argument effectively sheds light on the ‘general predispositions’ of small states towards 
the UN and peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:3, original emphasis). Yet, Bellamy 
and Williams (2012) rightly argue that ‘a positive disposition towards the UN or 
peacekeeping in general does not determine individual decisions about contributing to 
particular missions’ (p.3). Based on this insight, this research stresses two elements 
overlooked by the peacekeeping and norm entrepreneur literatures; namely decision-making 
processes and contextual factors. Only by investigating whether, how and when the 
governments of small states decide to deploy peacekeeping forces in light of the international 
political process preceding each deployment and the conditions on the ground, can we 
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account for variations in the peacekeeping involvement of small states. In fact, research 
shows that even the Nordic countries do not form a category as homogenous as the Nordic 
model suggests. Closer inspection reveals varied levels of commitment and different 
preferences about the institutional framework for peacekeeping activism amongst Nordic 
countries (Anderson, 2007:489). The main reason is that the Nordic countries and other small 
states have not addressed ‘the strategic and political issues of ‘when’ ‘where’ and ‘with what 
partner’ to get involved in peacekeeping operations (Anderson, 2007:476, 491). This point 
underlines the fact that the norm entrepreneur argument is founded on a relatively small and 
specific sample of states and is poorly equipped to capture the ups and downs of small states’ 
peacekeeping commitments. Therefore, generalisation across the category of small states is 
premature before decision-making processes and context are seriously examined. 
 
1.3 Peacekeeping Changes and Dilemma 
 
When considering peacekeeping engagement, small states are required to make 
important political choices in light of the peacekeeping context. However, at present, this 
context is in flux. The position of small states has been challenged by quantitative and 
qualitative changes in the nature of peacekeeping which have accelerated owing to post-cold 
war reconfigurations. Governments in small states are confronting increasingly numerous 
and complex decisions. 
 
1.3.1 Historical Evolution 
 
As the cold war ended, the UN launched an unprecedented number of operations, 
raising the demand for peacekeepers. Between 1988 and 1993, seventeen new missions were 
established, principally to respond to conflicts which were legacies of the superpower 
rivalry. After 1989, the UN was forced to address a wider range of threats previously 
inhibited by superpower competition (Kaplan, 1994; Bellamy and Williams, 2010:94). The 
end of the superpowers’ ideological and power struggle, and its regional manifestations, 
created fertile grounds for the emergence of dormant ethnic and religious antagonisms 
fuelled by collapsing central authorities and their ensuing incapacity to deliver services 
(Wilkinson, 2000:65). The surge in peacekeeping operations also resulted from the 
resumption of cooperation in the Security Council where a forty year-long deadlock amongst 
the permanent five ended (Makdisi et al. 2009:8). Another major quantitative development 
was the increasing number of states willing to deploy troops to peacekeeping operations 
including great powers which had remained on the margin of peacekeeping during the cold 
war (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:100). While great Western powers somewhat retreated 
from UN peacekeeping after 2000, non-Western great and emerging powers including China 
became active peacekeepers (Table 1). 
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Qualitatively, the practice of peacekeeping during the cold war involved a UN force 
deployed to separate consenting parties and/or to ensure that an already agreed peace 
settlement was being conformed to. Troops were minimally armed as the use of force was 
strictly limited to self-defence. The intervening force had no mandate to become involved 
with the parties or with the political conditions of ensuring lasting peace. This traditional 
approach to peacekeeping, characterised by consent, minimum use of force and impartiality, 
was a specific product of the cold war (Malone and Wermester, 2000:37). Its limited scope is 
evident from the first UN operation in 1948 involving unarmed military observers tasked to 
oversee a ceasefire between Israel and its neighbours (Makdisi et al. 2009:7). Peacekeeping 
initiated immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union initially followed the traditional 
approach, but also ‘showed signs of improvisation and change’ (Bellamy and Williams, 
2010:97). The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in Namibia reflected a 
shift from ‘traditional’ to ‘complex’ operations, typified by a larger civilian dimension, 
election monitoring functions, and disarmament as well as demobilisation tasks (Malone and 
Wermester, 2000:38). 
Optimism about the effectiveness of peacekeeping was widespread in the early 
1990s and led to the deployment of additional missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia 
(UNOSOM) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). In the latter two, conditions deteriorated rapidly, 
forcing the UN to widen the mandate and reinforcing the notion that peacekeepers should be 
ready to confront violent opposition groups (Thakur, 1994:394). These changes were 
institutionalised by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 through the establishment of the Department for 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the release of An Agenda for Peace. At the core of 
this report was a dilemma between the need for adaptation to more complex operations, 
opening the door for peace enforcement on the one hand, and the imperative of retaining 
peacekeeping’s defining features of impartiality, consent and non-use of force (Thakur, 
1994:394). Its main conclusion was that peacekeeping could remain an effective tool for 
managing peace as long as peacekeepers were mandated to take on a wider range of tasks as 
part of more complex operations and were provided with adequate resources. It was even 
suggested that consent was no longer a necessary requirement. By 1995, however, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali reversed his position asserting that core principles were not to be dismissed 
and large-scale enforcement activities not to be performed (Donald, 2002:22; Malone and 
Wermester, 2000:47). The stage was set for a more ‘comprehensive approach, actively 
promoting sustainable peace processes and supplementing classical peacekeeping with mid- 
to long-term peacebuilding mandates to manage peaceful transitions’ (Franke and Warnecke, 
2009:407). 
 
1.3.2 Doubts and Reassessments 
 
Between 1992 and 1995, four tragedies questioned the very foundations of 
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peacekeeping. Peacekeepers deployed in Angola (UNAVEM II) to demobilise ex- 
combatants and supervise elections were unable to stop the fighting which broke out after the 
elections of September 1992, resulting in 300,000 casualties. The lack of cooperation from 
the parties meant that disarmament had not proceeded as rapidly as anticipated (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2010:104). On 5 June 1993, over twenty Pakistani peacekeepers operating in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) were killed by a rebel group seeking to overthrow Siad Barre’s 
government. Neither the authorisation to use all necessary force by the Security Council, nor 
the deployment of US troops succeeded in stopping the violence against civilians and foreign 
troops. In 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers part of UNAMIR’s force deployed in Rwanda 
were murdered by extremist militias precipitating the withdrawal of UN troops and the 
Rwandan genocide. Dutch peacekeepers assigned to ensure the security of Srebrenica in 
1995 did not have the mandate to halt the murder of over 7,600 Muslims by Bosnian Serb 
forces who were residing in an area identified as ‘safe’. 
Amongst the main causes of these failures, a succession of inquiries and reports 
emphasised a widespread unwillingness to provide adequate resources, to implement 
mandates suited to the challenges in the field and an inability to provide clear rules of 
engagement. A common feature was a gap between what the mandates demanded the 
peacekeepers achieve, and the conceptual and material instruments, inspired by traditional 
peacekeeping, which they were provided with (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:117). When 
situations escalated, communication failures and a reluctance to engage meant that 
peacekeepers were given poor guidance as to how they were to respond. Jakobsen (2000) 
summarises well the situation at the end of the 1990s: ‘the problems experienced by the 
UN…exposed the limitations of the traditional peacekeeping principles in operations 
characterized by limited consent in the middle ground or grey area between traditional 
peacekeeping and large-scale peace enforcement’ (p.36). As a result, faith in peacekeeping 
disappeared and UN member states, especially in the West, turned highly reluctant to 
contribute troops to its operations. They complained that mandates were inadequate, UN 
command and control structures did not allow for clear military objectives to be articulated, 
and that the absence of peace as well as robust rules of engagement placed their troops under 
too much risk. 
A period of dissatisfaction with, and lesson learning around, peacekeeping ensued 
until 1999 when violence in Kosovo and East Timor required the international community to 
act. Responses to the crises, however, were not UN-led, but took the form of coalitions of 
states under the command of NATO in Kosovo and Australia in East Timor. These 
deployments ushered a trend whereby formal and informal regional arrangements as well as 
wider ad hoc coalitions emerged as alternatives to UN peacekeeping deployments (Bellamy 
and Williams, 2005). Such arrangements proved attractive to many states dissatisfied with 
UN peacekeeping, but willing to engage, thereby, accounting for the increasing deployment 
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of peacekeepers under non-UN auspices (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:124). The main effect 
of these developments was to instil a sense that peacekeeping could be put back on track by 
applying the lessons learnt from the 1990s failures. This was the objective of the Brahimi 
report which set forth a number of proposals designed to articulate new approach to 
peacekeeping. 
The report introduced the notion of ‘complex peace support operations’ founded on 
the assumption that a ‘symbiosis between peacekeeping and peacebuilding’ should be 
achieved (Thakur, 2001:117). UN officials argued that peace-making, peacekeeping and 
peace-building initiatives with the consent of the hostile parties should be combined with 
peace enforcement actions without the necessary consent of the parties. Furthermore, the UN 
should be prepared to support the implementation of peace agreements, protect civilians, 
assist the building of state institutions and/or supervise elections as part of complex 
‘multifunctional’ operations demanding large civilian components (Makdisi et al. 2009:7). 
The implication was that the UN should lead more ‘robust’ operations employing the use of 
force when necessary to protect civilians and peacekeepers (Karlstrud, 2015:42). This 
doctrinal evolution also originated from Western governments which, concerned with the 
destabilising effects of humanitarian crises in their neighbourhoods, sought to ‘lift the 
doctrinal fog’ and agree that ‘(impartial) peace enforcement will be required in most 
intrastate conflicts and complex emergencies and that peace forces must be armed and 
organized accordingly’ (Jakobsen, 2000:40). The overall effect of these transformations was 
to gradually erode the basic principles of traditional peacekeeping. Arguments have been 
made over the need to adapt impartiality to contemporary challenges (Donald, 2002), 
whether and how to build consent amongst parties (Johnston, 2011) and the appropriateness 
of the use of force (Wilkinson, 2000). Finally, another recent trend whereby peacekeeping, 
even UN-led, has sought to use ‘military means to stabilise a country, often with all 
necessary means to neutralise potential ‘spoilers’ to a conflict’ (Karlstrud, 2015:42). Such a 
stabilisation approach, encapsulated in the Capstone Doctrine, has intensified the 
contradiction with traditional peacekeeping. 
 
1.4 The Peacekeeping Dilemma of Small States 
 
Changes in the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping have challenged small TCCs, 
from the Nordic countries to Austria and New Zealand, whose peacekeeping activism is 
closely tied to the traditional approach to peacekeeping (Stamnes, 2007:450). During the 
cold war, it was the development of peacekeeping along the principles of impartiality, 
consent and non-use of force which placed small states in prime position to become large 
contributors. This conceptual triad matched small states’ own approach to international peace 
and security, generating the idea that peacekeeping was best performed by the smaller 
members of the international community. Troop deployments by small states enhanced the 
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operations’ legitimacy. On the other hand, traditional peacekeeping presented them with 
opportunities to excel internationally and gain international reputation. Policy-makers from 
small states were the first approached by UN officials when troops were required for an 
operation. As exemplified by the case of Finland, troops from small states were seen to be of 
‘peaceful, quiet disposition, together with their ‘down-to-earth-ness’, discipline and 
resilience’ (Stamnes, 2007:453). In other words, small states’ foreign policy orientation and 
the qualities of their troops made small states ‘perfect for the job’ of keeping the peace 
(Jakobsen, 2007:382). However, the job has changed in significant respects, forcing small 
states’ policy-makers to make difficult decisions. 
Quantitatively, the increasing number of missions and their expanding size have 
applied pressures on the limited capabilities of small states. Successive assessments that 
peacekeeping failures were due to the lack of material resources signalled to small states that 
more was needed. Small states have been pressed to meet intensifying demands for greater 
commitments to a field that has become increasingly crowded and competitive. As emerging 
and great powers stepped in to fill some of the material and operational gaps in the conduct 
of peacekeeping operations, small states have found it difficult to keep pace to the detriment 
of their status as major troop contributors (Anderson, 2007). This has also negatively 
affected their ability to shape the way peacekeeping is operationalised and conducted. As 
Jakobsen (2007) accurately reports, growing competition amongst TCCs means that 
‘traditional battalion-sized contributions were not sufficient to obtain operational influence 
and autonomy in operations led by the great powers’ (p.458). Consequently, great powers 
have gained greater leverage in framing and designing operations which risks undermining 
the impartiality criteria. Furthermore, shifting ideas about the tasks that peacekeepers are 
expected to perform on the ground have generated ‘complex demands’ testing the 
willingness and ability of small states to deploy forces as intensively as during the cold war 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2012:1). At the core is a growing incompatibly between the way 
peacekeeping is evolving and the ‘security identity’ of small states (Wivel, 2005:396). 
Evidence indicates that policy-makers in small states are becoming uncomfortable at the 
prospect of having to deploy forces in higher intensity missions especially those involving 
enforcement activities. 
Therefore, the dilemma that small states are currently facing is the following: On the 
one hand, small states may prioritise maintaining a strong peacekeeping reputation by 
accepting the demands of international actors to contribute troops to a wide range of 
missions. This strategy allows small states to retain some influence on the way operations are 
constructed and undertaken while keeping a voice in international institutions. However, 
their international image as good international citizens may be tarnished by having to 
undertake tasks closer to enforcement and combat operations than peacekeeping. 
Additionally, preferred rules of engagement may be difficult to attain as they are negotiated 
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in cooperation with more influential actors (Haaland, 2007:505). In turn, this strategy may 
become politically costly given the difficulty of justifying engagement in high intensity, 
potentially dangerous, missions to domestic constituencies attached to traditional 
peacekeeping. On the other hand, to offset these drawbacks, small states may be selective in 
their peacekeeping participation, contributing to operations that fit the traditional model 
while remaining on the side-line of those more politically and operationally challenging. 
This strategy has the advantage of protecting the domestic consensus over participation in 
traditional peacekeeping operations. Non-involvement in operations led by great powers 
means that small states can continue to cultivate their normative qualities and promote good 
international behaviour. Yet, they will no longer be able to rely on their status as active 
peacekeepers and will gradually lose their say on future peacekeeping developments 
including during UN reforms. 
 
1.5 Looking for Clues: The Prospect of Role Theory 
 
This dilemma raises the central question of this project: how have small states’ 
policy-makers responded to the shift from traditional peacekeeping to the ‘complex 
emergencies’ typifying modern conflicts (Wilkinson, 2000:64)? The objective is to analyse 
the foreign policy decisions of small states when confronted with other forms of 
peacekeeping. Based on the assumption that small states are unlikely to respond similarly, 
this thesis argues that how small states navigate this dilemma depends on the roles they play 
as demanded by a particular peacekeeping context and negotiated in decision-making. A case 
is made that a role approach, grounded in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), is better suited to 
account for variations in small states’ foreign policy behaviour than conventional IR 
perspectives (Gigleux, 2016:28). FPA’s attention to the purposeful actions of human 
decision-makers and their consequences for the external behaviour of states is a suitable 
foundation to link the effect of state size to foreign policy action (Hudson, 2005:3). The 
theoretical framework articulated in this project draws on the concept of roles, or national 
role conceptions (NRCs), defined as ‘policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, 
their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system’ (Holsti, 
1970:246). Roles also emerge from a process of socialisation through which states adopt 
roles that other political actors expect them to occupy (Barnett, 1993:275; Thies, 2013). 
Thus, roles are a combination of self-conception (ego) and social recognition prescribed by 
Others (alter) (Chafetz, 1993:733). According to Krotz (2002), roles affect national interests 
not only by generating ‘wills, goals and actions’ but also by ‘making interests … intuitively 
implausible’ and by inducing a particular policy-making style (p.7). They consist of 
motivational statements on the part of policy-makers, making them valuable analytical tools 
for researchers aiming to explain states’ foreign policy actions. 
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A role approach draws on a constructivist insight bringing to the fore the perceptions 
of policy-makers and citizens about the position(s) of their states in the international system 
(Breuning, 2011:20). This is appropriate given that scholars have long recognised the 
primacy of self-perception for small states’ policy-makers in defining the scope of action 
available to them (Keohane 1969:296). Focusing on roles allows conceptualising norm 
entrepreneurship as a role that small states have traditionally seen themselves playing, and 
which has long guided their foreign policy behaviours as well as their peacekeeping 
strategies. However, a changing peacekeeping context is expected to make it more difficult 
for small states to continue enacting a norm entrepreneur role. Thus, this project asks: what 
other roles do small states play in peacekeeping and international affairs? This is an 
important question because role theory research has overlooked the roles of small states, 
focusing instead on those played by middle and great powers (Thies, 2013; Harnisch, 2011; 
2016, Wehner, 2014). It is also crucial for this research to analyse small states’ roles ‘in 
relations to a specific policy area’ since ‘decision makers’ perceptions of their state’s role 
within the system may differ with respect to different issue areas’ (Breuning, 1995:237). 
Researchers have already turned to roles to explain states’ compliance with the nuclear non- 
proliferation regime (Chaftez et al., 1996), foreign aid policy (Breuning, 1995; 2010), foreign 
policy status (Thies, 2013), attitudes to peace processes (Barnett, 1999), engagement in 
military interventions (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2013) and membership in multilateral economic 
blocs (Wehner and Thies, 2014). Yet, the decisions of small states to participate in 
peacekeeping has not yet been analysed with reference to their roles2.  
One exception is Goetschel (2013) who argues that ‘while these [small] states have 
continued to pursue ambitious peace polices since the cold war ended, the content of these 
policies has changed significantly’ (p.260). Goetschel’s starting assumptions and theoretical 
approach using roles as a basis for clarifying the evolution of small states’ peace policies are 
analogous to those of this project. His main proposition is that changes in peace policies 
reflect a shift towards the idealist functions of European small states’ role concepts at the 
expense of realist ones (Goetschel, 2013:268). However, while the theoretical and empirical 
insights into the variations of small states’ attitudes to peace issues are highly informative, 
Goetschel’s work is driven predominantly by a concern for neutrality. The analysis appears 
to be more focused on unpacking the concept of neutrality rather than on considering the full 
range of role conceptions that small states may adopt, and how roles inform their responses 
to current peacekeeping dilemmas. This prevents Goetschel from making the most of role 
theory’ rich conceptual toolbox by systematically considering how policy-makers in small 
states have domestically conceived new roles in light of external expectations. 
 
2 Role theory scholars have used a number of terms to denote the concept of roles as applied to states 
including “national role conceptions” (NRCs), “national roles”, “role conceptions” or just “roles”. The 




One of these tools is role socialisation. Broadly defined, state socialisation refers to 
the internalisation of ‘patterns of behaviour and role expectations which characterise the 
groups in which they [states] interact’ (Alderson, 2001:416; also see Armstrong, 1994:7-8). 
It is a prominent feature of relations amongst states and, therefore, has been conceptualised 
by many IR theories. Consequently, widely different conceptions of ‘what it is, who its 
affects or how it operates’ have emerged (Alderson, 2001:416). While neorealists view 
socialisation as a process through which anarchy instils notions of self-help to states (Waltz, 
1979; Thies 2010), constructivists emphasise international norms and co-constitutive 
interactions as socialising forces generative of states’ identities, interests and behaviours 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1992). English School theorists posit that 
socialisation help explain how states on the fringes of the international system consent to 
follow common rules and values, thereby integrating the international society of states 
(Cantir, 2011; Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2000). Socialisation has also been a 
significant theoretical point of reference for those interested in the trajectory of EU 
integration and expansion (Checkel, 1999; Beyers, 2010; Engert, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 
2005; Flockhart, 2006). Their contention is that European integration does not progress as a 
result of strategic exchanges between rational national agents, but through ‘social learning, 
socialization, routinization and normative diffusion, all of which address fundamental issues 
of agent identity and interests’ (Checkel, 1999:545). 
Role theory proposes a different view of socialisation. Thies (2012; 2013; 2015), 
who pioneered a role approach to socialisation labelled role location, defines it as a process 
‘where role expectations of the self and other, role demands of the situation, and cues from 
the audience all come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its 
appropriate enactment’ (Thies, 2013:35). In this way, socialisation is ‘a role bargaining 
process’ involving both ego choosing a role based on its status and material capabilities and 
an assessment of that choice by relevant alters expressing role expectations (Thies, 2013:35). 
I develop a more comprehensive framework around role socialisation in Chapter 3, but here 
it is important to offer some early indication of its relevance and manifestation in the 
peacekeeping domain. This project views the period before a peacekeeping deployment as a 
highly political phase during which negotiations between conflicting parties, the UN and 
other interested actors take place over three interrelated issues. First, the need for a 
peacekeeping operation must be negotiated. Deployment is unlikely to happen without 
international momentum to halt a crisis, an agreement from the conflicting parties and a 
consensus in the Security Council. Second, a mandate providing the legal basis, purpose and 
tasks of an operation must be established. Third, international actors must be willing to take 
the lead in generating and coordinating forces to implement the mandate. These efforts must 
be met positively by potential troop contributing countries. This latter phase is highly 
relevant for this project because it establishes interactions between international institutions, 
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lead nations (alters) and small prospective TCCs (egos). These interactions form the 
material, social and normative context in which small states are confronted to certain 
expectations and locate the type of peacekeeper they are expected to be. Before small states 
can contribute to separating factions, stabilising volatile areas, training security forces or 
providing humanitarian assistance, they must first be socialised into adequate peacekeeping 
roles. In line of the conceptualisation of role socialisation offered in chapter 3, this thesis 
operationalises the concept broadly in that it identifies role socialisation as any forms of 
behavioural expectations implicitly and explicitly expressed. One might anticipate notions of 
responsibility and solidarity as well as influential peacekeeping norms to be significant in 
this process. Thus, a peacekeeping role encapsulates three dimensions: the actual demands of 
expected peacekeeping behaviour, who demands it and the norm on which it relies.  
One major clue that an investigation of small states’ roles is valuable lies in the 
conceptual proximity between role theory and concepts such as identity and (self-)image 
(Breuning, 2011:20; Hermann, 2003). The latter two have been prevalent features of small 
states’ peacekeeping engagement. Stammes (2007) notes that ‘participation in peace support 
operations forms a natural part of the Nordic states’ self-images’ while national identity has 
been both a factor and a product of the peacekeeping activism of small states (p.453). Yet, 
these constructivist concepts do not get to the bottom of what explain the peacekeeping 
decisions of small states’ governments when confronted by the current dilemma. Nor are the 
literatures on small states and peacekeeping anymore helpful given that they offer conflicting 
expectations. On the one hand, the foreign policies of small states are expected to reflect the 
imperatives of the international system, making system-level explanations ‘most relevant’ for 
explaining their foreign policy choices (Elman, 1995:175). Conversely, the peacekeeping 
literature has a tendency, especially when it comes to small states, to locate the factors of 
peacekeeping engagement inside states while overlooking the effects of contextual elements, 
although these have been well documented in separate studies. Therefore, a role approach is 
beneficial because it offers the possibility of bringing together different levels of analysis and 
bridging the gap between structure and agency (Wehner and Thies, 2014:412). It also allows 
researchers to pay greater attention to processes in identifying the causes of states’ 
peacekeeping contributions, a move consistent with the need to consider decision-making in 
explaining peacekeeping participation. Through this, we can effectively identify the external 
and domestic sources of the roles that small states pursue, thereby providing a 
comprehensive understanding of the processes through which they emerge and of what 
influences their peacekeeping decision-making. 
The above historical overview has underlined the importance of international 
institutions in conditioning small states’ peacekeeping decisions. However, the dynamics of 
the institution–small state relationship are complex and multidirectional. On the one hand, 
institutions form part of the context in which small states interpret a situation and conceive 
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their own roles (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:30).  In this way, institutions act as alters 
influencing role-taking through the dissemination of common rules, expectations and 
practices. On the other hand, the distinction between small states as egos and institutions as 
alters is not clear-cut since small states, as members of these institutions, exercise agency 
within them by remaining the arbiter of compliance and shaping the meaning afforded to 
institutions and the specific goals they are established to achieve (Charon, 2001:46). 
Therefore, it must be acknowledged that small states are institutionally involved in shaping 
the rules, norms and practices of peacekeeping through strategies designed to enhance their 
influence within these institutions. Yet again, this is counterbalanced by their limited 
capabilities and status which limit their voice in the EU and continue to exclude them from 
the UN Security Council where mandates are formulated and agreed upon, unless they gain a 
non-permanent seat. This discussion reflects the inherent tensions between structure and 
agency at the heart of this project. 
Before laying out how this research will proceed, it is worth specifying the type of 
inquiry it performs to generate knowledge about what small states do in international 
peacekeeping. The overarching purpose is to identify the causes of small states’ policies and 
decisions when confronted with new forms of peacekeeping. From this perspective, this 
thesis conducts a ‘scientific’ analysis evaluating the causal influence of roles on small states’ 
peacekeeping behaviours, using the language of causal inferences such as ‘influence’, 
‘impact’, ‘effects’ and ‘outcome’. Yet, Jackson (2011) is sceptical about the possibility of 
clearly demarcating the criteria for defining ‘science’, which ‘opens the door for IR scholars 
to reach into an alien field of study and pull out something that fits their immediate aims’ 
(p.15-16). The ‘immediate aim’ of this research is to understand how political agents in small 
states are renegotiating the social positions of their states in peacekeeping through a dual 
process of role socialisation and conception. It implicates an interpretive approach designed 
to inductively understand the social meanings which underpin political actions and to locate 
these meanings in their social, cultural, institutional and historical contexts (Bevir and 
Daddow, 2015:277). I draw on Bevir and Daddow (2015) who offer ‘an alien field of study’ 
by positing the logics of explanation and interpretation as compatible. The ‘covering-law’ 
model of explanation must be abandoned in favour of one which incorporates agents’ beliefs 
and perceptions in order to understand ‘how the processes of social representations are 
formed and internalized’ in the realm of the ‘international’ (Hollis and Smith in Bevir and 
Daddow, 2015). This position stems from the assumption that we cannot effectively account 
for states’ foreign policies without considering ‘the media by which external conditions and 
factors are translated into a policy decision’ (Singer in Bevir and Daddow, 2015:277). 
Therefore, this thesis performs an interpretive exercise to assess how small states’ foreign 
policy-makers understand their historical, normative and material contexts and, as a result, 
socially and discursively make sense of ‘who their state is’ in the international social system. 
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It is a compatible and indispensable step towards explaining small states’ peacekeeping 
decisions and policies. 
1.6 Aims, Objectives and Structure 
 
The research questions presented above have generated specific aims and objectives. 
The primary aim of this PhD project is to investigate how small states are adapting to 
changes in the doctrine and practice of international peacekeeping. Relatedly, the aim is to 
ascertain the factors explaining why small states continue to participate in, or refrain from 
contributing to, complex peacekeeping operations. To achieve these, the objective is to look 
at the influence of the roles that policy-makers in small states see their states playing in this 
new context on their decisions to participate, or not, in new types of peacekeeping. A role 
approach does not seek to compete with other explanations of foreign policy behaviour. 
Thus, the objective is not to test how well role theory fetches in comparison to other theories, 
but to analyse how roles intersect with other peacekeeping considerations in decision- 
making. This strengthens the need for the interpretive approach presented above. Four case 
studies (Chapters 6,7,9 and 10) analyse recent peacekeeping decisions taken by Austrian and 
Belgian governments. Each exposes a novel way of undertaking peacekeeping and 
investigates Austria’s and Belgium’s responses to it. 
Chapter 2 reviews the main IR theories explaining the foreign policy behaviours of 
small states and concludes that none sufficiently consider structure-agency interaction 
necessary to effectively accounts for the choices small states are having to make when 
considering participating in modern peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the second aim of 
this research is to improve the analysis of small states’ foreign policies by bridging the gap 
between structure and agency through role theory. The objective of Chapter 3 is to construct 
a theoretical framework allowing the analysis of how policy-makers interpret external 
pressures on their small states, to perform certain roles in this new peacekeeping 
environment, and how these interpretations inform national peacekeeping decisions. This 
effectively meets the requirement posited in this introduction to consider decision-making 
and context in explaining peacekeeping decisions. 
A third aim is to debunk the idea that small states’ participation in peacekeeping 
operations is automatic and motivated by a single uncontested perception of themselves as 
norm entrepreneurs. The objective is to determine what new or existing roles small states 
adopt in this evolving peacekeeping system. Chapter 4 devises a methodology combining 
deductive and inductive approaches which provides both methodological rigour for the 
systematic observation of roles and the flexibility to capture roles previously unreported by 
researchers of small states. The cases of Austria and Belgium were chosen mainly because 
they offer opportunities to assess whether the norm entrepreneur argument applies to non- 
Nordic small states. Additionally, the changing nature of peacekeeping has forced Austria 
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and Belgium to make important policy adjustments to their respective peacekeeping 
approach involving difficult decisions. Performing an analysis of states’ roles involves 
collecting rhetorical data form primary sources as well as identifying roles from existing 
reports and analyses. In the initial stages of this research, a valuable source of data was the 
diplomatic historical literature which often refers to roles as leaders attempted to position 
their states between the two-bloc confrontation of the cold war. With regard to the case-
studies, I first followed the initiative of previous role theorists (Below, 2016) and examined 
state leaders’ UN speeches to identify the role inclination of an incumbent government. 
When it came to the specific decisions, I was primarily interested in retracing the course of 
events and how different actors socially positioned their states towards a particular crisis. I 
searched for declarations by representatives of international institutions and leading states to 
gain a sense how they defined the situation and what demands they were making about who 
should act. I turned my attention to reports of the force generation process, and previous 
bilateral and multilateral meetings, to gain access to these declarations. Then, I examined 
press articles reporting spontaneous declarations by small states’ elites who were expected to 
respond to these demands and to rely on roles to justify their decisions. I also consulted 
parliamentary documents to discern other domestic voices expressing views about the role(s) 
the state should be playing in the context of an ongoing international effort to address a 
crisis. I also referred to official press releases from the governments under study to 
reconstruct the role evolution of these elites as a decision was approaching.  
The fourth aim is to better understand where the roles of small states come from and 
through which processes they affect decision-making on peacekeeping deployments. Using 
the theoretical framework devised in Chapter 3, the objective is to empirically investigate the 
interactions between structural forces of role expectation and domestic dynamics of role 
negotiation. Chapters 5 and 8 provide the foreign policy background on Austria and Belgium 
retracing the evolution of their foreign policy roles. They provide the foundations for the 
following chapters to analyse, through the comparative case study method, how the 
interplays between external role demands and domestically conceived ideas about the state’s 
position affect Austria’s and Belgium’s adjustment to new peace missions. Chapter 6 
investigates Austria’s decisions to participate in EUFOR Chad, 2007-2008, while Chapter 7 
is interested in the country’s withdrawal from UNDOF in 2013; two telling cases of a small 
state adapting to new forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. Chapter 9 
and 10 examine the roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian 
governments towards the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war and the Malian crisis, 2012-2013 
respectively. For each, a concluding discussion theorises about the effects of external 
pressures to adopt certain roles on decision-making dynamics of small states. 
This research contributes to an improved understanding of small states in IR via the 
refinement of the role approach to analysing the foreign policies of the international system’s 
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smaller members. However, the role theoretical approach also has broader relevance for IR 
theories. Walker (2017) reminds us that role theory is guided by the assumption that 
‘understanding the relations between states is enhanced by recognising their respective roles 
in a system of states’. Given that a role theoretical approach provides us with ‘a perspective 
for describing cooperation and conflict between states as a social system’, this thesis also 
speaks to the broader IR discipline in three ways. First, it offers valuable insights into the co-
constitution of states’ identities and interests through social interactions and, therefore, 
builds on constructivist efforts to resolve the structure–agency problem (Wendt, 1987). 
Wendt’s “generative” approach has been criticised because it ‘conflates agency and social 
role’ and ‘obscures precisely those elements of agency which are central in a worthwhile 
conceptualisation of agency–agency interpretability and choice’ (Friedman and Starr, 
1997:13). Role theory fills the gap by acknowledging that ‘agents may play a plurality of 
oftentimes competing social roles associated with divergent interests, and that agents may 
value each of the roles in this set to a different extent in any given decision-making context’ 
(Friedman and Starr, 1997:13). Second, this thesis’s role theoretical framework speaks to 
research on international norms by studying how the interactions between external 
expectations of, and the domestic ideas about, one’s roles influence states to assume (or not) 
the entrepreneurship of norms. Third, by formulating propositions which help ‘explain the 
dynamics of interactions between and among actors with different roles’ (Walker, 2017), role 
theory can shed light on the most common type of interactions in the international system, 
those characterised by asymmetry (Womack, 2016). It can act as a reminder that the forms 
and trajectories of asymmetrical relationships are the results of material, interactional and 
social dynamics. This last point also has implications for the scholarship dedicated to states’ 
balancing and bandwagoning behaviours, especially as debates over whether smaller states 









Small states have been studied since the eighteenth and ninetieth centuries 
(Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:9). However, academic interest in the place, function and 
foreign policy behaviour of small states has fluctuated mirroring major shifts in the 
international system. The problematic position of small European states in the midst of the 
Second World War was the central concern of Annette Baker Fox (1959) who, with the 
publication of The Power of Small States, formally initiated small state studies. Research 
intensified steadily in the post-war era addressing the puzzling question of small states’ 
survival. Decolonisation in the mid-1970s witnessed an upsurge of work on the trade and 
industrial strategies of small states (Höll, 1983) as well as on the effects of limited material 
capabilities on their foreign policies (Barston, 1973; East, 1973; Waltz, 1979). This growing 
interest paused when observers began questioning the usefulness of small states as an 
analytical tool (Baehr, 1975). It was revived following the material and ideational shifts of 
1989-1991. The end of the cold war not only contributed to a proliferation of small states, 
but also fundamentally altered their position in a new environment characterised by deeper 
economic, political and security interdependence as well as by processes of economic 
liberalisation and regional integration (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:13). From then on, 
research sought to examine the implications of this evolving and globalising context for 
small states. 
Therefore, while scholars are accurate in noting that small states have been relatively 
understudied, we should not underestimate the extent to which small states have drawn 
scholarly attention (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). In fact, Long (2017) emphasises that ‘there 
is impressive and growing empirical and conceptual richness in the field of small-state 
studies’ (p.144). However, a growing number of scholars, dissatisfied with the way the 
scholarship has progressed over the last decade, is arguing that small state research has now 
reached an impasse. Lamoreaux (2014) notes that ‘problematically, substantive content 
within small-state studies, especially with a European emphasis, has stagnated’ (p.565). The 
sources of the current dissatisfaction lie in a lack of diversity, theory building, and 
knowledge accumulation, as well as in poor cross-regional comparisons and in the absence 
of conversation with the wider IR discipline (Wivel et al., 2014; Lamoreaux, 2014, Long, 
2017; Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). Lamoreaux (2014) develops his critique by pointing to 
the repetition currently characterising the field: ‘the issues that European-focused scholars 
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highlight are largely the same, their key assumptions and expectations are the same and their 
claim that small states are worthy to be studied as a group is the same’ (p.565). This project 
agrees with these assessments and positions itself with other works seeking to rejuvenate the 
field (Crandall and Varov, 2016). 
Long (2017) attributes this dead end to the definitional debate which, through a lack 
of consensus, has inhibited knowledge accumulation on what foreign policies small states 
pursue, and ‘turned the study of small states into cul-de-sac infrequently visited by IR 
scholars’ (p.149). In the same critical spirit, I argue that the current impasse is attributable to 
a lack of research explicitly demonstrating how small states’ foreign policies are shaped by 
interactions between structure and agency. In 1992, Carlsnaes complained that, although we 
are conscious that both agents and social structures entertain reciprocal relationships that are 
central to any comprehensive account of social behaviour, IR and FPA still lack a framework 
that captures ‘the dynamic interplay’ between the two (p.246; 255, original emphasis). The 
sub-field of small state research offered much potential for resolving the agency-structure 
problem owing to small states’ responsiveness to structural variables, in particular. The 
primacy of the structure-agency issue to analysing small states can also be detected from 
Carlsnaes’s empirical inspiration in ‘the sudden volte- face on the issue of membership in the 
European Community (EC) of the nonmember West European neutrals’ (p.247, original 
emphasis). Much, if not all, of the discussions around small state foreign policy relate to the 
interplay between structure and agency, but research has not explicitly established a link 
between the two. In turn, the scholarship has been trapped in endless debates over whether 
small states are structurally too weak to achieve any ambitious and independent foreign 
policy or, on the contrary, are able to overcome structural constraints and exercise power in a 
wide variety of material and non-material ways (Long, 2016; Chong and Maas, 2010). The 
introductory article of Third World Thematics’ special issue by Gibert and Grzelczyk (2016) 
entitled ‘Non-Western small states: activists or suvivors?’ reflects the continuing relevance 
of this debate. Knowledge about the conditions under which small states are unable to affect 
international change or become influential international actors remains insufficient, in part 
because small states display wide disparities in behaviour. Long (2016) rightly comments 
that small states ‘might have different sources of power, differently exercised, to varying 
degree, across a range of issues’ (p.9). Recently, Gebhard (2017) has shown that even the 
foreign policies of small Scandinavian states, expected to display significant similarities 
owing to a common strategic environment and political culture, have diverged especially in 
terms of the institutional platform through which they are carried out. Such variations have 




Ultimately, this shortcoming is partly due to the strong emphasis which the existing 
research and theories place on structural factors for understanding small states’ positions and 
interactions in the international system. (Neo-)realism, liberal institutionalism and social 
constructivism focus primarily on examining how different constraints and opportunities 
condition small states’ relations. They provide clues about the scope of action and the 
strategies available to small states, but are less effective at explaining their foreign policy 
behaviour through frameworks incorporating both structure and agency. In fact, small state 
research has struggled to escape the argument that small states respond first and foremost to 
the imperatives of the international material structure. This is not to deny the contributions of 
actor-specific perspectives which have considered the agency of small states within different 
structures and, therefore, made valuable inroads into combining structure and agency 
(Gebhard, 2013; Rickly, 2016). Yet, when research focuses on the agency of small states, it 
has done so with a state-level conception of agency and, therefore, paid insufficient attention 
to how state agents perceive different structures and whether they are constraining or 
enabling. Thus, small state research has not fully addressed the gap between structure and 
agency because it has not yet articulated a framework allowing for the systematic analysis of 
the effects of structures on foreign policy decision-making and how structural effects are 
perceived and interpreted by foreign policy agents at the domestic level.  
What follows is a review of the key contributions made by the main theoretical 
lenses to our understanding of small states. The specific expectations they have generated 
about the action scope and the strategies available to small states in order to achieve their 
foreign policy objectives will be critically examined. This will be achieved alongside 
definitional considerations because IR theories are inextricably linked to different definitions 
of small states. The way one defines a small state is closely intertwined with the theoretical 
perspective used to understand its foreign policy behaviour given that each lens focuses on 
particular defining criteria. 
 
2.2 The Contributions of IR Theories 
 
Realism has dominated our understanding of small states in the international system. 
Its main assumption, as articulated by Waltz (1979) in Theory of International Politics, that 
states seek material capabilities to ensure security in an anarchic environment, has oriented 
small state scholars towards power resources, defined in absolute or relative terms, as 
indicators for defining small states and conceptualising their security predicaments (Wivel et 
al., 2014:6). Realists define small states using quantifiable criteria including GDP, military 
assets and population as well as territorial size (Rothstein, 1968; Vital, 1967). Small states 
are those falling below a pre-defined threshold on one, or a combination, of these criteria. 
Thus, small states are seen as vulnerable actors lacking traditional resources of power 
(Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:652). Operating in an anarchical environment with an inferior 
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set of capabilities means that small states experience strong constraints on their foreign 
policy choices (Waltz, 1979). According to a realist perspective, the survival of small states 
can never be guaranteed because a lack of capabilities does not allow them to effectively 
anticipate international trends, shape international events or withstand the economic, military 
and/or political pressures from great powers (Wivel, 2016:93). Writing during the cold war, 
Vital (1967) finds that there is very little that small states can achieve independently of great 
powers. 
This alludes to a key tenet of the realist take on small states expecting that the 
international structure, defined in terms of distribution of capabilities, will be the primary 
driver of their foreign policies (Hey, 2003; Long, 2016, Wivel, 2016, Waltz, 1979; Rothstein, 
1968). Experiencing greater threats to their survival than larger powers, small states cannot 
afford to overlook where power lies and what great powers do when shaping the 
international system (Elman, 1995:175). In a recent structural realist examination, Maas 
(2016) attributes small state disappearance and proliferation to their structural irrelevance 
within ‘the particular set-up of the state system’ (p.1304). Neorealists have elaborated this 
structural argument by investigating how different power configurations have affected small 
states’ room for manoeuvre and foreign policy strategies (Rothstein, 1969:14-15; Handel, 
1985). Jesse and Dreyer (2016) discuss how unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity have 
generated varying opportunities for small state survival and influence in the system (p.22). 
The instability of a multipolar system lead realists to expect small states to either bandwagon 
with, or balance against a great power (alliance strategy, Rothstein, 1968) while they can also 
choose a passive strategy of neutrality (Jesse and Dreyer, 2016:23). A bipolar system offers 
small states fewer foreign policy options. Under bipolarity, Long (2016) notes that 
‘incentives to bandwagon will be increased, and possibilities to gain influence by shifting 
sides will be reduced’ (p.4). 
Wivel (2016) positively assesses the realist approach to small states by asserting that 
it helps understand how ‘inequality in capabilities creates inequalities in opportunities for 
survival and influence internationally’ (p.93). It emphasises the important notion that small 
states have inherent characteristics which place them at a disadvantage. Any analysis seeking 
a comprehensive picture of what small states do in international relations will not be able to 
ignore such ‘inherent vulnerabilities of being small’ (Bailes et al., 2016:10). A realist lens 
allows insights into the position of small states in the international hierarchy. In essence, 
realism shows us that the international material structure is in-built in the notion of 
smallness, implying that one cannot evade asymmetry as a structural factor when analysing 
small states’ foreign policy actions. However, a growing body of research has disputed 
realist assumptions and findings. In terms of definition, Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) 
contends that defining small states in terms of power ‘tells us little about the behaviour of 
small states or the challenges that they face’ (p.653), or the different ways they might 
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exercise influence through other sources of power. For example, Long (2016) proposes that 
small states might specialise in exercising particular-intrinsic, derivative and/or collective 
form of power (p.2). 
In this vein, works on small states have challenged the realist premise that small 
states are weak actors dependent on will of great powers. Attention began shifting away from 
quantifiable objective criteria of definition because they obstruct examinations of, not only 
the challenges, but also the opportunities that small states can exploit to secure foreign policy 
autonomy and influence (Wivel, et al., 2014:7). Relatedly, Bailes et al. (2016) find that the 
concepts advanced by traditional alliance theory ‘do not capture well small state motivations 
and alliance conduct’ which cannot be boiled down to ‘one size fit all’ (p.12).  These 
critiques can be seen as responses to observed variations in the behaviour of small states 
which a realist focus on material capabilities and international structures does not capture 
and is ill-equipped to explain. Neorealism, in particular, struggles to account for differences 
in foreign policy behaviour among small states possessing similar material limitations and 
evolving under similar structural constraints. This observation concurs with a recent call to 
‘improve our understanding of how and why the conditions for small state strategy vary 
across the international system’ (Wivel, 2016:93). 
These limitations have not undermined the significance of realism. Small state 
scholars have sought to refine the traditional concepts of bandwagoning and balancing to 
examine small state behaviour under the new conditions brought by a post-bipolar system. 
This adaptation was founded on a definitional shift away from power possession, or the 
power small states do not possess, to concentrate instead on ‘the experience of power 
disparity and the manner of coping with it’ (Rickli, 2008; Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; 
Wivel, 2005). This new emphasis led numerous researchers to define small states in 
relational terms as ‘the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship, which is unable to 
change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; 
2012; Wivel et al., 2014:9; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). The effect of this shift was to place 
small states’ relationships with more powerful states at the heart of future analyses and to 
open up new avenues of research which this project seeks to exploit. Lobell et al. (2015) 
explore what hegemony means for the action scope of secondary and tertiary states, and how 
these states deal with a global and regional hegemon. The argument advances that a global 
hegemon’s level of engagement, the number of regional hegemons and hegemons’ level of 
influence determine the constraints and opportunities available to secondary and tertiary 
states, which in turn influence whether these middle and small states resist, accommodate 
and/or remain neutral vis-à-vis hegemons (Lobell et al. 2015:151-153). Small state 
researchers have developed this relational line of inquiry by contending that the concept of 
asymmetry is key to understanding the specific security and foreign policy dilemmas of 
small states (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Wivel, 2005; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Steinmetz 
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and Wivel, 2010). Considering asymmetry induces ‘analysts to ask, not how ‘scarce’ 
resources spur common behaviours, but how power differentials affect the ability to 
influence or resist influence’ (Long, 2017:149). By arguing that what matters is not size but 
relations between states, Long (2017) persuasively argues that ‘IR scholars should stop 
defining and redefining the concept of ‘small state’’, and turn their attention to how 
dynamics of power differential shape relationships, incentives and behaviour (p.146). 
A greater focus on asymmetrical relationships between small states and greater 
powers has been accompanied by an emphasis on small states’ geopolitical space. Wivel 
(2016) argues that ‘location’ and ‘distance’ are important for small states because their 
strategic options ‘are dependent upon how much action space they are allowed by other 
states, in particular the great powers in their close vicinity’ (p.92; Mouritzen and Wivel, 
2014). Bailes et al. (2014) and Rickly (2008; 2016) engage with the issue of small states’ 
alliance choices when confronted with shifting security environments including greater 
interdependence or diminished great power involvement. They offer a novel approach to 
traditional concepts by providing a framework illuminating the dilemma between autonomy 
and influence that small state face when considering joining an alliance (Bailes et al. 
2014:32; Rickly, 2016:134). By arguing that the resolution of this dilemma depends on ‘both 
the changing balance of power at the systemic level and the perceptions of it by national 
decision-makers’, Rickly (2016) effectively incorporates another level of analysis and a 
perceptual variable into a neorealist explanation, thereby making a valuable contribution 
towards linking structure and agency (p.135). In a different geopolitical context, Cheng-
Chwee (2008; 2016) discusses to what extent small Asian states display bandwagoning, 
balancing or hedging behaviour in response to China’s rising power. In attempts to further 
refine realist notions, several authors have investigated the extent to which small states can 
successfully balance against great powers using soft strategies (Cantir and Kennedy, 2015; 
Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). Bailes et al. (2016) are sceptical about the value of 
bandwagoning and balancing ‘to understand and appreciate the contingency of small state 
alliance behaviour’ (p.10). They seek to accommodate traditional alliance theory through the 
concept of shelter, whereby small states seek arrangements with an outside entity to dampen 
external vulnerabilities. Their argument is that the idea of shelter helps capture small states’ 
domestic incentives for aligning with larger entities and gives wider recognition to the role of 
regional and international organisations in providing small states with, not just military, but 
political economic and societal protection (Bailes et al., 2016:13-14). The adaptation of 
realism performed by these latter works is beneficial for this project because it offers the 
prospect of incorporating its precepts into frameworks which allow the study of what 
inequalities in capability mean for the agents involved in negotiating asymmetrical 
dynamics.  
What has become evident is that small states are increasingly operating in an 
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environment characterised by greater interdependence and institutionalisation of inter-state 
relations. Realist precepts have come under fire for overstating small states’ preoccupation 
with survival in the face of traditional military threats, overlooking international norms and 
rules as determinants of small states’ foreign policy responses to new security challenges 
(Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:20; Thorhallsson, 2012:141; Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2013). 
Thus, analysts have drawn on liberal IR theories to explore ‘how small states use institutions 
to enhance security and pursue their interests’ (Long, 2016:7). Based on Keohane and Nye’s 
argument (1977) that ‘international organisations are frequently congenial institutions for 
weak states’, a wide scholarly consensus has formed suggesting that small states favour 
international and regional institutions because rule-based environments alleviate the negative 
externalities of interdependence (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006), mitigate the power of large 
states (Wivel, 2005) and offers small states forums and tools for advancing their interests 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977). Through a liberal institutionalist approach, small states can, for 
the first time, be conceptualised as having agency in the international system since 
institutions give them a wider scope for manoeuvre and a platform from which to be heard 
(Browning, 2006:672; Long, 2016). This theoretical shift came hand-in-hand with a 
definitional development emphasising context as a necessary element to a more nuanced 
definition of small state. There was recognition that a small state may be weak in certain 
circumstances, such as negotiating a security arrangement with a great power, but that in 
other, more institutionalised contexts, small states can specialise in a particular policy-area, 
shape the agenda and gain leverage over larger members. A wide body of research has 
flowed from liberal institutionalism exploring to what extent and how institutional 
arrangements allow small states to ‘punch above their weights’ in international affairs 
(Thorhallsson, 2000; Panke, 2012). Thorhallsson and Bailes (2013) note that, by joining the 
UN, small states can be recognised as equal members of the international community and 
gain access to additional diplomatic resources (p.100). According to Ingebritsen (2004), 
small European states choose to relinquish national sovereignty in favour of participation in 
European institutions because they can sit at the decision-making table, have a bigger say in 
the development of the EU vis-à-vis US hegemony, and increase their leverage in 
influencing the agenda on global issues. Hey (2003) asserts that small EU member states 
have sought to bolster European institutions to safeguard their interests against both German- 
French rivalry and dominance. Interest in the capacity of small states to profit from 
institutionalised frameworks has also generated research on the strategies they employ to 
ensure influence inside institutions (Nasra, 2008; 2011; Grøn and Wivel, 2011).  
Thorhallsson (2012) critiques liberal institutionalism on that ground that it does not fully 
acknowledge the possibility of small states affecting outcomes in international institutions 
according to their interests as the focus remains on differences in capabilities (p.142). To 
overcome this pitfall, researchers should concentrate on the ‘qualitative means’ that small 
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states can develop, such as good image, administrative competence and favourable 
diplomatic multilateral arrangements. Panke (2012) finds that small states’ fewer 
administrative and financial resources, which are likely to inhibit their influence on 
international negotiation outcomes (p.316), can be compensated for through a range of 
‘capacity-building and shaping strategies’ (p.318). 
The main criticism that can be levied against a liberal institutionalist approach is that 
it tends to assume that international and regional institutions benefit small states and that 
their foreign policies will be conducted through institutional arrangements. Should we 
continue to assume that participation in institutions is unproblematic for small states because 
the benefits they draw from a level playing field outweighs the constraints they experience 
within them? This is not to say that the literature has omitted to highlight the disadvantages 
that small states face within institutions. Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2017) underline that 
small EU member states have to deal with ‘the uneven allocation of votes in the Council of 
the European Union, their limited number of seats in the European Parliament, and the 
smallness of both their public administration and foreign service as compared with the large 
states’ (p.12). Similarly, Wivel (2005) recognises that, although the EU continues to be ‘an 
attractive security organization for most small states’, political and institutional 
developments designed to transform the EU into an autonomous security actor have 
challenged the traditional security identity and interests of the region’s small states (p.395). 
Bailes and Thorallsson (2013) have also called for rethinking the institutionalist approach to 
accommodate ‘the modern spectrum of ‘softer’ security concerns, and the increased variety 
of international or regional organizations now addressing such issues - some of them with 
unprecedentedly transnational and integrative approaches’ (Thorhallsson and Bailes, 
2013:100-101). Yet, again, the assumption remains that new institutions dedicated to 
addressing soft security threats represent an ‘added value’ for small European states. 
Reflecting the wider critique articulated in this project, it becomes important to nuance the 
institutionalist take on small states’ foreign policies by focusing on the conditions under 
which small states integrate institutions and actively participate in their development. 
Because research has been absorbed by how institutions have empowered small states, and 
how small states have, in turn, sought to influence institutional norms and processes, there 
has been limited work on the effects of institutional rules, norms and institutions on the 
foreign policies of small states. As Thorhallsson (2012) notes, ‘the power of institutions, 
then, also lies in the structure, consisting of laws and treaties, which states create and by 
which they have to abide’. This project accepts the liberal institutionalist notion that 
institutions are effective platforms for small states to perform peacekeeping activities while 
recognising that small states have contributed to constructing the meanings, norms and rules 
underpinning them. Yet, drawing on liberal institutionalist approach, it also calls for 
considering institutions as part of the normative contexts in which small states’ peacekeeping 
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roles and endeavours operate.  
The constructivist turn in IR has had profound impacts on the way small states were 
defined and their foreign policy behaviour understood and explained. Attention to ideas 
norms, perceptions and identity enabled novel conceptions of small states to emerge not 
solely based on material considerations. In 1969, Keohane defined a small state as ‘a state 
whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant 
impact on the system’. He strengthened his perceptual definition by stating that ‘perception 
of systemic role, more than perception of need for external aid in security, seems to shape 
small powers’ distinctive attitudes towards international organizations’ (quoted in Neumann 
and Gstöhl, 2006:61). Social constructivism permitted to fully exploit Keohane’s perceptual 
element. A constructivist take on definition underlines the socially constructed meaning of 
smallness by looking at collective perceptions of vulnerability which have been historically 
interpreted and guide future behaviour. Crandall and Varov (2016) combine relational and 
perceptual definitions by positing a small state as ‘one that perceives it is the weak part in an 
asymmetric relationship’ (p.4). 
These definitions allowed social constructivism to challenge neorealist assumptions 
that small states are rational and unitary actors acting in accordance with the requirements of 
the international system (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017:16). Constructivists argue that 
what matters is not material factors of size, but identity (Browning, 2006), values 
(Lamoreaux, 2014) and status (Crandall and Varov, 2016; De Carvalho and Neumann, 
2014). Moving away from material considerations made it possible to argue that small states 
had ways to circumvent the influence of hard power and exercise international influence 
through ideational power (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:15). Chong (2010) shows how the 
Vatican and Singapore have used their political economy potential, models of good 
governance and diplomatic mediation to project soft power internationally. Browning (2006) 
uses a discursive approach to small state identity ‘leaving open the possibility that smallness 
can be told more positively than Keohane indicates’ (p.673). Thus, ‘more positive readings 
of smallness may create opportunities for action and innovation’ (Browning, 2006:674). 
Cooper and Shaw (2009) put forward that ‘what small states lack in structural clout they can 
make up through creative agency’ engaging in ‘resilient diplomacy’ (Cooper, 2009) and 
‘smart’ strategies (Prasad, 2009; Grøn and Wivel, 2011) to reshape global practises and 
maximise their influence. The application of social constructivist thought to our 
understanding of small states is not without limitations. A more comprehensive critique of it 
is developed in the next chapter as a basis for developing the theoretical framework of this 
research. Here, I turn to the argument which has drawn most heavily from constructivist 




2.3 The Norm Entrepreneur Argument 
 
This strand of the scholarship is directly influenced by, or seeks to continue, 
Ingebritsen’s influential argument of small states as “norm entrepreneur”. Her 2002 article 
contended that small states’ lack of material capabilities prompts them to seek and achieve 
international influence through the promotion of international norms. It was a landmark 
study because it emphasised that small states could exercise ‘independent influence’ using 
not economic or military capabilities but ideational means (Ingebritsen, 2002:11). She 
demonstrates that geographical remoteness, limited material capabilities and unique domestic 
institutions have given small Scandinavian states a particular identity oriented towards active 
internationalism, pragmatic economic development, and consistency. It became the basis on 
which small Nordic countries sought to influence what counts as appropriate behaviour in the 
fields of environmental policy, multilateral security and global welfare. Many have followed 
in Ingebritsen’s footsteps and dedicated their research to demonstrating that small states 
‘punch above their weights’ by advocating international norms in a wide range of policy-
areas (Björkdahl, 2007). Bower (2015) shows that ‘effort on the part of less materially 
powerful actors to use multilateral institutions’ has resulted in the construction and 
maintenance of new norms in the fields of security, human rights and environment despite 
great power non-involvement (p.348). Small states have been active in creating new 
understandings around environmental protection aimed at curbing climate change (Benwell, 
2011; Jaschik, 2014), in shaping what is seen as appropriate behaviour in military 
interventions and in promoting a civilian approach to the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) (Jakobsen, 2009). 
As presented in the introduction, a key objective of this project is to critically re- 
examine the “norm entrepreneur” argument as it pertains to small states’ participation in 
peacekeeping, by questioning some of the interconnected assumptions on which it rests. 
First, partly owing to the argument’s popularity, it has fostered the impression that all small 
states pursue normative and ethical foreign policy objectives at all times. In this way, it 
displays a tendency to take small states’ ability to punch above their weight for granted. 
There has been limited consideration and analysis of small states choosing not to promote 
international norms when presented with the opportunity or failing in their norm advocacy. 
One exception is Gebhard (2013) who points out that Sweden did not take up the opportunity 
to collaboratively promote the Northern Dimension framework within the EU, preferring 
instead to selectively pursue elements which aligned with its own national agenda (p.378). 
This omission is rooted in the second assumption that small states are likely to 
pursue normative foreign policy goals at the expense of national self-interests. The prevailing 
notion in the small state literature is that, because they ‘exhibit a low level of participation in 
world affairs’ and ‘address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues’ over a limited 
geographical area, small states do not pursue a wide range of foreign policy interests in the 
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same way as great powers do (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010:25). This has instilled the idea that 
their foreign policy behaviour is not driven by self-interest. Shortages in material resources 
means that small states are unable and unwilling to enter in competition for material power. 
Instead, they strive to gain influence by ‘doing the right thing’ and by acquiring a reputation 
as good international actor. Thus, by positing that size shapes states’ senses of responsibility 
towards international norms of appropriate behaviour, the norm entrepreneur scholarship 
reinforces the view that small states are “good” and large states “bad” international citizens 
(Browning, 2006:672). This view overlooks the possibility that their normative ambitions 
might come into conflict, not only with their own interests, but also with those of external 
actors. Also, the proposition that small states might defend their national interests more 
intensively than great powers has rarely been considered. Ingebristen (2002) argues that 
‘while some critics may view the role of norm entrepreneur as strategic action by a small 
state, this does not discount the effects of Scandinavia’s pursuit of different models of 
interaction, models that structure the choices available to states in international politics’ 
(p.13). However, research on small states as norm entrepreneurs needs to be more explicit 
that, ultimately, small states endeavour to strengthen international rules because it increases 
their chances of survival and influence (see Goetschel, 2013:261). 
Third, the self-interested nature of small states’ norm advocacy has not been 
thoroughly investigated because identity is identified as the main driver of small states’ norm 
promotion. Geopolitical and historical exposure to great power dominance, economic 
dependence, geographical remoteness, consensus-oriented policy-making have combined to 
create a particular small state identity deemed to motivate their promotion of international 
norms. For example, small states have presented themselves, and been regarded, as taking 
non-military approaches to security issues (Wivel, 2005). In essence, small states are thought 
to possess characteristics naturally predisposing them to become norm entrepreneurs defined 
by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as actors with ‘strong notions about appropriate or 
desirable behaviour in their community’ (p.896). Although this identity-based rationale shifts 
the analysis away from purely material considerations, it assumes a direct linkage between 
state features and identity construction on the one hand, and between a small state identity 
and norm entrepreneurship behaviour on the other hand. In this vein, a Swiss Political 
Science Review’s special issue edited by Goetschel (2013) asks to what extent Western 
European small states with their history of conflict and conflict resolution are ‘destined or 
“bound” to be peaceful’ (p.260). I concur with several contributions in this special issue that 
there is no automatism between features of small state size and norm promotion. It remains 
that more attention should be paid to processes through which norm entrepreneurship by 
small states have been influenced by domestic and external actors’ expectations regarding 




Fourth, the norm entrepreneur argument overlooks the extent to which small states’ 
norm advocacy is dependent on the international structure, materially and ideationally 
defined. Ingebritsen (2002) builds her analysis on the life-cycle of norms arguing that small 
states contribute to the norm emergence phase. Beyond this, no consideration is given to how 
norm entrepreneurship is also constrained by small states having to conform and adopt 
standards of appropriate behaviour. Additionally, Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2017) note 
that ‘for small states, it has never been as easy being small as it is in the current international 
system with its unprecedented degree of peace, economic openness, and institutionalization. 
Small states can and do influence world politics in an international system as permissive as 
the current one’. This claim underlines that the norm entrepreneur argument could more 
explicitly recognise that small states are only able to act as such thanks to a greater scope for 
action. Therefore, Ingebritsen’s expectations could be refined to better account for other 
functions that small states may be driven to fulfil as a result of shifting international 
conditions including crises or great power assertion. This latter development, for instance, 
brings asymmetry into the equation generating questions about whether small states could 
continue, and be successful at, promoting norms even if it goes against the interests and 
expectations of great powers. 
 
2.4        Moving Towards a New Framework 
 
The limitations identified in the norm entrepreneur argument reflect those involved 
in applying IR theories to understanding small state foreign policy behaviour. Many 
drawbacks arise from the inability of these theoretical frameworks to adequately address the 
structure-agency gap as a necessary step to offering a more complete, yet nuanced, picture of 
small states’ foreign policies. Constructivists have come the closest to effectively address the 
structure-agency gap based on Wendt’s “generative” approach (1987). It proposes that 
structures should be defined as ‘sets of internal relations’ generative of states’ identities 
which, in turn, provide them with the agency to affect international structures (Wendt, 
1987:344). However, the introduction of this project has already alluded that Wendt’s 
“generative” approach omits ‘the defining properties of agency, subjectivity and choice’ and, 
therefore, reinforces the small state scholarship’s unitary and state-level conception of 
agency. Long (2017) makes a broader, yet related, point suggesting that IR theories’ ‘search 
for common characteristics in terms of opportunities, limitations and behaviors have not 
produced sufficient consensus or cumulation’ (p.156). As a result, existing theoretical lenses 
have a tendency to impose a blanket upon the whole category of small states, ignoring 
important behavioural variations. While liberal institutionalist and constructivist agendas 
should be credited for ‘breaking the mould of small state vulnerability’ established by 
neorealism (Chong, 2010), they go too far the other way by exaggerating the ability of small 
states to shape the international system through multilateral channels in particular. 
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Importantly, small state agency-oriented research relies on an inadequate conception of 
agency as a collective actor as opposed to one that grants human decision-makers creativity 
in responding to structural imperatives (Hudson, 2005:4). Hudson (2005) brings up the FPA 
concept of ‘foreign policy substitutability’ which refers to the presence of variability ‘for 
any possible combination of material and structural conditions’ (p.4). She argues that ‘FPA’s 
agent-oriented and actor-specific theory is what is required in attempting to explain that 
variability’ (Hudson, 2005:4). The continuing use of agency as an unitary actor strengthens 
the black-boxing of small states and represents the key obstacle to linking structure and 
agency in the analysis of small states. As Carlsnaes (1992) reasons, ‘it is individuals who 
create social structures, and that these structures both constrain and enable the subsequent 
choices of the same individuals or those of future generations’ (p.256, original emphasis). 
Thus, what we need is ‘the current mainstream approach within foreign policy analysis’ 
which ‘retains the notion of “interpretative” individuals but takes the ontological step from 
collectivism to individualism’ (Carlsnaes, 1992:253, original emphasis). This critical point is 
introduced into the field of small states by Veenendaal (2014) who puts forward that ‘in 
order to be able to explain the international behavior of small states, scholarly analysis … 
should also focus on the incentives, motivations, and attitudes of the people who craft small 
state foreign policy’ because how domestic actors ‘confront’, ‘deal’ and interpret political 
and economic vulnerability ‘remains largely unclear’ (p.4). Positioning human decision-
makers as focal point is necessary to appreciate that ‘leaders have choices in the face of the 
limitations that size and dependence place upon policy options available to them’ (Breuning, 
2007:153). It allows us to better grapple with how small states foreign policy behaviour is 
the product of a ‘dynamic relationship’ between structuring agents, on the one hand, and 
constraining as well as empowering structures, on the other (Carlsnaes, 1992). It provides 
small state research with a new ‘ground’ to account for behavioural differences which cross-
regional comparisons have brought up by retaining and connecting the various strands of IR 
theories (Long, 2017:156; Hudson, 2005). 
The core of FPA lies in ‘explanations involving psychological factors, small and 
large group effects, culture and social discourse, and domestic politics’ (Hudson, 2007:143). 
With reference to small states, Breuning (2007) argues that ‘insight into decision-making 
process can help us untangle the motivations behind the foreign policy actions’ (p.153). 
However, agent-based and decision-making approaches have had limited impact on the study 
of small states owing to both small state and FPA subfields. Small state scholars have been 
primarily concerned with determining which level of analysis best accounts for small state 
behaviour. Long (2017) opines that the debate has produced few satisfactory results because 
‘on their own, levels do not tell much that seems unique about ‘small states’ as a category, 
nor have they led to much theory building’ (p.150). It can even be argued that the debate 
continues to be dominated by a strong consensus that systemic factors are most influential in 
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explaining small state foreign policy. A high level of external threat forces small states to 
pay more attention to external developments and constraints than to domestic preoccupations 
(Elman, 1995). Even when domestic variables have been considered, it has not resulted in 
comprehensive investigations of decision-making because analysts have operated under the 
assumption that domestic politics in small states are dominated by consensus. Katzenstein 
(1985) showed that small states have domestic arrangements characterised by consensual 
politics which enhances their capacity to respond effectively to external pressures. The 
argument is straightforward proposing that ‘an open economy and a position of international 
marginality generate a common outlook shared across the main political divisions in 
domestic politics’ (Katzenstein, 1985:35-36). External threats and vulnerability prompts 
policy-makers to agree on foreign policy issues since divisions would endanger the survival 
of the state. Analyses of this strand overlook disagreements amongst domestic actors due to 
the significance that they still attach to the constraining effect of the material structure. 
Assuming consensus allows holding domestic politics constant to generalise about what 
small states do externally, thus improving little upon previous neorealist models. Others have 
delved deeper into the effects of small public administrations, foreign services and limited 
policy-making expertise on small states’ chances to gain influence in international 
organisations (Panke, 2012; Thorhallsson, 2017; Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017). These 
studies contend that small states have developed strategies to overcome domestic structural 
weaknesses, but leave agents’ creativity, and how it manifests itself politically in-between 
international and domestic processes of interaction, largely unexplored. 
The FPA subfield first addressed small state size through research on the effects of 
national attributes such as natural resources, geography, population characteristics and size 
on foreign policy direction (East, 1973, 1978; East and Hermann, 1974). This scholarship 
prioritised large N-studies drawing broad generalisations about states’ level of foreign policy 
activity and likelihood of going to war based on their size. However, by relying on 
characteristics associated with traditional sources of power, this scholarship tends to reify 
small state weakness (Hudson, 2007:144). Statistical correlations between state size and 
foreign policy behaviour variables were ‘unable to uncover any lawlike generalizations’ 
(Hudson, 2005:13). Nor did national attribute research investigated the impact of small state 
size on decision-making, despite alluding to the hypothesis that a small bureaucracy, in 
particular, is likely to affect decision-making processes. Challenging previous research 
suggesting that a small bureaucracy is a disadvantage due to the limited amount of 
information it can gather and process, Hey (2002) argues that it can have a positive effect on 
policy-making because the ‘small community effect’ enables close relationships to be 
developed amongst personnel, consequently improving communication (p.221). Elman 
(1995) argues that domestic institutional choices rather than international determinants 
should be investigated to account for small state foreign policy. More recently, Doeser 
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(2011) finds that shifts in both party and public opposition contributed to a change in the 
Danish ‘footnote policy’, demonstrating that small states’ foreign policies can be influenced 
by domestic political factors. Doeser (2017) complements his previous research by 
introducing the ideational variable of strategic culture and analysing its interaction with 
domestic political calculations in influencing small states’ decisions to participate military 
interventions. Crandall and Varov (2016) draws on a psychological approach to gain insight 
into how the collective perception of status helps small states define themselves and drives 
their foreign policies. Unfortunately, by adhering to ‘state based actor-general theory with 
psychological frameworks’, this research falls short of looking at how psychological factors 
plays out into decision-making of small states (p.5). Perhaps, a more promising avenue is 
pursued by Gvalia et al. (2013) who claim that elite ideas, identities and preferences are key 
to explaining continuity and change in the foreign policies of post-Soviet small states in 
transition (p.131). The focus on elites draws our attention to the role of individuals in 
shaping the decision-making and content of small states’ foreign policies. Hey (2002) shows 
that the small foreign policy bureaucracy of Luxemburg allows a Prime Minister with 
initiative, expertise and an orientation towards foreign policy issues, such as Jean-Claude 
Juncker, to exercise ‘a great deal of influence over the foreign policy process’ (p.222; 
2003:10). Bringing perceptions into the mix, Mellander and Mouritzen (2016) explain 
Swedish and Danish assertiveness towards Russia by looking at personal ‘lessons of the past’ 
of key individual decision-makers. Overall, these works have made positive contributions to 
small state research by opening up the black-box of small states and moving beyond 
structural domestic limitations. They seriously consider decision-making factors while 
incorporating ideational and perceptual elements. This body of research ‘reminds us that the 
leaders of small and dependent states, like those of any other type of states face dual 
pressures: the international environment is one source of constraints – and sometimes 
opportunities – but the imperatives of the domestic environment cannot be ignored’ 
(Breuning, 2007:153). Nonetheless, systematic efforts to link different levels of analysis 
remains limited; a shortcoming which can only be overcome through a theoretical framework 
incorporating both structure and agency. 
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2.5       Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the main theoretical approaches used to interpret the 
foreign policy actions of small states. It has identified that (neo-)realism, liberal 
institutionalism, social constructivism or FPA approaches have, on their own, not fully 
addressed how the international behaviours of small states result from interactions between 
structural constraints, materially and ideationally defined, and policy-makers making choices 
under international and domestic imperatives. Therefore, the chapter has argued that as long 
as the structural and agential dimensions of small states’ foreign policies are considered in 
isolation, the study of small states will continue to stagnate. Developing a theoretical 
framework that enables researchers to capture the interplays between structure and agency is 
vital for understanding when and how small states become norm entrepreneurs or perform 
other international roles. The FPA sub-field provides an adequate starting point for such 
framework because it ‘has consistently shown the significance of domestic politics and 
decision making to issues central to international politics’ while incorporating ‘agent–other 
interactions and agent–structure relations’ (Kaarbo, 2015:195-200). In fact, this review has 
shown that there is no reason to assume that either international structural constraints or 
agency exercised at domestic level predominantly influence the actions of small states. 
Moreover, an FPA approach meets the requirement identified in the introduction for a focus 
on both decision-making and context in order to better understand states’ response to the 
doctrinal shifts in peacekeeping. The following chapter goes a step further by using the 
notion of roles to fill the gap between structure and agency in the study of small states. 
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CHAPTER THREE A ROLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 




This chapter argues that a theoretical framework grounded in role theory is well 
suited to studying small states’ foreign policy behaviours and peacekeeping patterns for two 
reasons. First, role theory allows drawing on important constructivist insights while moving 
beyond a focus on identity. In this way, it offers the prospect of refining the norm 
entrepreneur argument. Second, role theory is believed to provide the theoretical bridge 
necessary to link structure and agency. This bridging function can help the study of small 
states overcome its current impasse by painting a more complete picture of the conditions 
under which small states act in international relations. In turn, these two arguments form the 
foundation on which a theoretical model, taking Thies’s (2012; 2013; 2015) concept of role 
socialisation as starting point, will be developed to guide the analysis of the decisions taken 
by small states’ governments towards peacekeeping deployments. The model also 
incorporates other analytical tools provided by role theory to investigate how the process of 
socialisation is domestically negotiated (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016a; Brummer and Thies, 
2015). Through this, we will be able to assess the domestic politics behind small states’ 
contributions to peacekeeping operations. 
Role theory originates from social psychology where it has been approached from 
both a structural and a symbolic interactionist angle (Harnisch, 2011). Its central claim is that 
states and their leaders conceive their states as having particular functions in the international 
system. These conceptions, or roles, generate certain behavioural expectations which guide 
foreign policy actions (Harnisch 2011; Holsti 1970; Walker 1987). Holsti’s work (1970) 
advanced our understanding of IR by positing that roles, traditionally used to study the 
behaviours of individuals, could be applied to states. Thereafter, role theorists developed a 
wide range of concepts including role conception, role enactment (behaviour), role 
expectation, role demand, role location, role set and role conflict. Combined, these concepts 
provide researchers with a rich analytical toolbox to explore issues pertaining to 
policymakers’ own perceptions of their states’ role(s), the origins of roles, how interactions 
between agents and structures shape roles, role conflicts and how role conceptions inform 
foreign policy actions (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:3). 
In constructing this project, two elements emerged as early indicators that a role 
theory framework was highly appropriate to understand small states’ foreign policies. First, 
like other IR sub-fields, small state research often refers to, and uses the language of, roles 
without exploiting role theory’s ‘rich array of concepts’ to analyse their foreign policy 
behaviours (see Thies, 2017:664). Already in 1969, Keohane asserted that ‘perception of 
[one’s] systemic role, more than perception of need for external aid in security, seems to 
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shape small powers’ distinctive attitudes towards international organizations’ (p.297). 
Following Keohane’s lead, small state researchers have long understood that ideational 
considerations such as identity, status, norms and/or strategic culture were important to small 
states’ leaders when developing foreign policy. However, one thing that a review of the 
literature has shown is that focusing exclusively on ideational or material concerns will only 
lead to a partial understanding of their international positions and actions. Neither can be 
prioritised at the expense of the other. This leads us onto role theory’s second advantage in 
that both ideational and material factors contribute to state leaders’ conceptions of their 
international roles. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) capture this point well at multiple levels of 
analysis by pointing out that ‘roles also combine ideational and material factors to get to the 
bottom of how leaders’ conceptions of their country’s place in the world interact with both 
ideational and material constraints from outside of its borders’ (p.4). Therefore, a role theory 
framework can provide insights complementing IR theories into the effects of state size on 
foreign policy behaviour by considering how decision-makers in small states understand the 
implications of having fewer material capabilities through the conception of roles for their 
states. As Breuning (2007) notes, ‘classifications of states into small, middle and great 
powers are often as much about the roles states play in international politics as about 
objective power differences’ (p.159). 
 
3.2 Moving Beyond a Constructivist Understanding of Small States’ Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
If, in 2003, Kaarbo noted that ‘the study of foreign policy has taken an ideational 
turn … consistent with much of the constructivist perspective’, those interested in the foreign 
policy choices of small states have not missed the turn (p.159). These scholars assumed that 
small states’ lack of material capabilities made it logical to pivot towards ideas and other 
non-material factors as likely sources of their foreign policies. The focus shifted towards 
how perceptions of vulnerability translated into ideas about the nation, and on how these 
ideas were constructed and articulated in the domestic political discourses of small states 
with consequences for their external behaviours (Gstöhl, 2002:21). As argued by Goetschel 
(2013) ‘for small states, ideas are both constitutive of their national identity (as for other 
states too) and a crucial foreign policy instrument to achieve their foreign policy objectives’ 
(p.262). Thus, the issue of state identity was increasingly recognised as a significant factor 
influencing many of small states’ foreign policy priorities and strategies. It permitted 
researchers to challenge the neorealist assumptions that small states are rational and unitary 
actors exclusively acting in accordance with the requirements of the international system. 
Instead, it was argued that small state size is not a natural condition, but one that is socially 
constructed and historically interpreted through collective perceptions of vulnerability 
(Wendt, 1999). This constructivist perspective explores how ‘smallness’ is given meaning(s) 
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to form a national identity informing and guiding the state’s interests on the international 
scene (Lee, 2006:23). A small state identity can be defined as ‘a product of past behaviour 
and images and myths linked to it which have been internalised over long periods of time by 
the political elite and population of a state’ (Goetschel, 1998:28). 
Nonetheless, small state research has relied excessively on the concept of identity 
with the effect of obfuscating the variety of ways in which small states perceive themselves 
in the international system. Browning (2006) had hypothesised that “smallness’ can be 
constructed differently in different identity narratives, with different narratives in turn 
entailing different implications for state action’ (p.669). However, it now appears that all 
(Western European) small states cultivate a similar identity, displaying commitments to ‘a 
multilateral and non-military approach to security policy based on ideals of conflict 
resolution, peaceful coexistence and a just world order’ (Wivel, 2005:395). This identity has 
been the basis for their high levels of peacekeeping contribution. This uniformity is partly 
due to scholars identifying the sources small states’ distinct identity in their geopolitical 
position, either on the periphery or at the heart of big power politics, limited material 
capabilities (Ingebritsen, 2002) and social democratic institutions (Katzenstein, 1985). 
Unfortunately, these findings improve little upon previous realist perspectives as small state 
identity appears to flow directly from inherent and material conditions of international 
weakness. This establishes a close link between small states’ international weakness, the 
construction of a particular identity and their behaviour as entrepreneurs of peaceful and 
environmental norms (Ingebritsen, 2002). Campbell and Hall’s (2009) argument reflects this 
flaw by suggesting that the strength of national identity in small states is dependent upon the 
degree to which the state is perceived as vulnerable. Can we continue to assume that small 
states’ intrinsic characteristics generate an identity as ‘good international citizen’ and, 
therefore, that all small states have a ‘natural’ predisposition motivating them to relinquish 
national interests in favour of acting impartially and peacefully towards international 
conflicts? This is not to deny the influence of identity as a factor on the foreign policy of 
small states nor that small states represent the weaker side in asymmetrical relationships. 
Instead, the contention is that some constructivists have failed to recognise the presence of 
intervening variables contributing to an identity being interpreted in varying ways. There is a 
need to consider the multiple roles that small states may play in the international system. 
Banchoff (1999) refers to this when contending that identity-based accounts lack the 
analytical tools to investigate and specify the content of state identity. Part of the problem is 
also identified by Kaarbo (2003) who suggests that ‘although many who use the concept of 
identity try to avoid the individual or psychological level of analysis, identity remains a 
fundamentally psychological concept in that it concerns the ways in which people (or states) 
view themselves’ (p.160, original emphasis). This omission obstructs analysts from exploring 
how, and for what purpose, policy-makers domestically activate some features of national 
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identity at the expense of others, and how these choices inform foreign policy decisions. In 
this way, identity-based explanations have reinforced the black-boxing of small states. 
Research on the norm entrepreneurship of small states has been criticised for omitting agents 
acting in their domestic political environment. Petrova’s research (2007) is particularly 
significant because ‘it highlights the important role key individuals play in defining new 
norms, making use of state identity discourses and thus solidifying or reshaping certain 
perceptions of the roles states could and should play internationally’ (p.3). 
There is much overlap between constructivism and a perspective grounded in role 
conceptions. The two approaches ‘share in common the wish to move our understanding of 
foreign policy decision-making beyond the observable material characteristics of states – 
such as size, military capabilities, or economic performance’ (Breuning, 2011:20). Roles are 
fundamentally relational and social (Harnish, 2011:8) since individuals and states acquire 
notions of what is expected of them through interactions (McCourt, 2011:150; Biddle, 
1986:69). This is a key reason why the role approach is particularly suitable to the actions of 
small states as it allows insight into the social dimension of being a small state. This 
contention rests on the notion that ‘without the experience of social interaction, physical 
attributes have no meaning’ (Chafetz et al. 1996:736). This point exemplifies what FPA role 
theorists have identified as ‘a natural connection … between state identity and previous 
research on role theory’ (Kaarbo, 2003:160). However, roles have often been overlooked by 
scholars interested in demonstrating the impact of ideational factors on small states’ foreign 
policies. In order to better conceptualise the relationship between the two approaches, one 
has to look at the ‘theoretical nexus’ between the concepts of role and identity (Harnisch, 
2011:9; Nabers, 2011:82). Although some researchers do not differentiate between the two 
and use both interchangeably, others argue that a distinction should be drawn pointing to 
their distinct conceptual properties (Chafetz et al. 1996; Wehner and Thies, 2014:418). The 
argument has been made that an identity represents ‘something more intrinsic about an actor 
than a role conception’ (Breuning, 2011:21). While roles emerge through an interactive 
process with an external Other, the constitution of identity does not necessarily involve 
interactions with outside actors (Wehner and Thies, 2014:418). When constructivists refer to 
the Other, it is always ‘from the vantage point of the Self as a means of legitimizing and 
validating the identity of the self toward the Other’ allowing the claim that the Other lacks 
agency (Wehner and Thies, 2014:419). Thus, a constructivist account of identity relies too 
much on the Self (ego) at the expense of investigating how the Self is actively casted into 
specific roles by the expectations held by Others (alter). 
Importantly, McCourt (2011) argues that identity is not necessarily an action- 
orientated concept (p.1605). This creates difficulty in drawing a direct connexion between 
state identity and action. McCourt (2011) further contends that agency must be introduced 
because it is through the conception and adoption of roles by actors that identity is affirmed 
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and actions made socially meaningful (p.1608). The affirmation of identity can only occur 
through social roles leading to the conclusion that roles, especially in the context of small 
states behaviour, act ‘as methodological tools to capture the links between national identity 
and foreign policy formulation’ (Goetschel, 2013:263). An identity presents actors with a 
variety of possible roles but gives no specific information as to which one(s) should be 
played. Agency is exercised when actors interpret the national identity in which they are 
embedded, thereby undertaking a selection process ‘to select which of many roles they will 
attempt to enact in a given situation’ (Wehner and Thies, 2014:419). 
This argument is in line with Holsti’s (1970) notion that policy-makers express 
multiple roles when conducting foreign policy (see also Breuning, 2017, Cantir and Kaarbo, 
2016 and Aggestam, 2006). States do not adopt a single role guiding their behaviour in all 
situations, issue-areas or sets of relationships in contrast to what was generally believed 
(Holsti, 1970:254). The main reason why a state can play a range of different roles at any one 
time is that roles have numerous sources. They can emerge from states’ material features 
such as size (Breuning, 2011) and economic performance (Alden and Schoeman 2013), but 
also through interactions with external actors (Thies, 2013). Additionally, roles originate 
from a state’s history, culture and identity (Aggestam, 2006; Krotz, 2015), as well as from 
domestic political dynamics (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). Thus, states play numerous roles 
because they are embedded in different institutional contexts simultaneously, at both 
domestic and international levels (Aggestam, 2006 and Barnett, 1993). This multiplicity 
indicates that roles ‘are not exclusively generated by the international distribution of power’, 
strengthening the possibility that small states’ lack of power is not the only source of self- 
identification in the international system. (Aggestam, 1999). In other words, although the 
size of small states may not allow them to play any role they like, their foreign policy- 
makers are still confronted with a choice over which roles are to be pursued. While 
introducing much needed diversity in the study of small states, a discussion around the 
multiplicity of roles adopted by states underlines the potential of role theory to expose, if not 





3.3 Linking Structure and Agency in the Analysis of Small States: The Promise of Role 
Theory 
The main weakness plaguing small state research today lies in the lack of dialogue 
between work on the influence of structural factors, on the one hand, and agential 
determinants, on the other, when accounting for small states’ foreign policy choices. The 
literature review has cited a number of works which have attempted to go beyond this “either 
or” approach. Yet, we still lack a framework that explicitly connects international structures 
and domestic agencies. As a result, we have little insight into how small states’ foreign 
policies are the products of dynamic relationships between structures and agencies. Role 
theorists agree that ‘role theory … provides the tools that permit systematic empirical 
investigation of the relative importance of agent and structure as determinants of foreign 
policy behaviour’ (Breuning, 2011:16). When confronted with a foreign policy problem, 
agents will rely on roles for guidance. These roles are informed by both the material 
environment and the rules provided by political institutions and identities (Aggestam, 
2006:14). They also are the products of agents’ own ‘judgement and skill’ (Hollis and Smith, 
1990:168). Thus, role theory actively bridges the gap between actor-centric and structural 
approaches by incorporating ‘the manner in which foreign policy is both purposeful and 
shaped by institutions context’ (Aggestam, 2006:14). It becomes an indispensable feature to 
provide small state research with a much needed ‘synthetic framework of 
analysis…consisting of an intentional, a dispositional and a structural dimension of 
explanation’ (Carlsnaes, 2007:17; original emphasis). By emphasising ‘the structure of the 
international and domestic systems, how states and individuals perceive their role(s) within 
those systems, as well as how the structure affects those perceptions’, role theory effectively 
exposes ‘the reinforcing nature of agent-structure relationship’ (Below, 2016:27). Through 
this, the conditions under which small states do exercise disproportionate influence can be 
uncovered while taking into account the constraints imposed by social and material 
structures upon their foreign policy scope. Role theory is implemented in the following 
analyses by exploring how roles are constructed via an interactive process whereby political 
actors in small states interpret intensifying and novel behavioural expectations emanating 
from a peacekeeping context in transition while remaining free to formulate their own vision 
of the role(s) their state should play in international peacekeeping.  
Role theory has traditionally been approached from a structural angle stressing the 
limitations imposed on policy-makers’ choices of roles by the international system (Walker, 
1979; 1981). A prevailing notion is that states’ social position in the international system is 
contingent upon their material capabilities whether militarily or economically defined 
(Wehner and Thies, 2014:414; McCourt, 2012). Put plainly, Thies (2012) asserts that 
‘virtually any role is open to a state that has the capabilities to enact that role’ (p.29). From 
this perspective, it is easy to see how role theory has been closely connected with research on 
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national attributes (Wish, 1987) and state size in particular (Adigbuo, 2007; Chafetz et al. 
1996). In this way, the size of states has significant consequences for the roles they play in 
international politics (Breuning, 2011:18; 2017). Importantly, the structural approach has 
evolved along an interactionist line placing the interactions between a role-seeking state 
(ego) and other international actors (alter) at the heart of the process through which ego 
conceives roles for itself. Harnisch (2012) effectively presents this symbolic interactionist 
view by underlining that ‘the social structure is thick (enough) in world politics for inter- or 
transnational role expectations to grow’ (p.52). The effects of structures work through the 
expectations that other actors (alters) have regarding the role(s) that a role-seeking state 
should occupy. Whether these role expectations emerge from the distribution of capabilities 
in the system or from institutions, they establish limits on the range of roles that policy- 
makers perceive as acceptable (Aggestam, 2006:18) 
The usefulness of an interactionist approach also rests on its ability to bridge agent 
and structure as external role pressures, generated by ego-alter interactions, prompt agents 
from role-seeking states to innovate regarding the role(s) they envision their states playing in 
the system (Aggestam, 2006). Moreover, structural approaches cannot account for the wide 
variety of roles that states play in the international system (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:4; 
Breuning, 2017). Agency is exercised through role conception defined as ‘the normative 
expectations that the role-beholder expresses towards itself, i.e. the ego part’s own 
definition’ (Aggestam, 2006:19). Foreign policy decision-makers matter in this process. 
States and their agents are seen as being ‘actively involved in categorizing and classifying 
themselves’ rather than as objects passively adopting roles imposed upon them by other 
actors (Aggestam, 1999; Barnett, 1999:276). Thus, role analyses can foster more 
comprehensive understandings of small states’ behaviours by introducing the notion of 
agency. However, agency-based approaches risk overlooking ‘structural factors which, one 
can assume with regard to small states, are particularly constraining in terms of available 
policy choices’ (Carleanes, 2007:16). This is where role theory is most valuable for small 
state research as it considers the ability of policy-makers ‘to create, modify, and violate 
expectations that emerge from and within relations with others and from the limitations of 
structures’ (Wehner and Thies, 2014:414). In combination with FPA, role theory shows that 
foreign policy is conducted by ‘situated actors’ who are embedded in various institutional 
structures that generate expectations of certain role behaviour’ while remaining ‘reflexive 
vis-à-vis these institutional rules of action’ (Aggestam, 2006:25). Foreign policy-makers in 
small states should be seen as having the capacity to act creatively within the constraints of a 
given situation (Wehner and Thies, 2014:414; McCourt, 2012:378). Also, in the FPA 
tradition, role analysts made significant inroads into ‘more complex understandings of 
agency’ by examining how roles are internally debated within states and affect decision- 
making (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016; Brummer and Thies, 2015). Role theorists are 
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continuously developing new and sophisticated ways to link structure and agency through 
frameworks incorporating institutional, interactional and intentional perspectives (Aggestam 
2006), role socialisation (Thies, 2012; 2013), role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016) 
and role learning (Harnisch, 2012). Yet, many role theorists pursue research on either the 
international/structure or domestic/agency side of role theory, with little engagement 
between the two. Thus, the two branches of role theory appear to be evolving in interesting 
and valuable directions but in isolation. The following model builds on this body of original 
research to make a novel contribution towards strengthening role theory’s analytical 
capability to bridge structure and agency and help the analysis of small states’ peacekeeping 
decisions. 
 
3.4 A Socialisation Model for Studying Small States’ Roles in Peacekeeping 
 
3.4.1 The Roles of Small States as Responses to Outside Pressures 
 
Having demonstrated that role theory could help us better explain the foreign policy 
actions of small states by improving identity-based accounts and bridging structure and 
agency, our attention now turns to devising a model that fulfils these promises and 
effectively guides the analysis of peacekeeping deployments initiated by small states’ 
governments. For this purpose, this project focuses on the way roles emerge through an 
interactive process between ego (a small state) and alter (other), where the former selects an 
appropriate role for itself partly in response to the expectations, cues and demands of the 
latter (Aggestam 2006; Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2012; Wehner and Thies 2014; Beneš and 
Harnisch 2015; Beasley and Kaarbo, 2017). I draw directly from Thies (2012; 2013; 2015) 
who developed a role approach to socialisation labelled role location; a process ‘where role 
expectations of the self and other, role demands of the situation, and cues from the audience 
all come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its appropriate 
enactment’ (Thies, 2013:35). Here, socialisation is conceived as ‘a role bargaining process’ 
involving both ego choosing a role based on its status and material capabilities and an 
assessment of that choice by relevant alters expressing role expectations (Thies, 2013:35). 
This conception of socialisation is used to show how members of an international system 
emerge and transition from one status to another only after being socialised into certain roles 
(Thies, 2013:43). A theoretical zoom on role socialisation allows making the general 
hypothesis that the adaptation of small states to new forms of peacekeeping will be 
accompanied by socialising efforts led by a range of external actors with a stake in the 
modern peacekeeping system, thereby expressing views about appropriate peacekeeping 
behaviour. As it will become clear, this model does not give precedence to role socialisation 
at the expense of other role dynamics, especially those steered by state agents within their 
own domestic context. But why does role socialisation form the starting point of the model? 
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First, role socialisation as developed by Thies (2012; 2013) affords the structure a 
significant degree of influence in determining any state’s role(s). The structure is the initial 
determinant, or ‘ultimate arbiter’, of the roles that states can and cannot play in the 
international system (Thies, 2013:37). Thies (2013) exemplifies its effect on states’ role 
choice by noting that ‘a state with few capabilities could choose to enact the role of a great 
power but would be punished by other states acting on structural imperatives’ (p.37). The 
possession of relatively inferior capabilities by small states establishes a context which 
conditions, but by no means determines, their positions in the international system and 
interactions with other states. There is no way around it: any model failing to acknowledge 
this structural reality will result in a skewed appreciation of the ways they act in international 
relations. 
Second, role socialisation suggests that ‘structures do not exercise direct effects, or 
act as agents do, but rather affect behavior indirectly through socialisation and competition’ 
(Thies, 2013:36). An audience of states ensures that ego does not deviate from ‘the expected 
norms and roles for interaction in the system’ (Thies, 2013:37). To successfully emerge and 
operate within a system, ego is required to select roles in line with the ‘social reality’ 
sustained by an audience of states and the role expectations emanating from relevant 
socialisers. This claim makes an important contribution because it improves upon the 
neorealist assumption that small states respond principally to a structure defined materially. 
Furthermore, the norm entrepreneur argument assumes that small states have the capacity to 
alter the normative structure without paying attention to how this structure constrains their 
identity construction and normative behaviour in the first place. Therefore, role socialisation 
usefully emphasises the complementing influence of an ‘intersubjective international 
structure’ on the roles small states come to play (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012). 
Third, a role approach to socialisation sheds light onto the social nature of the 
interactions taking place in the context of small states’ asymmetrical relationships with more 
powerful actors. When socialisation occurs, a role relationship is established between a 
‘member’ and a ‘novice’ characterised by ‘relative differences in power, status, and prestige’ 
(Thies, 2012:28). Because a member is well established into its roles and has the capabilities 
to enact a large number of them, it holds a ‘great’ or ‘regional power’ status and exercises 
socialising influence upon the ‘novices’ and ‘small members’ present in its sphere of 
influence (Thies, 2012:28). In contrast, ‘novices are new states that emerge in the system’ 
while ‘small member states’ represent a higher status typified by ‘a larger number of roles, 
and more well-developed roles than emerging states’ (Thies, 2013:43). It should be noted 
that small states will always remain either ‘novices’ or ‘small members’ because of their 
inability to acquire the capabilities to transition to a ‘major member’ status. Thies (2012) 
underlines that ‘the asymmetry between the member’s and novice’s views of reality is 
important because the member largely structures the reality within which the novice must 
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operate’ (p.28). As established members of the system, great powers have the responsibility 
of socialising ‘novices’ and ‘small members’ because these small states are unfamiliar with 
the ‘rules of the game’ and the roles they are supposed to perform in the system (Thies, 
2015:288). Therefore, the expectation generated by a role socialisation perspective is that 
small states will find themselves under ‘high’ to ‘medium socialisation pressure’ leading to 
their roles being ‘mostly ascribed’ (Thies, 2015:289). 
In these ways, role socialisation allows a more complete analysis of how outside 
pressures come to shape the self-perceptions of small states, an area overlooked by both 
neorealist and identity-based explanations. We know how small states are keen to portray 
themselves as, and take on the role of, norm entrepreneur (Ingebritsen, 2002), but there has 
been limited examination of the ways outside actors have perceived such role and evaluated 
small states’ normative ambitions. It is not enough for small states to see themselves as 
international normative agents, they also need to be recognised as such by members of the 
international community to have any normative impact and legitimacy. This line of 
argumentation suggests that for small states to be successful norm entrepreneurs, they first 
need to be norm takers. A consideration of how small states are socialised into international 
roles moves away from ‘nature’ as the source of small states’ activism towards issues of 
international peace including peacekeeping. Instead, role socialisation demonstrates that 
small states are also ‘nurtured’ to act as entrepreneurs of peaceful norms or to perform other 
roles. 
These propositions lead to a more refined understanding of the effects of material 
capabilities on small states’ foreign policy behaviour. In an article dedicated to the rising 
power of China, Thies (2015) shows that an increase in material capabilities is accompanied 
by efforts from the United States to socialise China into specific roles supportive of the 
system advocated by Washington. Thus, Beijing does not acquire its rising power status 
independently of social (sometimes conflictual) interactions with the dominant power. 
Similarly, inferior material resources mean nothing outside ‘the mechanisms of socialisation’ 
which condition small states (Thies, 2015:287). Small states’ identities, positions in the 
international system, and foreign policy trajectories, do not flow directly from the possession 
of limited material resources. It is mediated by patterns of interaction characterised by 
negotiations with more powerful socialising states to determine appropriate roles and 
accepted behaviour. IR theories tell us that a lack of material capabilities drive small states to 
promote international norms, join alliances and/or stay neutral. Yet, small states do not 
develop nor pursue these strategies independently of relations with other actors or preceding 





At this stage, an additional building block needs to be added to the model by 
clarifying the conception(s) of socialisation used. Thies’s conceptualisation is developed on a 
critique of the constructivist view of socialisation ‘as a process of inducting actors into 
norms and rules of a given community’, in other words, as norm internalisation (Checkel, 
2005:804). The reasons are that scholars interested in internalisation fail to distinguish 
whether socialisation is a process or an outcome or both. Nor do they consider that 
socialisation might include more than norms and that states might adapt their behaviour to 
meet others’ expectations, but not internalise norms (Thies, 2003). Beasley and Kaarbo 
(2017) agree with Thies that norm internalisation is ‘problematic’ because ‘it presents too 
limited a vision: first, with regard to the potential for socialisation to fail; and, second, with 
regard to the neglect of non-normative aspects’ (p.3). Thies (2003) acknowledges that the 
content of socialisation ‘could include norms, but might also include roles, beliefs, 
principles, or rules’ (Thies, 2003:545). In line with this inclusive definition, I argue that 
norm internalisation is an essential component of role socialisation because explicit role 
expectations and demands from alters cannot be made outside of a broader normative 
context. Norms and role expectations are two sides of the same coin. Socialisers rely on 
common understandings of appropriate behaviour to demand certain roles and socialisees 
adopt their roles by both meeting alters’ demands and internalising the norms supporting the 
demands. An example should illustrate this point. According to a role socialisation approach, 
‘the role of professor is meaningless without another actor in the role of student’ (Thies, 
2003). While this is accurate, it sidesteps the norm(s) that make these roles possible in the 
first place. It should be added that these roles are meaningless without their normative 
framework of which the norm of attending classes is most important. A professor is unlikely 
to be appointed in that position if he or she refuses to teach a class. Nor can he or she expect 
students to fulfil their role by attending this non-existent class. For their part, students are 
likely to be expelled, and cast out of their student role, if they fail to show up to class. 
Norm internalisation should be incorporated as a mechanism of socialisation into a 
role approach for two more reasons specific to this project. First, attention to both norms and 
roles offers a comprehensive view of the socialising influences of institutions. Constructivist 
research argues that international institutions socialise states by persuading policy-makers to 
accept and abide by international normative standards (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). 
Barnett (1993) builds on this argument from a role perspective by advancing that ‘it is in the 
process of interacting and participating within an institutional context that the actor comes to 
occupy a role’ (p.275). Role theorists have increasingly recognised that international and 
regional institutions can act as alters expecting adherent and prospective states to adopt 
certain role behaviours. Those seeking entry into an institution will be pressed to adopt 
certain roles as a rite of passage to become part of the community. Yet, while there is nothing 
to suggest that norms have disappeared from this process, role theorists have not sufficiently 
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looked at the relationship between norms and roles in the socialisation of states by 
institutions. Folz (2011) is perhaps an exception contending that states change roles as their 
policy-makers decide to comply with the community norms, thereby internalising new 
practices and rules. This internalisation prompts actors to re-conceptualise their identities 
(Folz, 2011:149). Considering that small states prefer to operate within institutions, 
overlooking the different ways the formers are socialised into the latters would be a serious 
omission. Second, the peacekeeping policy-area under scrutiny requires a dual consideration 
of norm internalisation and role adoption. Indeed, Björkdahl (2006) contends that 
‘peacekeeping operations are not undertaken in a normative vacuum’ (p.215), but in a  
context defined by prevailing understandings of appropriate behaviour. If one is to fully 
understand the attitudes of small states towards peacekeeping, their relationships to dominant 
peacekeeping norms must be understood as well as the roles they are expected to perform as 
required by key institutions. This is in keeping with Harnisch (2012) who found that greater 
institutionalisation of interstate relations, as in the peacekeeping subsystem, causes an 
increase in the number of external expectations as ‘the proliferation of significant (states), 
organised (institutions) and generalised (international community) others fosters the density 




3.4.2 Explaining Peacekeeping Contributions through Role Socialisation 
 
Crucially, role socialisation is identified in this project as an effective tool to analyse how 
small states conceive their interests to partake in international peacekeeping. It can unveil the 
process through which small states decide to deploy their armed forces to peace support 
operations characterised by new peacekeeping doctrines and practices. A focus on role 
socialisation in this context requires conceptualising peacekeeping, not only as a policy-area 
that small states target in their foreign policies, but also as a social subsystem constituted of 
agents, structures, interactions and a physical environment (Tang, 2014:487). Only by 
considering peacekeeping as a social subsystem can the transformations within it, and what 
they mean for small states’ roles, be effectively captured. 
The end of bipolarity followed by a succession of peacekeeping failures (physical 
environment) have triggered changes in the conduct of peacekeeping (structure) and 
witnessed new actors (agents) entering the subsystem. In turn, the balance of power in terms 
of who participates in peace operations, with what means and what influence on the ways 
missions are performed has been altered (structure). In the past, small states had become 
highly specialised in undertaking traditional peacekeeping. The principles of impartiality, 
consent and limited use of force fitted well with their own self-conception as entrepreneurs 
of the norm pertaining to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This suitability and willingness 
to deploy under these conditions bought small states significant leverage over peacekeeping 
practices and the rules of engagement under which specific operations took place. However, 
failures in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Cambodia exposed a gap between traditional 
peacekeeping and the need for multifunctional and robust operations to address the complex 
emergencies of intra-state conflicts involving a range of state and non-state actors. It became 
doubtful that peace could be established without mandates allowing enforcement tasks and 
more permissive use of force to protect civilians and peacekeepers as well as to repel 
spoilers. Consequently, Britain, France, the US and NATO took the lead in devising a new 
doctrine of ‘grey area operations’ characterised by an agreement on more extensive use of 
force and different combinations of traditional, consent building (carrots) as well as 
enforcement (sticks) techniques (Jakobsen, 2000). Therefore, Jakobsen (2007) argues that 
‘strategic changes triggered by the end of the cold war and changes at the operational level 
‘pulled the rug’ from under’ the traditional approach as practiced by small states, most 
prominently the Nordic countries (p.459). The argument goes that ‘as peace operations 
moved from the margins to the centre of Western security policy and many new states, 
including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, entered the scene, it became 
impossible for the Nordics [and other small states] to maintain their status as major troop 
contributors’ (Jakobsen, 2007:459). Nor could they remain in the driving seat of emerging 
operations, as great powers invested more strategic and material resources in peacekeeping 
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than ever before. These (sub)-systemic shifts forced small states out of their traditional 
peacekeeping roles positioning them as ‘novices’ (Thies, 2013:17). Because small states are 
no longer familiar with the rules of the game, they ‘must be socialised into appropriate 
norms, roles, and behaviours for social interaction’ (Thies, 2013:37). Socialisation has hardly 
been used to account for small states’ motivations and preferences towards international 
peacekeeping in this new context. One exception is Céu Pinto (2014) who explains 
Portugal’s increasing positive attitude towards UN peacekeeping after 1974 by pointing to 
the Portuguese elites having ‘internalised many international peace maintenance and human 
rights norms’ as a consequence of Lisbon’s participation in the organisation (p.396). This 
internalisation induced the elites ‘to rearticulate their conceptions of the national interest’ in 
line with UN values and norms (Céu Pinto, 2014:391). Yet, this analysis does not explore 
how Portugal was cast into new roles as a result of the Portuguese elites meeting the role 
expectations emanating from UN actors and the international community. 
Céu Pinto’s (2014) emphasis on the UN as a location of socialisation where small 
states conceive peacekeeping roles by internalising new peacekeeping norms and responding 
to role demands is, nonetheless, well judged. The UN should be considered as a primary 
socialiser because it ‘has often taken the lead in building new norms related to international 
peace and security’ (Björkdahl, 2006:221). It has been at the forefront of peacekeeping 
reforms through the Security Council decisions, debates in the General Assembly where 
member states have lobbied for changes in the practice of peacekeeping and initiatives led by 
various Secretary Generals in introducing new peacekeeping concepts. On specific 
operations, it is through the UN that the nature of conflicts is defined, and possible solutions 
identified. Security Council resolutions and UN mandates are key medium through which to 
convey standards of appropriate peacekeeping behaviour, implicitly casting troop 
contributing states into certain roles. According to a role socialisation perspective, the UN 
should also be seen as an alter expecting member states to fulfil certain roles in relations to 
particular missions. Role relationships between the UN and potential troop contributing 
states are especially likely to emerge in the context of the UN force generation given that it is 
‘a politically charged decision-making process – a back and forth between high-level 
government officials weighting carefully the pros and cons of a particular peacekeeping 
deployment’ (Henke, 2016:1). Focusing on force generation creates the expectation that the 
Secretary General and the UN Peacekeeping Department, as UN actors traditionally in 
charge of this negotiating process, will communicate role expectations to potential troop 
contributing countries in order to solicit their participation (Henke, 2016:5). Given their 
reputation as active peacekeepers, one can anticipate small states to be on the frontline of 
such role socialising pressures. Following Henke’s (2016) finding that ‘powerful states can 
be critical in building a credible UN force’, they should also be seen as key socialisers within 
the formal institutional context of the UN (p.21). 
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Great powers’ growing interest and involvement in international peacekeeping is 
relevant in light of another major development whereby ‘a variety of non-UN actors have 
conducted peace operations’ in cooperation with, but sometimes at the expense of, the UN 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2005:157). This is an additional feature of the evolving 
peacekeeping system which leads one to expect that small states will come under more role 
socialisation than ever before. It represents a response to the UN’s increasing inability to 
meet the demands of modern peacekeeping due to overstretched capabilities (Dee, 2001). 
One way the UN has sought to fill the gap has been to authorise regional or international ad 
hoc coalitions of the willing, formal regional institutions and individual states to lead and 
carry out peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:160; Dee, 2001:2). More 
worrying for the UN system’s credibility, such arrangements have also acted without UN 
mandate. Coalitions of the willing can be defined as ‘groups of actors that come together, 
often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises’ 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2005:169). They have proven to be an attractive option as formal 
regional organisations have sometimes been unprepared for deployment, hesitant to engage 
and/or unable to build consensus amongst their members; all of which have delayed action. 
Ad hoc coalitions materialise from the impetus of a lead nation which will often be a 
regional hegemon unwilling to act alone. This hegemon will seek to assemble a force with 
regional partners to add legitimacy and material strength to an operation (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2005:169). There is an interesting literature assessing the efficacy of ad hoc 
coalitions (Ryan, 2002; Wilson, 2003; Morris et al, 1999; Dee, 2001). However, the 
characteristic of interest here is that they generate a different pattern of interaction among 
their participants than in UN operations (Greco, 1998:201). Indeed, ‘the risk that the power 
of some regional hegemons may become consolidated’ is exacerbated in such coalitions 
where ‘interaction among troop-contributing states is promoted through ad hoc mechanisms’ 
(Greco, 1998:201). Coalitions create ground for asymmetrical role relationships to form as 
hegemons attempt to socialise small partners into roles which will induce their contributions 
to a given operation. 
Regional organisations have increasingly taken on peacekeeping and conflict 
management responsibilities (Bellamy and Williams 2010:301). Focusing on European 
institutions, the EU emerged as a peacekeeping actor through wider institutional 
developments designed to provide the Union’s with the capabilities to act externally. 
Initiated in 1998 with the St Malo declaration in which the UK and France established the 
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basis on which to build the ESDP, these developments culminated with the Lisbon Treaty 
which ‘represented the first time a fundamental treaty explicitly referred to the term 
peacekeeping’ (Brosig, 2014:78). Its Article 43(1) stated that the EU should become an 
active participant in ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization’ (The Lisbon 
Treaty, 2007). Thus, the insertion of peacekeeping into the Lisbon Treaty prompted the EU 
to conceive a wide-ranging approach to peace operations including a ‘fairly comprehensive 
spectrum of crisis management akin to those of the UN’ (Brosig, 2014:78). NATO engaged 
in peacekeeping as an inevitable step towards finding a post-cold war rationale in a shifting 
strategic environment marked by new threats from the Balkans in particular (Tardy, 2006). 
While ‘the existing NATO military doctrine corpus’ is heavily relied upon for a 
peacekeeping strategy, the organisation has invested substantially in the development of a 
concept which also incorporates a civilian dimension such as disaster relief operations, civil 
protection, civilian crisis management and peacebuilding (Tardy, 2006:28). Consequently, 
NATO contributed to transforming peacekeeping into the much wider concept of Peace 
Support Operation (Frantzen, 2006:2). 
By signalling their readiness to engage in the full spectrum of peace operations from 
traditional to combat activities, the involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions has reinforced 
the widening of the peacekeeping concept. Small European states have sought to integrate 
their armed forces into these regional arrangements following national decisions to 
restructure and reduce the size of their armed forces (Haaland, 2007:505). This trend has 
accelerated since the 2008 financial crisis which has compelled small states to divert 
resources away from defence. Deeper integration allows small states to participate in 
decision-making and draw on the collective strength generated by the pooling of military and 
civilian capabilities for peacekeeping purposes. Yet, the capabilities that small states can 
bring to the table are minimal compared to those of other members. Small states will find it 
difficult to influence the way EU and NATO missions are conducted in a way they once did 
in a UN framework. Haaland (2007) underlines that ‘decisions about where to deploy and 
which rules of engagement to apply will have to be made in cooperation with other 
countries’ implying that ‘military capabilities count when political decisions are made’ 
(p.505). Opportunities to weigh in on peacekeeping standards, practices and decisions will be 
few in a policy-area which has grown more significant in the overall security policies of 
more powerful member states. Therefore, small states will feel pressured to adapt to the 
capabilities and operating procedures imposed by larger members at a regional level 
(Haaland, 2007:505). Remaining on the side lines will increasingly be an unattractive option 
for small states’ governments which do not want to be seen as unreliable partners in a system 
they used to lead. Nor do they want to obstruct institutional developments intended to 
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provide organisations with capabilities to deploy externally by refusing to internalise norms 
promoted at a regional level. Ultimately, the transformation of the EU and NATO into 
peacekeeping actors create new sites where small states will undergo role socialisation. 
Small states’ peacekeeping roles are being renegotiated as institutions advance new 
peacekeeping norms and practices reflecting larger members’ preferences. This process will 
intensify as combat-related norms find their way into the EU’s and NATO’s peacekeeping 
doctrines and come into conflict with small states’ own conception(s) of peacekeeping and 
their place within it (Wivel, 2005). One strategy that small states can follow is to ‘enhance 
their political profile’ by acquiring ‘indispensable niche capabilities in short supply’ 
(Jakobsen, 2007:472). However, this strategy can only be successful if it matches the role 
expectations embedded in these institutions. 
This discussion shows that an increased number of actors is now engaging in 
peacekeeping activities making the subsystem more crowded than ever before. Small states 
are no longer the sole entrepreneurs of peaceful norms through active peacekeeping 
participation. The involvement of numerous international actors in preserving peace in 
unstable theatres has created a dense normative environment for small states. New 
relationships have also generated multiple role demands and expectations upon small states. 
For any given conflict, their policy-makers will find themselves confronted with different 
interpretations of the situation, perceptions of threats and visions of what is appropriate 
behaviour to resolve the crisis. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the way(s) small states 
adapt to changes in the subsystem will partly be out of their hands. A wider range of actors 
means an increase in socialising pressures resulting in small states’ roles being ‘mostly 
ascribed’ (Thies, 2015:289). 
 
3.4.3 The Roles of Small States as Role Conceptions 
 
The contention that small states are re-learning their place within the peacekeeping 
subsystem exclusively through structurally-driven roles is debatable given that ‘most FPA 
scholars seem to agree that role players are not dupes that merely ‘take on roles’ defined by 
society’ (Harnisch, 2012:49). A small state’s exposure to, and uptake of, external role 
demands has real consequences for its conception of its own role. Harnisch (2012) builds on 
Mead’s approach of symbolic interactionism to demonstrate that, in interacting with various 
alters, ego is not ‘a passive recipient of social rules’, but undergoes a process of self-
reflection whereby it becomes ‘an active interpreter of social attitudes’ (p.53). Nonetheless, 
states have no interpretative capacities of their own. Agents working on their behalf in 
various agencies and operating within a wider domestic and foreign policy-making setting 
do. It becomes necessary to move beyond role theory’s tendency to black-box the state and 
heed its practitioners’ recent calls ‘to integrate a more complex understanding of agency into 
its analyses by opening up heretofore ignored domestic political processes’ (Cantir and 
 
54 
Kaarbo, 2016:6; see also Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; 2013; Harnisch, 2011; 2012; Brummer 
and Thies, 2015; Jones, 2017). Delving into internal role dynamics offers the prospect of 
uncovering ‘the process whereby a NRC [or role] is selected to represent the state’ 
(Brummer and Thies, 2015:273). For Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), it holds the key for 
effectively bridging structure and agency because ‘a proper understanding of the complexity 
of the ego and alter is as necessary as analysing their interaction’ (p.16). They contend that 
‘black-boxing the state … could obscure the dynamics occurring within an agent’ which 
‘more likely than not influence the process of interaction’ (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:16). 
From this perspective, the socialisation of small states into new peacekeeping roles can 
partly explains their adjusting behaviours towards new forms of peacekeeping. Accounts 
must incorporate an understanding of how socialising efforts to cast small states into certain 
roles are perceived by different agents of small states (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:6). Policy- 
makers’ perceptions are key, shaping the domestic processes through which roles are 
conceived, defined and selected (Breuning, 1997, 2011). The gist of the argument is well 
captured by Brummer and Thies (2015): ‘even if external actors attempt to persuade a 
country to adopt a certain role, it is within the domestic political system that potential NRCs 
are debated and contested, ultimately yielding an official NRC for the country’ (p.277). 
Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) incorporate insight from existing FPA research on the 
relationship between government and opposition, foreign policy under multiparty coalitions, 
and bureaucratic politics to investigate how roles are domestically generated, contested and 
selected (p.9). Such headway provides a unique opportunity to open up the black boxes that 
are small states. It becomes possible to draw on, and complement, the growing research 
dedicated to demonstrating the influence of domestic determinants on small states’ foreign 
policies (see review). Importantly, the point at which external socialisation enters the 
domestic realm is also where societal sources of roles including culture (Aggestam, 2004), 
historical experiences (Krotz, 2015), national identity and values (Fazendeiro, 2016) interact 
with agents’ perceptions. At this stage also, more immediate political, financial and 
institutional considerations involved in deciding to deploy a peacekeeping force will weigh 
in on agents as they conceive a role for the state with regard to a particular mission. Given 
this complexity involved in the role conception process, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) are 
accurate in emphasising the unlikelihood that domestic actors will agree about which role is 
most appropriate for the state. Each state agent will perceive socialisation attempts 
differently, diverge in their interpretations of domestic role expectations emanating from 
various sources and prioritise different peacekeeping imperatives. This justifies exploring 
how roles are contested horizontally, amongst elites, and vertically, between elites and 
masses (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:9). Moreover, as small states come under increasing 
pressure to participate in controversial operations involving elements of combat and peace 
enforcement, their traditional political consensus on defence, security and peacekeeping 
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participation will weaken (Haaland, 2007:506). Vertical contestation is likely to occur as 
publics in small state find it difficult to approve shifts away from traditional peacekeeping 
roles pursued by their elites in response to international partners’ demands for solidarity in a 
wider range of missions. Nonetheless, I take a step back from Cantir and Kaarbo’s emphasis 
on contestation given the diverging expectations regarding the degree of consensus or 
disagreement in small states’ foreign policy-making. This project still follows their lead in 
drawing from FPA research on government and opposition, foreign policy in small groups 
and under multiparty coalitions as well as on bureaucratic politics, but to investigate how 
roles are internally negotiated, rather than contested (author’s emphasis). The objective is to 
analyse the effects of role socialisation on internal role dynamics, and to understand how 
these dynamics influence the decisions that small states’ governments take on peacekeeping 
deployments. It is about studying the pathway through which domestic actors respond to 
external role pressures and use resulting role conceptions domestically in interactions with 
other actors to inform peacekeeping behaviours. Whether role socialisation drives domestic 
consensus or disagreement over roles in the foreign policy-making of small states on 
peacekeeping remains an understudied issue. This project will address it empirically. 
 
3.4.4 The Missing Link: Foreign Policy-Making Unit 
 
While in agreement with Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) that ‘the impact of international 
norms and role structures is not automatic, as it is shaped by the agents in the domestic 
political process’ contesting roles, I contend that role theory requires additional analytical 
tools to effectively link structure and agency. By pursuing research on either the structure or 
domestic side of role theory with limited dialogue between the two, role theorists risk 
reinforcing the divide they are meant to be bridging. Harnisch (2012) has already pointed out 
that ‘FPA role theoreticians have implicitly assumed that roles are either ego/agent or 
alter/structure-driven entities’ (p.48). To escape this pitfall, the present model incorporates a 
final building block in the form of the foreign policy-making unit composed of the head of 
state (Prime Minister), Foreign Minister and Defence Minister. The logic is akin to Hermann 
and Hermann’s (1989) when developing their typology of decision-making units in that, like 
other international influences, socialisation attempts have to be ‘channelled through the 
political structure of a government’ via a unit with agency capable of conceiving, selecting 
and enacting roles (p.362). The first reason why focusing on this foreign policy-making unit 
might be a productive way forward is that it recognises that who the decision-makers in 
power are matters for the selection of roles. For instance, different unit configurations are 
likely to result in different role choices, as members differ in their perceptions of external 
attempts to impose a role on their state. Thus, attention is given to the composition of the 
unit in terms of who the members are including their party affiliations and political 
backgrounds. This project offers some indications of the members’ foreign policy outlook to 
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uncover how their identities might influence the role statements they make (Cantir and 
Kaarbo, 2016:8). 
The second reason is that these governmental posts ‘tend to be the positions most 
likely to influence the debate about the proper NRC for the state’ (Brummer and Thies, 
2015:278). Furthermore, decision-making processes have been overlooked in explanations of 
states’ contributions to peacekeeping (Velázquez, 2010). Velázquez (2010) argues that, 
because peacekeeping ‘involves the willingness by states to use military force, even if the 
intentions are benign, peaceful, or defensive in nature’, the two key governmental 
bureaucracies likely to shape decisions to participate in a peacekeeping operation are the 
defence and foreign ministries (p.171). This exposes an overlap in terms of the most 
influential actors shaping both national roles and peacekeeping decisions. 
Third, the foreign policy-making unit straddles international and domestic spheres 
where role expectations from external and domestic actors converge to be interpreted and 
responded to. This makes it a suitable governmental location to study the effects of role 
socialisation on coalition, bureaucratic and leadership dynamics, and determine whether 
external role expectations foster consensus or conflict amongst small states’ governing elites. 
It is a necessary first step before analysing role processes between governments and masses 
on the one hand, and political oppositions on the other, because what initially goes on inside 
the unit determines the shape of the wider domestic debate. For instance, if unit members 
reach a consensus over a role informing their decision to deploy a combat element, a 
common front will be established which the political opposition in parliament and the wider 
public will find difficult to contest (Kreps, 2010). Additionally, the unit is the primary 
receiver of external role demands and acts as a filter through which role pressures from 
outside the state are framed in ways compatible with the role expectations held by domestic 
audiences. In much the same way as elite responsiveness is key for public opinion to affect a 
government’s foreign policy decisions (Dimitriu and de Graaf, 2016), if socialisation is to 
have any impact on foreign policy-making and the domestic debate, unit members have to be 
responsive to external role demands while outside norms must also resonate with their 
foreign policy outlooks and orientations (Folz, 2011). This perspective is in keeping with the 
process of peacekeeping force generation whereby a request for a troop contribution based 
on certain roles is initially addressed to the head of state and/or the cabinet members in 
charge of foreign policy, following both formal and informal contacts between these elites 
and the actor leading the mission. The general population and parliament are informed by 
this governing elite only after a formal demand has been extended and informal discussions 
have already taken place amongst these three agents. 
Most small European states are parliamentary democracies entailing that the unit’s 
authority will often be shared amongst at least two parties. The Prime Minister, Foreign and 
Defence Ministers will belong to different parties since these are the posts most sought after 
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during coalition negotiations (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:13). One might expect these agents to 
disagree over roles because ‘role contestation may stem from party ideology and be 
institutionalised in electoral platforms’ (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:13; Brummer and Thies, 
2015:278). On the other hand, they might also be driven to agree on roles in order to avoid 
deadlock which might jeopardise the coalition’s chances of remaining in power. Importantly, 
Willigen (2016) has already observed that ‘coalition politics determines for a large part the 
[Dutch government’s] decision to participate or not to participate’ in UN peacekeeping 
(p.717). Because unit members might be acting within cabinet as representatives of their 
respective bureaucracy, they can often advocate roles supporting the interests of their 
respective organisation (Brummer and Thies, 2015:278). Looking at Chinese foreign policy- 
making, Jones (2017) found that ‘different bureaucracies within China adhered to different 
NRCs’ and that ‘role conceptions appear to broadly coincide with each actor’s respective 
bureaucratic interests’ (p.14). Velázquez (2010) expects relations between civilian and 
military bureaucracies to play a significant part in national decisions to take peacekeeping 
action because they ‘often have different views of the world and sometimes disagree when 
force must be used’ (p.171). Generally, foreign ministries tend to emphasise diplomatic 
solutions and are inclined not to promote the use of force to resolve crises (Velázquez, 
2010:171). Thus, they may display a wariness towards highly robust peacekeeping 
deployments and seek alternatives in more civilian roles within an operation’s division of 
labour. However, diplomatic organisations are keen to entertain good diplomatic relations 
with international partners and seek international visibility and prestige through 
peacekeeping, making them inclined to accept external role expectations. Armed forces may 
display a preference for engagements in large multilateral coalitions with robust mandates. 
This is because militaries, especially in small states, can gain valuable military experience in 
challenging environments and improve their capabilities by collaborating with larger 
counterparts, thereby strengthening their raison d’être towards domestic constituencies 
seeking to downgrade them. For instance, small European states’ militaries have been 
increasingly dissatisfied with the slow pace of peacekeeping deployments under the UN flag 
as they have required long term commitments and drawn on little of their military expertise. 
In turn, NATO and EU have become their preferred frameworks of deployment. It should be 
noted; however, it is not necessarily the case that militaries prefer the use of force to solve 
crises (Velázquez, 2010:172). Finally, there is very limited, if any, research on the impact of 
individual decision-makers on peacekeeping decisions. Yet, role theorists have hypothesised 
that leaders including their decision-making styles and personalities can have important 
leeway on role conceptions and the way they are advocated domestically. It has already been 
suggested that the small size of bureaucracies in small states do not impose strong constraints 
on executives allowing an individual decision-maker with institutional power, diplomatic 
skills, an interest in foreign policy and charisma to have significant influence on his or her 
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country’s foreign policy (Hey, 2002:222). As a result, it may not be surprising to witness a 
predominant leader pushing his or her preferred national role(s) through the domestic system 




Figure 1 summarises and illustrates the role theoretical model developed in this 
chapter to better explain small states’ foreign policy decisions to participate in modern 
peacekeeping operations. A crisis is deemed necessary for the whole process to begin 
because it prompts international actors to act, thereby translating international structures into 
role expectations directed at smaller prospective contributing countries. Importantly, the 
conclusion of this thesis (chapter 11) completes and refines the model in light of the findings 
emerging from the case studies. 
The model is founded on a critique of the constructivist argument that small states’ 
foreign policies reflect primarily their common identity. Constructivists rightly emphasise 
the social construction of small state size. However, they fail to demonstrate theoretically 
and empirically the full extent of the social and relational nature of identity construction. 
Therefore, I argue that small states’ foreign policies are not guided by one uniform and 
unchanging identity, but by a range of different identities which change over time as a result 
external bargaining and domestic negotiation. I further contend that constructivists are 
missing an important step in their endeavour to show that identity influence the behaviour of 
small states. In fact, the notion of role is essential for policy-makers to make sense of who 
they are, and what function their states should fulfil, in the international system. This is 
additionally relevant for small states which have been socially disoriented by the changing 
nature of peacekeeping and, therefore, must re-learn their position as international 
peacekeepers. Finally, this chapter makes an important theoretical contribution by bridging 
















This chapter outlines the methodological approach used to translate role theory into a 
suitable instrument for the empirical analyses of peacekeeping decisions taken by Austria 
and Belgium. Role theory’s lack of agreed-upon methodology has led to criticisms that it is 
methodologically underdeveloped (Walker, 1979:176). Breuning (2017) recently argued that 
role research is not so much methodologically poor as it is ‘eclectic’, since role theorists 
have used a wide range of existing social research methodologies to capture the influence of 
roles on foreign policy behaviour including game theory, process-tracing, as well as narrative 
and interpretive analysis (p.7). The fact is that a number of methodological questions remain 
unanswered: What sources should be sought to observe roles? What qualifies as a role? Are 
the same roles present across different historical periods, geographical areas or issue-areas? 
Should roles be considered as independent or dependent variables? Should researchers 
analyse the meanings given to roles by foreign policy actors? Can and should roles be 
distinguished from policy? Although the main contributions of this project are not 
methodological, some of these issues must be addressed in order to present a transparent and 
sound research strategy for the following empirical analyses. It represents a first step towards 
future and more comprehensive efforts for methodological development in role research. 
 
4.2 Methodological Review 
 
The value of Holsti’s (1970) original article lies largely in its methodological 
dimension. Holsti constructed the first role typology by inductively coding, and providing 
examples of, statements made by foreign policy-makers when depicting the position of their 
states in the international system. His research demonstrated that rhetoric of high level 
foreign policy officials could serve as indicators of roles (Breuning, 2017:21). Holsti’s 
seventeen-role typology provided the basis for many subsequent role theorists, especially 
those interested in quantitative analyses designed to measure the frequency at which foreign 
policy elites express certain roles (Catalinac, 2007; for a critique of this approach see Kaarbo 
and Cantir, 2012:9). In fact, systematic content analysis has been a widespread methodology 
for applying role theory. Researchers working in this tradition have either used Holsti’s 
typology or devised their own role template (Breuning, 1995; Hansel and Moller, 2015) to 
identify and code roles from a wide range of sources including policy documents, 
parliamentary debates, speeches and interviews. The data obtained is quantitatively or 
qualitatively connected to the foreign policy behaviour under scrutiny allowing inferences to 




Interest in the relationship between the international structure and roles prompted 
Walker (2011) and Thies (2013) to develop formal models grounded in game theory in order 
to guide their empirical investigations of the interactive process through which states bargain 
amongst each other to locate their roles. Thies (2013) complements his socialisation model 
with an analytic narrative approach allowing him to examine the historical record and 
document the path from foreign policy crisis to role location and enactment. This approach is 
refined by Wehner and Thies (2014) who incorporate the concepts of dilemma, narrative and 
tradition. Their narrative analysis is effective at reconstructing foreign policy actors’ 
interpretations of events as they draw on existing traditions to recast their roles when 
confronted with a dilemma. The historicism of their methodology is shared by Krotz (2015), 
whose qualitative historical strategy is suited to coding the ‘domestically-anchored’ and 
historically constructed roles of France and Germany. Krotz (2015) focuses on ‘various types 
of empirical data’ to ascertain the influence of ‘historical domestic constructions’ on national 
interests. 
Theoretical developments which have brought domestic role processes more sharply 
into focus have required methodological adaptation. The methodological advances made by 
Thies, Wehner and Krotz underline the benefits of the case study approach to empirically 
demonstrate the influence of roles on foreign policies. Cantir and Kaarbo’s (2016) edited 
volume compiles a number of case studies carried out through process-tracing, secondary 
historical research and structured comparisons to analyse the effects of role contestation on 
the foreign policy decision-making of a wide range of states. Below (2016) also combines a 
case study strategy with process-tracing and structure-focused comparisons to understand the 
decision-making of Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina in the issue-area of environmental 
foreign policy. However, Below (2016) argues that case study is well suited to discovering 
the sources of role conceptions where roles are dependent variables as opposed to 
independent variables. This approach is conducive to testing whether known assumptions 
about role formation apply to these Latin American cases in policy-areas of ‘low politics’, 
thereby, helping generate new hypotheses (Below, 2016:34). 
Intellectual shifts towards internal role dynamics have also led role scholars to take 
on more interpretivist approaches by considering different ways in which actors have re- 
interpreted existing roles. This became essential as it emerged that decision-makers do not 
necessarily abandon entrenched roles but reinterpret them to fit new conditions or demands. 
Attention shifted towards examining the multiple ways actors re-interpret dominant roles. 
Oppermann (2012) contends that, although Germany maintains a civilian power role, 
German decision-makers have increasingly had more opportunities for ‘creative role 
interpretations’ (p.506; see also Harnisch, 2012). McCourt (2011) goes a step further 
advancing a reflexive analysis, which not only considers the roles held by British foreign 
policy actors, but also investigates the political effects of analysts and commentators when 
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invoking Britain’s international role (p.146). His argument suggests that descriptions of 
Britain’s role in the world by policy-makers, academics and journalists are political 
performances advocating a particular course of action. The static language used in these 
descriptions stereotypes the UK’s international position and obstructs discussion around the 
more pressing issues of foreign policy objectives, capabilities, instruments and ethics. While 
a linguistic ‘therapy’ founded on a critical social constructivist approach can help 
deconstruct the ‘tropes’ and ‘clichés’ characterising the language around the UK’s foreign 
policy, a sociological approach is also necessary to investigate the structure of the British 
foreign policy establishment as a possible source of foreign policy continuity (p.147). 
Similarly, Teles Fazendeiro (2016) conceptualises roles as comprising a narrative component 
which are ‘sources of understanding’ constitutive of the ‘world out there’ (p.488). The author 
shows that the role scholarship, through role attribution, plays an important part in creating 
narratives and reproducing particular understandings of states. Role researchers are 
encouraged to be more reflexive when attributing roles ‘to increase awareness of the 
“world”-making power of roles’ (p.492). 
 
4.3 Methodological Approach 
 
This project considers roles as social constructions which emerge historically 
through interactions between foreign policy actors at both international and domestic levels. 
It does not fully embrace an interpretivist perspective as roles are afforded some degree of 
independent “reality”. Roles already are interpretations of a national culture, identity and 
international expectations which ‘generate motivational dispositions’ (McCourt, 2011:1605). 
They do not need to be reinterpreted to cause effects on behaviour. This ontological 
standpoint aligns with the project’s aim of studying the causal mechanisms through which 
actors carrying pre-existing roles influence the decision-making of small states on 
peacekeeping deployments. The project has two empirical parts dedicated to Austria and 
Belgium. Both proceed along the same format involving three stages. Each stage is 
characterised by its own methodology. The overall methodological strategy emulates 
Below’s (2016) ‘multi-method approach’ combining content analysis of UN speeches and 
case study methodology. An initial step using Wehner and Thies’s (2014) narrative analysis 
is introduced as foundation. 
At every stage, roles are independent variables hypothesised to explain the 
dependent variable: small states’ peacekeeping behaviour. It should have become clear that 
roles do not affect outcomes directly, or independently of other material and ideational 
factors at the system, domestic and individual levels. In this way, I concur with Krotz (2015) 
who points out that roles ‘will mingle with other causal forces in moulding national interests 
and foreign policies’. Determining the exact combination of factors is an empirical question 
focused on a particular policy-area and time. Thus, the aim of this research is not to test how 
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well role theory competes with alternative explanations, but to analyse how roles intersect 
with financial, geopolitical, institutional and normative considerations in decision-making on 
peacekeeping deployments. Doing so will provide clues about the causal proximity of roles 
to the dependent variable (Krotz, 2015). 
The complexity of modern conflicts and conflict resolution strategies makes it 
inadequate to reduce the dependent variable to ‘participation’ versus ‘non-participation’ in 
peace operations. Nor do quantifiable indicators, such as the number of troops deployed, 
sufficiently capture the nature of the commitment made by TCCs. Governments 
contemplating participation in peacekeeping are required to weigh up an increasing number 
of considerations beyond the mere number of troops intended for deployment. These include 
whether the mission has an observing, peacekeeping or enforcement mandate, the conditions 
for the use of force, the risks to troops and the activities to be performed once on the ground. 
Analytically, the dependent variable is disaggregated into three components, namely the 
number of troops deployed, the mission’s framework and the operational role of 
peacekeepers. Therefore, roles are expected to explain small states’ choices on these three 
dimensions. In combination, they form a robust indicator of a state’s attitude towards a 
mission and the type of peacekeeping it involves. The rest of the chapter details each stage in 
turn justifying the methodological choices involved in their design. 
 
4.3.1 Stage 1: Identifying National Roles 
 
The first stage identifies the traditional foreign policy roles of Austria and Belgium 
using Wehner and Thies’s (2014) concepts of narrative, tradition and dilemma. Roles are 
inductively extracted through historical research of secondary material relating to Austria’s 
and Belgium’s post-war foreign policy traditions. Based on Bevir et al. (2013)’s assertion 
that ‘agency always occurs against a particular historical background that influences it’, 
Wehner and Thies (2014) argue that a tradition represents a useful analytical focal point 
because it ‘encompasses the historical inheritance (or patterns) as the starting point for 
human activity, in which individuals act and reason’ (p.416). Thus, traditions can be defined 
as the first (yet not the only) ‘sets of understandings an actor receives during socialization’ 
but which can be modified through agency. The investigations focus on dilemmas because 
they are critical points at which actors reassess national roles in light of new developments 
by drawing on existing traditions. It is around dilemmas that roles manifest themselves most 
clearly. While I initially relied on Holsti’s typology to link traditions with roles, it quickly 
became apparent that his role conceptions did not sufficiently match those of Austria and 
Belgium, especially as both reassessed their roles after 1989. This underlines the main 
drawback of Holsti’s typology. Having been constructed in a cold war setting, it does not 
fully reflect the roles played by states under a multipolar system (Below, 2016:44). 
Consequently, I also drew on roles found in other empirical analyses. The key benefit of 
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inductively searching for roles in small states’ foreign policy traditions lies in the prospect of 
discovering roles so far unrecorded. In this way, this research takes a first step towards 
updating Holsti’s typology by mapping a new pool of roles better suited to the current 
international system. It offers an up-to-date foundation for future empirical role analyses. 
This stage does not seek to reconstruct narratives as intended by Wehner and Thies’s 
(2014), but to catalogue, define and provide examples of the roles that both small states are 
expected to play in their approach to peacekeeping. It contributes to the overall framework 
developed in chapter 3 by providing a repertoire of roles towards which governing decision- 
makers and other domestic actors are likely to turn to when confronting with peacekeeping 
dilemmas. Traditions and associated prevailing roles are identified from an extensive body of 
historical and contemporary research. In line with the argument that states enact multiple 
roles simultaneously, the role theory literature often refers to states as having a number of 
‘role sets’ which themselves comprise several individual roles. Role sets are held 
concurrently and are linked to different audiences and policy-areas in which the state is 
engaged in. The argument has been made that states have ‘a dominant role set and a 
secondary one’ in which some roles can be added, others reinforced or discredited and 
abandoned (Adigbuo, 2007:91). What this discussion indicates is that certain roles are more 
dominant than others in that they are referred to by policy-makers on a more regular basis 
and, therefore, have a stronger influence on the state’s foreign policy orientation and 
decisions. It also implies that roles, and their articulation, can be measured. The present 
research follows a similar logic since it attempts to identify the most important roles 
(“prevailing roles”) which inform foreign policy-making. Yet, these “prevailing roles” have 
not been identified by rigorously measuring their frequency, but through comprehensive 
inductive research which has allowed a judgement to be made about their significance for 
policy-makers and the decision-making process. 
These are important roles to identify given that they will ultimately feed into the 
discourse surrounding Austria’s and Belgium’s participation in modern peacekeeping 
operations. This stage functions as a codebook signposting the type of evidence that one 
expects to observe and code in UN speeches and other statements selected for the case 
studies. The option of developing a role typology suited to the policy-area of peacekeeping 
was considered in light of Breuning’s (1995) argument that ‘it is important to study national 
role conceptions in relation to a specific policy’ (p.237). The decision was made not to 
follow Breuning’s lead for the main reason that peacekeeping remains in the realm of 
security policy which inspired initial role typologies in the first place. It will be shown that 
the foreign policy roles found in the cases can easily be transposed to the policy-area of 
peacekeeping. Moreover, a central theme of this research suggests that the boundary between 
peacekeeping and other types of foreign interventions are becoming ever more blurry. This 
makes devising a new typology unnecessary and potentially obstructive to capturing relevant 
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roles. Another downside of designing a new typology specifically for peacekeeping is that it 
is likely to prevent generalisation in the broader fields of IR and FPA. 
 
4.3.2 Stage 2: Determining Governments’ Role Inclination 
 
The second stage involves content analyses of speeches given by Austrian and 
Belgian foreign policy officials at the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Each 
content analysis is the foundation of its associated case study (table 2). The speeches selected 
are those given by the administration which took the decision under investigation in the 
following case study. Initially, only those given in the lead up to the decision were selected. 
However, because in some cases the decision came relatively quickly after the government 
came into office, giving officials no opportunity to make statements at the UN, all the 
speeches made by an administration at the UN were retained regardless of whether these 
were given before or after the decision. The goal is not to identify the cause of the decision 
under scrutiny by measuring the frequency at which a particular administration was 
expressing certain roles. This stage simply seeks to provide initial indication as to the role 
inclination of an administration and to offer examples of how roles are articulated. The 
results are presented in tables (see appendix) and should be considered as complementary to 
the domestic political background of each decision. This is an important stage given that the 
framework emphasises central role-conceiving function of the foreign policy-making unit. 
The assumption is that roles may fluctuate from one government to another. As new political 
actors arrive in office following an election, they may bring with them a different foreign 
policy orientation and role preferences. 
Although stage one provides information about the roles likely to appear in the 
speeches, the main difficulty of this approach is to determine what type of statement should 
be regarded as a role. The decision to code for a role was informed by Hansel and Moller’s 
(2015) criteria specifying that the word ‘Austria’ and ‘Belgium’ (or a substitute term such as 
“We,” “Us,” or “Our”) had to be present. Statements also had to indicate a ‘particular 
responsibilities or functions … [either Austria or Belgium] performs in the international 
system’ (p.82; emphases added). Below’s (2016) choice to code statements making ‘specific 
reference to the country’s place in the international or regional system’ was also useful to 
approach the material (p.33; emphasis added). The principal risk involved here is to code 
statements that are not expressions of roles. This is particularly acute when using UN 
speeches as national policy-makers often speak in the name of the international community 
making general observations about the state of the international system. Hansel and Moller’s 
(2015) primary criteria should alleviate this problem. Nonetheless, the General Assembly 
and Security Council, of which Austria and Belgium were non-permanent members at times 
covered by the analyses, are rare opportunities for small states’ policy-makers to promote the 
contributions made by their country to relevant international issues such as peacekeeping. 
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Speeches made in these arenas are, therefore, likely to articulate roles. UN speeches also 
offer a systemic source of evidence in the English language allowing for more valid and 
robust comparisons to be made. 
 






















UNIFIL II Belgium 2004-2008 Verhofstadt II 
G. Verhofstadt, 
Prime Minister; 




Malian Crisis Belgium 2012-2014 Di Rupo 
E. Di Rupo,  
Prime Minister 
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4.3.3 Stage 3: Connecting National Roles to Peacekeeping Behaviour 
The final stage involves case studies of two peacekeeping decisions made by 
different Austrian and Belgian governments using process-tracing methodology and 
structured-focused comparisons. Below (2016) uses this methodology to investigate the 
effects of Latin American presidents, mediated by domestic and international factors, on role 
formation in the area of environmental foreign policy (p.33-35). Yet, the case studies 
undertaken here do not seek to identify the origins of roles. Rather, drawing on Thies’s 
(2013) emphasis on process, their purpose is to reconstruct ‘the stream of events’ through 
which roles became salient in the decision-making and informed governmental actors in their 
decisions to involve their country in peacekeeping missions. Having identified and narrowed 
down the pool of roles likely to be played by Austria and Belgium in stage one and two 
respectively, stage three employs case studies to connect roles to foreign policy behaviour 
(Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:20). Like most IR subjects of inquiry, the national decision to 
deploy peacekeeping troops to a conflict zone is a complex phenomenon involving 
interactions amongst numerous material and ideational factors present across multiple levels 
of analysis (Bennett and Elman, 2007:171). This is a challenge most effectively dealt with 
using process-tracing since the aim of this methodology is to ‘understand the processes 
linking the different relevant factors to the outcome’ (Ulriksen and Dadalauri, 2016:224). It 
is highly effective at uncovering what stimuli actors are responsive to (George and Bennett 
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2005:35-36). The method is, therefore, suited to disentangling how roles interact with other 
peacekeeping factors to motivate Austrian and Belgian actors’ peacekeeping decisions. 
Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) argue that process-tracing ‘may be useful in identifying the causal 
mechanisms through which role contestation affects a country’s foreign policy decision- 
making process or behaviour’ (p.20). Thies (2013) adds that ‘the process-tracing procedure 
applies … also to collective actors in regional or international systems’ (p.26). Thus, 
process-tracing is well equipped to meet the empirical demands of this project, generated by 
its multi-level theoretical framework, of demonstrating how external socialisation of 
peacekeeping roles interact with domestic dynamics of role conceptions within Austria and 
Belgium.  
The notion of “role compatibility” is recurrent throughout the case studies (and the 
previous methodological phases of this project). To clarify what is meant by “role 
compatibility”, it is useful to consider that roles may be incompatible with one another, 
which is referred to as interrole conflict when ‘an individual [or state] finds himself [itself] 
concurrently in two or more positions requiring contradictory role enactments’ (Thies, 2009; 
original emphasis). In this research, the expectation is that certain roles demanded by a 
peacekeeping context which is likely to place a premium on more comprehensive and robust 
operations might be incompatible with small states’ traditional roles associated with good 
international actorness (Wivel, 2005). Role incompatibility (or compatibility) in the context 
of peacekeeping might also emerge when considering who to partner with (Pedersen, 2018) 
and what tasks are to be performed. For instance, small states will likely struggle to reconcile 
a Global System Collaborator (GSC) and a humanitarian actor role if the UN demands 
peacekeeping troops to perform enforcement activities. In a historical perspective, roles tied 
to neutrality are incompatible with the role of loyal ally because the latter implicates 
participation in great power politics. Yet, roles are not entirely independent of the 
interpretation given to them by their emitters. In fact, Thies (2009) notes that ‘mechanisms 
must be found to prevent the dysfunction that would result from the incompatibility among 
the roles’ (p.7). This means that agents can actively fashion “role compatibility” by 
reinterpreting and discursively adapting the meanings attached to roles, or what it means to 
play the neutral role, for example. 
The ambition behind undertaking four case studies is to produce comparable data on 
small states’ decision-making towards peacekeeping deployments. To ensure comparability, 
the case studies are ‘structured’ around a set of general questions reflecting the research 
objective of understanding the peacekeeping behaviour of small states (George and Bennett, 
2005:67). They are also ‘focused’ in that they address only features that the theoretical 
framework sheds light on, in this case, the relationship between external role socialisation 
and domestic role processes (George and Bennett, 2005:67, 70). The following questions, 
and their connection to the role theory framework, were used to guide in each case study:  
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What are the root causes of the conflict under scrutiny and how has the peacekeeping 
mission emerged? 
This question is designed to provide background information on the conflict that the 
mission being studied was set up to address. Its answer helps map out the main international 
actors that have contributed to establishing the mission and its mandate, which itself 
prescribe certain peacekeeping behaviour. This section outlines the type of peacekeeping 
involved in the operation. 
What government was in power when Austria or Belgium considered participation? 
This question establishes the domestic context in which the peacekeeping decision 
was made. It determines the formation, composition and political orientation of the 
government that took the decision. It seeks to uncover who the main actors making up the 
foreign policy-making unit were. Attention is given to the foreign policy orientation or 
outlook of each actor. This should help determine which domestic actor is likely to be most 
influential in the decision-making and what type of foreign policy decisions they are likely to 
take. The findings of the content-analyses provide some answer to this question by revealing 
the role inclination of the administration under scrutiny. 
Who were the main socialisers (alters) of Austria or Belgium? 
This question reflects the theoretical priority afforded to socialisation. The reasoning 
suggests that small states experience disproportionately strong socialising pressures. As a 
result, policy-makers must first account for these pressures before taking into account 
domestic considerations. This requires identifying the international actors who have 
attempted to shape the peacekeeping behaviour of Austria and Belgium when considering a 
participation. Answers to the first question should provide useful pointers. It is here 
important to focus on the organisation or the leading nation offering the operation’s 
framework. These international actors are likely to solicit the help of Austria and Belgium 
and express demands on what type of contribution is expected of them. In answering this 
question, one has to look at the points at which Austrian or Belgian foreign policy-makers 
have entered international debates surrounding the mission because they are likely location 
of role bargaining. By doing so we should obtain information on when and how small states’ 




What peacekeeping norms or mission types were the main socialisers promoting? 
Having identified the actors, it is now necessary to assess what they were saying and 
what demands of peacekeeping behaviour they were asking Austria and Belgium to perform. 
In line with the definition of socialisation provided in chapter 3, the objective is to outline 
the dominant normative context within which the mission emerged and unfolded. This 
requires identifying the peacekeeping norms that international actors are promoting. Answers 
to this question should also provide information about how the normative context has been 
translated into direct demands of expected peacekeeping behaviour. 
How did these demands resonate with the domestic agents making up the main policy- 
making unit? 
This question steers the analysis into the domestic realm. Role research focuses 
primarily on high level foreign policy-makers as the main agents involved in the conception 
of roles. It also came to my attention that only a small unit of foreign policy-makers was 
involved in the making decisions on issues of peacekeeping deployment. Thus, I 
hypothesised that these actors were primary receivers of external socialisation and acted as 
intermediaries between external demands of peacekeeping behaviour and domestic role 
expectations. Having assessed the foreign policy orientation of the main agents in the policy-
making unit in question two, it becomes possible to assess the extent to which each actor is 
prepared to integrate peacekeeping norms and accept peacekeeping socialisation. 
Were new peacekeeping norms and direct demands of peacekeeping behaviour 
sources of role contestation amongst members of the main policy-making unit, within 
parliament and at the public level? 
Following the theoretical framework of horizontal and vertical role contestation, this 
question helps determine the extent to which the members of the policy-making unit agree on 
an appropriate role and whether they were inclined to open it for debates within the wider 
political class and the general public. 
Answers to these questions are sought using evidence from press articles, secondary 
material, UN documents, and parliamentary debates as well as WikiLeaks sources. The aim 
is to use as many reliable sources as possible to assemble ‘bits and pieces of evidence into a 
pattern’ (Thies, 2013). In combination, they help to construct a story around a particular 
mission and how Austria and Belgium came to their decisions. As much as possible, only 
evidence dating prior to the decision was selected. This ensures that the process of role 
conception did not overlap with role enactment. This step should help consolidate the claim 




4.4 Case Selection 
 
The selection of the cases follows a research design combining cross and within case 
analyses. This design creates more opportunities for comparisons as each case can be 
compared in two different ways (Lamont, 2015:134; Bennett and Elman, 2007:176). In 
practical terms, this means that for both small states selected, two instances of decision- 
making on troop deployment were studied. 
The rationale behind the choice of peacekeeping missions used to explore the 
Austrian and Belgian decision-making should now be outlined. They were chosen as ‘test 
sites’ to add the number of observations and explore how the relationship between external 
socialisation and domestic role processes shapes small states’ peacekeeping roles. Ulriksen 
and Dadalauri (2016) underline that single case studies, undertaken through the process-
tracing approach, have traditionally been employed to build theory and explain single 
outcomes (p.224; Gerring, 2007; Mahoney, 2012). However, this research design follows 
their argument that ‘this method can be useful to test and modify theoretical frameworks by 
uncovering and evaluating theoretically specified causal mechanisms’ (p.225-226). In this 
way, each case study concludes with a discussion of how role socialisation was domestically 
negotiated, thereby, helping to theorise further about foreign policy-making processes in 
small states. For Austria, cases include the 2008 deployment to the EU mission in Chad 
(EUFOR Chad) and the decision of Chancellor Faymann’s government to withdraw from the 
United Nations Disarmament Observation Force (UNDOF) in 2013. The Belgian decision-
making is studied around the country’s contributions to the 2012-2013 Malian crisis and its 
re-engagement in UN peacekeeping in 2006 with a deployment to the reinforced United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II). 
The selection of UN and EU missions was important to assess both small states’ 
attitudes towards different institutional frameworks under which modern peacekeeping takes 
place. An essential criterion for choosing these missions is their capacity to illustrate broader 
peacekeeping developments. Each represents an unique moment at which the doctrine and 
practice of peacekeeping was actively being transformed by a range of international actors. 
The cases studies aim to survey these transformations and the ways in which Austria and 
Belgium have responded to them. Furthermore, the missions have been selected based on 
expectations that the theoretical processes of interest will be empirically present. Rapid 
peacekeeping transformations implicate a shifting normative context generating new 
demands of appropriate behaviour. As small states with a long tradition of troop contribution, 
Austria and Belgium are expected to be confronted with important socialising pressures to 
adapt their roles as a result of this new environment. These missions generated much 
uncertainty for the governments which have considered deploying troops to them. They have 
been dilemmas, thereby increasing the likelihood of political elites having invoked roles to 
justify their decisions. As some of these decisions were contentious, one may anticipate the 
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presence of domestic role contestations. Finally, role theory requires theoretical development 
to better integrate external role socialisation and domestic processes of role conception. 
Therefore, the case studies strive to create new hypotheses about the missing link between 
external role socialisation and domestic contestations by focusing on the foreign policy 
orientation and role inclination of policy-making units. 
While the aim is not to perform strict comparisons, it remains necessary to control 
for some variables, explaining why Austria and Belgium were selected according to a most 
similar system design (Bennett and Elman, 2007:176). Although their peacekeeping patterns 
have been generally similar to the extent that both have contributed comparable numbers of 
troops over the years under UN, EU and NATO flags, variations on the dependent variable 
can still be detected when considering particular missions. It is not rare to see the troops of 
one absent from a given mission while the other is participating with a large contingent. 
They also differ with regard to the institutional framework within which they prefer to 
deploy troops. Belgium is generally more willing to participate in EU and NATO missions 
than Austria for instance. The complexity of decision-making on peacekeeping issues means 
it is unfeasible to hold all variables constant but one, national roles. It is highly unlikely to 
find two ‘perfectly matched’ small states with wide disparities in roles (Bennett and Elman, 
2007:175). Nonetheless, the selection of Austria and Belgium controls for some important 
variables including state size, geographical location, political system, level of EU integration 
as well as economic development. Controlling for these variables will strengthen the claim 
that roles were at play in the Austrian and Belgian decision-making and that differences in 
peacekeeping behaviour can be explained by the different roles that informed governmental 
decisions. 
Austria differs from Belgium in one significant respect; it is constitutionally neutral. 
Differences in peacekeeping behaviour can easily be attributed to Austria’s neutrality and 
Belgium’s deeper commitment to military alliances, most significantly through NATO 
membership. Small neutral countries are argued to contribute more peacekeeping troops than 
larger, but also non-neutral small states, because their commitment to peaceful resolution of 
conflicts makes them well equipped to fulfil the requirements of impartiality and limited use 
of force traditionally demanded by peacekeeping. In designing this project, the option of 
holding the security policy variable constant by replacing Belgium with another small neutral 
state like Ireland was considered. This was rejected, however, because it would have 
restricted the generalisation of the findings to the smaller population of small neutral states. 
The project intends to advance our understanding of the foreign policy and peacekeeping 
behaviours of the whole category of small states, the majority of which are not neutral. The 
second option of abandoning the case of Austria was also ruled out because, in order to 
understand small states’ evolving approach to peacekeeping, it is critical to investigate how 
neutrality has been reinterpreted to deal with developments in international peacekeeping. 
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The empirical sections of this research show that it no longer makes sense to demarcate 
neutral and non-neutral small states into distinct categories. Over time, both have displayed 
foreign policy patterns typical of the other category. Finally, the security policy variable is 
closely intertwined with small states’ national roles. Thus, the inclusion of both a neutral and 
non-neutral small state is justified as it introduces variations on the variable of interest. 
Equally significant to this project is the notion of variation within cases. A key 
criterion for selecting Austria and Belgium is that each display wide variations in the number 
of troops deployed over time and from one mission to another. Taking into account these 
fluctuations allows the identifications of turning points illustrative of significant increases or 
reductions in the number of troops deployed. Interesting questions emerge as to why, for 
example, Austria and Belgium remained on the side-line of a mission they were expected to 
participate in large numbers given its status as a significant contributor of peacekeeping 
troops. The following case studies are meant to explain such puzzles by focusing on the 
relationship between the cases’ national roles and important shifts in the doctrine and 
practice of international peacekeeping. In sum, within cases comparisons provide insights 
into the evolution of one small state’s approach to peacekeeping while comparing Austria 
with Belgium will allow for inferences to be made about the category of small states as a 
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This chapter sought to address some of the methodological questions surrounding the 
use of the role approach to empirically understand the political behaviours of states in IR. It 
also positions itself as a modest contribution to the ongoing collective effort in the role 
theory scholarship dedicated to making the role approach more systematic. The strength of 
the methodology presented here is that it unfolds in multiple stages and incorporates multiple 
cases, permitting a satisfactory level of depth and breadth to be achieved simultaneously. It 
allows the researcher to investigate the historical record as well as the more immediate 
context and to reconstruct events across several cases. Therefore, not only is it highly suited 
to the demands of the theoretical framework, it also provides scope to construct thick 
accounts and undertake theory-building. 
A final note should be made on the sources used for the empirical analyses. I relied 
primarily on secondary literature. The political history literature used in stage 1 was 
particularly useful in that it often refers to the roles of Austria and Belgium in a historical 
perspective without systematically using the tools of role theory. Given that historical and 
 
74 
process-tracing research require the collection of large amounts of data, I have 
complemented the findings extracted from secondary material using media accounts, 
parliamentary records, states’ official press releases and officials’ spontaneous declarations. 
This wide range of sources allowed me to corroborate initial findings. Tansey (2007) rightly 
argues that elite interviewing is an important source of data when undertaking process-
tracing because it ‘frequently involves political developments at the highest level of 
government, and elite actors will thus often be critical sources of information’. 
Consequently, one methodological weakness of this research lies in the absence of evidence 
drawn from Austrian and Belgian elites themselves. This drawback was partially offset by 
following the initiative of role theorists (Below, 2016) and examining state leaders’ UN 
speeches to identify the role inclination of an incumbent government. When it came to the 
specific decisions, I was primarily interested in retracing the course of events and how 
different actors socially positioned their states towards a particular crisis. I searched for 
declarations by representatives of international institutions and leading states to gain a sense 
how they defined the situation and what demands they were making about who should act. I 
turned my attention to reports of the force generation process, and previous bilateral and 
multilateral meetings, to gain access to these declarations. Then, I examined press articles 
reporting spontaneous declarations by small states’ elites who were expected to respond to 
these demands and to rely on roles to justify their decisions. I also consulted parliamentary 
documents to discern other domestic voices expressing views about the role(s) the state 
should be playing in the context of an ongoing international effort to address a crisis. I also 
referred to official press releases from the governments under study to reconstruct the role 
evolution of these elites as a decision was approaching. The absence of interviews was also 
addressed through the use of Wikileaks documents3. Scholars of political science have been 
reticent to use the information revealed by the leaks as evidence in research because of 
concerns over selection bias, the quality and unknown provenance of the information as well 
as the harms its publication could cause (Michael, 2015:178). However, the documents 
proved to be a valuable source of data on the diplomatic relationships between Washington 
and both small states. Significantly, they provided essential contextual details and exposed 
some of the demands and expectations that a great power is likely to generate regarding the 









3 The use of WikiLeaks in the case studies are referenced in text as “Embassy Vienna” or “Embassy 









This chapter forms the basis for the next two case studies and serves two analytical 
purposes. First, it provides an overview of Austria’s post-war foreign policy by reviewing 
key foreign policy traditions and by identifying the roles that successive Austrian 
governments have sought to play on the international scene. Early connections are made 
between uncovered roles and their effects on different Austrian governments’ decisions to 
engage in international peacekeeping missions (see table 4). Second, it provides the 
researcher with a repertoire of roles that one expects Austrian policy-makers to refer to and 
draw on when socialised by external agents in the two peacekeeping episodes explored in the 
case studies. 
 
5.2 Tradition of Neutrality 
 
The tradition of neutrality forms the main pillar of Austria’s post-war foreign policy. 
Austria was liberated from Nazi rule in April 1945. A period of Allied occupation followed 
during which the political elite progressively returned from exile to organise the recovery 
and negotiate an independence treaty with the occupying powers4. Ten years of negotiation 
culminated on 15 May 1955 when the State Treaty was signed, and Austria officially 
regained its independence as a sovereign state. The Treaty was only made possible as 
Austrian leaders agreed to the Soviet Union’s demand of implementing a neutral status based 
on the Swiss model (Gebhard, 2013:283). The Soviets wanted to turn Austria into ‘a buffer 
state’ to prevent close cooperation with Germany and integration into Western military 
alliances (Bischof, 1995:126; 1999:141, 144, 147). For Austrian leaders, neutrality was the 
price to pay to end the occupation (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:98). 
The years following independence saw neutrality become the basis for a neutral role. 
In a conflict situation, neutrality legally entails an abstention from joining any one side. In 
peace times, a neutral state needs to ensure that neutrality remains credible by refraining to 
enter in military alliances, to station foreign troops on its territory or to open its airspace to 
military overflights (de Flers, 2012)5. Although the link between an emerging tradition of 
neutrality and a neutral role may be obvious, this chapter regards neutrality as ‘an essentially 
contested concept’ which is interpreted through the adoption of different roles (Devine, 2011 
 
4 In May 1945, the Allies reached an agreement on the division of Austria into four sectors. The Soviet 
Union controlled the East, the United States the North, the United Kingdom the South while the Tyrol 
and the Vorarlberg regions in the West were administered by France. 
5 For comprehensive analyses of the evolution of neutrality in Europe see Agius (2011); Agius and 






:335). As the Austrian case shows, a neutral role may be one of many roles enacted by states 
with a tradition of neutrality. Surprisingly, the neutral role does not figure in Holsti’s 
original typology. It is conceptualised by Thies (2012; 2013) who finds that the US and 
Israel sought a neutral role in their early statehood. Brummer and Thies (2015) also identify 
the neutral role as one of several role options available to the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) in the democratisation period following the Second World War. In the German 
context, the role’s guiding theme indicates ‘that no foreign policy action must be taken that 
jeopardized the prospects of bringing Western and Eastern Germany back together’ 
(Brummer and Thies, 2015:281). Its goal was ‘to reunite a sovereign Germany and afterward 
keep it out of the military blocs of both the west and the east’ (Brummer and Thies, 
2015:281). Their use of the neutral role is instructive since the German question is closely 
intertwined, and bears many similarities, with the emerging foreign policy of Austria. 
Significantly, the neutral role had a much more profound effect on the Austrian case than on 
the German one. It permitted Austria to defend its newly regained independence and re- 
claim international status after the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919 and 
assimilation into the Third Reich in 1938. Thies (2012) expects that ‘new states will often 
seek a neutral or nonaligned role upon entry into the international system’ as a strategy of 
survival designed to avoid entanglements that may drag the state into war (p.39). This 
expectation is substantiated by the case of post-war Austria as a neutral role was sought 
primarily to diminish the risks of entrapment (Gärtner, 1998:66). 
Thies (2013) also accurately asserts that the roles of a novice state like Austria will 
largely be ascribed by its socialisers due to limited capabilities. In fact, the neutral role 
developed as Austrian leaders confronted the dilemma of upholding the country’s 
sovereignty in the face of Soviet and Western pressures as tensions between East and West 
intensified. Its main advocate was Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab of the Austrian People’s 
party (ÖVP). In the years after the State Treaty, his intention was to position Austria at 
equidistance between the two superpowers. The United States, Great Britain and the FRG 
had been highly critical of Raab’s independent course with Moscow during the State Treaty 
negotiations and had long opposed the neutrality option. It was perceived ‘to be the first step 
into pro-Soviet non-alignment’ (Rathkolb, 2001). Therefore, Western powers applied 
significant pressures before and after the State Treaty to orient neutrality towards the West. 
The Eisenhower administration only accepted neutrality on the condition that Austria would 
be secretly rearmed with extensive US military aid and technical assistance (Rathkolb, 
1995:133). Soon after independence, US shipments of military equipment intensified; a 
cooperation which was formalised with the signing of the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP) in June 1955 (Harrod, 2010:225). NATO saw Austrian neutrality to be performing an 
important function creating the exception that Austria should create ‘its own army that could 
easily hold western Austria in the service of the alliance in any conflict’ (Harrod, 2010:220). 
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FRG’s Chancellor Adenauer and Raab differed dramatically in their foreign policy objectives 
(Gärdner, 1998). As a fierce proponent of Western integration, Adenauer demanded Austria 
to remain ‘absolutely loyal to the West and suspicious of the Soviet Union’ throughout the 
negotiations (Rathkolb, 1995:131). Attempts by the West to cast Austria into a secret ally 
role resonated positively with a number of domestic actors and were, therefore, influential in 
the implementation of anti-Soviet policies (Rathkolb, 1995:136). In February 1956, Austria 
joined the Council of Europe, and in October 1956, Vienna offered a pro-Western response 
to the Hungarian crisis by providing humanitarian assistance and asylum to refugees while 
criticising the Soviet repression of the uprising (Rathkolb, 2001). It must be noted that the 
Austria’s reaction to the crisis is the origin of a humanitarian tradition closely intertwined 
with neutrality. As more than 170 000 Hungarians sought refuge in Austria, officials in 
Vienna began to see it as Austria’s responsibility to assist people repressed by their regimes 
and in need of humanitarian aid. This humanitarian actor role permitted a new sovereign 
state to walk the fine line between Soviet accusations of breaching neutrality by acting as a 
‘springboard’ for Hungarian dissidents and embracing its Western values by showing 
solidarity with the suffering of Hungarian people.6 
In fact, Raab made significant efforts to maintain a neutral role by counter-balancing 
Western inclinations with attempts to normalise relations with Moscow. He believed that a 
neutral role was essential to preserve Austria’s political independence and territorial integrity 
from Soviet interference. The violent repression of the Hungarian revolution on Austria’s 
border emphasised the Kremlin’s readiness to respond with force to any threats likely to 
jeopardise its security interests and sphere of influence (Rathkolb, 1995:137). The 
dependence of Austrian sovereignty on Soviet goodwill justified a neutral role. The Raab 
government was extremely cautious to avoid any action that could be perceived by Moscow 
as a threat. Moscow effectively socialised Austria into a neutral role; a process which 
influenced the Austrian decision not to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
when created in 1957. This role also affected Raab’s preference for joining the UN in 1955 
as opposed to formally integrating Austria into Western institutions (Rathkolb, 1995:137). 
This underlines the origin of a close connection between a neutral role and Austria’s 










6 The Austrian tradition of giving asylum to refugees is disputed. For a discussion of Austrian 
credentials as an asylum country see Granville, 2006 and Rathkolb, 2001.
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5.3 Tradition of Independence 
 
By 1958, growing US opposition to the policy of equidistance became a significant 
dilemma for the Raab government. Pro-Soviet rhetoric, abstention on the issue of China’s 
UN membership and a visit to Moscow by the Austrian Defence Minister, damaged relations 
with Washington (Rathkolb, 1995:140). This situation worsened as Raab argued that US 
military flights transiting through Austrian airspace in the context of the US intervention in 
the Lebanon crisis were violations of neutrality. The Chancellor’s decision to retract transit 
rights previously granted to the US as a secret ally, dealt bilateral relations with Washington 
another harmful blow (Rathkolb, 1995:144). The Eisenhower administration rejected 
Austria’s neutral role, making its advocacy increasingly untenable. This dilemma forced the 
Austrian foreign policy elite to reinterpret neutrality through the performance of new roles. 
Raab himself conceded that ‘his idea of remaining equidistant from both superpowers had 
not really worked’ (Rathkolb, 1995:144). A ‘lack of conviction’ about neutrality in the early 
years created ‘inconsistencies, disloyalties and dubious morality, all of which affected the 
country’s precarious position between East and West’ (Gehler, 2005:136) 
Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) became the driving force behind establishing a tradition of 
independence and activism when appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1959. His tenures 
as Foreign Minister until 1966, and as Chancellor between 1970 and 1983, were marked by 
his personal influence on positioning Austria as an active independent, mediator-integrator 
and humanitarian actor. Throughout the cold war, Kreisky’s leadership permitted Austria to 
play an increased number of roles conveying an image of Austria as a ‘peaceful small state 
with altruistic intentions’ and ‘a commitment to building bridges’ (Gebhard, 2013:285). 
These roles helped Kreisky translate into practice his active interpretation of neutrality which 
fell between the passive model of Switzerland and the Swedish policy of non-alignment 
(Höll, 1994). The role promotion pursued by Kreisky corroborates Thies’s observation that 
‘as states mature in the system, they generally drop the neutral role in favour of a more active 
stance in world politics’ (p.116). 
Kreisky’s primary commitment lay in an independent foreign policy course (Höll, 
1994:34). It originated from his rejection of a secret ally role which expected Austria to meet 
the strategic interests of NATO through armament and alignment in case of conflict with the 
Soviet Union. His objective was to disentangle Austria from any military commitment as 
foundation for cultivating an active dialogue between East and West in the aim of fostering 
détente. Kreisky pursued an active foreign policy by seeking a comprehensive approach to 
détente. It aimed to improve bilateral relations with Austria’s Soviet neighbours, while 
maintaining dialogue with Khrushchev. This marked a break from Raab’s limited strategy 
which prioritised top-level negotiations with Moscow (Rathkolb, 1995:145). These regional 
initiatives allowed Kreisky to position himself as trusted intermediary between Moscow and 
Washington. He was effective at minimising suspicions with the Soviet Union, while his 
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‘Altanticist’ orientation made him a reliable interlocutor from the perspective of US officials 
(Höll, 1994:34). Between 1958 and 1963, the ‘Kreisky channel’ was solicited multiple times 
to arrange secret meetings and pass on information in the context of the Berlin crisis (Kofler, 
2006:180). During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy was advised to meet Kreisky 
for his analysis of Soviet intentions, and his recommendation on a missile trade was 
considered by the National Security Council (Kofler, 2006:180). A combination of 
independence, ‘mediation functions’ and ‘an active program to extend diplomatic relations’ 
testifies that Kreisky acted upon an active independent role (Holsti, 1970). However, the 
Foreign Minister was only able to perform this role as it became accepted by both 
superpowers. Whereas the Eisenhower administration fought against Austria playing any role 
toward an East-West rapprochement, Kennedy was far more sympathetic to an active 
interpretation of neutrality. The fact that Moscow did not perceive Austria to be fully 
integrated into the West also worked in favour of an active independent role. 
This conception of Austria during Kreisky’s term as Foreign Minister was 
concomitant with the UN launching its largest peacekeeping mission of the cold war in 1960, 
the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC). It provided Kreisky with an 
opportunity to advance the South Tyrol issue at the UN7. While Austria’s precarious 
geopolitical position made the deployment of an armed military contingent difficult, Austrian 
officials eventually agreed in September 1960 to send a medical unit as an alternative 
(Schmidl, 2015:721). This first experiment meant that Austria found it problematic to decline 
the UN request for a troop contribution when the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) was created in 1964. Before that, the Austrian government had no plans to 
pursue additional deployments. The UN demand for a 700-strong battalion was unfeasible in 
the eyes of Austrian leaders considering that Austria remained without legal provision for the 
deployment of military troops on foreign soil (Schmidl, 2015:723). Once again, a medical 
unit appeared to fit Austria’s roles as neutral and active independent better. 
The Austrian failure to negotiate an association agreement with the EEC in the late 
1960s largely accounts for the decision to intensify and geographically widen the foreign 
policy of activism (Höll, 1994:37). As he became Chancellor in 1970, Kreisky sought to 
perform an active independent role on a global scale. Austria’s active foreign policy was 
multilateralised through new diplomatic contacts with leaders of developing countries and 
active participation in international organisations (Schmidl, 2015:720). A strong 
commitment to performing an active independent role at the UN in the 1970s contributed to 
improving Austria’s reputation within the organisation. This role pattern led to Austria 
serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time in 1973- 
 
7 The South Tyrol region has been part of Italy since the end of World War One when it was seized 
from Austria as the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed. It has a large German-speaking population 
and is subject of a long-standing territorial dispute between the two Alpine countries. In 1960, Kreisky 
was determined to bring the issue in front of UN General Assembly. 
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74. It also induced a number of peacekeeping deployments to UN missions. The election of 
Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary General in 1971 ensured support for Kreisky’s preferred 
role inside the UN. In 1972, Waldheim pressed for Austria to increase its contribution to 
UNFICYP with a battalion of 300 troops (Schmidl, 2015:725). Following the Yom Kippur 
War in 1973, the Kreisky government responded positively to a UN request, deploying 602 
men to the second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II). The number of Austrian peacekeeping 
troops increased tenfold within two years of a globally-oriented active foreign policy and 
associated roles (Schmidl, 2015:725). In June 1974, the troops serving in UNEF II 
transferred to Syria, where the Austrian contingent became the largest serving in the new UN 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). It is interesting to note that, in 1974, Kreisky 
refused to dispatch three battalions to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) because 
Austria risked compromising its roles as active independent and neutral by taking part in an 
operation perceived to be outside traditional peacekeeping (Schmidl, 2015:726). 
The Austrian involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts should also be understood in 
light of Kreisky’s ambition to mediate in North-South conflicts. His activism in the Israeli- 
dominated Socialist International and his commitment to Palestinian rights contributed to the 
Chancellor’s perception that Austria had a responsibility to fulfil ‘special tasks’ to assist 
Israelis and Palestinians reconcile their differences (Holsti, 1970:262). The role conception 
of Austria as a mediator-integrator motivated Kreisky to actively work towards the Middle 
East peace process. He led the international reaction to the Yom Kippur War, organised fact- 
finding missions and built trust between Israeli and Palestinian leaders to facilitate dialogue 
(Gebhard, 2013:286). It should be added that the foreign policy led by Kreisky was founded 
on, and strengthened, the humanitarian tradition of Austria. He believed that détente should 
also contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in the Soviet Union and that the 
North had a responsibility in implementing economic policies conducive to poverty 
alleviation and the respect of human rights throughout the developing world (Höll, 1994:39). 
These beliefs were at the root of his conception of Austria as a humanitarian actor dedicated 





5.4 European Tradition Rediscovered 
 
International and domestic shifts during the 1980s challenged the continuing 
performance of an active independent and mediator-integrator roles. The end of east-west 
détente marked by the election of Ronald Reagan, the Teheran hostage crisis and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan generated a constraining environment for Austria’s mediating 
function (Höll, 1994:50). Regionally, the EEC initiated in 1985 a new integration phase 
aimed at eliminating non-tariffs barriers and creating an internal market of goods, capital, 
services and people (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:95). As a small industrialised nation, Austria is 
heavily reliant on exports to European markets (Kaiser, 1995). Non-participation raised the 
prospects of negative economic consequences in the form of competitive disadvantage. 
Moreover, the prospect of the EEC and the US failing to reach an agreement at the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) discredited economic 
protectionism as viable economic strategy (Müller, 2009:8). Growing economic 
interdependence contributed to the belief that maintaining independent-oriented roles was 
increasingly infeasible. Domestically, the growing gap between new international realities 
and Kreisky’s roles generated much contestation from the conservative (ÖVP) opposition 
(Höll, 1994:50). Domestic criticisms gained additional traction as Austria was experiencing a 
period of low economic growth and high inflation, which the opposition attributed to an 
overregulated service sector and a large nationalised industry sustained by Kreisky’s policies 
(Kaiser, 1995:412). Even the SPÖ-led coalition which replaced the Kreisky government in 
1983 could not continue performing prevailing roles in this shifting international 
environment. An active and global foreign policy was bound to be downgraded. 
The transition to an ÖVP-led coalition following the 1986 federal elections was a 
key factor behind a role change in the second half of the decade. New Foreign Minister Alois 
Mock (ÖVP) was determined to re-evaluate Austria’s roles in line with emerging global 
demands by drawing on the country’s European tradition. From early statehood, Austria has 
sought to maintain its sovereignty through neutrality while simultaneously pursuing ‘a policy 
of informal, that is, partial economic integration’ with Western Europe, conferring Austria a 
distinct European orientation (Gehler, 1998:197). In 1959, the Raab government announced 
participation in the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This 
option avoided isolation by continuing to profit from trade with EEC members, while 
evading Soviet pressures and the legal requirement of downgrading neutrality (Gehler and 
Kaiser, 1997:88). It was also hoped that EFTA participation would bring Austria closer to, 
and facilitate, a future EEC accession. However, in 1967, the EEC rejected a European role 
for Austria when Italy vetoed an association agreement. It was not until 1972 that a free trade 
agreement was signed preserving Austria’s economic interests, permitting Kreisky to keep 
Austria away from full membership as he believed that it would prevent Austria from 
performing a mediating role between east and west (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:90). 
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By 1988, the regional drive towards deeper integration solidified the belief that any 
solution short of full membership would be insufficient at preventing serious comparative 
disadvantages. Given that EEC policies would have direct consequences on the economic 
performance of Austria, Vienna could no longer afford remaining outside common decision- 
making institutions (Kaiser, 1995:412). Thus, economic incentives were most significant in 
motivating the government of Frank Vranitsky to formally apply for membership in July 
1989. However, a regional subsystem collaborator (RSC) role had to be articulated in order 
to demonstrate that Austria had a rightful place in the integration project. Under pressure 
from the Commission to enhance the compatibility of neutrality with existing Treaties, the 
elite endeavoured to depict Austria as making ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperative 
efforts with other states to build wider communities’ (Devine, 2011:348; Holsti, 1970:267). 
A rhetorical shift discrediting neutrality as a meaningful foreign policy principle was 
undertaken (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006:102-103). The new narrative presented neutrality as 
having been unfairly imposed, and indicated that Austria had been ‘always European’ 
(Agius, 2011:378, original emphasis). Foreign Minister Mock was the main advocate of a 
RSC role arguing that Austria as ‘a European core country’ would not be an obstacle to 
integration. Entry negotiations took place simultaneously as the Treaty of Maastricht 
materialised envisioning the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Anxious not to derail negotiations, the Austrian government announced in 1992 its readiness 
‘to participate in the CFSP and in its dynamic development actively and in a spirit of 
solidarity’ (Kaiser, 1995:421). From then on, solidarity became the cornerstone of Austrian 
foreign policy. Its inclusion in the 1994 White Paper signalled that Austria was performing a 
RSC role committed to fully participating in the development of the EU as a security actor. 
Reassured that neutrality remained a significant element of security policy (Agius, 
2011:378), 66.6% of the public voted in favour of membership in a referendum in June 1994. 
Austria officially became a member of the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1995. 
 
5.5 International Engagement 
 
The re-conception of Austria as a RSC took on added significance as the Iron Curtain 
was brought down by the events of 1989-91. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
confirmed the perception that cold war roles had become redundant. As Plassnik (2013) 
notes, for Austria, the end of the cold-war ‘marked the end of its beloved self-definition as a 
builder of bridges and a mediator between East and West’ (p.55). Austria confronted its most 
significant dilemma since the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. While a RSC role guided 
Vienna’s evolving relationship with the EEC (soon to become the EU), the roles that Austria 
would come to play, and be demanded to perform, vis-à-vis Washington and the transatlantic 
alliance remained uncertain. Both EU rapprochement and Washington’s perception that 
Austria no longer occupied a strategically significant position were challenges to Austrian 
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policy-makers attempting to maintain a constructive partnership with the new hegemon 
(Bischof, 2013:17). Institutional transformations within the EU, NATO and the UN, 
accelerated by international crises in the Balkans and the Middle East, added further 
pressures on Austria to redefine its neutrality and find new roles in a post-cold war context 
(Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003:440). 
Austria did not confront the new international system through isolation. Its post-cold 
war doctrine evolved out of the perception that ‘the current threats to Austria’s security 
cannot be countered by any single country, but only through international cooperation within 
an international (reliable) security partnership’ (Hauser, 2006:211). The logic which had 
induced a RSC role was broadened to a global level, encouraging the conception of Austria 
as a global system collaborator (GSC). Both roles contributed to the re-evaluation of its 
international position away from neutrality towards an alliance-free position (Hauser, 
2006:2011). Absent from Holsti’s typology, the categorisation of GSC is formulated by 
Chafetz et al. (1996) to capture the role that a number of states pursued in a post-cold war 
setting. States adopting a GSC role display ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperate with 
other states to support the emerging global order’ (Chafetz et al., 1996:734). Evidence of 
Austria acting as a GSC can be found in its evolving relationship with the UN. As bipolarity 
froze the peace and security functions of the UN, the organisation became the institutional 
platform of choice for Vienna to enact its neutral and active independent roles. Austria 
developed a solid UN tradition evident from its reputation as a reliable UN peacekeeper 
(Plassnik, 2013:81). The rebirth of the UN as a peace and security actor offered Austria an 
opportunity to draw on its UN tradition and introduce a new momentum for multilateral 
diplomacy (Plassnik, 2013:86). In terms of peacekeeping, this translated into a policy of 
participation in as many operations as possible even if it meant making token contributions 
(Schmidl, 2015:727). An additional sign of Austria developing a GSC role lies in its 
commitment to an UN mandate as a precondition for supporting and/or participating in 
international deployments (Gärtner, 2017). It highlights the value of a multilateral order for 
Austria, and its determination to preserve it. The Austrian response to the Gulf War should 
be understood in terms of the Vranitsky government being motivated by a GSC role. It was 
only after the UN sanctioned the regime of Saddam Hussein and authorised a military 
intervention that Austria permitted US aircrafts to fly over Austrian territory on their way to 
the Gulf (Bischof, 2013:22). Underscoring the re-interpretation of neutrality through a GSC 
role by the Austrian leadership during the crisis, President Klestil remarked that ‘when the 
members of the United Nations act against an aggressor, there can be no question of 
neutrality, only of solidarity’ (quoted in Lahodynsky, 1992). Austria played the same role in 
1999 when the government of Chancellor Klima refused to open Austrian airspace for the 
NATO intervention against Serbia due to the absence of UN authorisation (Bischof, 
2013:28). This time, however, support for the multilateral order came at the expense of 
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solidarity with Western partners attracting much US criticism. 
In 1995, Austria joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); a security system 
designed to enhance military coordination and interoperability amongst NATO members. 
Participation committed Austria to ‘supporting the tasks of NATO’s PfP, including 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace enforcements’ (Hauser, 2006:211). Accession to the 
Partnership signalled an important change for Austrian participation in peace operations 
(Schmidl, 2015:727). It underscored that increased participation in peace operations would 
become a priority and demonstrated Austria’s readiness to assist the post-cold war 
transformation of NATO by assigning its armed forces far more peacekeeping 
responsibilities than ever before (Schmidl, 2013:113). Moreover, instability in the Balkans 
was a direct threat to Austria’s security and commercial interests. The increased engagement 
of NATO and the EU in the region motivated the Austrian decision to perform a wider range 
of peacekeeping activities as part of these frameworks (Schmidl, 2015:729). Again, national 
interests have shaped Austria’s role evolution. In 1995, a logistical unit was sent to NATO’s 
Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This NATO commitment was 
extended after the mission transitioned to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 1996. In 1999, 
the decision was made to assign a battalion task force to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
(Schmidl, 2015:729; 2013). Importantly, the enforcement nature of the IFOR, SFOR and 
KFOR missions including mandates to use force for non-defensive purposes did not become 
an obstacle to participation (Neuhold, 2013:195). 
The perception of many that the PfP was an intermediary stage to full membership 
sparked an intense domestic debate in 1998 on whether NATO membership should be 
included as an option in the report from which a new security doctrine was being developed. 
At the heart of the debate was the question of whether Austria should complement its post- 
cold war roles with an Atlantic partner role. The role involved committing to mutual 
assistance with NATO members and to common security endeavours in the geographical 
areas identified by the Alliance. Determining Austria’s roles within the emerging European 
security architecture generated intense horizontal contestations amongst the SPÖ and ÖVP 
members of the coalition headed by Chancellor Klima. As junior partner, the ÖVP supported 
an Atlantic partner role based on the ambition of former Foreign Minister Mock to avoid 
post-cold war isolation by fully integrating Austria in the West (Bischof, 2013:22; 
Lahodynsky, 1992). Incoming Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) became the main 
advocate of the Atlantic partner role declaring that the principle of neutrality would have to 
be abandoned in favour of solidarity. His position was shared by many in the ministries of 
foreign affairs and defence who regarded participation in the PfP as a transitional stage 
(Gärtner and Höll, 2003: 190). Schüssel’s inclination towards this role is also apparent from 
his belief that NATO and the US remain relevant security providers (Schüssel, 1998). 
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On the other hand, Social Democrats (SPÖ) along with the Greens, contested an 
Atlantic partner role on the ground that Austria should not be affiliated with what they 
regarded as an extension of US hegemonic influence in Europe (Bischof, 2013). For them, 
further rapprochement to NATO would undermine the peace credentials of Austria as the 
organisation encourages military expansions and arms races (Benke, 2003: 283; Devine, 
2009). The Greens remained committed to an active independent role by suggesting that 
neutrality was ‘a modern idea, since neutral states can fulfil important functions as active 
mediators in a conflict’ (Van der Bellen quoted in Perrault, 1999). Furthermore, the public 
played an important part in the debate and in wider discussions about Austria’s role in the 
emerging European security architecture. While the political elite, especially the 
conservatives, had gradually narrowed the interpretation of neutrality to its military core 
since the mid-1980s, the public had remained deeply attached to its traditional interpretation. 
Neutrality had become the central element of what it meant to be Austrian. This feature goes 
a long way in explaining public opposition to any proposal of abandoning neutrality in 
favour of NATO membership. Moreover, the war in ex-Yugoslavia contributed to 
strengthening the public’ pro-neutrality attitudes (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003:440). 
Ultimately, aware that the public continued to favour neutral and active independent roles, 
and that negative electoral results would follow if these were not sustained, the SPÖ shut the 
door to NATO membership by excluding it from the option report of April 1998 (Ferreira-
Pereira, 2006:111). 
The 2001 Security and Defence Doctrine calls for ‘Austrian solidarity and active 
participation’ in institutional endeavours to provide the EU with the means necessary to act 
externally. Yet, debates over NATO membership exposed the continuing relevance of 
traditional roles as held by the left of the political class and the public. As the EU deepened 
security and defence integration, the inconsistency of maintaining a neutral and an active 
independent role for domestic consumption have become increasingly unsustainable. By 
1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam had laid out the legal basis for a Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), including plans to integrate the Western European Union (WEU), 
and its mutual defence clause, into the EU and to enhance its capacity to respond to 
international crises. The Petersberg tasks envisioned the Union taking on responsibilities 
across the full spectrum of crisis management from low intensity activities such as conflict 
prevention to traditional peacekeeping, to separation of parties and peace enforcement 
through the use of force (Hauser, 2006:216; Devine, 2011:351). Austria subscribed to the 
entire scope of the Petersberg tasks (Gebhard, 2013:291). In 2003, defence reforms aimed to 
prepare the armed forces ‘to participate in the whole spectrum of international operations, 
from robust combat missions to traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance’ 
(Schmidl, 2013:116). Participation in more demanding tasks was framed and justified in 
terms of peacekeeping and crisis management as a way to appease domestic concerns 
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(Ferreira-Pereira, 2006:105). Nonetheless, Plassnik (2013) argues that ‘the question whether 
… Austria would assist in EU actions as specified in the ‘Petersberg Tasks’, without an 
explicit mandate by the UN Security Council’ remains the most significant dilemma for 
successive governments (p.81). If this scenario materialised, it would force decision-makers 
to choose whether to perform a RSC or GSC. This underlines that, as Austria seeks to play an 
increasing number of roles in a post-cold war system, inconsistencies amongst them are 
likely to arise. 
Proposals to insert a mutual defence clause into an EU Treaty were even more 
challenging to Austria’s roles. A RSC role predisposed Austria towards accepting an EU- 
WEU merger. However, a neutral role was incompatible with, and might have made it 
impossible for Austria to agree to, a mutual defence clause as it would have implied 
membership in a military alliance. Again, the public was the main carrier of the neutral role 
accounting for its opposition to a mutual defence clause (Devine, 2011:357). The 
governments of European neutrals, under the leadership of Ireland, succeeded in shaping the 
final wording of the Amsterdam Treaty in a way that accommodated their neutrality policies 
(Hauser, 2006, Devine, 2011:358). Nonetheless, the subsequent Nice and Lisbon Treaties 
intended to transform the EU into a more assertive international actor through expanding the 
Petersberg tasks, the creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) in defence and the 
re-introduction of a mutual defence clause. Although these provisions were in fundamental 
contradiction with Austrian neutrality, pressures to adapt made it unfeasible for the elite to 
reject them. This effectively solidified Austria into a RSC role, side-lining its neutral 
position, yet without fully relinquishing it due to domestic constraints. The elite performed a 
balancing act between professing solidarity, and seeking coordination, with European 
partners in the context of the CSDP while assuring pro-neutrality constituencies at home that 
Austria remained a neutral state (de Flers, 2012). This situation resulted in the elite adopting 
the principle of ‘solidarity within Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe’ (Devine, 
2011:357). This formula became the basis for active participation in EU operations. In 1995, 
a police contribution was made to the EU administration in Bosnia Herzegovina. Austria was 
one of the largest contributors to both EUFOR in Bosnia. In 2003, attempts were made to 
meet EU ambitions by making meaningful contributions to three crisis management 
operations, EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rezac, 2003). 
In 2008, Austria made a significant deployment to one of the most challenging EU missions; 
EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (see chapter 6). Finally, Austria contributed 
elements to EU’s ‘battle groups’ in 2011 and 2012 which has been interpreted as further 







The examination of Austrian foreign policy traditions revealed that Austria has 
performed numerous roles in the international system despite its small size and policy of 
permanent neutrality. These have shifted over time as successive governments responded to 
emerging foreign policy dilemmas. Importantly, initial traditions have continued to influence 
Austria’s roles and foreign policy well beyond the early years of statehood, as evident with 
the neutral role which remains highly significant in shaping Austria’s relationship with 
European institutions (de Flers, 2012:2). They have remained part of a role set albeit in a less 
dominant way. This chapter also emphasised that the ways Austria has conceived itself since 
independence motivated active participation in international peacekeeping. We are now 
equipped with a pool of roles expected to be influential in the decision-making of Austrian 
governments over recent peacekeeping deployments as Austria seeks to increase its 
participation in peacekeeping operations in the framework of NATO, EU and UN missions 
(Hauser, 2006:239). The identification of Austria’s foreign policy roles created expectations 
regarding the type of peacekeeping, and the institutional framework under which Austrian 
troops were likely to operate. While the neutral, active independent and/or humanitarian 
roles predispose Austria toward traditional peacekeeping under UN command, a GSC and/or 
RSC roles may indicate a commitment to supporting both the UN, the EU and NATO in their 
evolutions towards more demanding tasks. There appears to be a linkage between a RSC role 
and Austrian troops performing the peacekeeping tasks demanded by, and necessary to, the 
development of the Union as an international actor. These are only expectations requiring 
further empirical evidence to be refined by the following case studies. It is worth noting that 
the fluidity of modern peacekeeping rules means that Austria is likely to find itself in 
position of asymmetry in relation to new peacekeeping actors. As Austria pursued an 
increasing number of roles over the years, the prospect of inter-role conflict has also been 
raised, in turn, generating uncertainty regarding peacekeeping behaviour. The ways Austrian 
policy-makers discursively adapt existing roles and justify the adoption of new ones must be 
investigated further in light of current peacekeeping dilemmas. Whether a neutral, GSC or 
RSC role will motivate future deployments is an open and empirical question. It is one likely 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis given that the changing nature of peacekeeping has 
introduced additional variables into the decision-making process. Significantly, initial 
expectations of the EU developing into a civilian actor focused on projecting soft power did 
not materialise. The militarization of the EU’s external actions, already observable since the 
1999 Franco-British summit in St Malo with robust operations such as Artemis, has 
accelerated with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, thereby creating new dilemmas for 
European neutrals including Austria (Aguis, 2011:381-382). With regard to two missions 
characterised by shifting peacekeeping practices, the following chapters seek to determine 
which roles Austria has sought to play to navigate a shifting peacekeeping environment. 
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1964 - Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
medical unit 
1967 – Suez (UNTSO), 
military observers 
1972 - Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
one battalion 















1974 – Golan Heights 
(UNDOF), one battalion 
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1995 – EU Administration of 
Mostar, police officers 
1996 – Bosnia Herzegovina 
(IFOR/SFOR), logistical unit 
1996 - Bosnia Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), police officers 
1996 – Croatia (UNTAES), 
police officers 
1997 – Albania (Italian-led 
Operation Alba), company 
1999 – Kosovo 
(NATO/KFOR), battalion 
task force 
2002 – Afghanistan (ISAF), 
company 
2003 – DRC (EU, Artemis) 
2004 - Bosnia Herzegovina 
(EUFOR Althea) 
2005 – Afghanistan (ISAF), 
company 
2008 – Chad (EUFOR 
Chad/RCA) 
2009 - Chad/RCA 
(MINURCAT) 
2011 – Lebanon (UNIFIL), 
logistic contingent 
2011 – EU Battlegroups 
2012 – EU Battlegroups 










The EU authorised in late 2007 EUFOR Chad/CAR, a one-year military operation in 
eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)8 to address the security and 
humanitarian crisis emerging from the neighbour region of Darfur in Sudan. Being ‘the most 
ambitious’ and ‘largest autonomous military operation’ since launching the European 
Security and Defence Policy in 2003 (now the Common Security and Defence Policy), it is 
often regarded as a milestone in its development (Dijkstra, 2010:405 and IISS, 2008:1). 
EUFOR Chad was multinational with twenty three member states contributing a total of 
3700 troops. The geographical remoteness, difficult terrain, water scarcity and weak 
infrastructures characterising the area of operation made EUFOR Chad logistically and 
militarily challenging (Helly, 2009:342; IISS, 2008:1). Its ‘bridging’ function, whereby EU 
military capabilities were deployed to prepare the ground for a subsequent UN operation, set 
new standards in EU-UN cooperation for peacekeeping purposes (Dijkstra, 2010:405; Tardy, 
2005). EUFOR Chad has received ample scholarly attention identifying the EU’s motives for 
deploying forces in Africa, assessing whether the mission’s objectives have been met and if 
they have positively contributed to the development of the EU’s international actorness. 
France’s leadership role in generating momentum for the mission has also been thoroughly 
investigated (Mattelaer, 2008). However, research has overlooked what drove other 
European governments to participate in the mission, notwithstanding varying degrees of 
enthusiasm during the force generation process (Franke, 2010; Bono, 2011:39). 
On 9 November 2007, the Austrian Parliament voted in favour of contributing 160 
troops making Austria the fifth largest contributor after France, Poland, Ireland and Sweden. 
Most Austrian troops were special forces tasked to provide information about potential 
threats in the area of operation. It was the first time Austria deployed special forces to a 
peacekeeping operation (Zecha, 2015:327). In January 2008, twenty Austrian soldiers took 
part in the initial deployment with Swedish, Irish and French forces to prepare the arrival of 
EUFOR Chad’s main contingent which meant that ‘Austrians stood on the forefront of the 
mission’ (Brettner-Messler, 2008). Such meaningful commitment was unexpected 
considering Vienna’s limited military capabilities, neutrality, lack of knowledge about Chad 
and earlier reluctance to engage in Africa (Franke, 2010). Importantly, EUFOR Chad 
developed into an operation diverging from the traditional peacekeeping engagements in 
which Austria normally prefers to be involved. First, it operated in an environment where 
approximately 700 000 refugees had been driven out of their home by warfare between Su– 
 
8 As this chapter only addresses the security situation in the border region of Western Sudan and 
Eastern Chad and, therefore, overlooks the dimension of the operation in the Central African 
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Republic, the mission will be referred to as EUFOR Chad. 
danese and Chadian-backed militias (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:284). Thus, troops faced a 
highly volatile and dangerous environment. Second, the mission was granted an extensive 
mandate under Chapter VII (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:284). UN Security Council 
Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 authorised the EU ‘to take all necessary measures’ to 
protect civilians in danger, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide UN 
personnel with protection and freedom of movement. Third, EUFOR Chad deployed despite 
the lack of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties (Brettner- Messler, 2008). 
Finally, the operation’s neutrality remained ambivalent as EUFOR Chad was closely linked 
to France’s colonial legacy in Africa and French interest in the Chadian regime’s stability 
(Bono, 2011:37). 
EUFOR Chad constituted a more intrusive and robust undertaking than the 
peacekeeping of interposition Austrian troops had traditionally been accustomed to. 
Combined with French leadership, this is likely to put Austria in a position of weakness 
unable to have the voice within, and exercise the influence on, the mission it once could have 
under traditional peacekeeping. This chapter seeks to understand why the Austrian 
government made a sizable contribution when there was little to suggest that Austria would 
participate, let alone deploy special forces. While the official justification indicates that 
Austria was acting for humanitarian reasons, Brettner-Messler (2008) contends that the Chad 
engagement represented an expression of the country’s neutrality. Schmidl (2015) interprets 
the deployment as an attempt by Austrian officials to regain the prominent role the country 
had once played in international peacekeeping (p.730). Relatedly, Pohl (2014) argues that the 
Austrian government attempted ‘to show off its credentials as a security provider at a time 
when it geared up for a UN Security Council seat’ (Pohl, 2014:140). Along a similar line of 
argument, Franke (2010) proposes that the Austrian contribution to EUFOR Chad served a 
number of national self- interests. To better understand the motivations behind the 
government’s decision, the chapter analyses the underlying roles it articulated and selected 
throughout the force generation process. It specifically focuses on the influence exercised by 
France on European partners and potential contributors. The case is made that, had France 
not socialised Austria into roles conducive to a participation by promoting key peacekeeping 
norms and making direct demands, Vienna would have likely abstained from contributing so 
substantially. 
 
6.2 Background to EUFOR Chad, a Refugee Crisis 
 
The security instability in eastern Chad should be understood as an extension of the 
Darfur conflict which has unfolded since the 1980s owing to internal, yet interrelated, 
dynamics in both Sudan and Chad. Since gaining independence in 1960, Chad has been ruled 
by a succession of authoritarian regimes implementing discriminative measures against rival 
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ethnic minorities (Berg, 2008:10). The failure of Chadian leaders to bridge the divide 
between southern and northern communities has thrown the country ‘in a state a permanent 
conflict’ (Bono, 2011; ICG, 2008:20). Groups discriminated against have consequently 
sought refuge in the Darfur region where they have organised politically and militarily to 
oppose their government’s oppression (Bono, 2011:26). Current president, Idriss Déby of the 
Zaghawa ethnic group accessed power in November 1989 through a military coup disposing 
of Hissein Habré who had forced the Zaghawa people into exile and established a 
dictatorship favouring the members of his own Gorane ethnic group (Bono, 2011:27). Hopes 
for reconciliation and political openness following the overthrow of Habré were short-lived. 
Déby continued a policy of repression and increased his domination over the political life. 
Regionally, Déby entered an arrangement with the Sudanese government whereby Sudan 
would prohibit Chadian rebel groups from setting up base in Darfur while Déby similarly 
agreed not to support Sudanese dissidents in their rebellion against Khartoum (Bono, 
2011:27). Domestically, the most recent crisis erupted in 2005 after Déby amended the 
constitution to maintain himself as president for a third successive term (ICG, 2008:3). 
In 1987, the government of Sudan began implementing an ideological program 
designed to hand Arabs greater political power and autonomy over other non-Arab groups 
(Helly, 2009:364). As a result, conflict between Khartoum and a Darfur-based alliance of 
insurgents, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the 
Justice and Equality movement (JEM), ensued for the next twenty years. In 2003, violence 
intensified when the Sudanese government unleashed an offensive against rebels, most 
notably by deploying Janjaweed militias which killed, raped and looted rebels and civilians 
indiscriminately. By 2005, nearly two million Darfurians had been forced to flee their 
villages of which 200 000 travelled to Chad to find refuge (Bono, 2011:28). This shifted the 
attention of the international community to eastern Chad where the influx of Sudanese 
refugees altered the demographic makeup of the region and generated further instability 
(Churruca, 2015:218; Berg, 2009:57). Ethnic tensions arising from competition over 
resources, militia movements across the Chadian-Sudanese border, the militarisation of 
refugee camps and the resulting violence against civilian populations came to be seen as 
significant security threats (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2011:7; Churruca, 2015:218). From mid- 
2005, Déby began breaking the Chadian-Sudanese agreement by supporting JEM fighters, 
many of whom belonged to his Zaghawa ethnic group. The move was a response to internal 
pressures from Zaghawan members of the Chadian army who had become dissatisfied with 
Déby’s agreement with Sudan (Marchal, 2008:432). In retaliation, Khartoum provided 
Chadian opposition groups with resources and sanctuary in Darfur, from where to launch 
attacks against Déby’s regime (Marchal, 2009a:21). This was unsurprising given that Sudan 
had always intervened in Chadian affairs with the aim of establishing a friendly Turabist 
government (ICG, 2008:25). By 25 December 2005, N’Djamena and Khartoum were 
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unofficially at war, fighting each other by proxy in eastern Chad and causing unprecedented 
violence against civilian populations (ICG, 2008:23-26; Marchal, 2009a:21). 
By then, the international community had failed to act in time to prevent the crisis 
from escalating to regional level despite expressing concerns for the humanitarian crisis, UN 
resolutions against Khartoum and peace negotiations in October 2004 and February 2006 
(Darfur Peace Agreement). It was not until August 2006 that the UN acted decisively, 
passing Resolution 1706 which expanded the mandate of UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS 
authorised under resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005) to include a security presence in eastern 
Chad and CAR (Seibert, 2010:7). However, the plan envisioning the deployment of a hybrid 
African Union (AU)-UN peacekeeping force did not materialise immediately because of 
disagreements amongst international actors over whether the conflict in Darfur amounted to 
genocide requiring a robust UN military intervention. Additionally, Western governments 
were highly wary of another open-ended deployment at a time when interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were proving more complicated than expected (Le Monde, 1 July 
2008). While the EU had grown increasingly concerned with the aggravating humanitarian 
situation and supported an AU mission, its member states were disinclined to become direct 
contributors by placing boots on the ground (Bono, 2011:31). Importantly, Secretary-General 
Annan was averse to deploying UN troops because continuing militia confrontation and 
Déby’s refusal to accept a UN presence meant that the conditions for a UN operation were 
not being met. 
Following the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French president in May 2007, Paris 
began a diplomatic offensive advocating the deployment of an EU force which would 
provide a security umbrella to the political and humanitarian work of the UN (Mattelaer, 
2008:9). This option was politically acceptable to the Chadian government with which 
France maintained close ties. After a strong diplomatic push by France in Brussels from 
March 2007, European partners reached an initial agreement by August over the 
appropriateness of a EU mission. A month later, UN Resolution 1778, authorised a 
‘multinational presence’ consisting of the United Nations in the CAR and Chad 
(MINURCAT I) in charge of training Chadian police and a complementing EU presence to 
protect civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide protection to UN 
personnel (Styan, 2012:658). The EU deployment was both a humanitarian and security 
endeavour. 
 
6.3 The Austrian Domestic Context 
 
A Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) headed by Social Democrat (SPÖ) Chancellor Alfred 
Gusenbauer was sworn in on 11 January 2007, only two months prior to first hearing about 
the French proposal to act in eastern Chad. The coalition was entering its tenth month in 
office when it officially announced that it would actively participate in EUFOR Chad. The 
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Gusenbauer government formed following the 2006 parliamentary elections, ending six years 
of ÖVP-led coalitions with the FPÖ radical right party (Schüssel I, 2000-2003 and Schüssel 
II, 2003-2006). The SPÖ surprised many by overcoming the ÖVP as the largest party, albeit 
with a narrow lead of 1% and losing votes from the previous elections. Recording an 8% 
decline in the vote, and losing the chancellorship as a result, was felt as a major defeat by 
Christian Democrats (ÖVP) (Duncan, 2007:24). Another unexpected result came from the 
Greens who managed to translate progress in the polls into electoral success. They achieved 
their best ever result securing third place. The elections were also marked by the renewed 
ascent of the far right with the FPÖ achieving 11% share of the vote; a better result than 
expected due to vote transfer from both ÖVP and SPÖ. This allowed the FPÖ to strengthen 
its position on the right following intra-party protests and the creation of Die Freiheitlichen 
(BZÖ) in 2005 (Duncan, 2007:24). 
Arduous coalition negotiations ensued during which the two main parties found 
themselves on an unwanted collision course (Luther, 2008). Although the SPÖ preferred 
talking to the Greens about a possible coalition, it could only secure the chancellorship by 
negotiating with the ÖVP (Luther, 2008:1011). The return of a Grand Coalition seemed 
inevitable after both SPÖ and ÖVP ruled out coalitions with the Greens and the Freedom 
Party respectively (Duncan, 2007:27). During the negotiations, the ÖVP sought to capitalise 
on the Social Democrats’ eagerness to return in office after six years in opposition (Fallend, 
2009:2). Despite losing the elections, outgoing ÖVP Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel led the 
negotiations for his party determined to safeguard his legacy of neo-liberal policies (Luther, 
2009). The negotiations saw deep mistrust, confrontation and animosity between the two 
parties. One contentious issue was the purchase of eighteen Eurofighter jets by the Schüssel I 
government. Motivated by their anti-militarism and desire to redirect resource towards social 
programs, the Social Democrats had made the campaign pledge to cancel the contract. SPÖ- 
ÖVP relations during the negotiations worsened when, at the parliament’s inaugural meeting, 
the SPÖ voted in favour of a parliamentary enquiry into the Eurofighter contract (Luther,  
2008, Meyer, 2007:18). A deeper cause of the growing hostility lies in the ÖVP’s decision in 
1999 to break the cordon sanitaire and form a coalition with the FPÖ. It was a major turning 
point after which both traditional parties displayed decreasing willingness to work together 
(Duncan, 2007:13). Irreconcilable divisions on key policy areas emerged signalling a ‘shift 
from Austria’s traditionally consensual style of party interaction towards an increasingly 
conflictual, zero-sum style of competition’ (Luther, 2008:1012). In the end, SPÖ leader 
Gusenbauer paid a heavy price for his ambition to become Chancellor forced to concede 
seven cabinet positions including the key ministries of finance and the interior (both 
traditionally held by the SPÖ in Grand Coalitions) as well as the foreign ministry. 
The ÖVP’s retention of foreign affairs allowed Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) to be re- 
appointed as Foreign Minister. She became a key ‘asset’ for the Christian Democrats within 
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cabinet (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Her background indicates a substantial 
experience in foreign policy having acted as Schüssel’s Chief of Staff when he was himself 
Foreign Minister, as Ambassador to Switzerland and as Foreign Minister since 2004. 
Consequently, Plassnik has developed a dense network of relationships with foreign 
counterparts (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Her previous positions in several Austrian 
representations at European institutions and her leadership during the Austrian EU 
presidency have given her significant knowledge of, and interest in, EU affairs. 
The appointment of Norbert Darabos in the defence ministry came as a surprise. 
Many had expected his nomination as Interior Minister after playing an instrumental role in 
the SPÖ’s electoral success (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Doubts were even raised 
over whether Darabos himself aspired to get the job. From the start, his appointment was 
controversial and regarded with great scepticism in the Armed Forces. It had been thirty 
years that the office had not been occupied by a SPÖ minister. Moreover, the fact that 
Darabos was the first Defence Minister to have fulfilled his mandatory service through a 
civilian rather than a military path did not help him gain the trust of the military 
establishment (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008; Embassy Vienna, 18 December 2008). He 
was criticised early on for being ‘unable, perhaps unwilling, to secure increased funding for 
the armed forces’ (Spiegel Online International, 8 December 2010) This should be 
understood in light of Darabos’s primary responsibility to undertake ‘a strategic re‐ 
orientation of the Ministry’ away from territorial defence which no longer corresponded to 
the requirements of Austrian and European security (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). One 
can also detect signs of anti-Americanism in Darabos’s foreign and defence outlook, 
especially regarding US pressures to instigate a greater Austrian military role in Afghanistan 
(Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). 
New Chancellor Gusenbauer arrived in office with a weak political position. Many 
in his own party criticised him for having conceded too much in the negotiations to fulfil his 
personal ambition of becoming Chancellor. However, he brought with him an extensive 
expertise in international affairs, gained through his years in the field of development 
assistance and in the Socialist International. Although Gusenbauer called for close relations 
with the US in his first weeks in office, given the conflictual context which saw him rise to 
the chancellorship, the US ambassador anticipated that he could ‘indulge in confrontational 
rhetoric [with the US] when it suits his needs’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). Such 
expectation came after he stated that ‘the U.S. has to understand that they are not the only 
ones that are going to determine what is happening in the world’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 
2007). 
In short, the new government’s decision to contribute troops EUFOR Chad was 
taken in a highly volatile political climate. Yet, both parties reached a stable agreement on 
the coalition’s foreign policy program which reflected the vision of Foreign Minister 
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Plassnik (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 2007). This ensured much continuity with the ÖVP 
agenda pursued during the Schüssel era. It proposed no major change to Austria’s traditional 
foreign policy posture, thereby reinforcing the ‘stable consensus among all Austrian political 
parties that neutrality is the cornerstone of the country’s security policy’ (Embassy Vienna, 
11 May 2007). Drawing on the momentum created by Austria’s EU presidency the previous 
year, the coalition included a significant European component to the program. The 
government expressed readiness to actively contribute to EU’s efforts to integrate the 
Western Balkan states and strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy focusing 
specifically on closer cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 
2007). By pledging active commitment to ESDP goals, the coalition signalled that ‘European 
integration and policy coordination remain at the centre of Austria's world view’ (Embassy 
Vienna, 11 May 2007). Importantly, the new administration decided to accentuate Austria’s 
image as ‘a committed supporter of the UN system’ in view of its campaign to win a non-
permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2009-2008 (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). 
The Grand Coalition vowed to continue the country’s engagement in international 
peacekeeping missions with a focus on the Balkans and on supporting the Middle East peace 
process (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 2007). 
From the US perspective, however, Austria’s peacekeeping position is not 
interpreted as active as it is from a domestic perspective. US Ambassador Kilner’s 
description is revealing: 
‘An important element of this [foreign policy] consensus is a scepticism of 
the value of active military operations. Austrians of all political stripes are 
unapologetic about their lack of support for military engagement in the world's 
crisis areas. Instead, they believe that Austrian participation in classic UN 
peacekeeping operations, together with a relatively robust engagement in the 
Balkans, constitute an active contribution to the world's security’ (Embassy 
Vienna, 11 May 2007). 
Appendix 1 presents some of the roles the Gusenbauer administration sought to articulate on 
the international stage while in office. The findings presented in the table should be 
considered with caution. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, the order in which 
roles have been included do not reflect rigorous quantitative measurements of role 
articulation. The aim was to expose the diversity of roles communicated by the 
administration at the UN. The following case study analysis does not rely on the full range 
of roles presented in the table but focuses only on those which come back in the discourse of 
Austrian policy-makers when considering a deployment to Chad. As it will be shown below, 
two appear most prominent; namely the Global System Collaborator (GSC) and Regional 
Subsystem Collaborator roles (RSC), reflecting the choice faced by the Austrian government 
with regard to the institutions, and associated norms and rules, in which to anchor its 
peacekeeping initiatives. Other roles not articulated at the UN have also become salient in 
the decision-making process including the Humanitarian actor role which refers to how the 
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government defined this particular situation and how it conceived type of response Austria 
should offer. This last feature validates the decision to combine methodological approaches.  
 
6.4 French Socialisation 
 
Being the chief architect behind EUFOR Chad and its framework nation, France 
could arguably be seen as the main socialiser of Austria’s roles towards the operation. Paris 
defined the nature of the crisis as a ‘humanitarian emergency’, advocated a particular 
solution by diffusing peacekeeping norms and lobbied European partners to follow its plan 
of action. 
The socialising influence of France originates from the leadership role it has played 
from 2003 addressing the deteriorating situation in the border region between Sudan, Chad 
and the Central African Republic. This leadership is rooted in French colonial legacy and 
ongoing cooperation with Chad (Berg, 2009:62). Since 1986, France has a military 
agreement with N’Djamena involving French protection of Déby’s regime in return for 
Chadian backing of French geostrategic interests in the region (Bono, 2011:29). It 
materialises itself through Operation Epervier which maintains around 1000 French troops 
and six Mirage aircrafts near the capital and in Abéché, providing military and intelligence 
assistance to Déby’s government. A thorough review of Franco-Chadian relations is beyond 
the scope of this study (see Marchal, 2009b), but one episode illustrating the nature of their 
relationship must be mentioned. On 2 February 2008, days before EUFOR Chad was due to 
deploy, a convoy of rebels attacked N’Djamena determined to remove Déby from power. 
Much secrecy surrounds the extent to which Epervier troops were involved in suppressing 
the rebellion, but reports indicate they provided Chadian forces with intelligence on the 
rebels’ movements, secured N’Djamena’s airport and supplied presidential forces with 
ammunitions from Libya (Styan, 2012:663; Mattelaer, 2008:10). Under pressure to salvage 
EUFOR Chad’s neutrality, the French government maintained that they did not participate in 
direct combat and that operation Epervier remained separate from the European force. 
Nonetheless, this episode reinforced existing suspicions amongst European partners that 
France was instrumentalising the EU to serve its own interests. This remained the main issue 
behind member states’ reluctance to become more actively engaged in EUFOR Chad. 
Between 2003 and 2006, French foreign policy-makers kept a close eye on the 
repercussions of the crisis in Darfur on neighbouring states, pushing the EU and the UN ‘to 
treat the conflict in Chad as a crisis in its own right’ (Berg, 2009:58). Yet, neither France nor 
the international community perceived the instability in Chad as a humanitarian priority. It 
was the plight of civilians in Darfur which the French public became aware of during the 
2007 presidential campaign, forcing both candidates to pledge action if elected (Marchal, 
2009b). Upon winning the elections in May, Nicolas Sarkozy appointed socialist Bernard 
Kouchner as Foreign Minister in a move to co-opt his left-wing opposition (Marchal, 2009b). 
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On his first day in the Quai d’Orsay, Kouchner organised a meeting dedicated to Darfur and 
proposed a plan to establish a ‘humanitarian corridor’ for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. It was received with great scepticism by international actors, and NGOs in 
particular. They pointed to the lack of consent from the Sudanese government without which 
the delivery of humanitarian aid would be counterproductive (Pohl, 2013; Marchal, 
2009a:23; Le Monde, 2 June 2007). Unhappy to have his plan rejected, Kouchner turned his 
attention to protecting refugees in Chad through a European mission (Koepf, 2012:337). As 
founder of Médecins sans Frontières and long-time advocate of humanitarian interventions, 
Kouchner was instrumental in interpreting the instability in Chad through a humanitarian 
prism. It contributed to his belief that the EU should ‘do something’ to stop the suffering of 
Darfurian refugees in Chad caught in the middle of militia fighting (Bono, 2011). He insisted 
that EUFOR Chad ‘will look after populations which must be protected’ and ‘if possible, we 
will securitise the zone which will allow Chadian populations to rebuild – it is also a 
development operation – their villages’ (French Government, 22 February 2008). Defending 
that the operation fulfilled French interests, the Foreign Minister conveyed his pride that ‘the 
French army, and seventeen other armies, is going to look after the populations which are 
suffering’ (French Government, 26 February 2008). Therefore, Kouchner became the main 
proponent of the civilian protection norm and set out to actively diffuse it in European circles 
by relying on special adviser for crises and conflicts, Eric Chevalier, a long-time collaborator 
who previously directed Médecins du Monde’s international missions (Glasier and Smith, 
2008:63-69). As he likely shared Kouchner’s normative disposition, Chevalier became an 
effective agent advocating the norm in European capitals as a way ‘to drum up troops for 
EUFOR Chad’ (Glasier and Smith, 2008:63-69). Henke’s work (2012) confirms that Paris 
was pressing Europeans to adopt certain roles and that French diplomats ‘travelled from 
European capital to European capital to negotiate contributions’ using ‘every bilateral or 
multilateral meeting to approach potential force contributors’ (p.199-200). Relying on the 
testimony from a high-ranking French military official, Henke (2012) describes the French 
approach to convincing potential contributors: 
‘French embassies in Europe did most of the preparatory work. They approached 
their host governments to ask for contributions. The information was then 
transferred back to Paris, where senior officials in the Quai d’Orsay under 
Chevalier’s guidance organized the follow-up work’ (Henke, 2012:199-200). 
Only when member states turned out to be more reluctant than expected did Foreign 
Minister Kouchner, Defense Minister Morin, and President Sarkozy step in the negotiations. 
Member states’ fears that Paris was using the EU to serve its own interests were partly 
justified as France was seeking to remove itself from neo-colonial relationships with former 
colonies. Considering Epervier as a waste of resources, Sarkozy wanted European states to 
assume a greater role in assisting France stabilise and reconstruct Chad in order to ensure a 
smooth departure of French forces (Marchal, 2009b; Glasier and Smith, 2008:63-69). This 
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provided France with a strong incentive to socialise European partners into roles conducive 
of their participation, although this self-serving argument was never explicitly used. In fact, 
Chevalier attempted to diffuse doubts amongst EU states by pushing them to take on a more 
active role: ‘your fear of being instrumentalised should be another reason to become 
engaged. The more in it you are, the better you can control EUFOR Chad/CAR’ (quoted in 
Glasier and Smith, 2008:63-69). 
Records of meetings between French and Austrian diplomacies are rare as most 
discussions took place informally. Yet, one 2005 episode in the lead up to the Austrian EU 
presidency is indicative of French effort to ensure Austria remained away from its neutral 
role. Then French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie appeared ‘convinced that in the course of its 
EU presidency in 2006 Austria will be able to make progress with pending issues in 
European defence policy’ since Vienna ‘realised better than other neutral countries in Europe 
that neutrality makes ever less sense in the European context’ (BBC Monitoring European, 1 
December 2005). This socialising pattern is likely to have persisted under Sarkozy and to 
have intensified in the run up of EUFOR Chad’s deployment. 
French officials presented Chad as a humanitarian problem which should be 
addressed by protecting civilian lives (Styan, 2012:666). Importantly, Bono (2011) argues 
that ‘the framework of ideas captured in the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ did act as a 
political mobiliser of initial consensus within the EU’ (p.28). This suggests that the civilian 
protection norm was used by France as a socialising device to cast likely contributors into a 
humanitarian actor role. Moreover, there is evidence that French diplomats sought to 
convince neutral member states to participate as a mean to bolster the mission’s legitimacy 
(Henke, 2012:197). It was not lost on French officials that a humanitarian argument was 
likely to resonate positively amongst neutrals and, therefore, have significant socialising 
effects on them. Demanding neutrals to perform a humanitarian actor role ensured they did 
not revert to a neutral role, which would have obstructed their participation, while 
simultaneously tapping into their traditional mode of peacekeeping. 
 
6.5 EU Socialisation 
 
French activism in generating international momentum also aimed to galvanize 
interest within the EU. Both the UN’s overstretched capabilities and France’s aspiration to 
multilaterise its Africa policy made the EU the ideal framework for ‘doing something’ in 
Chad (Bono, 2011; Charbonneau, 2009:555-558). Crucially, French and EU officials shared 
a belief that ‘it was time for a new military operation to foster the development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a crisis management tool’ a year after 
EUFOR RD Congo mission (Mérand and Rakotonirina, 2009:124, Mattelaer, 2008:15). This 
turned the EU into a socialising agent promoting ideas about how its foreign policy should 
operate, ultimately, casting member states into roles conducive to achieving key crisis 
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management objectives (Wong in Hill and Smith, 2008:147). From 1999, the EU has 
identified the management of conflicts in Africa as a priority of the CFSP and ESDP. It has 
strived to become a ‘unified actor’ towards Africa by coordinating its member states’ 
differentiated policies, producing a coherent Africa conflict management strategy and 
undertaking numerous policy initiatives, beginning with the 2000 EU-Africa summit in Cairo 
(Furness and Olsen, 2016:107; Olsen, 2009:246-247). Consequently, member states’ roles 
towards the management of crises on the African continent have increasingly been the 
products of institutional demands for greater policy coherence and coordination. This fits 
well with France’s aim of ‘demonstrating that the EU is an independent international conflict 
manager, at least in Africa’ (Olsen, 2009:256). 
The Union’s norm advocacy throughout the formation of EUFOR Chad fell in line 
with the one conducted by France emphasising civilian protection, most likely owing to Paris 
having uploaded its preference to the EU level. As Churruca (2015) notes, the ‘protection of 
civilians not only has become a priority of all UN peacekeeping missions, particularly in 
Africa, but also seems to be the natural objective of an actor which has done the promotion 
of human rights the cornerstone of its external action’ (p.216). The EU promoted the norm 
since 2003 when the EU Council integrated guidelines into the CFSP for the protection of 
civilians during EU-led crisis management operations (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:283). 
The norm guided EUFOR Chad’s objectives as reflected by the EU joint action plan aimed at 
‘improving the security of refugees and internally displaced persons, facilitating the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance and creating favourable conditions for reconstruction and 
development efforts in these regions’ (European Council, 15 October 2007). On 17 July 
2007, the EU applied significant socialising pressures on its member states to perform a 
humanitarian actor role. In a Political Security Committee (PSC) meeting, head of the UN 
DPKO, Jean-Marie Guehenno, requested Foreign Ministers to commit a significant number 
of troops contending that: ‘this is a humanitarian emergency in Chad’ (quoted in Melander, 
2007; Bono, 2011:26, 32). This meeting was important in socialising member states because 
the ‘normative socialisation processes which inform the work of the PSC have succeeded to 
an appreciable extent in allowing a trans-European strategic culture to begin to stamp its 
imprint’ on EU foreign policy (Howorth, 2010:4). 
However, researchers found that European states participated in EUFOR Chad ‘to 
prove the EU’s capacity to act alone, and not first and foremost to answer to a humanitarian 
crisis’ (Bono, 2011:24; Gegout, 2005:435-436). Berg (2009) asserts that ‘European interests’ 
which had ‘nothing to do with the conflict in Sudanese/Chadian border region’ motivated the 
deployment of EUFOR Chad (p.62). Witnessing the UN’s incapacity to contain the violence 
in Darfur and deploy in time in Chad, ‘European governments may have found the idea of 
the EU making its mark as an effective actor in this conflict-torn region rather appealing’ 
(Berg, 2009:62). Bailes (2008) claims that such ‘self-regarding’ consideration has dominated 
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the EU rationale for establishing the ESDP at the expense of ‘help[ing] the suffering’ 
(p.119). It suggests that the negotiations around EUFOR Chad saw member states 
experiencing pressures from the EU to act in its interests by performing a RSC role. The 
prescription of this role was important in that it ensured that member states were dedicated to 
the development of an effective and coordinated common defence. 
Preparations for EUFOR Chad took place at a time when the twenty-seven were due 
to sign the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007. Thus, the timing of the operation 
amplified EU socialisation of member states into RSCs as national governments felt 
necessary to show solidarity with the EU in order to avoid derailing the process. 
Substantively, Devine (2011) finds that the Europeanisation process generated by the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty led elites to yield to ‘big power pressure not to object to high- 
intensity missions’ (p.359). Foreign policy leaders no longer sought to resist the demands of 
the big powers by advancing the principle of ‘constructive abstention in defence’, in so doing 
transforming their ‘former peacekeeping concept with the UN in order to implement the 
EU’s high-intensity Petersberg Tasks’ (Devine, 2011:359). Austria has found itself on the 
front line of this socialisation because its low defence spending has generated doubts 
amongst EU actors that Vienna was committed to act as a RSC. Former chief executive of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), Nick Witney (2008) emphasised that Austria did not meet 
the minimum requirement of 1% of GDP in defence spending as a ‘fundamental criteria’ for 
the advancement of ESDP (p.4). This meant that Austria qualified more as a ‘laggard’ than 
as a member of the ‘pioneer group’ (Witney, 2008:4; Franke, 2010). Also deploring the little 
investments made by Austria into defence, commentators urged Vienna to ‘intensify its 
efforts in the field of security policy in order to maintain its influence’ (Reiter and Frank,  
2004:1). 
Arguably, EU socialisation of Austria also came from EU Commissioner for 
External Affairs and former Austrian Foreign Minister (ÖVP), Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at a 
critical time when, in February 2008, the first wave of Austrian troops was caught in fighting 
which saw Darfurian rebels trying remove Déby from power. As the Gusenbauer 
government was under intense domestic pressure to bring troops home, Ferrero-Waldner 
weighted in by casting Austria into a RSC role. In an interview on 7 February 2008, she 
expressed her preference for ‘keeping Austrian soldiers in Chad’, recalling that the mandate 
was to ‘protect refugees against persecution’ and referring to the powerful notion that ‘we 
Europeans want to avoid a second Srebrenica’ (BBC Monitoring European, 8 February 
2008). The allusion to the 1995 failure was a clear appeal to member states, including 
Austria, that they should actively contribute to improving the EU’s capacity to act externally. 
It should be noted that, in 2000, Ferrero-Waldner made the case for including a mutual 
defence clause in the Treaty and, in 2003, played an active part in coordinating the neutrals’ 
position(s), eventually convincing four of them to accept the clause (Bischof et al. 2006:235 
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in Devine, 2011:358). Devine (2011) links Ferrero-Waldner’s ‘instrumental role in the 
elimination of neutrality and non-alignment in the EU’ with her appointment as EU 
Commissioner for External Affairs between 22 November 2004 and 1 December 2009. In 
September 2007, she had already made her position clear that ‘EU battlegroups could act 
without UN mandate’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 11 September 2007). Asked whether 
Austria should solely undertake peacekeeping missions or also combat missions, she refused 
to comment on what she regarded as a matter of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, she 
highlighted that ‘all EU countries are participating with solidarity in the common foreign and 
security policy’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 11 September 2007). 
 
6.6 Austrian Reactions and Role Conceptions 
 
The aim is now to assess the extent to which role expectations flowing from the 
normative framework established by Paris and Brussels resonated amongst foreign policy 
actors in Vienna. It involves analysing how external role expectations have been 
domestically negotiated to understand how they have informed the decision to deploy 160 
Austrian troops to EUFOR Chad. 
As European states were first considering the idea of an EU mission throughout the 
summer of 2007, the Gusenbauer government remained silent about its views on the French 
plan. Austria’s constitutional requirement for an UN mandate explains why the government 
was reluctant to make an early commitment until a political framework was established by 
the UN. Moreover, initial reactions to the French proposal emerging from European capitals 
were unfavourable. Holding the EU Council Presidency, Germany was already expressing 
doubts over France’s true motives in light of its dubious role as both a European leader and a 
former colonial power (Berg, 2009:60). The passage of Resolution 1778 on 25 September 
2007 authorising the EU to intervene gave the governing foreign policy unit in Vienna the 
green light to develop a more tangible position. It positively perceived the idea of an EU 
military force acting as a bridge to a subsequent UN operation because a participation could 
contribute to existing ambitions, expressed by the foreign ministry under minister Plassnik’s 
leadership, to position Vienna as ‘a hub in an ever more tightly knit network of links 
between the UN and the EU’ (Zecha, 2012:134; European Integration and Foreign Affairs 
(EIFA), 22 February 2007). Thus, Austria first appeared less reluctant than its partners 
because it saw an opportunity to strengthen its role as ‘loyal partner of the United Nations’ 
(or GSC) pursued ‘for decades’ having ‘always actively participated in joint international 
peace missions’ (EIFA, 19 June 2007). Moreover, this role served the Gusenbauer 
administration’s interest in securing a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council 
between 2009 and 2010 for which it was campaigning. Schmidl (2015) argues that, during 
the candidature, ‘Austrian diplomats worried that by then little was left of the once 
prominent role the country had enjoyed in UN operations’ (p.730). This clarifies why 
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Foreign Minister Plassnik presented the operation as first and foremost an ‘UN mission in 
Chad and in central Africa with the inclusion of military forces from the EU’ (BBC 
Monitoring European, 26 September 2007). A participation in a joint UN-EU peace 
operation in Chad would be an expression of Austria’s loyalty to both institutions; its key 
selling point of its campaign to secure a seat. As discussions on Chad were in full swing, 
Austrian State Secretary, Hans Winkler declared at the UN General Assembly: ‘our efforts 
are characterized by consistency, both in the EU and in the United Nations. We do not make 
any absurd promises just to get elected but intend to sustainably strengthen and enlarge our 
profile on an international level’ (EIFA, 4 October 2007). 
That the Austrian participation was the result of a role purely motivated by self- 
interest for a non-permanent seat is only one piece of the puzzle. That argument overlooks 
the effect of French and EU socialisation in influencing Austrian foreign policy agents to 
conceive Austria as a humanitarian actor. By early November, members of the governing 
foreign policy unit advanced a more self-assured position in favour of a troop deployment 
claiming they were pursuing a humanitarian agenda (Pohl, 2014:200). External pressures to 
adopt a humanitarian approach aimed at protecting refugees resonated positively with 
Foreign Minister Plassnik who favoured a humanitarian mission so that Austria could make 
‘a meaningful contribution … in the spirit of its humanitarian tradition’ (BBC Monitoring 
European, 26 September 2007). Demands for a humanitarian role aligned with the foreign 
ministry’s goal of ‘lending a hand wherever real suffering can be alleviated’ (EIFA, 4 April 
2007). Austria had recently enacted this role by actively participating in the elaboration of 
the Ottawa Convention designed to implement an international ban on anti-personnel mines. 
Defense Minister Darabos echoed a similar humanitarian role for Austria in EUFOR Chad 
which he qualified as a ‘true humanitarian mission’ (The Vienna Review, 1 February 2008; 
EIFA, 4 April 2007). The socialisation of Austria into a humanitarian role accounts for the 
government’s initial proposal to deploy up to 240 soldiers, twice as much as originally 
intended (BBC Monitoring European, 7 November 2007). It was justified in reference to the 
‘human suffering in Darfur’ which mirrored the logic and rhetoric used by Kouchner who 
defended a deployment in Chad on the ground that it was a response to the Darfurian crisis 
(BBC Monitoring European, 26 September 2007). The reality was that an EU deployment to 
protect refugees in Chad only partially addressed the political, humanitarian and security 
emergency unfolding in Darfur. Therefore, Austria’s positive response to French and EU 
socialisation aligns with the previous finding that EU states ‘gave political legitimacy to an 
operation by reacting to the call of ‘humanitarian emergency’’ before any domestic debates 
could take place (Bono, 2011:38). 
Interestingly, Chandler (2009) asserts that Western governments’ inclination to 
approve calls for humanitarian intervention arises from their inability to formulate coherent 
foreign policy trajectories informed by both values and interests, and their failure to build 
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domestic consensus around these foreign policy goals (p.183, 206). This argument suggests 
that the Gusenbauer government gave in to external pressures for a humanitarian role 
because it could not generate a domestic consensus amongst the wider political class and the 
citizenry around an Austrian participation in EUFOR Chad. In fact, the government’s 
proposal to contribute 160 troops to the mission was met with unprecedented contestation 
from both opposition parties and public. In Austria, peacekeeping deployments traditionally 
receive widespread domestic support (Schmidl, 2013b). Parliamentary debates held on 
Friday 9 November 2007, prior to a vote on the government’s plan, saw strong opposition 
from the Greens, Freedom Party (FPÖ), and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). Their 
main argument was that participation in EUFOR Chad was incompatible with neutrality 
(Brettner-Messler, 2008). The Green party criticised the government for not acting upon a 
neutral role, depicting the operation as ‘a French Foreign Legion mission with Austrian 
support’ (Agence France-Press, 9 November 2007). The reference to the French Legion 
underscores the opposition’s perception that Austria was shifting its approach to 
peacekeeping to a more militarised one. Similarly, the FPÖ condemned the move as a 
‘reckless adventure’ violating Austria’s policy of neutrality (Agence France- Press, 9 
November 2007). An additional argument made by the opposition, most vocally by the 
Green party, was that Austrian forces were not adequately equipped to undertake this type of 
mission (Brettner-Messler, 2008). This contention had gained traction when reports emerged 
that Austrian helicopters were fitted with neither engine filters required in desert operations 
nor with armoured fuel tanks (BBC Monitoring European, 5 November 2007). The findings 
stalled the recruitment of volunteer pilots who became unwilling to fly in the dangerous 
conditions prevailing in Chad with inadequate equipment. Although a technical issue, the 
opposition used it to demonstrate that the government was not playing an appropriate role for 
Austria by sending troops to a mission where their security could not be guaranteed. 
The opposition parties’ role contestation resonated well amongst the Austrian public, 
a majority of whom rejected the deployment on the ground that it violated neutrality (Wiener 
Zeitung, 7 November 2007). Public opposition reached 70% making the Austrian public the 
least supportive of the mission amongst other EU member states. (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 
2008; Embassy Vienna, 23 November 2007). The scepticism of the Austrian people also lied 
in the emerging character of the operation. Minister Darabos underlined that EUFOR ‘could 
be the most‐dangerous mission [that] the Austrian army has undertaken in peacetime’ 
(Wiener Zeitung, 7 November 2007). The intensification of war language alongside claims 
of humanitarianism sent confusing messages to the public. Introducing the possibility of war-
like situation certainly exacerbated existing fears that the mission was becoming more 
militarised than first thought. The public had grown increasingly suspicious in what it saw as 
‘a mission to a far-off dangerous country’ (The Vienna Review, 2008). This perception 
suggests a reluctance to support peacekeeping undertakings out with traditional types of 
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deployment. On 5 February 2008, a demonstration of around 50 people, organised by the 
League of the Socialist Revolution and the Anti-Imperialist Coordination, took place in front 
of the chancellery in protest against Austria’s involvement (Austrian Times Online, 6 
February 2008). Although small in size, the rally was nonetheless significant in a country 
where peacekeeping missions conventionally receive high public approval. Protesters were 
also calling for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty due to be ratified the following April. 
Arguably, this indicates a linkage in the public’s mind between the Lisbon Treaty and the 
coalition’s EUFOR decision. People perceived the Austrian participation as the domestic 
outcome of the new EU treaty. In other words, an attack was being made on the 
government’s enactment of a RSC role. 
Although political and public dissent failed to sway a parliamentary vote against the 
deployment, elite contestation intensified in February 2008 when Darfurian rebels attacked 
N’Djamena, days after the Austrian advance team had been dispatched. All three opposition 
parties rushed to attack the government claiming that their initial concerns were warranted, 
and that France was no longer neutral party in Chad (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). 
FPÖ party leader, Heinz‐Christian Strache stated that ‘if the situation escalates and the 
French increase their military presence, it will be only a matter of time before every 
European soldier in Chad is perceived as an enemy’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). 
Underlying the party’s perception that the government was deviating from a neutral role, he 
added that Austrians ‘should not fight a foreign war on foreign soil’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 
February 2008). The accusations held some legitimacy as Chad’s largest rebel group, the 
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), issued in December 2007 a 
‘state of war against French and other foreign forces’ owing to the ‘diplomatic, strategic and 
logistical aid’ they brought to Déby (BBC News, 3 February 2008). Strache went as far as to 
demand Darabos’s resignation when it appeared that the Defense Minister failed to provide 
parliament a critical piece of intelligence (Franke, 2010). The undisclosed document 
underlined that the Chadian situation was more volatile than the government was willing to 
admit, and that the role of France was threatening the impartiality of the mission. One may 
speculate that the government omitted these findings to ensure a parliamentary majority in 
favour of the mission (Zecha, 2012:137). FPÖ leader alluded to the report’s conclusions 
when claiming that the conditions were ‘not quiet and not stable’ and that it would be 
‘disastrous’ to send personnel under these circumstances (Embassy Vienna, 23 November 
2007). In essence, opposition parties contested the government’s decision by invoking a 
neutral role for Austria. They disputed that the government was truly pursuing a 
humanitarian role, which would have been congruent with their role preference. Ultimately, 
this role contestation was not enough to force the government to reverse its decision and end 
Austria’s participation in EUFOR Chad. 
Neither external role pressures nor role contestation from the political opposition 
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produced disagreements in cabinet over the appropriateness of a humanitarian actor role. 
Expectations of role contestation in the foreign policy unit between SPÖ Chancellor and the 
Defence Minister on the one hand, and ÖVP Foreign Minister Plassnik, on the other, were 
high given the confrontational atmosphere prevailing amongst coalition partners on all other 
issues. While all three accepted demands for a humanitarian role, US ambassador in Vienna 
identified Darabos as ‘the main driving force behind the mission’ (Embassy Vienna, 18 
December 2008). This leadership is closely intertwined with the minister’s domestic task of 
reforming the armed forces. This involved reducing expensive territorial defence structures 
while upgrading capabilities in ‘network-integration, smart weapons and precise strike, joint 
operations and expeditionary warfare’ (Gressel, 2013). The third element was to keep 
Austria engaged as ‘an active participant in the European security structures and 
international missions’ (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). In a November 2007 speech, he 
clarified his intentions:  
‘The new orientation of Austrian security policy undoubtedly and above all 
means Europeanisation. As a middle‐sized EU member state we have, in view of 
the changed security landscape, no alternative to putting our entire security 
structure in a European context’ (quoted in Global Security Online, 2007). 
 
This indicates that Darabos’s priority on re-orienting his ministry made him a receptive agent 
of EU socialisation. His determination to deploy troops in the face of domestic opposition is, 
therefore, better understood as part of his plan to implement a new strategic concept for 
Austrian defence. Another key component of the reorientation consisted of finding new 
partners to enable troop training, international defence cooperation and enhanced 
capabilities. A declining interest in the Balkans combined with an aversion to assuming a 
greater military role had distanced Germany from Austria as a suitable partner since the mid- 
1990s (Gressel, 2013). Italy and Hungary could have shared leadership responsibilities with 
Austria towards the Balkans if it were not for the financial difficulties of the former and the 
political weakness of the latter. The only option remaining was for Austria to ‘follow the 
French’ (Gressel, 2013). This strategy was attractive because Paris saw the EU as the 
primary framework for coordinating defence affairs and had an ‘ambitious and robust 
expeditionary agenda’ which would allow for an efficient modernisation of the Austrian 
defence. A partnership with France was the option least likely to attract criticisms from 
neutralist voices at home as it evaded deepening involvement in NATO or participation in 
US defence endeavours. This confirms the claim that an Austrian participation in EUFOR 
Chad was ‘a move to avoid having to contribute more than a few staff officers to ISAF, 
which would have been highly unpopular in Austria’ (Schmidl, 2015:730). Thus, the defence 
ministry’s need for new partners explains why socialising demands from Paris were likely to 
be positively met by Darabos who sought to combine a humanitarian actor role with a 
French partner (or loyal ally to France) role. While this provides evidence that a French 
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partner role motivated Darabos to push for a participation in EUFOR Chad, domestic 
contestation against this role means that defence officials were cautious not to articulate it 
explicitly. Nonetheless, analyst Antoine Glaser conveys well the reasoning likely to have 
predominated following the rebels’ attack and calls to bring the troops home. He opined that 
withdrawing Austrian troops ‘would be a serious blow for Paris’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 
February 2008). Developing further, he pointed out: 
‘Eric Chevallier, advisor to French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, has been 
committed for months to putting the EUFOR force together, and he had a really 
tough time of convincing Poland, Austria and Ireland of deploying small 
contingents ... All his efforts would be in vain’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 
2008). 
Additionally, the view of an official from one of the neutral member states reported by 
Mattelaer (2008) is indicative that many, even neutrals, in Brussels sought a French partner 
role: 
‘We know the French have certain national interests in Chad and that they are in it 
with a somewhat different agenda. But without the French nothing would happen 
at all. By and large, we believe the French are honest about this and trying to do 
the right thing’ (p.15-16). 
The adoption of a French partner role by Darabos was not devoid of bureaucratic 
and political calculations. First, it served the purpose of improving the minister’s relationship 
with the military. Darabos anticipated that acquiescing to France’s demand for troops was 
important for improving Austrian defence and was likely to be received positively in the 
military. The prospect of deploying with a weighty European military generated much 
support for the mission in the armed forces (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). Second, and 
as a result, it allowed Darabos to strengthen his political and bureaucratic position vis-à-vis 
the foreign ministry and his ÖVP coalition partner. In fact, his first months in office turned 
out to be challenging as he came under heavy criticisms for trying to renegotiate the purchase 
of Eurofighters. On 26 March 2008, the Defence Minister attended a meeting with UN 
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon in New York during which he expressed his view that 
‘Austria’s participation in the framework of the European Chad mission was temporary’ but 
nonetheless ‘crucial’ to provide humanitarian assistance and avoid negative spill over in 
Europe (Federal Chancellery, 31 March 2008). A source close to the Minister admitted that 
the ‘meeting was an intrusion into Foreign Minister Plassnik’s turf’ and that Darabos met the 
Secretary-General in the aim of scoring political points (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). 
The episode indicates a more antagonist relationship between the Defence and Foreign Affair 
Ministers than the official consensus on a humanitarian actor role suggests. A comment 
made by FPÖ party leader urging Darabos to ‘free himself from the ÖVP’s stranglehold and 
end the African operation’ hints at a slight competitive undercurrent between Darabos and 
Plassnik (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). 
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Differences in role preferences between the two Ministers can also be detected in the 
lack of reference to a French partner role by Plassnik who placed greater emphasis on 
Austria’s partnership with the EU in addressing African crises. The expression of a RSC by 
the Foreign Minister is predictable given that she was ‘a prominent pro-EU voice in Austria 
where many people are Eurosceptics’ (Reuters Online, 9 November 2009). Her EU- 
orientated outlook is likely to have facilitated the socialisation of Austria into a RSC towards 
Africa. Austria began formulating a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy towards 
Africa when taking the EU Council Presidency in 2006 during which Vienna actively 
worked for implementing of the EU’s Africa Strategy (Austrian Council Presidency, 8 May 
2006). Referring to the government’s endeavours in the years leading up to the Presidency, 
Plassnik stated that ‘we [Austria] have developed ever closer and broader cooperation 
between the EU and Africa’ (Austrian Council Presidency, 8 May 2006). Following the EU- 
Africa Summit held in December 2007, which was a significant step in the development of a 
common Africa strategy, the Foreign Minister commented that Austria ‘shall assume a 
leadership role’ in contributing ‘pro-actively to the EU-Africa Strategy and co-shape it in a 
dedicated way’ (EIFA, 14 January 2008). This commitment is grounded in the belief that 
‘developments in Africa are having an increasing impact on Europe’ (EIFA, 9 November 
2007). In this context, the foreign ministry acknowledged that ‘stronger international 
integration - including Africa - calls for a partial realignment of the security and defence 
policy pursued by both Europe and Austria’ (EIFA, 9 November 2007). 
In this socialising context of the EU’s Africa strategy, EU demands for a 
humanitarian role in Chad gained resonance amongst foreign ministry officials, especially 
Plassnik who was committed to integrating Austrian foreign policy towards Africa in a 
European framework. State Secretary Winkler justified the government’s EUFOR Chad 
decision before Parliament by underlining that ‘for decades now, Austria has seen itself as a 
loyal partner of the United Nations and the EU. We have therefore always participated pro- 
actively in joint international peace missions’ (EIFA, 9 November 2007). This substantiates 
the explanation suggesting that Austria participated in EUFOR Chad to improve its image as 
a reliable EU partner following widespread domestic Euroscepticism and mounting pressures 
from European circles to do more towards the ESDP (Franke, 2010; Reiter and Frank, 2004). 
To be sure, the defense ministry accepted a RSC role anticipating that ‘missions in Africa for 
[the Armed Forces] will become more and more likely’ given that ‘Austria will not be able to 
shirk the common responsibility of the EU’ (Austrian Armed Forces Online, 2006). 
Nonetheless, by 22 February 2008, the Defense Minister’s commitment to a RSC role was 
wavering in light of delays accumulated by a continuing lack of helicopters for the mission. 
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Darabos criticised EUFOR Chad as ‘badly prepared’ concluding that ‘if the EU takes its 
commitment to security and stability outside its borders seriously, then this must be 
discussed’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 24 February 2008). 
Ultimately, the two Ministers only displayed minimal differences in the role emitter 
they were prepared to accept demands from. Whereas Darabos was more likely to meet 
French expectations for bureaucratic reasons, Plassnik was a receptive agent of EU demands 
as she perceived the EU to be giving ‘medium-sized countries the opportunity to contribute 
as active co-designer’ (EIFA, 4 October 2007). Role contestation inside the foreign policy 
unit was avoided as France and the EU converged in demanding a humanitarian role which 
Darabos and Plassnik favoured. Both also perceived significant benefits in accepting 
demands for solidarity in terms of bringing Austria back from the margins of European 
defence integration and fostering new partnerships with influential European powers. 
Anticipating negative reactions at home, the selection of a humanitarian role served the 
purpose of appealing to the neutralist values of the electorate and the political opposition 
(Pohl, 2014:200-202). Rhetorical manoeuvring was undertaken to make a humanitarian 
actor role consistent with a neutral role and increase the sense that Austria was sticking to its 
traditional approach to peacekeeping. Those favouring a deployment argued that ‘as neutral 
country, Austria was well-placed to help refugees and to protect displaced persons’ (Franke 
2010). It is also how one should understand Darabos’s declaration that ‘Austria practically 
has an obligation to get involved in such a mission … this is completely compatible with 
neutrality; after all, neutral Ireland provides the mission commander, Lt Gen Pat Nash’ (BBC 
Monitoring European, 7 November 2007). His advisor, Johann Pucher defended the mission 
in similar terms by reasoning that ‘neutrality does not mean sitting still’ (Agence France- 
Press, 9 November 2007). To diffuse ‘a certain level of suspicion with regard to the French 
agenda’ amongst domestic constituencies, Austria led a group of neutral countries seeking a 
limited mandate based on neutrality and a restricted deployment period of one year 
(Mattelaer, 2008:15; EIFA, 4 October 2007). Austria participated in EUFOR Chad because it 
was successfully socialised into the roles of RSC, French partner and humanitarian actor. 
Defence and Foreign Ministers openly embraced the latter as it offered them an opportunity 
to convince domestic opponents of the appropriateness of the mission while simultaneously 
responding to external role demands. 
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6.7 Concluding Discussion 
 
French leadership in establishing EUFOR Chad through the EU, which itself was 
Europeanising an Africa strategy, indicates that Austria faced strong socialising pressures in 
the form of role prescriptions intended to elicit a consequential Austrian participation. 
Austrian agents most active in the decision-making positively identified with a humanitarian 
role demanded by Paris and Brussels. They also perceived benefits in adopting the expected 
role of humanitarian actor. Austria could enhance its chances of gaining a UN Security 
Council non-permanent seat, enter the core of EU defence cooperation and foster a new 
partnership with France required for re-orientating the armed forces towards new tasks. At 
least, they sought to halt the deterioration of Austria’s reputation as a ‘laggard’ in the 
construction of a common European defence. These perceptions contributed to the 
socialisation of Austria into a French partner and RSC. Had Vienna not been socialised, the 
Chadian crisis is unlikely to have appeared on the Gusenbauer government’s agenda given 
that Chad had not been a foreign policy priority for any previous government. Moreover, 
Austrian domestic audiences were more prone to demand action aimed at alleviating 
suffering in Darfur than in Chad, since that the plight of Darfurian civilians had received 
more extensive international scrutiny. Hence, the fact that Austria directed its efforts to Chad 
reflected Kouchner’s inability to intervene in Darfur, indicating Austria aligned its foreign 
policy priorities to those of France as a consequence of socialisation from Paris. 
External socialisation by France and the EU produced unprecedented political and 
public opposition to a deployment, discontinuing the cross party and societal consensus 
which traditionally prevails over peacekeeping deployments. This case shows that small 
states’ decisions over modern peacekeeping missions can be highly contested by opposition 
parties invoking roles divergent from those advocated by the governing elite in cabinet 
(Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:12; Brummer and Thies, 2015:277). Opposition parties contested 
the government’s humanitarian role, not on the ground that it was inappropriate for Austria, 
but because they rightly suspected that it also involved performing RSC and French partner 
roles. They feared that enacting these concealed roles would jeopardise Austria’s and the 
mission’s neutrality putting Austrian troops into arms way. Foreign policy roles perceived, 
conceived and negotiated domestically bear consequences for the troops’ peacekeeping 
posture and tasks in the field. 
There is only mixed evidence that the role contestation between governing and 
opposition parties was rooted in ideological differences over European cooperation in 
defence and whether Austria should continue to pursue a neutral role in international affairs. 
While the FPÖ has been critical of the EU because of a reluctance to delegate decision-
making authority over foreign deployments, it has openly called for neutrality to be 
discarded in favour of NATO membership (Virchow, 2007:61). However, the party oscillates 
between contradictory calls for downgrading neutrality and retaining it as a key guiding 
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principle to shore up patriotic feelings. The Greens are the party most supportive of 
neutrality opposing any foreign policy move that implicates its abandonment. The party 
supports participation in international peacekeeping based on a neutral role in that missions 
must be UN authorised and preferably be dedicated to protecting human rights through 
civilian means (Zecha, 2012:39). Therefore, the roles advanced by the government were not 
altogether incompatible with those emanating from opposition parties’ ideologies. The 
Greens could have approved the deployment of troops to protect refugees and the FPÖ could 
have perceived the operation as an opportunity for secure Austrian security interests through 
multilateral cooperation. In fact, it was ‘reported that the opposition to the deployment from 
the Green Party was weak’ as evidenced by the party’s foreign policy spokesman, Ursula 
Lunacek, who unofficially supported the deployment (Embassy Vienna, 6 January 2008). 
The evidence suggests that as small states’ political opposition increasingly disputes the roles 
held by their governments to inform peacekeeping decisions, the source of their contestation 
does not lie in party ideology. In contrast, the contestation over Austria’s roles towards 
EUFOR Chad emerged from opposition parties seeking to play the electoral game (Brummer 
and Thies, 2015:277). They aimed to appeal to a pro-neutrality public in the hope that it 
would punish an already fragile coalition for enacting the RSC and French partner roles. 
Further undermining the argument that role contestation unfolded along ideological 
lines is that disagreements did not spill over inside the divided foreign policy-making unit. It 
is surprising that a SPÖ Minister headed the charge for a French partner role given that the 
party has been a major force in retaining neutrality. Although the SPÖ has embraced a 
European agenda since 1982 including the whole spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks, it retains 
Eurosceptic tendencies translating into an uneasiness towards integrative plans envisaging 
automatic obligations to participate in military operations (Rickly in Wivel and Steinmetz, 
2010:186). There is little sign that Darabos accepted this Euroscepticism which likely 
facilitated an agreement with Plassnik. It was, nonetheless, prevalent within the party, 
becoming most significantly expressed in June 2008 when Chancellor Gusenbauer and acting 
leader, Werner Faymann pledged to put all future EU treaties to popular referenda in 
response to growing public discontent with the Lisbon Treaty (Lansford, 2015:86). The 
policy shift caused the ÖVP to defect, bringing the coalition to an end on 7 July (Luther, 
2009:1051). The ÖVP has been the most forceful advocate of abandoning neutrality, arguing 
that Austria should be fully integrated into European defence structures (Gebhard, 
2013:289). This view is shared amongst large parts of the foreign and defence ministry, 
confirming that Darabos’ role preference was largely grounded in bureaucratic reasons rather 
than ideology (Gärtner and Höll, 2001:190). It could be argued that bureaucratic interests in 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation at European level explain why this ideological divide 
coalition partners did not become active and lead to role contestations inside the unit over 
EUFOR Chad, despite deep fragmentation within cabinet. The role selection process 
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regarding the European mission did not generate intra-cabinet disagreements comparable to 
those which ended the coalition months later. Hagan (1995) substantiates this point by 
asserting that ‘although there are numerous cases of these divided cabinets, there are also 
numerous examples of coalition governments whose members were able to reach meaningful 
agreements for foreign policy action’ owing to a ‘consensual style of coalition decision 
making’ (p.132). 
A key finding of this examination indicates that the Gusenbauer government 
successfully overrode strong political and public opposition to meet external role 
expectations. This supports the argument that the governing elite of small states may 
experience little domestic constraints when selecting the roles that their states will come to 
play in modern peacekeeping. Despite a record level of opposition, the coalition was not 
punished electorally for the enactment of the RSC and French partner roles. Another SPÖ- 
led Grand Coalition was re-elected in September 2008 following snap elections held after the 
collapse of the Gusenbauer government. Defence Minister Darabos survived politically being 
maintained in that function after the elections. It raises the question as to what strategies the 
coalition used to overcome the opposition and reduce the risk of an electoral backlash. Based 
on Hagan’s (1995) suggested ‘dynamics by which the games of building policy coalitions 
and retaining political power influence foreign policy’, the Gusenbauer government 
confronted domestic opposition through manipulation designed to generate new support for 
its decision (p.127, 129; original emphasis). This was the primary purpose of a humanitarian 
actor role which was used strategically to appeal to the majority of Austrians who still 
regarded neutrality as the cornerstone of Austria’s foreign policy. 
It can be argued that external demands for a humanitarian role suited the governing 
elite in that they offered the prospect of both regional cooperation and domestic 
legitimisation. The latter was crucial since the government had given its approval to 
participate in EUFOR Chad prior any domestic discussions (Bono, 2011). Darabos 
maintained efforts to mobilise support for the mission after the deployment began claiming, 
in an April 2008 visit to Chad, that the Austrian armed forces’ work was valued by 
international partners (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). A mobilisation strategy founded on 
a humanitarian role failed to influence the political opposition in parliament. Yet, the 
government was not forced to adjust its roles owing to an institutionally weak parliament. 
In Austria, the main institutional hurdle is the Main Committee of the National Council (first 
chamber of parliament) which must formally approve any decision to deploy personnel on 
foreign soil (Schmidl, 2013b). However, the delegation of authority from the plenary to the 
main committee limits parliamentary control of military operations (Wagner, 2006:36; 
Mello, 2014:13). Green chairman at the time Alexander van der Bellin deplored that 
Austrian parliamentary procedures did not allow him to abstain on the Chad vote (Embassy 
Vienna, 16 January 2008). Additionally, the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition managed to gain 
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parliamentary approval for its roles as it controlled a majority of parliamentarians who were 
strongly behind a participation in EUFOR Chad. 
As the government no longer needed to manipulate the political opposition after the 
parliamentary vote, it began pursuing an insulation strategy intended to ‘override’ additional 
challenges to its role selection (Hagan, 1995:131; Kaarbo, 2015:203). This approach was 
successful in deflecting the opposition’s calls to withdraw the troops when EUFOR’s initial 
contingent witnessed a rebel attack on Déby’s regime in February 2008. The coalition 
ignored the demands calculating that reputational costs of withdrawing outweighed domestic 
ones associated with eventual Austrian casualties. The governing elite insulated itself against 
domestic pressures by agreeing that a neutral role should not keep Austria away from 
regional peacekeeping partnerships. This finding corroborates Kreps’s (2010) research on 
NATO-led operations showing that ‘elites are sensitive to the costs of international defection 
and converge around a commitment to international cooperation, which reduces the electoral 
and foreign policy effects of public opinion’ (p.192). This case study has gone a step further 
and demonstrated that consensus over roles in small states’ foreign policy unit can inhibit the 
appeal of responding to domestic role demands. When no credible political alternative exists 
to enact a neutral role, ruling parties have no incentive to accommodate the opposition’s role 
preferences. Thus, while new peacekeeping patterns have eroded small states’ peacekeeping 
consensus, the evidence suggests that governing parties may continue to follow the norm of 
consensual decision-making as they come under socialising pressures to adapt and recognise 
the benefits associated with peacekeeping cooperation. It has allowed successive Austrian 
governments to override a reticent public and undertake a ‘fundamental shift away from old 
values and practices related to [anti-] militarism and neutrality’ towards ‘the adoption of EU 
rationale of participation in crisis management operations as the way to secure peace’ 
(Devine, 2011:359). Gebhard (2013) similarly contends that the Gusenbauer government has 
followed a ‘path towards a normalized and inconspicuous national role conception and has 
pursued a policy of ‘pragmatic neutrality’, albeit without turning into a free rider’ (p.291). 
The fact that the electorate did not elect an alternative government in the following elections 
indicates that an insulation strategy succeeded and that the Austrian public is progressively 
adapting to new roles for Austria in international affairs. 
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On 6 June 2013, Austria made international headlines when the government of 
Chancellor Werner Faymann announced the withdrawal of its contingent from the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights following violent 
clashes between Syrian armed forces and opposition militants in the area of operation. 
Austrian troops had been part of UNDOF since its launch in 1974 and were due to celebrate 
the fortieth anniversary of their participation in the operation. UNDOF was Austria’s longest 
and most substantial commitment to any peacekeeping theatre and contributed to its status as 
a reliable UN peacekeeper (Mühlberger, 2016). The departure of Austrian troops (around 
380), amounting to a third of the total number (1000 troops) participating in UNDOF, left a 
significant capability gap threatening the entire operation (Reuters, 6 June 2013; UN News 
Centre, 2013). Following criticisms from the UN, Washington and Tel Aviv, the decision 
severely damaged Austria’s UN reputation. This chapter seeks to understand why the SPÖ- 
ÖVP coalition took a decision that went against Austria’s longstanding UN tradition and 
would inevitably weaken its reputation as a reliable peacekeeper. Officially, the government 
justified the pullout on security grounds contending that ‘the uncontrolled and immediate 
danger to Austrian soldiers has risen to an unacceptable level’ (Europe Integration Foreign 
Affairs (EIFA), 6 June 2013). Commentators also claimed that the decision was driven by 
domestic political considerations (Korkisch, 2013). In light of the next general election due 
to be held the following September, the government worried ‘about adverse public reactions 
in the event that Austrian soldiers were killed because of the civil war in Syria’ (Schmidl, 
2013). 
The account presented in this chapter builds on these explanations but offers a more 
comprehensive picture suggesting that the worsening security situation on the ground, 
combined with uncertainty about how the mission was to evolve, generated inconsistencies 
in the peacekeeping roles the Faymann government intended to play. The initial deployment 
of Austrian troops to UNDOF in 1974 was driven by Kreisky’s determination to perform a 
neutral and an active independent role in the context of an active foreign policy, especially 
towards the Middle East (Mühlberger, 2016). Having sustained a large contingent over the 
years, the participation in UNDOF became synonymous with Vienna’s commitment to the 
UN system and its peacekeeping endeavours. In other words, successive Austrian 
governments have sustained a substantial contribution to UNDOF driven by a GSC role. 
However, the prospect of UN-led adjustments to the mission, designed to shift its character 
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away from traditional peacekeeping towards more demanding tasks with a lower threshold 
for the use of force, challenged Austria’s neutral role. As UNDOF became entangled in the 
Syrian crisis, it became increasingly difficult for Vienna to perform the roles of GSC and 
neutral simultaneously as basis for its participation in the operation. A decision had to be 
made over whether to remain a GSC, supporting the UN regardless of how robust the 
mission may become, or revert back to a neutral role restricting Austrian troops to traditional 
peacekeeping duties. This case could be conceptualised as one of failed socialisation. The 
Faymann administration rejected calls made by international actors proposing changes to the 
mandate in order to allow for interventions between Bashar al-Assad’s forces and the armed 
opposition endowed by greater use of force. By failing to integrate the norm pertaining to the 
use of force in peacekeeping and meet direct demands for a smooth transition, the Austrian 
government gradually abandoned its GSC role. External pressures to maintain it were 
successfully withstood, demonstrating the enduring influence of domestic constraints, 
ideationally and materially defined, on Austria’s self-definition. 
 
7.2 Background to UNDOF, the Israeli-Syrian Conflict 
 
UNDOF was established in 1974 to mitigate the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The origins 
of the conflict can be traced back to 1948 when Syria advanced westwards from the Golan 
Heights up to the Jordan River taking over a small piece of land assigned to Israel under the 
1947 Partition Plan. The move aimed to secure Syria’s access to the waters of the Jordan 
River and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) (Daoudy, 2008:218; Slater, 2002:83). This 
geopolitical episode forms the context in which the dispute over the Golan Heights between 
Israel and Syrian has unfolded9. As Neff (1994) notes ‘the guide to understanding the 
security issue facing the two countries lies not on the heights themselves but in the valley 
below’ (p.26). The area is strategically significant as it comprises the sources of the Jordan 
River, the Yarmuk triangle south of Lake Tiberias and the western part of the Jordan. It 
provides whoever possessing it access to water and control over the quantity running 
downstream (Daoudy, 2008:218). In a compromise solution negotiated by the UN in July 
1949, Syria agreed to withdraw on the condition that the area was transformed into 
demilitarised zones (DMZs). However, from 1951, Israel sought to gradually claim its 
authority over the DMZs and to take hold of the Syria-controlled Golan (Slater, 2002:89-91). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Golan Heights became seen by Israeli leaders, not only 
9 For comprehensive examinations of the security issues between Israel and Syria leading to the Six 
Day War see Cooley, 1984; Daoudy, 2008; Neff, 1994 Slater, 2002; Shuval, 2000. These also include 
references to the debate over whether control of water sources in the area of the Jordan River basin 
should be seen as a cause of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours. 
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as highly symbolic to the realisation of Greater Israel, but also as an invaluable asset offering 
the necessary security and water resources to achieve settlement plans (Slater, 2002:89-91). 
Tensions arising from Israeli assertiveness and Syrian retaliation steadily escalated until to 
the outbreak of the Six Day war in June 196710. Within days, Israeli forces had taken control 
of the Golan Heights. Determined to regain this lost territory after gaining power in 
Damascus, Hafiz al-Assad entered a military alliance with the Soviet Union providing Syria 
with material capabilities to compete with Israeli military strength (Slater, 2002:93). On 6 
October 1973, Syria took advantage of Egypt’s attack against Israel in the Sinai to open a 
second front in the Golan Heights. Israeli forces were caught off guard allowing the Syrian 
army to recapture the Golan. This military achievement was short-lived. Israel instigated a 
counter-offensive which saw the IDF retake the Golan and capture additional territories. 
Israel advanced into Syrian territory to such an extent that it threatened to attack Damascus 
(Tzabag, 2001:195)11. 
The danger of escalation to a global war between the Soviet Union and the US, 
which had recently negotiated a period of détente, enabled the Security Council to adopt 
Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). Fighting ended on 24 
October marking the start of drawn out negotiations mediated by Washington in the context 
of the Geneva Conference. As both parties had interests in finding a peaceful solution 
(Tzabag, 2001:201), Syria and Israel signed the Disengagement Agreement on 31 May 1974 
laying down plans for the separation of forces (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). To that effect, it 
stipulated that UNDOF would be deployed in the Golan Heights to maintain a buffer, 
demilitarised zone. The zone was divided into Areas of Separation (AOS) and Limitations 
(AOL). To this day, the AOS delimits the area that neither side is authorised to occupy. 
Expanding outwards to either side of the AOS are the AOLs which impose different limits 
on armament allowed to be stationed within them. The mandate is set forth in UN Resolution 
350, assigning the Force to ‘maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria’, ‘supervise the 
disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces’ and ‘supervise the areas of separation and 
limitation’ (UN Online, 2017). UNDOF’s role is to monitor Israeli and Syrian military 
activities in the area of operation ensuring that neither side enters the AOS nor mobilises 
military equipment exceeding the limits set for each AOL (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). The 
Force is limited to a maximum strength of 1250 peacekeepers and includes unarmed 
observers and lightly armed soldiers. These constraints ‘reflect compromises between Israeli 
and Syrian negotiating demands’ (Lindley, 2004:154). It should be noted that UNDOF was  
 
 
10 For an in-depth examination of the immediate causes of the Six Day war see Ziser, 2002. 
11 For a detailed account of the Israeli decision-making during the war see Tzabag, 2001. 
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largely the product of American diplomacy led by Kissinger at the UN’s expense. The UN 
only had a limited input because Secretary-General Waldheim was neither fully dedicated to 
the missions that emerged during his mandate nor able to act independently of American 
influence to shape their developments (Kille, 2006:149). 
In nearly forty years, UNDOF positively contributed to stability in the Golan Heights 
region having maintained the 1974 ceasefire and prevented a major conflict between Syria 
and Israel. Rudloff and Diehl (2015) emphasise that, aside from minor incidents and 
violations, the operation has a ‘sustained and solid record of conflict management in 
patrolling the Golan Heights and separating Israeli and Syrian forces’ (Rudloff and Diehl, 
2015). One of its main achievement is that it increases transparency by conducting bi-weekly 
inspections of both sides’ positions and by reporting violations. In this way, it reduces 
uncertainty about the intentions of either side and helps build confidence between the parties 
(Lindley, 2002:161). Additionally, UNDOF was able to gain the trust of the parties and is, 
therefore, seen as a reliable channel of communication. On the challenges faced by UNDOF, 
Lindley (2002) found that its Standard Operating Procedures (SPOs) represent the main 
obstacle to more precise confidence-building inspections. SPOs prevent inspectors from 
undertaking unexpected and more intrusive inspections that can be verified independently of 
Israeli and Syrian officials (Lindley, 2002:156). UNDOF’s key limitation lies in its poor 
conflict resolution record having failed to bring the parties to sign a permanent peace 
agreement (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015)12. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 
2011 became UNDOF’s most pressing and challenging test yet, throwing the whole 
operation into doubts. By early 2012, clashes between the Syrian army and anti-Assad rebels 
had moved into the area of operations leading to a number of serious ceasefire violations. 
Most notably, Syrian armed forces crossed into AOS to undertake military operations against 
the rebels, consequently sparking Israeli protests (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). While the 
ceasefire has not broken down, the risk of escalation between Syria and Israel has intensified 
significantly. The danger is that Israel might lose confidence in UNDOF’s capacity to fulfil 
its mandate prompting Israeli leaders to take unilateral actions against Syria. In October 
2012, the IDF was reported to have already ‘reinforced its troops along the fence’ as a 
‘precautionary measure’ and to have crossed the ceasefire line to observe activity (UNSC, 30 
November 2012). Furthermore, unrest drastically raised the level of risk for peacekeepers. 
Numerous incidents have occurred where UN troops have been threatened, held hostage and 
fired on. Having increasingly been restricted in their freedom of movement, and sometimes 
 
 




forced to seek shelter, peacekeepers have not been able to achieve their mandate. The crux of 
the problem is that UNDOF was established as an interposition force mandated to supervise 
an inter-state ceasefire. Therefore, it lacks the mandate and material capabilities to deal with 
an internal conflict and potential emergencies emerging from it (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). 
What remains to be seen is whether and how UNDOF and its participants will adapt to the 
challenges posed by the Syrian civil war. 
 
7.3 The Austrian Domestic Context 
 
The Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) headed by Chancellor Werner Faymann (SPÖ) had 
been in power for over four years when it took the decision to bring Austrian troops home 
from UNDOF. It formed following the snap elections of 28 September 2008, held after the 
previous SPÖ-ÖVP coalition led by Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) suddenly collapsed. The 
Gusenbauer coalition had been highly dysfunctional, marked by governmental stalemates 
and public dissatisfaction from the start (Müller, 2009:492). Only eighteen months after 
taking office, it was brought down by a dispute over EU referenda. In late June 2008, 
Chancellor Gusenbauer and Werner Faymann, Infrastructure and Transport Minister and 
acting SPÖ leader at the time, committed their party to putting all future EU treaties to 
popular referenda. It was a response to growing public discontent with the Lisbon Treaty 
which had recently been ratified by the Austrian Parliament in April 2008 (Lansford, 
2015:86). The policy shift was enough for ÖVP leader, Wilhelm Molterer to end the 
coalition on 7 July (Luther, 2009:1051). 
The 2008 elections were disastrous for the main parties, both recording their lowest 
ever results. The ÖVP performed the worst, gathering only 26% of the vote. It was a major 
disappointment for the party which had hoped to make significant electoral gains and 
become the largest party by blaming the coalition’s failure on the Social Democrats. 
Molterer resigned as party leader following the results and was replaced by Josef Pröll. The 
SPÖ performed only slightly better, winning 29% of the vote. The party could, however, be 
comforted by its success in fending off ÖVP’s electoral offensive, thereby securing the 
chancellery for a second consecutive term. The main winners were the two extreme right 
parties, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) 
led by charismatic leader, Jörg Haider since breaking away from the FPÖ in April 2005. 
Respectively winning 17.1% and 10.7% of the vote, they far exceeded their performances in 
the 2006 elections. When combined, they formed the second largest political force in the 
country. Their success meant that the Greens lost, albeit marginally, votes from the 2006 
elections recording a score of 10.4%. A number of factors contributed to limiting coalition 
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options. First, the SPÖ had renounced entering into a coalition with an extreme right party. 
Second, new ÖVP leader, Josef Pröll favoured a coalition with the SPÖ and managed to 
appease voices inside his party calling for the ÖVP to go in opposition (Luther, 2009:1057). 
Third, the sudden death of Jörg Haider in a car crash in October ended FPÖ-BZÖ talks about 
a possible alliance for re-entering government. This context made a new Grand Coalition 
between Social Democrats and Conservatives inevitable. The Faymann I government was 
sworn in on 2 December 2008 after straightforward and short negotiations. 
Observers had mixed expectations about the formation of another Grand Coalition 
following the failure of the previous one to overcome divisions. Optimistic views contended 
that this coalition would be more effective and reliable because both governing parties had 
new leaders who appeared willing to put their ideological positions and goal scoring mind- 
sets aside for the sake of consensus (Luther, 2009:1060). Moreover, economic and political 
instability generated by the emerging global financial crisis was expected to force both 
parties into cooperation (Spiegel Online, 24 November 2008). Detractors criticised the return 
of the same traditional parties which had shown little efforts to work together in the past, 
deriding the new administration as a ‘coalition of losers’ (The Economist, 2 October 2013). 
There were fears that, instead of acting as a driver of consensus, the global economic 
downturn would cause divisiveness as it demanded many difficult decisions. On foreign 
policy, the governing parties found a compromise on the EU referenda question. They agreed 
to publicly support referenda for future EU treaties as long as neither would call for one 
without the other’s approval (Luther, 2009:1058). 
Below the surface, the issue highlights a fault line along party lines within the 
coalition with potentially important consequences for the government’s foreign policy. 
Having instigated the SPÖ’s policy shift, Faymann ran the campaign based on a Eurosceptic 
message designed to divert votes away from the FPÖ and the BZÖ (Luther, 2009:1059; 
Politico, 3 July 2016). This strategy provided Faymann with ‘unprecedented support’ and 
electoral success (Müller, 2009:515). His election as Chancellor introduced isolationist 
tendencies into the coalition in the form of a more critical stance towards the EU. This 
Euroscepticism found no opposition within the party and, therefore, was likely to be 
supported by SPÖ colleagues in cabinet. On the other hand, the ÖVP continued to support 
greater EU integration ‘stressing the need to remain a reliable and responsible partner in the 
EU’ (Müller, 2009:515). Early foreign policy activity indicated that the coalition ‘has largely 
ignored foreign policy since its formation in December 2008’ (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 
2009). This initial trend raised doubts about the willingness of the Faymann government to 
engage internationally. The economy diverted the attention of new Austrian leaders away 
from foreign policy and forced significant cuts in the foreign affairs and defence budgets. 
These budgetary constraints restricted resources necessary to conduct an active foreign 
policy and sustain current overseas deployments (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). 
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Similarly, the new government showed minimal interest in utilising the election of Barack 
Obama to seek a relationship with Washington more constructive than it had been during the 
tense years of the Bush administration (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Thus, at least 
early on, there were limited indications that the Faymann government was actively pursuing 
a RSC or an Atlantic partner (loyal ally) role, underlining further the administration’s 
inclination not to fully engage with international developments. 
Partly responsible for this trend were the new political actors whose foreign policy 
outlooks were likely to shape Austria’s international roles and foreign policy choices. 
Werner Faymann was largely unknown to the public when elected Chancellor. While 
the press labelled him as a ‘blank page’, political opponent and former Foreign Minister 
Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) was even more critical by describing him as a ‘man without 
character’ (quoted in Politico, 3 July 2016). Importantly, it quickly became apparent that 
Faymann had neither significant experience nor personal interest in foreign policy 
(Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). The coalition negotiations produced few changes in 
the allocation of governmental portfolios. The ministries of foreign affairs and defence both 
remained under ÖVP and SPÖ leadership respectively. Michael Spindelegger replaced 
Ursula Plassnik as Minister of Foreign Affairs and was ‘widely credited with good 
intentions’ (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Yet, criticisms have stressed his lack of 
leadership when he failed to give the ministry a clear direction from the start. His early 
initiatives underlined a commitment to expand Austria’s role in the Black Sea region as 
a way to secure economic interests (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Spindelegger’s 
political profile was enhanced in 2011 when he succeeded Josef Pröll as ÖVP leader after 
the latter resigned due to health issues. Norbert Darabos (SPÖ) was re-appointed as 
Defence Minister until March 2013 when he was substituted for Gerald Klug (SPÖ). 
Darabos gained a poor reputation as part of the previous administration. International and 
domestic partners alike saw him as ‘uninterested in foreign and international security affairs’ 
as well as ‘openly hostile to deploying Austrian troops on dangerous missions abroad’ 
(Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). There is limited evidence available to construct 
Klug’s foreign policy outlook. His appointment in the midst of the Syrian crisis suggests 
a period of transition in the ministry at a time when Austria was re-considering its 
participation in UNDOF. Klug spent little time in office before having to adopt a 
position on the matter. Overall, this examination reveals that the decision to withdraw was 
taken by a government reluctant to engage internationally owing to its members lacking 
experience, interest and leadership in foreign policy and to a constrained international 
environment brought on by the financial crisis. This general foreign policy orientation 
provides preliminary indications that the decision-making unit responsible for re- 
considering Austria’s peacekeeping role towards UNDOF was predisposed to respond better 
to domestic role preferences than external role demands.  
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Appendix 2 presents some of the roles the Faymann administration sought to 
articulate on the international stage while in office. They form a role repertoire from which 
the Faymann government is expected to draw when re-considering the presence of Austrian 
troops on the Golan Heights. These roles form the role domestic context in which the foreign 
policy agents of the administration have to operate, and act as a resource when these agents 
must creatively confront the dilemma of UNDOF’s changing nature. Like most states, 
Austria is enacting a wide and diverse range of roles at the UN reflecting the numerous 
foreign policy-areas it is involved in. Yet, the following analysis focuses only on those which 
appear most prominently in the discourse of Austrian policy-makers when re-considering 
Austria’s participation in UNDOF. Interestingly, this peacekeeping episode will become a 
challenge to the roles which Austria performs most actively at the UN, in other words the 
Global System Collaborator, Humanitarian Actor, Regional Subsystem Collaborator roles. 
The role of neutral will emerge as significant as events unfolds, challenging Austria’s 





7.4 Austria’s Role Conceptions in a Shifting Security and Normative Environment: A 
Case of Failed Socialisation 
Austria was one of the first contributing countries to experience the security threat 
engendered by the Syrian civil war directly. On 29 November 2012, a convoy transporting 
Austrian UN peacekeepers to Damascus airport for a scheduled rotation was caught in 
fighting between the Syrian army and the armed opposition. Five Austrian personnel were 
injured, including two severely (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 19 December 2012; 
International Business Times, 29 November 2012). The Austrian foreign ministry called an 
emergency meeting with the Syrian Ambassador during which Secretary General for Foreign 
Affairs, Johannes Kyrle, requested the Syrian government ‘to take all measures to make it 
possible for the Austrian UN troops to fulfil their mandate under the UNDOF mission 
(supervision of the ceasefire on the Golan Heights)’ (EIFA, 29 November 2012). The 
diplomatic episode was drawn to a close without Austria’s participation being questioned. 
Two days earlier, Foreign Minister Spindelegger had reaffirmed his commitment to a GSC 
role by supporting Austria’s contribution to international operations abroad including in the 
Golan Heights. It came from his perception that ‘we [Austrians] will not be able to ensure 
our own security in a globalised world if we pursue a head-in-the-sand policy or display a 
free-rider mentality’ (EIFA, 26 November 2012). His justification underscores a belief that 
the small size of Austria and its economic dependency on exports do not allow for isolation 
but require good integration in ‘international networks’ of cooperation (EIFA, 26 November 
2012). This reasoning also encouraged references to a RSC role: ‘Austria is actively involved 
in European crisis management in its own interest … we cannot afford to reduce our efforts 
in this field’ (EIFA, 26 November 2012). Aside from the fact that the incident occurred 
outside the area of operation, the dedication of the Austrian foreign ministry to pursuing GSC 
and RSC roles ensured that the contribution to UNDOF remained undisputed. 
The incident, nonetheless, raised concerns amongst international stakeholders that 
UNDOF may not have the mandate nor the capabilities to function effectively in this 
increasingly challenging environment. In November 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki- 
moon reported to the Security Council that ‘the military operations carried out by the Syrian 
Arab armed forces have affected adversely the efforts of UNDOF to effectively carry out the 
mandated tasks’ (UNSC, 30 November 2012). Fears that Israel might forcefully respond to 
these military activities also began to spread. Conflict escalation between Syria and Israel 
became a major source of alarm in light of the IDF having mobilised military capabilities, 
crossed into the AOS for observation purposes and retaliated fire across the cease fire line 
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(UNSC, 30 November 2012). The incident was condemned and prompted the Security 
Council to ‘stress the need to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF personnel’ (UNSC, 
19 December 2012). Both Ban Ki-moon’s November report and Security Council Resolution 
2084 instigated a re-examination of the normative framework in which UNDOF and its troop 
contributing countries operated. At the heart was the question whether the norm pertaining to 
the minimal use of force continued to be appropriate in ensuring troop safety and mandate 
completion. This reassessment reflected realities on the ground which had already compelled 
the force to ‘adapt its operational posture’ and take ‘necessary security measures to ensure 
the safety and security of its personnel’ (UNSC, 30 November 2012). This entailed limits on 
movements, the use of armoured vehicles, enhanced patrolling and the construction of 
additional defensive positions. Such adjustments were also essential considering operational 
challenges owing to the Canadian pull out in September 2012 and Japan’s decision to bring 
its 46 personnel home in early January 2013. Sensing that others might follow, Israel began 
weighing in as a socialiser, making explicit role demands to states to remain present in the 
field including Austria, Croatia, India and the Philippines. Israeli officials perceived that, 
more than ever, they were performing an important role ‘ensuring that the situation along the 
border does not get out of control’ (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 19 December 2012). 
A turning point occurred on 6 March 2013 when 21 Filipino peacekeepers were 
kidnapped and detained for three days by a Syrian militant group. The peacekeepers were 
eventually released unharmed. Discrepancy between the character of UNDOF as a traditional 
peacekeeping operation and the increased seriousness of the attacks against UN troops 
became wider than ever. This point is emphasised by Kertcher (2014) who contends that ‘the 
main difficulties plaguing peacekeeping missions along Israel’s borders in the past decade 
stem from the fact that they operate according to first generation rationale, while their 
environment is more suited to second-generation missions’ (p.9). In fact, UNDOF remains 
highly restricted in what it can do. It is only mandated to separate conflicting parties, and 
observe the ceasefire between, Israel and Syria. It cannot interfere in the Syrian civil war 
between Bashar al Assad’s forces and rebels. This is certainly not an option given that its 
troops are only authorised to use force in self-defence (World Politics Review, 8 March 
2013). Consequently, the argument contending that ‘the mandate is not strong enough’ 
gradually gained traction and led experts to call for its modification to ‘allow for certain 
amount of interventions in hostilities’ (Deutsche Welle, 25 June 2013). 
Such proposals raised the expectation that peacekeepers should do more than 
observe and use force if necessary. The norm specifying that peacekeepers should not use 
force except in self-defence was gradually being redefined. Sloan (2014) offers a useful 
 
123 
typology of UN peacekeeping missions according to their approach to the use of force 
(p.675). UNDOF falls within the ‘defense of mandate’ category having emerged after the 
first United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez (UNEF I) at a time troop contributing 
countries pressed for more guarantees of troop safety. With the launch of UNEF II and 
UNDOF, the concept of self-defence was broadened to include, not just the use of force for 
peacekeepers’ protection, but also ‘to prevent interference with the peacekeeping operation’s 
mandated duties’ (p.684). The concept was never implemented in practice, however, because 
it authorised the use of force beyond what was required on the ground. The observational 
character of UNDOF also bears resemblance with earlier peacekeeping missions which 
imposed strict limitations on the use of force. Operational and tactical considerations set in 
motion UNDOF’s transformation of what was a ‘non-forceful’ mission into ‘forceful 
operation when confronted with crisis’ (p.685). The entrapment of UNDOF in the Syrian 
conflict tapped into international actors’ fears of peacekeeping failure or mission creep. 
Precedents include the United Nations in the Congo (ONUC), the United Nations Protection 
Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM). All these missions began with authorisations to use force only for self-defence; 
limitations which turned out to inhibit peacekeepers in responding effectively to the threats 
and emergencies that eventually arose. In desperate attempts to salvage these operations the 
UN subsequently authorised to use of offensive force (p.685). In the same way, the Syrian 
crisis motivated international actors to take pre-emptive steps by considering providing 
peacekeepers with a wider scope for the use of force. 
By March 2013, the high security threat compelled the UN to react by choosing from 
three different courses of action, identified by Kertcher (2014:11). Each carried important 
implications for the roles that Austria would be able to perform towards its participation in 
UNDOF. These roles would come to play an important part in determining the position of 
the Faymann government regarding the continued presence of Austrian peacekeepers in the 
operation. The first option was to maintain UNDOF under its current mandate regardless of 
the changing situation on the ground. For Austrian policy-makers, this option was attractive 
in that it kept Austrian soldiers away from more robust and dangerous tasks. In this way, it 
did not challenge Austria’s neutral role and mitigated the risks for the troops. However, it 
left them poorly equipped in legal and material terms in case of escalation. The second 
alternative was to bring UNDOF to an end. This ensured the safety of Austrian troops and 
the successful enactment of a GSC role without compromising a neutral role. The reputation 
of Austria as reliable peacekeeper would be intact, if not strengthened, considering Vienna 
would have contributed the largest contingent, without interruption, to the entire operation.
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A third option involved a large-scale enforcement operation carried out by a coalition of the 
willing in the aim of halting the oppression of civilians by Bashar al Assad’s regime. This 
was an unlikely scenario given Chinese and Russian vetoes, meaning that Austrian officials 
never had to seriously consider its consequences for Austria’s roles. The fourth option 
involved the Security Council pursuing ‘a complex model resembling those adopted in the 
civil wars in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Mali, and the Congo in the past decade’ (Kertcher, 
2014:12). This implicated shifting UNDOF from an observing to a fighting force capable of 
discouraging and repelling military activities in its area of operation (Kertcher, 2014:12). 
While most contributing countries would have seen this option as providing their troops with 
the necessary legal and material capabilities to defend themselves, for Austrian policy-
makers, it was the most problematic as it forced Austria out a neutral role if the priority was 
set on maintaining GSC role. It also entailed considerable risks for Austrian troops. 
The report presented by Ban Ki-moon in March 2013 in response to further 
deterioration in the security environment took a significant step towards the fourth option, 
thereby moving closer to the use of force beyond self-defence and defence of the mandate. It 
drew on a military capability study undertaken in January 2013 recommending the ‘need to 
further support the efforts of the mission to adapt, strengthen and reconfigure its capabilities 
to the ongoing situation’ (UNSC, 19 March 2013). While no call was made to alter the 
mandate, the scope for the use of force was widened within the existing one through a focus 
on enhancing force protection. Analysts have emphasised that this evolving normative 
context expected peacekeepers to ‘interpret their mandate more extensively, i.e. including the 
use of weapons to enforce UN law’ (Kurier in Gebhard, 2013:291). The effect of this 
normative development was to socialise Austria into a GSC and out of neutral role. Vienna 
was forced to decide whether this role configuration was compatible with neutrality and 
acceptable to domestic actors favouring a neutral role. Such decision-making was 
complicated by uncertainty regarding which formula the UN leadership would implement 
and the decisions of other troop contributing countries. In fact, the report coincided with the 
announcement by Croatia that it was withdrawing all its military personnel for security 
reasons (UNSC, 19 March 2013). Moreover, Austrian officials had limited opportunities to 
influence the shape of the operation in a way that would not bring the neutral and GSC roles 
into conflict. Austria was not even a non-permanent member of the Security Council; a 
position that would have afforded some leverage. 
The release of the report did not cause the Austrian government to shy away from 
its international commitment towards the mission. Gebhard (2013) notes that a normative 
shift towards more permissive use of force would have, in the past, been enough for the 
government to ‘withdraw its troops immediately to prevent them from getting involved in 
fighting’ (p.291). However, acting Defence Minister Darabos (SPÖ) only expressed 
‘concerns’ while the Austrian commander ordered ‘business as usual’ (Gebhard, 2013:291). 
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Foreign Minister Spindelegger positively perceived the measures taken by the UN arguing 
they were ‘necessary’ and required to be ‘reviewed constantly and adjusted to the situation in 
the area of the mission’ (EIFA, 28 March 2013). 
Attempts by the government to maintain both roles in a strategy of wait-and-see fell 
under further institutional pressures as divisions amongst EU member states over the Union’s 
arms embargo began to show during a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dublin on 23-24 
March 2013. The issue was whether the full arms embargo imposed by the EU on Syria in 
May 2011 should be lifted to allow for the delivery of weapons to the Syrian opposition 
(SIPRI, 13 November 2013). The UK and France were the only member states in favour of 
supplying arms to rebel groups. They argued that arming moderate opposition groups would 
reduce violence and force the Assad regime to the negotiating table. On the other hand, the 
majority of EU states led by Austria and the Czech Republic firmly opposed the Franco- 
British initiative. They believed that introducing more arms into Syria would only increase 
the likelihood of such weapons falling into wrong hands including Islamist groups (The 
Guardian, 28 May 2013). The risk for Austrian policy-makers was that the absence of 
European consensus on sustaining the embargo would place the EU as a party to the conflict, 
drawing Austria out of a neutral role. In an interview following the Dublin meeting, 
Spindelegger did not raise any doubt about the Austrian commitment in the Golan but did 
‘not think that it is right for the European Union to abandon the policy it has pursued so far 
by clearly siding with one party’ (BBC Monitoring European, 26 March 2013). As EU 
disagreements constrained Austria’s roles, the option of leaving the Golan mission began to 
be seriously considered within the coalition. During a visit to Israel and the Golan, the 
Foreign Minister expressed to Israeli officials his reservations about the future of the 
mission. He warned that ‘Austria may pull its soldiers from the UNDOF peacekeeping force 
on the Golan Heights if the EU fails to renew its arms embargo against Syria’ (The 
Jerusalem Post, 12 April 2013). On 14 April, Defence Minister Gerald Klug (SPÖ) entered 
the debate observing that the situation was ‘still manageable’ but that Austrian troops were 
‘staying … only under very specific conditions: the nonpartisan nature of the mission must 
be beyond doubt by those involved, the rotation and supplying of the troops through Israel 
must be guaranteed and the United Nations must replace the contingent from Croatia’ (BBC 
Monitoring European, 14 April 2013). 
These declarations indicate a shift away from previous emphases on Austria’s 
commitment to the UN in fostering peace and security in the region, towards a more 
qualified engagement conditioned upon Austria remaining a neutral actor. References to a 
GSC role became less frequent and definite. For instance, Klug categorically excluded a 
possible enlargement of the contingent. Asked whether sending EU battlegroups to the Golan 
was an option, the Minister refused to comment arguing that ‘the question of how the 
peacekeeping mission on the Golan is to develop further is presently so sensitive’ (BBC 
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Monitoring European, 14 April 2013). His response underlines a discomfort with any attempt 
to amplify the mission’s robustness. Interestingly, the Defence Minister still believed that 
having an Austrian as deputy commander of UNDOF could help in generating military plans 
which would ensure that Austrian peacekeepers could enact, at an operational level, the 
neutral role that the elite sought at a foreign policy level (BBC Monitoring European, 14 
April 2013). It should be pointed out that the foreign ministry appeared to remain more 
supportive of a GSC role than the Defence Minister. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Reinhold Lopatka (ÖVP) commented two days after Klug imposed his conditions that: 
‘550 Austrian soldiers are currently deployed in three UN peace-keeping 
missions in the Middle East and contribute their share to stability and peace in the 
region. We are determined to maintain this presence as long as our troops are able 
to fulfil their mandate. This applies to the tense situation on the Golan Heights as 
well’ (EIFA, 16 April 2013). 
Although any difference should not be exaggerated at this point, the evidence reveals that 
statements from Defence Minister Klug expressed a neutral role to a greater extent than 
those from officials in the foreign ministry who tended to emphasise international 
commitments instead. The fact that the SPÖ controlled the ministry of defence and that the 
foreign ministry was led by the ÖVP should not yet be discounted as an explanation of 
possible differences in role promotion between the two governmental Ministers. 
The coalition remained united when confronted by the failure of EU member states 
to reach an agreement on the arms embargo renewal. On 28 May, long EU negotiations 
achieved no consensus as Britain blocked a compromise solution envisaging an easing of the 
embargo while explicitly stating what could and could not be sent. All EU member states 
backed the proposal including France which had rallied behind it for the sake of a common 
approach (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). UK Foreign Minister, William Hague was inflexible 
however, demanding the full ban to be lifted immediately and only reinstated through a 
consensus vote; demands that were unacceptable to his European counterparts (The 
Guardian, 28 May 2013). The lack of unanimous agreement meant the EU sanction regime 
expired on 31 May leaving member states free to implement their own sanction policy. The 
negotiations saw the Austrian and British Foreign Ministers going head-to-head with 
Spindelegger blaming Hague for the failure of the talks (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). The 
former lost little time to declare that ‘Vienna would now have to reconsider its deployment 
on Golan’ (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). While the Foreign Minister maintained that the end 
of the embargo would not ‘automatically’ cause Austria to withdraw, the militarisation of the 
conflict and its consequences for UNDOF’s mandate represented significant preoccupations 
for the government: ‘we do not see that it is impossible to keep Syria and Israel apart - which 
is the mandate - but that groups are fighting in Syria, including the Golan - and this has 
nothing to do with fulfilling the mandate’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 29 May 2013). 
Spindelegger came to recognise that the end of the embargo clearly meant that Austria could 
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no longer perform a neutral role. He concluded that ‘the absence of such neutrality would 
increase the danger to the extent it may not possible to remain’ (The Jerusalem Post, 12 April 
2013). This diplomatic episode at the EU level underscores increasing great power interest 
and involvement in theatres of deployment to which Austria and small states have sent 
peacekeepers. 
The termination of the embargo was a significant, yet not decisive, factor in the 
Faymann government’s decision to withdraw from the Golan a week later. Its main effect 
was to push Austria onto an independent course. The catalyst came when fighting between 
Syrian armed forces and opposition groups escalated quickly on 6 June within the area of 
deployment, forcing UNDOF personnel to seek shelter in their positions (UNSC, 12 June 
2013). Two peacekeepers were injured. From the standpoint of decision-makers in Vienna, 
the incident only confirmed that the security situation had become too dangerous and would 
only deteriorate further as weapons would soon be delivered to opposition groups. Hours 
later, the government officially announced the end of Austria’s participation citing troop 
safety as main reason (EIFA, 6 June 2013). However, spontaneous declarations after the 
announcement reveal that, more than security concerns, the government was uneasy at the 
prospect of having to forego a neutral role as a result of likely changes to the mandate. 
Britain’s UN ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant believed that ‘the UN mandate in the Golan 
might not be sustainable over the long term’ (The Foreign Policy Group, 8 June 2013). The 
Security Council was prepared to implement necessary adjustments as recommended by the 
Secretary-General. Such prospect induced Chancellor Faymann (SPÖ) to declare that ‘we 
never could have and would never have wanted to take on a military mission to mediate or 
intervene between the opposition rebels and governmental troops’ and added that Austria 
‘took on a different mandate, which was appropriate for a neutral country’ (Reuters, 10 June 
2013). The security threat prompted Austrian policy-makers to pursue an independent 
course, brought upon them by EU developments, by enacting a neutral role. It confirms the 
pattern observed by Mayer (2015) describing that ‘when the situation on the world stage 





External actors could not sway the Faymann government to maintain its troops 
because Austria failed to be socialised into a GSC. The Austrian government rejected the 
notion that self-defence capabilities should be strengthened, and more permissive use of 
force implemented to prevent further attacks on peacekeepers and allow the mandate to be 
achieved. Additionally, socialisation was unsuccessful as the coalition resisted casting 
attempts by external actors to adopt a GSC role. The UN expressed regrets that Austria as 
‘the cornerstone of UNDOF’ will proceed in a ‘withdrawal that will adversely affect its 
ability to act’ (BBC Monitoring European, 10 June 2013; The Telegraph, 6 June 2013). Israel 
saw the move as ‘a betrayal of the United Nations’ commitment to regional security’ and of 
the trust conferred upon troop contributing countries to stabilise the border in time of trouble 
(The Guardian, 6 June 2013). Aside from these criticisms, however, there is limited 
evidence, at least openly available, indicating that international actors applied extensive 
socialising pressures on Austria to enact a GSC role in the lead up to the decision. The 
rapidity with which the government arrived at its decision provided little time for the process 
of role location to unfold. Furthermore, the government was determined to withstand 
criticisms for its decision, as indicated by the Chancellor’s statement that ‘it is our right to 
make such a decision in view of the circumstances’ referring to both the EU arms embargo 
and the fighting in the Golan (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). There is ground to 
suggest that the decision was influenced by concerns over negative reaction from the public 
if Austrian soldiers were to be killed. It would have seriously threatened the governing 
parties’ chance of re-election at the end of September (Wurz, 2013; Schmidl, 2013). Yet, it 
could be argued that the government anticipated negative public reaction, not only for 
putting troops at risks, but also for compromising neutrality by involving Austria in a wider, 
more robust mandate. The argument proposing that the decision was taken purely for 
security reasons is further undermined by a report indicating that the risks during the 6 June 
episode were actually minimal (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). The decision 
should be seen as a move by ‘both governing parties to serve the deeply ingrained desire of 
the majority of Austrians to remain neutral in conflicts’ (Mayer, 2015:2). In other words, it 
can be argued that the neutral role that guided Austria out of the Golan was shaped by a 
public reluctance to see Austrian soldiers die.  
Evidence indicates that the cabinet enacted a neutral role on the assumption that 
UNDOF would be terminated following the Austrian withdrawal (BBC Monitoring 
European, 12 June 2013). The timing of the decision, days before Ban Ki-moon was due to 
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evaluate the mandate before renewal by the Security Council, adds to suspicions that the 
Faymann government expected the pull out to force the UN to end the operation. Yet, the 
decision reinforced the UN determination to adapt to new circumstances. The Secretary- 
General recommended ‘as matter of priority’ enhancing the self-defence capacity of the 
mission and reinforcing its force strength to 1250 troops (UN Press Centre, 13 June 2013; 
Wall Street Journal Online, 27, June 2013). These recommendations were accepted by the 
Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 2108 on 27 June 2013. Interestingly, this 
adjustment process carried with it direct demands for Austria to keep performing a GSC role 
regardless of the departure of its troops. It was only after the announcement that the UN 
began casting Austria more extensively into a GSC role. Foreign policy officials in Vienna 
were requested to delay the withdrawal and ‘leave all its equipment with UNDOF’ so as ‘to 
ensure a smooth transition with incoming troop-contributing countries’ (UN Press Centre, 13 
June 2013). The DPKO unambiguously socialised Austria into a GSC by ‘trusting that 
Austria, given its long-standing and valuable contribution to the Mission, will keep the 
interest of the Mission at heart while withdrawing its personnel’ (UN Press Centre, 13 June 
2013). 
The choice to terminate the Austrian contribution to UNDOF was not disputed by 
opposition parties and the public, demonstrating the political endorsement of a neutral role. 
Nevertheless, the intensification of socialising pressures to adopt a GSC role generated 
significant domestic contestations within the coalition and between bureaucracies. The 
central issue concerned whether Austria should organise an ‘orderly withdrawal’ in 
cooperation with international and European partners or proceed with an ‘immediate pull 
out’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). Settlement of the issue involved role 
location through negotiations with the UN and internal bargaining over roles amongst 
domestic actors seeking political goal scoring in light of the upcoming elections. Domestic 
confusion owing to international criticisms was already visible three days after the 
declaration when Spindelegger suggested that Austrian troops ‘might stay longer’ while 
government spokesmen hinted at a possible return to the Golan at a later date (Korkisch, 
2013). Positively responding to UN demands for an orderly transition, Spindelegger 
favoured postponing the pullout until 31 July. His justification indicated a GSC role: ‘it is a 
matter of Austria being perceived as a reliable partner. If you have international obligations 
you have to respect them’ (The Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2013). On the other hand, Defence 
Minister Klug proved to be more resistant to UN role demands. He maintained that the 
withdrawal should be completed as soon as possible arguing that ‘after all the UN has two to 
four weeks to seek a replacement’ (BBC Monitoring European, 10 June 2013). His position 
indicates a clear rejection of the GSC role choosing instead to emphasise Austria’s right to 
withdraw according to its own timetable. Contestations between a GSC role stressing 
Austria’s international commitments and reliability and a neutral role which promotes 
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Austria’s right to make independent foreign policy decisions ‘exposed splits between the 
Social Democrats-led defense ministry and the conservative-led foreign ministry ahead of 
elections due by the end of September’ (The Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2013). Ultimately, 
Faymann acted as arbiter siding with his SPÖ Minister and insisting that the observer 
position needed to be abandoned (Korkisch, 2013). The government’s decision to abandon a 
GSC role and proceed to an immediate pull out was disputed by the foreign ministry and the 
military on the grounds that it could have damaged Austria’s image abroad. Ambassadors 
complained that Austria will no longer be relied upon in critical questions of security (BBC 
Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). In the military, officers argued that there was enough 
time to cooperate with the UN and European stakeholders and ‘go about it more softly 
without offending Austria’s partners’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). 
Commenting on the consequence of the decision, one officer noted that ‘life will be difficult 
for us in challenging missions in the future’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). 
 
7.5 Concluding Discussion 
 
Within six months, Austria went from highly committed to UNDOF to ready to 
jeopardise its reputation as reliable UN peacekeeper. This chapter demonstrated that the 
decision to leave UNDOF resulted from a failed process of role socialisation. Following a 
deterioration in the security conditions owing to the Syrian civil war, international actors 
began calling for a wider mandate. The security ramifications of the Syrian conflict on 
UNDOF were reminiscent of past peacekeeping debacles which international actors wanted 
to pre-empt by expanding the norm relating to the use of force beyond self-defence. The 
normative framework within which UNDOF traditionally functioned was being transformed 
to allow for more robust peacekeeping. This shifting context meant that Austria could no 
longer sustain a GSC and neutral roles as a basis for participating in UNDOF. This followed 
the decisions of Canada, Japan and Croatia to withdraw their contingent from UNDOF as 
well. The Faymann government abandoned a GSC role by rejecting international efforts to 
grant UNDOF tasks designed to mitigate violence between the parties of Syrian conflict 
using force if necessary. This case study examination has uncovered decision-making 
dynamics with which internal processes of role selection have intersected, shaping Austria’s 
response to socialising demands. A discussion of these interactions is necessary to inform on 
potential domestic factors affecting small states’ likelihood to accept socialisation. It 
speaks, therefore, to wider debates about the effects of structure-agency interactions on the 




Evidence suggests that the governing elite initiated the pull out with the aim of 
increasing its public support for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Such domestic 
consideration can be connected to what foreign policy analysts have theorised and labelled as 
diversionary foreign policy (Smith, 1996; Fravel, 2010; Hagan 2017; De Rouen, 2000). 
Diversionary theory expects leaders to engage in adventurous foreign policy, most often by 
initiating conflict, to divert domestic audiences from internal social, economic and/or 
political challenges (Fravel, 2010:311). The assumption is that diversionary foreign policy 
does not apply to small states for the simple reason that it would be risky for their leaders to 
initiate conflict under any circumstances, let alone for domestic popularity. Additionally, 
small states’ foreign policy identity(ies) emphasising anti-militarism and peaceful resolution 
of conflicts render this course of action inconceivable. Publics would perceive any 
aggressive move by their elites, not as evidence of their aptitude to govern, but as a sign of 
their irrationality and incompetence. However, this reasoning overlooks the ultimate purpose 
of diversionary activity which is to ‘help a government retain power’ (Smith, 1996:133). 
There is no reason to assume that governing elites in small states do not seek re- 
elections nor divert domestic audiences from internal troubles as an opportunistic move to 
maximise their chances of remaining in office. They might only do so through foreign policy 
strategies likely to find public approval. Limitations in material capabilities mean that small 
states’ governing agents may divert attention away from poor domestic performance by 
invoking roles at the international level which resonate positively amongst the public. In 
Austria, debates about participation in common security and defence endeavours have 
always seen the neutrality issue surfacing as ‘an important topic for public opinion, which 
has continuously endorsed a retention of the…country’s neutral status’ (de Flers, 2012). The 
Austrian public expects its government to pursue a neutral role on the international stage. 
International security cooperation is acceptable only to the extent that Austria can continue to 
act as a neutral one way or another. Security developments on the Israeli-Syrian border had 
made this increasingly complicated. Moreover, although the public is generally in favour of 
peacekeeping deployments, especially when they allow enacting of a neutral role, Schmidl, 
(2015) notes that it has become increasingly challenging to justify to the public ‘the political 
benefits’ of maintaining around 1000 troops abroad: ‘for a small power, the political wisdom 
that it is positive to have a stable international environment is sometimes difficult to convey 
to the public’ (p.731). While the Faymann government valued the reputational benefits of 
peacekeeping participation, it can be argued that the domestic electoral context in which 
the selection of role towards UNDOF took place, increased the domestic costs of remaining 
in a long-running mission which was losing public interest, could cast Austria out of its 




This corroborates the argument that ‘the mechanism of elections causes the 
government to behave against the national interests when forming policy’ (Smith, 1996:133). 
Adapting Fravel’s (2010) diversionary logic to a small state context allows explaining the 
Faymann government’s decision when confronted with a choice between a GSC and a 
neutral role. ‘When faced with the prospect of an upcoming defeat at the polls, unpopular 
leaders’ in small states may ‘gamble for resurrection’ by performing a role which will both 
strengthen national identity and show their competence to lead (p.312). Such diversion can 
be seen as an opportunistic effort on the part of an unpopular governing elite. The governing 
elite had much incentive to enhance its public support. It had been highly unpopular from its 
election in 2008 and continuously lost support as domestic ‘politics centred around an 
endless series of corruption scandals’ (Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014:644). Given that 
neutrality is an integral part of what it means to be Austrian, the evocation of a neutral role 
towards UNDOF offered the prospect of generating ‘ingroup identity’ vital to successfully 
undertake a diversionary foreign policy and increase public support in the government 
(Fravel, 2010:311). Furthermore, the governing elite needed to be seen as taking a ‘good’ 
decision. Bringing the troops home to avoid casualties was likely to be perceived as sensible 
decision by the public. At least, it was a good enough reason to justify a potentially damaged 
reputation. The role contestation which took place surrounding the pace of the withdrawal is 
evidence that party and bureaucratic competition was intensifying and that electoral concerns 
were at play in the dual processes of role socialisation and selection. This case showed how 
domestic electoral cycles can influence the propensity of small states’ leaders to positively 
respond to external role demands. If these differed from the roles expected by their public, 
looming elections and poor domestic record generate incentives to divert domestic attention 
by selecting a role in line with public expectations, thereby rejecting socialisation. 
An additional condition was necessary for the government’s diversionary strategy to 
be effective. The cabinet remained vulnerable to contestation from the public and the 
political opposition that it was abandoning a GSC role and undermining Austria’s reputation 
as a result. A successful diversionary decision resting on a neutral role was dependent on 
domestic audiences being casualty averse. All governments must be sensitive to the 
possibility of casualties ‘whenever the military is asked to perform its duty’ (van der Meulen 
and Soeters, 2005:485). Concern over casualties now ‘plays a major role in dissuading them 
from initiating or continuing military action’ given that the phenomenon has ‘grown 
stronger’ and elected officials have to answer for putting soldiers at risk (Smith, 2005:487). 
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Casualty aversion is also present with regard to humanitarian and/or peacekeeping 
deployments. There is little research on the level of casualty aversion in small states, 
especially regarding Austria. Nonetheless, one can hypothesise that neutrality is, in part, 
expression of a country’s aversion to casualties indicating that Austrian domestic actors may 
be relatively averse to casualties. Overtime, a permanent policy of neutrality is likely to have 
instilled a widely shared reluctance to see Austrian soldiers dying in a global competition for 
power; a cause that Austria has not been pursuing. Additionally, Austria as a small state does 
not have as many national interests to protect as great powers, thereby diluting the main 
justification for which losses can be tolerated. This is the key reason why ‘aversion to 
casualties in UN peacekeeping is also widespread’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:8). The 
constraint imposed by domestic actors’ aversion to casualties on foreign policy-making is 
evident in the extensive emphasis which Austrian policy-makers place on appropriate 
deployment conditions and force protection. This supports the argument that the Faymann 
government was constrained by a casualty averse public as state agents decided to withdraw 
under the assumption that the loss of Austrian troops would not be tolerated and bring a 
decisive blow to the governing parties’ chances of re-election (Schmidl, 2015:730). 
However, the public and the political opposition did not voice their concerns over casualties, 
nor did they apply pressures on the government to withdraw because of disproportionate 
risks. This alludes to Smith’s (2005) observation that ‘policy-makers may create casualty 
aversion among the public where it did not exist’ (p.489). They may do so for external 
reasons such as an unwillingness to contribute troops to a politically or logistically difficult 
mission. But governing elites may also decide to activate domestic aversion to casualties to 
serve a domestic political purpose. Therefore, it may be argued that the Faymann 
government opportunistically heightened fears because it reinforced the necessity for a 
neutral role, which itself was key to increasing public support in the governing elite. The 
claim that the government may have exaggerated the risks ran by Austrian troops is 
supported by reports indicating that the situation was not as dangerous as suggested by 
official statements. It served the purpose of containing contestation in favour of a GSC role 
and of showing that the appropriate role was being pursued and the right decision taken. No 
one could dispute efforts to protect Austrian troops. Had domestic constituencies been 
willing to bear losses, the decision to withdraw would unlikely have been regarded as 
appropriate. That also helps explain why contestation emerged regarding the withdrawal 
strategy from diplomatic and military agents who likely had more accurate information about 




It could be argued that the Austrian withdrawal from UNDOF did not constitute 
diversionary behaviour, but that it was simply an opportunistic move by the governing 
leaders designed to avoid having Austrian casualties appear in the media on the eve of an 
election. There is solid ground to argue that this was the case. However, it should be noted 
that the opportunistic argument does not place enough emphasis on the steps of external 
actors towards a more robust mission and the deeper domestic context marked by the 
governing elite’s unpopularity and the Austrian public’ growing disinterest in peacekeeping 
especially if it ran counter to a neutral role. One could question whether had these conditions 
not been present, the governing elite would still have withdrawn the troops. The answer 
might possibly be negative in that they increased the incentives for the government to 
pullout. Importantly, the argument put forward here is that opportunism and diversionist 
tactic are not mutually exclusive and that both were at play during the UNDOF episode. It is 
important to consider these concepts together as they allow for a connection to be made 
between the external and internal factors contributing to the final decision. In fact, it was 
very opportunistic of the governing elite to frame and construct the violence on the ground 
and the changing nature of the mission as challenges to the neutral role. This particular role 
guaranteed to stimulate positive sentiments amongst the public. This argument further 
demonstrates that even material and physical concerns are likely to be accompanied with role 
processes. 
Overall, the Faymann government’s refusal to adopt roles expected by external 
socialising agents reflects a role shift which lies at the heart of what Kramer (2016) notes as 
a ‘de-activation of foreign policy’ (p.56). The Faymann I coalition embodied a ‘change in 
Austrian foreign policy profile from active international political player to an increasingly 
reactive and inward-looking attitude in international affairs’ (Kramer 2016:56). This case has 
traced the external and domestic political processes which have contributed to Austria’s 
changing roles in peacekeeping and international affairs. Its findings substantiate those who 
point to ‘the growing impact of domestic politics’ as Austria’s ‘foreign policy decisions are 
more and more influenced and dominated by domestic political pressures, by party politics 
and the media’ (Lehne, 2015). This case study underscores that the socialisation of small 
states is not automatic. It is dependent on role selection which may take place concurrently 
with the electoral game. This is likely to prompt governing elites to respond to, but also 
manipulate, public role expectations. 
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In the same way as the Austrian cases were approached, this chapter provides the 
foundation for the next two case studies, serving two specific analytical purposes. First, it 
provides an overview of Belgium’s post-war foreign policy in a historical perspective by 
reviewing key traditions and identifying the roles that Belgium has sought to play on the 
international scene. Initial links between the observed roles and their effects on Belgium’s 
pattern of peacekeeping deployment are made (see table 7). Second, this chapter contributes 
to the wider role approach of this project by offering the researcher a repertoire of roles that 
one expects Belgian policy-makers to draw on when responding to the socialising pressures 
applied by external actors in the two peacekeeping episodes explored in the case studies. In 
essence, these roles are expected to play an integral part in domestic processes of role 
negotiation. 
 
8.2 The Origins of a Multilateral Tradition 
 
The Concert of Europe granted Belgium its independence from the Netherlands in 
1815 and imposed on the newly-created state political neutrality to maintain the balance of 
power between France, Germany and Great Britain (Breuning, 2016:75). In the late 1930s, 
Belgian leaders believed that neutrality offered the best line of defence against Hilter’s 
expansionist foreign policy, preventing Belgium from being drawn into the war (van Tuyll 
van Serooskerken, 2016:233). However, they miscalculated the readiness of Nazi Germany 
to disregard international law. Belgium was annexed and occupied by German forces 
throughout the Second World War. Thus, the one certainty the Belgian elite held at the end 
of the war was that the role of neutral was unsuitable for Belgium and that alliances should 
instead be sought (Dujardin, 2007:95). This new foreign policy orientation was personified 
by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak who, upon returning from exile in London, 
proposed the establishment of a ‘regional grouping of Western European countries 
…whereby the participating states promised each other political and military support in the 
event of new aggression by Germany’ (Coolsaet, 2009:5). His aim was to foster military 
cooperation by homogenising arms systems, coordinating armed forces, and exchanging 
information under the leadership of Britain (Coolsaet, 2009:5). The proposal was founded on 
the idea that continuing cooperation between former war Allies was crucial and that a small 
state like Belgium could, and should, work towards that goal. Therefore, while promoting 
Western cooperation, Spaak endeavoured to build friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
based on a perception that Moscow’s post-war motivations were legitimate (Van Alstein, 
2011:131). By enacting the role of partner to both superpowers, Belgium was seeking a third 
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way between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to adapt to growing superpower 
hostility (Van Alstein, 2011:146). 
Yet, a combination of domestic and international factors explains Spaak’s inability 
to successfully position Belgium as a partner to the West and the USSR simultaneously. 
First, Western partners did not share the Belgian view of Soviet intentions as benign or 
justified in light of Soviet advances in Eastern and Central Europe, and later Germany. 
Intensifying tensions between the great powers provided Belgium with a restricted space to 
promote cooperation and coexistence. Second, Moscow did not believe reassurances coming 
from Brussels that the Belgian proposal for Western military cooperation was not designed 
to balance the Soviet Union in Europe despite numerous diplomatic contacts between 
Belgian and Soviet officials. Third, Great Britain refused to assume a leadership role in this 
Western military grouping, preferring to develop ‘closer Atlantic ties’ with the United States 
‘in the role of junior partner’ instead (Coolsaet, 2009:4). Fourth, a group of Belgian 
aristocratic diplomats contested Spaak’s interpretation of Soviet actions and was, therefore, 
‘never able to perceive the Soviet Union as a partner or an insider in international politics 
and diplomacy’ (Van Alstein, 2011:147). Advocates of cooperation could not contain the 
growing domestic influence of this elite, precipitating Belgium into the cold war along an 
anti-Soviet path (Van Alstein, 2011:147). 
The first evidence of Belgium having turned to the role of loyal ally to the United 
States from 1947 emerged when Brussels accepted the Marshall Plan despite Spaak’s initial 
scepticism. The enduring belief that Great Britain should be the leader of European 
cooperation meant that the Belgian administration was initially reluctant to accept the 
American offer. Yet, the perception that Germany’s recovery and integration was critical to 
achieve Belgium’s economic interests and political ambition for closer European political 
and economic cooperation strengthened the loyalty of Belgian leaders to Washington 
(Coolsaet, 2009:9). The loyal ally role was also grounded in the realisation that, due to its 
small size, Belgium needed to integrate in Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in order to 
defend its interests in international affairs (Gerits, 2012:27). Therefore, in early 1948, when 
UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin launched the idea of Western Union to create closer 
European ties, Spaak enthusiastically signed the Brussels Treaty because it offered ‘for the 
first time’ a ‘possibility of achieving this close political-military cooperation between West 
European states under British leadership’ (Coolsaet, 2009:10). This initiative paved the way 
for the formation of a North Atlantic Treaty, committing the United States to the defence of 
Europe (Kent and Young, 1992:42). As with the Marshall Plan, Spaak was reticent to accept 
US leadership in Europe and, therefore, an Atlantic military pact. However, an alignment of 
US and Belgian preferences on German integration combined with a shifting balance of 
power in Europe in favour of the US encouraged Belgian policy-makers to use Washington 
as the primary point of reference for Belgian foreign policy. Spaak’s original scepticism was 
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placated when it hit home that Belgium would not be able pursue its national interests 
without performing the role of loyal ally. Belgium was one of the twelve founding members 
who signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949. 
American pressure for Belgium to perform a loyal ally role influenced its foreign 
policy-making throughout the 1950s. When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, American 
officials sought to ‘anchor Belgium more tightly within NATO’ arguing that Belgium acted 
as ‘a vital core of stability and leadership in Western Europe’ and that Brussels had 
‘international obligations to fulfil’ (Gerits, 2012:25-31). But Belgium was unwilling to send 
a battalion as demanded by Washington. In 1950, national elections saw the return of the 
Christian Social Party in a government headed by Prime Minister Joseph Pholien who 
perceived favourably US demands to increase the defence budget, maintain military service, 
and take anti-Communist measures (Gerits, 2012:31). Thus, after the UN passed resolutions 
calling for military action in support of the Republic of Korea, the government ‘moved 
quickly to support both the United States and the United Nations’ by contributing one 
battalion to the UN force (Edwards, 2013:72-73). Between December 1950 and June 1955, 
3500 Belgian troops served and 106 lost their lives. The loyal ally role served to overcome 
the doubts of the Belgian governing elite when France proposed to create the European 
Defence Community (EDC) in October 1950 which the Truman administration supported. 
Although Belgian Foreign Minister Paul van Zeeland supported the project, he feared that 
the supranational idea of a European Minister of Defence would diminish the influence and 
voice of small states (Gerits, 2012:38). However, the role of loyal ally was re-activated when 
Washington threatened to cut aid if Belgium continued its opposition, motivating Belgium to 
sign the treaty on 27 May 1952 (Gerits, 2012:38). The influence exercised by a loyal ally 
role on Belgium’s decision can be seen in Prime Minister Jean Van Houtte’s statement to 
Eisenhower in January 1953 that ‘[Belgium’s] ideas completely coincide with yours with 
respect to this policy for strengthening the peace, security, and prosperity of associated 
states. It is with this purpose in mind that the Belgian government has decided to give full 
support to the establishment of the European Defence Community’ (quoted in Gerits, 
2012:41). Similarly, Belgium began actively working towards the European Coal and Steel 
Community from June 1955 after the US pressed Belgium to participate once ‘it was 
absolutely certain that the Belgian diplomatic corps had fully embraced the American vision 





8.3 A Tradition of Peace 
 
The early 1960s proved to be a challenge for Belgium’s primary foreign policy roles, 
namely the loyal ally and colonial power roles. The Congo became a Belgian colony in 
1884-85 when European powers granted King Leopold II a large territory in the centre of 
Africa on the basis that it would be open for free trade (Breuning, 2007:29). In August 1960, 
Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba threatened to ask Soviet assistance if Belgium acted in 
support of Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Katanga region seeking independence. So, when on 
9 July 1960, Belgian troops intervened in Katanga at Tshombe’s request after a military 
rebellion broke out, the international community sided with Lumumba in denouncing 
Belgium’s move as an attempt to recolonise the Congo (Kaplan, 1967:240). Crucially, the 
US voted with the Soviet Union, and despite British and French abstention, in the UN 
Security Council for Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo. This generated much 
anger in Brussels against the US which was seen as ‘the leader of the Atlantic Alliance in 
which Belgium had long since buried its independence and to which it had committed its 
future’ (Kaplan, 1967:241). While the loyal ally role had become entrenched enough to help 
Belgium normalise relations with Washington after this episode, there was nothing that 
Belgian leaders could do to salvage the country’s role as a colonial power given the 
international criticism of its actions. 
However, Dujardin (2007) argues that this loss of status ‘did not affect its 
[Belgium’s] work towards détente’ (p.9). When Paul-Henri Spaak returned as head of the 
Foreign Ministry from his time as NATO Secretary-General in 1961, he continued the policy 
line of his predecessor proposing that a ‘small, sufficiently partial country such as Belgium’ 
has the potential to successfully negotiate détente with Soviet leaders (Dujardin, 2007:96). 
Spaak argued that NATO’s military strategy could and should be complemented with a 
dialogue with the East. Belgium was using its platform within NATO to enact the role of 
‘mediator’, ‘peace-maker’ (Delcorde, 1988:25) and/or ‘go-between’ meant to achieve a de- 
escalation and avoid east-west conflict. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Rapacki, with 
whom Spaak was coordinating to organise a Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) declared that Spaak’s activism ‘stems from his views on the role of small 
countries in creating détente’ (quoted in Dujardin, 2007:99). This provided Spaak’s 
successor, Pierre Harmel, with the necessary foundation to consolidate Belgium’s position 
within NATO and provide the Alliance with a new direction. He believed that Belgium 
should play an active role in re-defining NATO’s purpose after the decision of de Gaulle to 
withdraw France from the Alliance in 1966. In what came to be known as the Harmel report, 
the Belgian Foreign Minister advanced in December 1967 that, if NATO was to endure, it 
should ‘promote détente, recognise the right to national initiatives and overcome the division 
of Europe’ (Coolsaet, 2009:25). It should be noted that Belgium was acting as a loyal ally 
given that US President Johnson relied on Harmel to reinvigorate the Alliance after France’s 
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departure, while also acting as a mediator by pushing NATO towards negotiations with the 
Soviet Union (Dujardin, 2007:100). Arguably, the mediator role depended on Belgium’s 
continuing loyalty to Washington. The ‘Harmel exercise’ would have been impossible 
without US support, especially given that other Western partners believed it was going too 
far (Dujardin, 2007:102). 
From 1947, the objective of constructing a security and political community across 
the Atlantic always preceded integrating the economies and political systems of Western 
European states from a Belgian perspective. Belgium sought complementarity between 
NATO and the European Community (EC) by ‘linking Britain to the EC both in order to 
counter-balance the French and German dominance and to enable Western Europe to play a 
major role in world politics’ (Reinfeldt, 2016:84). Since the Atlantic Alliance was the 
‘backbone’ of Belgian foreign policy, European political and economic integration should be 
pursued within, and in consideration of, the Atlantic framework (Paul Van Zeeland quoted in 
Coolsaet, 2009:18). To pursue regional integration, Belgium turned first and foremost to its 
neighbours, undertaking common projects such as the 1943 Benelux agreement aimed at 
harmonising monetary policies. Such collaborative practice was the first step towards the 
Benelux countries playing a ‘pace-setting role’ in fostering wider regional cooperation and 
integration (Maes and Verdun, 2005:332). Prior Benelux cooperation was crucial in 
reinvigorating the integration process after France rejected the EDC. In 1955, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg signed the Benelux memorandum providing the necessary 
momentum to convene the Messina conference and sign the Treaty of Rome (Maes and 
Verdun, 2005:332). By the end of the 1960s, several shifts in the international system 
prompted West European states to create the European Political Cooperation (EPC); an 
intergovernmental agreement designed to increase foreign policy cooperation and 
coordination (Reinfeldt, 2016:83). The emergence of other centres of power and the 
achievement of détente led European policy-makers to suspect that the US might discontinue 
its engagement in Europe. Additionally, having gradually relinquished their colonial empires 
and moved away from financial dependence on Washington, European states became ‘self- 
confident enough to feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to east- 
west relations’ (Ludlow, 2007:5). In Belgium, these developments motivated policy-makers 
to emphasise their ‘intermediary role’ in a European context dedicated to ‘mediating between 
the foreign policies of their partners’ (Reinfeldt, 2016:84). Fearing American retreat and 
German economic rise, Foreign Minister Harmel pressed reluctant French officials to accept 
progress towards a common security and defence policy. The idea of pursuing further 
European foreign policy integration to provide the EC with more power on the international 





8.4 A Return to an Atlantic Tradition? 
 
The latter stages of the cold war saw Belgium re-emphasise its Atlantic tradition. 
Belgian policy-makers’ security perceptions began converging again on the primacy of 
NATO as they gradually lost interest in the diplomatic tradition of the Harmel policy 
(Coolsaet, 2009:29). Pierre Harmel’s successors, Renaat Van Elslande (1973-1977) and 
Henri Simonet (1977-1980) deemed his approach inappropriate in light of Belgium’s 
achievements in the European integration process and the perceived resurgence of the 
military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union. The dominant notion became that 
Europe in the form of NATO needed to present an undivided front led by the United States 
(Coolsaet, 2009:31). Simonet attacked Harmel’s vision directly in the following terms: 
‘Those who concentrate on a mediating role need never take a position. I reject that kind of 
laziness’ (quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:29). Ideas of de-escalation were substituted by beliefs of 
countering the Soviet threat; a shift that took place hand in hand with, and was informed by, 
a desire to act as a loyal ally (van der Beek, 2016:40; Coolsaet, 2009:30). Successive 
governments throughout the 1970s and 1980s consistently enforced defence budget increases 
in line of NATO requirements, supported the modernisation of the organisation and approved 
the deployment of American cruise missiles (van der Beek, 2016:50). 
This latter decision produced significant internal divisions related to the role 
Belgium should play in reacting to the dilemma brought by the end of the détente (De Wilde, 
2014:285). The push for a loyal ally role effectively discontinued the domestic agreement on 
the compatibility of ‘Atlantic cooperation’ and ‘European construction’. Political actors fell 
on each side of ‘a broad politically destabilizing gap’ between ‘Atlanticists’ and 
‘Europeanists’ (Coolsaet, 2009:30; Hoffmann quoted in Thies, 2009:183). The Belgian peace 
movement launched an extensive campaign demanding the Martens government to enact a 
specific role that would preclude a Belgian approval of NATO’s decision to deploy nuclear 
missiles. Based on a perception that both Moscow and Washington were threats to 
international security, the movement advanced that Belgium, as a small country, should take 
‘guiding roles in realizing a nuclear weapon-free-world’ (van der Beek, 2016:40). At an elite 
level, the Europeanists which included Social Democrats from both regions, younger 
members of the Flemish Liberal Party and a minority of parliamentarians from the ruling 
Flemish Christian Democratic Party, challenged the Atlanticist view held by Foreign 
Minister, Leo Tindemans (1981-1989) by emphasising Belgium’s responsibility towards 
disarmament rather than vis-à-vis the US. Unlike the peace movement’s preference for an 
independent and autonomous policy, Europeanists advocated greater European cooperation 
in easing tensions between East and West (Coolsaet, 2009:31). The opposition succeeded in 
forcing the government to retain the right to reassess its position depending on the Alliance’s 
result on the arms control track, delaying a formal decision (Thies, 2009:183; The New York 
Times, 1979). Yet, it ultimately failed to stop the enactment of loyal ally role when the 
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government accepted the deployment of American nuclear weapons on Belgian soil in March 
1985. Nonetheless, the Europeanists’ conception infiltrated ‘Belgian thinking on security and 
defence’ remaining relevant to policy-makers in their response to the events of 1989-1991 
(Coolsaet, 2009:32). 
 
8.5 A European Tradition 
 
Belgium’s uncertainty about its place in post-cold war security structures was 
exacerbated by the eruption of the Gulf crisis in August 1990. Belgian foreign policy-makers 
were apprehensive of American intentions and feared unilateral action (Coolsaet, 2009:38). 
High levels of uncertainty combined with the emerging norm of European coordination 
created propitious conditions for Belgian policy-makers to positively identify with the EC 
and the WEU as a basis for Belgium’s response to the crisis. Underlying the Martens 
government’s wish to perform a regional subsystem collaborator (RSC) role, ‘Belgium 
consistently insisted upon a European framework in order to achieve the joint European 
playing-down of an exclusive military option’ because the ‘government believed it could 
pursue a broader political agenda’ than it would have as a small member of NATO (Coolsaet 
and Soetendorp, 2000:137-138). This role motivated the government to participate in a 
Benelux contribution to the naval blockade, but only on the condition it was carried out 
within a WEU framework as opposed to under US leadership (Jørgensen, 1997:24; van 
Beveren, 1992). 
However, divisions amongst European states over how to manage the crisis prevented 
the Belgian government from fully performing its European role. France and Britain 
advocated a maximalist approach driven by desires to play leadership roles. In contrast, other 
member states favoured a range of minimalist responses determined by concerns for ally 
solidarity, their bilateral relationship with Washington and their own historical experiences 
(Jørgensen, 1997:22). It is in the context of the Gulf war that Foreign Minister Eyskens 
declared his famous quote: ‘Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military 
worm’ (The New York Times, 25 January 1991). Unable to act jointly with European 
partners, cabinet ministers disagreed about the role Belgium should take in responding to the 
crisis. British demands for an active military role by providing ammunition to the campaign 
generated additional conflicts in the Martens VIII coalition government. As a CVP (Flemish 
Christian Democratic Party)-led coalition, a majority of ministers including Prime Minister 
Martens and Foreign Minister Eyskens favoured an active international engagement based on 
concerns for solidarity and loyalty amongst allies (Interview of Eyskens by Deschamps, 
2010:36; Houben, 2005:46). It is on this basis that the government dispatched minesweepers, 
two frigates to the Gulf and provided Egypt with two transport aircrafts for the evacuation of 
refugees (UNGA, 1990). Yet, losses by the CVP to Socialist Parties in the previous 1987 
elections had forced Christian Democrats to include more Socialists in the cabinet (Wilsford, 
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1995:308). In this way, Guy Coëme from the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) succeeded 
Liberal François-Xavier de Donnéa as Minister of Defence in 1988. Members of the Belgian 
Left articulated a narrative emphasising international solidarity, the credibility of 
international law and humanitarian concerns as preconditions for international interventions. 
They envisaged Belgium into a non-military role acting as promoter of international law 
(Frank, 2011). In cabinet, they argued that the government ‘was going too far’ and failed to 
exhaust all other ‘diplomatic, verbal, possibly financial’ options (Eyskens in Deschamps, 
2010:36). Defence Minister Coëme played a significant part in Belgium’s refusal to meet 
British demands for military supplies (Eyskens in Deschamps, 2010:36; The Herald, 2000). 
The socialist influence in constraining Belgium’s military role was noticeable when Prime 
Minister Martens did not seek to overrule Coeme’s decision and failed to act on his promise 
to contribute F-16 fighters to the campaign (The Guardian, 2013). Public opinion was neither 
distinctly ‘activist’ nor supportive of ‘political and military adventures’ (Houben, 2005:46). 
Concepts of ally solidarity and/or humanitarian intervention did not resonate broadly 
amongst the Belgian public, thereby constraining the government from taking a ‘front line 
attitude’ through the deployment of ground troops (Houben, 2005:46; Jørgensen, 1997:22). 
The Belgian contribution was seen to be one of limited support for its transatlantic ally (De 
Wilde, 2014:284). In fact, the government chose to present its position as ‘participating in 
the international solidarity effort’ rather than in terms of support for the US intervention 
(UNGA, 1990). It was a compromise ‘heavily criticised’ by those who thought the 
government was ‘not very brave’ by limiting its support to ‘exasperated allies’ (The 
Guardian, 2013). 
The adoption of UN Security Council resolution 678 authorising ‘all necessary 
means’ to enforce the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait strengthened Belgian leaders’ 
belief in the UN as ‘the most legitimate player on the international stage’ (Liegeois, 2016:26; 
Coolsaet, 2016:13). The close alignment of Belgium’s foreign policy principles with those of 
the UN indicates that the Belgian elite identified positively with the institution’s mission in 
security affairs (Liegeois, 2016:26). Belgium feels a responsibility to extend what it achieved 
in ‘the process of European unification’ to an international level and ‘defend in priority the 
common interest, namely, in this case, that of the United Nations’ (Liegeois and Glume, 
2008:116). In this way, the reorientation towards the UN is a direct consequence of the 
common European security policy remaining inoperative. The UN narrative describes 
Belgium as a promoter of ‘human rights, the rule of law and right to peace and dignity’ 
which introduces a concern for human security in Belgium’s foreign policy outlook 
(Liegeois, 2016:26, 33). It enabled Belgium to fashion for itself a tradition as a ‘staunch 
defender of … the UN system’ (Permanent Mission of Belgium in the UN Online, 2016). 
The roles of humanitarian actor and UN activist (or GSC) have been the foundation of 
Belgium’s international activism in signing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties 
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(Liegeois, 2016:33). Belgium also called on the UN to take a more prominent and efficient 
peacekeeping role (UNSC, 1992). A period of intense UN activism ensued during which 
major contributions were made to UN operations including Western Sahara (1991), 
Cambodia (1992) as well as Somalia (UNOSOM), Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR and UNTAES) 
and Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Coolsaet, 2009:39). Belgium was successful in gaining a non- 
permanent seat at the UN Security Council from January 1991. In the end, the Gulf war 
established a strong consensus in Belgium regarding the need for a UN mandate and a EU 
framework as preconditions for taking part in military operations (Coolsaet, 2016:13). 
 
8.6 The End of a Colonial Tradition 
 
On 7 April 1994, ten Belgian paratroopers of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) were assassinated by soldiers of the former Rwandan army. The government of 
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene immediately terminated its contribution to the mission 
precipitating the ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi population. The loss of Belgian lives in the 
context of a UN operation and the intensity of the violence that followed were traumatic 
experiences for the Belgian public and political establishment. After much public 
condemnation of the government’s attempts to conceal the full extent of what happened in 
Kigali, a parliamentary commission of inquiry was established in April 1997 to investigate 
Belgium’s role in the Rwandan genocide (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:308). The actual 
conflict as well as Belgium’s process of self-evaluation had profound consequences for 
political actors’ views regarding the roles their country should have in Africa and as an 
international peacekeeper. 
The initial decision to deploy 370 Belgian peacekeepers to Rwanda can be explained 
by the government seeking to perform contradictory roles. Following the refusal of other 
potential contributors, Belgium felt under pressure to accept the UN Secretary General’s 
request for a troop contribution. Brussels was reluctant to undermine its UN activist (or GSC) 
role. However, both UN and Belgian leaderships overlooked the dominant peacekeeping 
norm stipulating that no blue helmet should originate from a state with interests in the area of 
deployment. There is clear evidence that Belgian policy-makers sought to enact a former 
colonial power role. They saw a participation in UNAMIR as ‘a unique opportunity of 
strategic repositioning in the middle of the Great Lakes region’ (Liegeois and Glume, 
2008:118). Political concerns for maintaining good alliance relations with the Rwandan 
leadership despite its poor human right record had driven Belgium’s policy towards Rwanda 
since 1990 (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:320). Conscious of these contradictions, the 
Belgian government contributed to UNAMIR half-heartedly, thereby accounting for the poor 
design of the operation, the lack of capabilities and the absence of a contingency plan 
(Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:320; Liegeois and Glume, 2008:118). It is a clear case of 
how a decision motivated by incompatible roles can have dramatic consequences. 
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In January 1998, the parliamentary inquiry delivered its main recommendation that 
‘Belgium should not send armed troops in countries with which we had colonial bonds 
anymore’ (in Liegeois and Glume, 2008:119). Belgium also sought distance from its UN 
tradition by rejecting the organisation’s peacekeeping norms. Prime Minister Dehaene 
criticised the DPKO for refusing to provide UNAMIR with the necessary mandate when 
peace had collapsed (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:313). Koops and Drieskens (2012) 
note that ‘it was the experience in Rwanda that turned Belgium’s ruling elite and society into 
UN-sceptics’. Belgium’s malaise with UN peacekeeping is apparent in the shifting discourse 
of Belgian leaders at the General Assembly. To be clear, they did not oppose the 
organisation’s role in peace and security but perceived the primary function of the UN as 
now lying in social and economic domains (UNGA, 1995). Greater emphasis was given to 
Belgium’s effort on ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘conflict prevention’ in the framework of 
European organisations (UNGA, 1998). According to Brussels, regional arrangements 
should be granted a more extensive role in supporting the UN’s security activities. Belgium 
was increasingly portrayed as a European state committed to addressing conflicts at their 
earliest stages in Europe. In the context of Belgium’s contribution to the NATO-led 
implementation force (IFOR), Foreign Minister Derycke stated that his ‘country is, with its 
partners, part of this peacekeeping operation whose role is to be a force for solidarity, 
reconstruction and hope for a new Europe’ (UNGA, 1996). The purpose of this narrative was 
to justify the ‘political choice made to concentrate Belgium’s peacekeeping contributions in 
NATO and EU missions’ (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Having lost faith in traditional 
peacekeeping practices, Belgium took it upon itself, through a UN reformer role, to request 
changes in the UN approach. Deheane asserted that ‘the credibility of the United Nations 
peace operations can be ensured only if certain conditions are met’ (UNGA, 1995). These 
were laid out in the inquiry’s report and included more permissive rules of engagements, 
maximum guarantees for troop safety and explicit authorisations to use force (in Liegeois 
and Glume, 2008:119). The Rwanda trauma along with the inquiry’s conclusions have 
created powerful domestic constraints on Belgium’s roles towards Africa and peacekeeping. 
The Rwanda episode made it clear that a former colonial power role, which 
traditionally shaped Belgium’s approach to managing crises in Africa, had become out of 
tune with the international norms of democratization, support for the rule of law and ‘African 
ownership’ (Belgium underwent a similar process in the domain of development cooperation 
see Breuning, 2016:76; Coolsaet, 2016:13). Nevertheless, the post-Rwanda adaption process 
generated a rift in the political class regarding the roles Belgium should continue to play in 
facilitating peace and security on the African continent. Disagreements surfaced as the 
second Dehaene government (1995-1999) attempted to react to the refugee crisis in eastern 
Zaire during 1996-97 involving a complex interplay of civilian and military cross-border 
movement between Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda, ethnic antagonisms and large-scale human 
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right abuses (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:308). A significant sign of change was 
Brussels’ recognition that Africa policy should increasingly be conducted multilaterally 
(Coolsaet, 2016:13). Yet, the international community’s lack of interest in the Zairian crisis 
exacerbated uncertainty and frictions amongst domestic actors surrounding Belgium’s role. 
Christian Democrats (CVP) favoured a former colonial power role based on a perception that 
Belgium should continue to ‘play a political role in the former colonies’ by furthering 
cooperation with the governments of the Great Lakes region (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 
2004:308). This role is expressed in terms of special relationship with former colonies. Its 
principal carrier inside the government was State Secretary for Development Cooperation 
Reginald Moreels. As a fervent supporter of humanitarian interventions, Moreels was a key 
agent in promoting the CVP’s policy line envisaging a deployment of Belgian troops to 
come to the aid of Zairian refugees. Former Prime Minister and Foreign Affair Minister 
Eyskens expressed the role and its policy implications most clearly: 
‘We have a right to intervene. I would say that right should become a military duty 
to intervene. The ideal would be a UN intervention. As a former colonial power, 
we should not say that we will never send Belgian troops to the region. We should 
not be guilty of non-assistance’ (quoted in Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:328). 
 
The Socialist Party, the second largest of the coalition, rejected any intervention with 
colonial undercurrents. An established member in the party, Foreign Minister Derycke 
believed that Belgium should take its distance with ex-colonies especially when these were 
governed by undemocratic leaders like Zairian president Mobutu. He wanted Belgium to 
enact a promoter of democratisation and human rights role by making cooperation 
conditional upon progress on these dimensions. On the refugee crisis, Derycke found himself 
in a difficult position between his coalition partners’ demands for a more active role without 
overlooking the Rwandan legacy, new international norms that corresponded to his party’s 
position and the fact that an intervention would provide president Mobutu military and 
political support. He expressed his preferred role in the following terms: 
‘The crisis in the Great Lakes region is a moral challenge for the United Nations. 
It imposes on us the duty of solidarity. We must help Africa to find solutions and 
to implement them without interfering or trying to impose solutions’ (Derycke in 
UNGA, 1998; author’s emphasis). 
This dilemma was a middle ground response in the form of logistical and financial 
support to an intervention ‘within the framework of a policy of conflict prevention which the 
European Union, in cooperation with the OAU, is trying to elaborate’ (UNGA, 1996). The 
Belgian government was not ready to take the lead of an intervention nor to send any troops 





8.7 An Integrationist Tradition in a Post-Cold War Environment 
 
In 1999, EU member states collectively reshaped the structures of European security 
by launching the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a response to their failure 
to act jointly in addressing the Balkan conflicts. Individually, they had to reassess their 
commitments to alliance solidarity, existing allies and European integration, feeding into the 
roles they wanted to play politically and militarily within existing and emerging security 
structures. The uncertainty of this process was heightened by the 9/11 attacks and the 
ensuing US war on terror. 
In the mind of Belgian policy-makers, the American invasion of Iraq and European 
defence integration were closely intertwined. Washington’s unilateral action had re- 
awakened old fears of great powers acting outside international rules to the detriment of 
small states’ autonomy and survival (Coolsaet, 2009:48). The crisis showed that the norms of 
European coordination and UN legitimacy, internalised during the first Iraq war, affected the 
roles of Belgium to a greater extent than US attempts to cast Belgium into a loyal ally role. 
The Verhofstadt government enacted a promoter of international law role, predisposing it to 
attach weight to the ‘external legitimacy of an operation’ (Houben, 2005:54) and side with 
France, Germany and Luxembourg in opposing the war. 
Belgium sought stability in its entrenched tradition of actively promoting European 
integration. The perceived necessity for stronger legal structures led Brussels to assume a 
leadership role in advocating ‘increased intra-European defence cooperation’ along with 
‘Europe’s autonomy in world politics’ (Coolsaet, 2016:18). Belgium’s role as a leading 
advocate of deeper defence integration is also rooted in policy-makers’ belief that the CFSP 
and the ESDP enhance foreign policy opportunities and leverage for Belgium (Coolsaet and 
Soetendorp, 2000:137). Soon after 9/11, Prime Minister Verhofstadt wrote to the UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac urging a new impetus ‘to relaunch 
the idea of a European defence and rekindle the Saint-Malo spirit’ (Verhofstadt in Haine, 
2003:113). Belgium took the lead in April 2003 by convening the ‘Chocolate Summit’ which 
gathered the European opponents of the war on terror (The Amazing Strategic Orchestra of 
Belgian Defence (ASOBD) 2015:41). By introducing the key concepts of European Defence 
Agency (EDA) and Battlegroups, the summit was testament to Belgium’s role as ‘leading 
theologian of European defence’ (Biscop, 2015:39; ASOBD, 2015:41-42). Furthermore, 
Belgian personnel have been present in almost all EU missions, whether military or civilian, 
since the first deployment in 2003 (Coolsaet, 2016:18). It should be noted that such 
European roles create an important degree of constraint on Belgian decision-makers who will 
find it increasingly difficult to abstain from participation as the CFSP extends further into 




In contrast, the new norms that NATO was developing as part of its post-cold war 
reorientation impacted minimally on Belgium’s roles during the Iraq war because the foreign 
policy elite was reticent to accept the ‘out of area’ military ambitions of the Alliance, 
especially if undertaken outside a UN mandate (Coolsaet, 2009:49). There were also fears in 
Brussels that the US would come to dominate the Alliance. Belgian scepticism about the 
evolution of NATO is reflected in the Prime Minister’s letter to Blair and Chirac: 
 ‘It looks very likely that NATO will cease to be an alliance in the future. 
The US seems to be pushing NATO in the direction of a loose coalition that will 
be formed differently and will deploy different resources depending on the enemy’ 
(Verhofstadt in Haine, 2003:112). 
 
Expectedly, this position carried negative consequences for Belgium’s role as a loyal ally. 
The assertion by Foreign Minister Michel upon taking office that Belgium would not be ‘the 
United States’ servant’ indicates a reluctance to allow Belgium’s roles to be determined by 
US pressures; a political choice not to prioritise strategic relations with Washington (quoted 
in Coolsaet 2009:44). 
The roles pursued by the Belgian government inside the ESDP integrate both French 
and German ideas of European security. It shares the French vision of the EU as a powerful 
independent actor in world politics. Like their German counterparts, Belgian leaders perceive 
an internal risk in the renationalisation of defence policies that only deeper integration and 
formal equality between members can prevent (Aggestam, 2004:93; Verhofstadt in Haine, 
2003:112). On transatlantic relations, Brussels balances French reluctance to accept 
American leadership with German Atlantic orientation envisaging the EU as a European 
pillar of NATO. Moreover, Belgium sees its purpose as working towards an EU that is 
capable to ‘counterbalance’ US dominance (Michel in Coolsaet, 2009:48). Defence Minister 
Flahaut stated that ‘striving to maintain American engagement does not mean that there can 
be any place for hegemony’ (quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:49). Nonetheless, the development of 
the EU into an independent security actor is regarded as a precondition for the continuation 
of a strong transatlantic relations (Biscop, 2015:39). 
Importantly, Belgium distinguishes itself from its two neighbours by seeking to limit 
their directorate in security policy-making. For Belgium, a chief concern lies in the risk of 
abandonment in decision-making when a functioning Franco-German partnership decides to 
act outside institutionalised mechanisms (Wivel, 2005:400). For this reason, Belgian policy- 
makers strongly believe in supranational arrangements as most effective in securing the 
interests of small states (Houben, 2005:38). The prospect of a Franco-German directorate 
activates Belgium’s self-conception as a promoter of international law and multilateralism 
preconditioning the country to reject any move undermining the role of institutions in the 
decision-making of security and defence issues. This suggests that not every form of 
multilateralism is always beneficial to small states (Wivel, 2005) and that the roles they 
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choose to play within multilateral institutions shape their directions and development into 
security actors (Aggestam, 2004). 
To conclude this analysis, several factors have undermined the external credibility of 
the RSC role and Belgium’s ability to perform it. First, even pro-integration Belgium was not 
immune to disagreement amongst political parties over Belgium’s roles towards EU military 
crisis management. Liberal and Socialist coalition members in Verhofstadt I (1999-2003) 
and Verhofstadt II (2004-2007) differed over the extent to which Belgium should be 
involved in European crisis management. As a member of the French-speaking Socialist 
Party (PS), Defence Minister Flahaut did not oppose Belgium participation, but nor did he 
promote it as vigorously as Prime Minister Verhofstadt (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 
2010:575). Socialists saw with scepticism the use of military force and the alignment of the 
EU external crisis management with US foreign policy objectives in the context of the war 
on terror (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010:575). They favoured Belgium to perform an 
active independent role implicating greater autonomy from Washington. Conversely, Prime 
Minister Verhofstadt was a committed federalist who ‘saw an active contribution to ESDP as 
a further expression of Belgium’s commitment to further European integration’ 
(Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010:575). Second, the political deadlock following the 2007 
elections gave the image of Belgium as a dysfunctional country at the heart of Europe. Third, 
Belgium was failing to sustain the necessary defence spending to support its rhetoric of 
European security autonomy (Coolsaet, 2016:18). Regional partners have repeatedly 
demanded Belgium to act upon its RSC role to a greater extent. Fourth, acting on the 
perception that the previous government had neglected transatlantic relations, the Christian 
Democrat-led coalition headed by Yves Leterme came into power in 2008 with the objective 
of implementing a ‘more pronounced pro-Atlanticist position’ (Coolsaet, 2009:51). Rather 
than a fundamental shift in roles, this development suggests a return to a more equal balance 




This chapter has reviewed the main dimensions of Belgium’s foreign policy through 
its relationship with different multilateral institutions. It can be difficult to understand how 
Belgium combines UN activism (GSC), NATO solidarity (loyal ally) and EU construction 
(RSC) into a coherent foreign policy, contributing to the criticism that Belgium lacks a clear 
foreign policy line (Coolsaet, 2016). By analysing the responses of Belgium to a series of 
foreign policy dilemmas, the aim was to clarify some of this ambiguity. One important 
finding confirms that small states’ relationship with multilateralism is not as unambiguous as 
the literature makes it seem. In fact, the Belgian case shows that small states’ commitment to 
multilateral institutions can vary significantly from one platform to another and over time. 
Furthermore, a recent review of the diplomatic mission of Belgium concluded that ‘in order 
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to pursue a pro-active multilateral agenda, a country needs an adequate bilateral network’ 
(Coolsaet, 2016:20). This substantiates the view that small states do not necessarily prioritise 
multilateralism because their elites also perceive the disadvantages of doing so, choosing 
instead to maintain their autonomy or deal with strategic partners on a bilateral basis. Yet, 
the choice to maintain bilateral ties also entails a move outside the formal rules of 
multilateral institutions which is likely to position Belgium in greater asymmetry with more 
influential partners. Belgium continues to struggle to reconcile NATO’s demands of greater 
solidarity, especially when these come from Washington, and European expectations for a 
Belgium contribution towards the development of a common and defence and security 
policy. This was the case when détente ended in the 1980s, as the Berlin Wall came down 
and again during both Iraq wars. As these fault lines have shaped Belgium’s post war foreign 
policy, the following case studies investigate how the roles embedded in them have played 
out in Belgium’s decisions to participate in two recent peacekeeping operations. 
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P. de Crem 
450 troops 
1996 – Eastern Slavonia, Baranja 
and Sirmium (UNTAES), 130 
troops 
1999 – Kosovo (KFOR) 
2003 – Congo (EU Op. Artemis) 
2004 – Burundi (ONUB) 
2006 – Sudan (UNMIS) 
2006 – Lebanon (UNIFIL II) 
2006 – Congo (EUFOR) 
2006 – Congo (MONUSCO) 
2006 – Chad (EUFOR Chad) 
2008 – Somalia (Atalanta EU 
NAVFOR) 
2009/10 – Afghanistan (ISAF), 




Loyal Ally Defence Minister 
CD&V 
2010 – Somalia (EUTM), 
instructors 
2011 – Libya (NATO Op. Unified 
Protector), F16s and minesweeper 
2013 – Mali (Operation Serval) 
2013 – Mali (EUTM), force 
protection 
  2013 – Mali (MINUSMA)  
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On 26 August 2006, the government of Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt authorised 
the deployment of 400 Belgian peacekeepers to the ‘enhancement’ of the UN Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) after twelve years of Belgian absence from UN peacekeeping. This 
re-engagement offers a unique opportunity to analyse the country’s evolving role 
conception(s) in the field of peacekeeping. The death of ten Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) in 1994 underscored that the roles of former colonial power and UN activist 
should together no longer guide the country’s decisions to participate in peacekeeping 
missions. 
The decision was also significant because it was part of a wider regional pattern of a 
‘European return to UN peacekeeping’ (Mattelaer, 2009:7). In their response to the 
escalating crisis, EU member states displayed signs of unity, cohesion and coordination not 
seen since the divisions over the Iraq war (Gross, 2009:46; Biscop, 2007:3). This common 
front enabled the EU to take on a leading role in UNIFIL II as shown by member states 
committing over 70% of the total number of UN troops (Biscop, 2007:3). This step should 
not overshadow the fact that troop commitments remained a difficult political choice for 
member states. A key reason for their hesitation was that UNIFIL II represented a junction in 
terms of peacekeeping practices. Mission commander General Pellegrini commented that 
‘UNIFIL of summer 2006 appears to be a real laboratory where new ways of approaching 
peace missions were being developed’ (quoted in Morselli, 2012:540). All actors involved in 
the conflict and its resolution expressed their own visions for the mission’s framework, its 
mandate and the exact roles that peacekeepers would assume on the ground. In Belgium, the 
trauma of Rwanda coupled with uncertainty around the conditions of deployment made a 
decision to commit troops a ‘highly sensitive political issue’ (Liégeois and Glume, 
2008:124). This was evident in the lengthy and hesitant process the Verhofstadt government 
underwent to reach its decision. 
Belgium was confronted with a dilemma as the international community converged 
on the need for the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The mission’s UN 
framework was simultaneously appealing and problematic for Belgium. Peacekeeping 
reforms within the UN since the mid-1990s generated a willingness from the Verhofstadt 
government to play a Global System Collaborator (GSC) role which was reminiscent of the 
previous UN activist role. Yet, the UN approach to mission conception and management 
continued to be at odds with the peacekeeping practices of many European states. In 
Belgium, it went against the recommendations made by the Rwanda commission, thereby 
reigniting fears of peacekeeping failure. Moreover, Belgium’s peacekeeping roles had been 
increasingly influenced by the socialising influence of the EU. Belgian policy-makers’ 
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positive attitude towards developing a European common foreign policy and defence 
contributed to a Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) role becoming a powerful driver 
behind their approach to peacekeeping. 
This case study argues that the decision resulted from Belgium having been 
socialised into a humanitarian Actor and GSC roles. The main foreign policy-making unit 
positively identified with new peacekeeping norms emerging from UN reforms and 
responded favourably to direct UN demands in the context of UNIFIL II’s force generation 
process. Yet, the enactment of these two roles would have been impossible without EU and 
French activism in influencing the mission’s ‘robust’ mandate. The Belgian government 
welcomed this activism, and also adopted a RSC role to overcome the hurdles established by 
the Rwanda Commission. 
 
9.2 Background to UNIFIL II, the Hezbollah-Israeli War 
 
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah militants attacked an Israeli army patrol across the Blue 
Line capturing two soldiers and killing another eight. Hezbollah rockets were launched from 
Lebanon onto Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) installations and the large urban centre of Haifa. 
Two civilians were killed. The Israeli government’s response was swift and robust. A large 
military operation including a blockade of Lebanon, airstrikes throughout the country and a 
major ground deployment in Southern Lebanon was unleashed (Schmitt, 2008:127). 
Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a 34 days-long conflict causing significant civilian 
casualties (Abdenur, 2016:395). 
The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war was the latest manifestation of decade long 
unresolved tensions rooted in the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mattelaer, 
2009:9). Significantly, it signalled the failure of UNIFIL, first deployed in 1978 following 
the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in an effort to dislodge Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) bases. On 19 March 1978, Security Council Resolution 425 called for 
Israel to immediately cease its operations and withdraw its forces. Resolution 426 authorised 
the deployment of UN troops to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore 
international peace and security and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuing the return 
of effective authority in the area (UNSC, 1978). UN forces were instructed to maintain 
‘complete impartiality’ and use force strictly for self-defence (Makdisi et al, 2009:14). 
However, such ‘unrealistic mandate’ combined with poor preparation severed UNIFIL’s 
chances of success from the start (Nachmias, 1999:105). The resolutions were received with 
strong reservations by both conflicting parties. While the PLO criticised the resolutions for 
failing to address the Palestinian question, Israel condemned the UN’s limited effort in 
ensuring the removal of ‘terrorist’ groups from South Lebanon (Makdisi et al, 2009:14). In 
this context, the objectives of removing Israeli forces out of Lebanon and containing 
Lebanese resistance factions were simply unachievable (Nachmias, 1999). The mission 
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remained characterised by major discrepancies between an overambitious mandate, 
restrictive rules of engagement and violent realities on the ground. The lack of peace coupled 
with conceptual ambiguity meant that troops never received coherent strategic instructions 
on how to achieve their mandate. 
International and regional shifts in 1982 further contributed to UNIFIL’s 
weaknesses. The election of Ronald Reagan as US president ended US-Soviet détente and 
the Security Council’s fragile support of UNIFIL. The nomination of Ariel Sharon as Israeli 
Defence Minister after 1981 elections accentuated the confrontational character of Begin’s 
cabinet (Makdisi et al, 2009:15). The reinforcement of UNIFIL with a total number of 7000 
troops did nothing to prevent Israel from launching operation Peace for Galilee on 6 June 
1982 in a bid to implement Sharon’s ‘New Middle East’ plan designed to remove the PLO 
from Southern Lebanon, establish a Christian-controlled government and weaken Syrian 
influence (Nachmias 1999:100). However, Israeli leaders had not anticipated the strong 
resistance of both Palestinian groups and Lebanese Shia fighters. The invasion was a human 
tragedy accelerating the radicalisation of Lebanon’s Shia communities, which already were 
being mobilised by Tehran around the objective of the Iranian Revolution (Schleifer, 2006:4; 
Norton, 2007). Both processes contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah which became an 
attractive alternative for many Shias determined to combat Israeli occupation and, what they 
saw as, a secular and corrupt Lebanese political system (Norton, 2007:477). The ideological, 
financial and military support provided by Iran enabled the ‘Party of God’ to develop into a 
coherent fundamentalist, anti-Western and anti-Israel movement with an effective insurgent 
force (Schleifer, 2006:4). The birth of Hezbollah demonstrates UNIFIL’s incapability to deal 
with ‘the near-impossible mission’ of containing the political and ethnic conflict amongst the 
various factions comprising the Lebanese political system (Nachmias 1999:98). 
Israel occupied the area for the next eighteen years assuming that a withdrawal 
would create ground for armed resistance. The story repeated itself throughout the 1990s. 
Major Israeli offensives against Hezbollah took place in 1993, Operation Accountability and 
in 1996, Operation Grapes of Wrath watched by UNIFIL’s powerless troops. Instead of 
achieving their objective of forcing Hezbollah out of South Lebanon, they led to large 
number of civilian casualties and drove populations to rally behind Hezbollah’s armed 
resistance (Makdisi et al, 2009:16). By 2000, Israel calculated that the costs of occupation 
were unsustainable and took the unexpected decision to withdraw unilaterally from its 
‘security zone’. The inability of UNIFIL and the Lebanese army to assert authority in the 
area created a vacuum rapidly filled by Hezbollah. Israeli reluctance to withdraw from the 
Sheba’a Farms area and to release Lebanese prisoners remained major sources of tension. It 
is against this background, and the international community’s failure to address these 
enduring issues within a broader framework of Arab-Israeli conflict resolution, that 
confrontation broke out in 2006 (Makdisi et al, 2009:5). 
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9.3 The Belgian Domestic Context 
 
The political institutional setting in which the government Verhofstadt II decided to 
re-engage in UN peacekeeping emerged following the unprecedented 1999 federal elections. 
Christian Democratic parties registered their worst electoral performance since the Second 
World War (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:33). Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP) was demoted as 
the country’s largest party by the Flemish Liberals (VLD), while Socialists remained ahead 
in Wallonia (Parti Socialiste, PS). The Greens emerged as the main winners gaining 
unprecedented support in both Wallonia and Flanders (Deschouwer, 2000:126). Motivated 
by a desire to force the Christian Democrats into opposition, Liberals, Socialists and Greens 
from both linguistic regions swiftly formed a ‘rainbow coalition’ headed by Guy Verhofstadt 
(VLD) (Verhofstadt I) (Van Assche, 2003:3). For the first time in Belgian history, Christian 
Democrats did not participate in a coalition government (Van Assche, 2003:2). 
Verhofstadt I instigated a foreign policy distinctly more proactive and European- 
orientated than its predecessor (Fitzmaurice, 2004:148). The 1998 St Malo agreement 
between France and Britain designed to revitalise the idea of European defence provided the 
coalition with an opportunity to reinvigorate Belgium’s European tradition (Coolsaet, 
2009:44). This came hand-in-hand with a distancing from NATO because of concerns the 
Bush Administration was transforming the Alliance into ‘a loose coalition’ deployed 
differently depending on Washington’s preferences (Coolsaet, 2009:44). The Verhofstadt 
government was not prepared to adopt the role of loyal ally, contributing to a deterioration in 
US-Belgium relations (Sauer, 2013:37). In 2002, the government decided to participate in 
ISAF by choosing to secure Kabul airport; a decision which ‘tells a lot about the political 
rationale that has been prevailing in Brussels when discussing troop deployment’ (Liégeois 
and Glume, 2008:121). This option demonstrated engagement through airlift function 
traditionally performed by the air force, while minimising the risks and ensuring effective 
contingency planning. Averse to US-style security formation, Belgium deepened its 
commitment to multilateral institutionalism as embodied by the UN and the EU. Verhofstadt 
I should be credited for re-emphasising the central role played by the UN in Belgian foreign 
policy and international security. 
Preferences for European coordination and a UN framework converged to dictate 
Belgian opposition to the Iraq war which began at the same time as the campaign for the 
2003 federal elections. The war did not figure predominantly in the campaign as all parties 
unanimously condemned the intervention, especially for its lack of UN legal framework 
(Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34; Van Assche, 2003:3). Calls by some Christian Democrats that 
such anti-US position ‘would weaken the Belgian role within NATO’ were unlikely to be 
popular amongst an anti-war public (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34). Although it was not a 
decisive issue in the elections, it highlights the Christian Democrats’ inability to stop their 
loss of popularity between 1999 and 2003. A change of leadership and name (CVP became 
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CV&D) were not enough for the Flemish Christian Democrats to overtake the VLD as 
largest party (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34). Compared to 1999, Liberals and Socialists 
improved their performances in Flanders and Wallonia while CV&D lost further ground. 
Green parties suffered heavy losses due to their inexperience and concessions made as part 
of the previous coalition (Fitzmaurice, 2004:155). The election results suggest that the 
electorate positively evaluated Verhofstadt I’s record and chose to afford it a new mandate. 
A four-party coalition of Liberals (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, VLD/Mouvement 
Réformateur, MR) and Socialists (Socialistische Partij Anders, Sp.a/Parti Socialiste, PS) 
(Verhofstadt II) emerged on 12 July 2003 following difficult negotiations marked, on a 
foreign policy front, by ‘an unmistakable hypersensitivity to anything that might rub the 
Americans up the wrong way’ (Anciaux quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:46). 
The elections did not alter the foreign policy-making unit from its setup between 
1999 and 2003. Prime Minister Verhofstadt emerged from the elections politically 
strengthened having successfully led a fragmented coalition that many predicted would 
collapse early. His free-market views, for which he was labelled “baby-Thatcher”, 
superseded during his first mandate in favour of more centre-ground policies (Independent, 
2016). He entered a second mandate as an ardent advocate of European common defence and 
‘ethical diplomacy’ (Heremans, 2013:81). This diplomatic approach was also central to the 
foreign policy outlook of Foreign Minister Louis Michel (MR). Michel was initially 
maintained in that post after the elections but was then replaced by Karel De Gucht (VLD) 
following a government reshuffle in July 2004. Although De Gucht’s appointment amplified 
the influence of Flemish Liberals in the unit, it introduced the possibility of a break from the 
ethical diplomacy and of conflict with the Prime Minister. André Flahaut (PS) was re- 
appointed as Defence Minister. Humanitarian activism was a salient characteristic in 
Flahaut’s approach to defence and had motivated him to orient the armed forces towards 
humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping (Embassy Brussels, 10 May 2007). He was a key 
agent in establishing B-FAST; a combination of procedures and operational capabilities 
enabling rapid mobilisation to respond in emergency situations where human lives are at 
stake (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:121; Kingdom of Belgium Online, 2017). 
The composition of this foreign policy-making unit injected a ‘rare continuity in the 
conduct of Belgian foreign and security policy’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:121). The 
coalition agreement advanced that Belgium would conduct ‘an active, dynamic, voluntarist 
foreign policy based on ethical principles’ (Grip, 2003, author’s own translation). Although 
the new coalition appeared willing to improve relations with Washington after the departure 
of Michel whose harsh anti-American rhetoric had alienated US officials (Embassy Brussels, 
10 May 2007), the idea of ‘New Atlanticism’ introduced by Verhofstadt, advancing a strong 
European common defence as foundation for new EU-NATO relations, reduced the prospect 
of normalisation (Coolsaet, 2009:46). Significantly, the coalition agreed on the possibility to 
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examine, within the recommendations of the Rwanda Commission, whether Belgium could 
‘undertake peace operations over short periods of time under the UN or the EU flag which 
would aim to halt human tragedies’ (Grip, 2003; author’s own translation). 
Appendix 3 presents a broad range of roles which the Verhofstadt II administration 
sought to articulate on the international stage when it entered into office. Yet, the following 
analysis will only focus on those which have figured predominantly in the process that led to 
the government’s decision to actively participate in the reinforcement of UNIFIL; namely the 
Global System Collaborator, Regional Subsystem Collaborator and Humanitarian Actor 
roles. The first two reflect the dense institutional setting in which Belgium had to reconsider 
its relationship with peacekeeping while the role of humanitarian actor exposes the distinct 
foreign policy inclination of the Verhofstadt-led foreign policy unit and the new basis on 
which Belgium was re-examining the possibility of re-engaging in peacekeeping and the 
reasons for doing so. 
 
9.4 UN Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions 
 
The diplomatic process preceding UN Resolution 1701 was highly contested 
amongst the conflicting parties and interested great powers. All conveyed peacekeeping 
behaviours they believed appropriate, thereby shaping the normative context in which 
conflict resolution would take place and peacekeeping troops would operate. France, the US, 
Italy, the UN and both conflicting parties agreed to deploy an international force but found 
no consensus on its framework or participants (Mattelaer, 2009:11). France and the US 
submitted a draft resolution on 5 August 2006 proposing an intervention, most likely NATO-
led, mandated by Chapter VII primarily to disarm Hezbollah (Makdisi et al, 2009:22). The 
proposal reflected Israeli, American and French preference for a robust intervention capable 
of neutralising Hezbollah and removing Syrian influence from Lebanon (Engberg, 2014:63; 
Makdisi, 2011:19). French President Chirac was unconvinced by the idea of reinforcing 
UNIFIL (Calculli, 2014:6). Nonetheless, the Lebanese government, under domestic pressure 
from Hezbollah, rejected the plan and clarified that only a more restrictive mandate under 
UN command was feasible. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert accepted a UN framework on the 
condition that European states were the main contributors (Mattelaer, 2009:11). 
This agreement paved the way for Resolution 1701 which was adopted by the 
Security Council on 11 August 2006 and authorised a troop increase up to a maximum of 
15000. Its mandate was to a) monitor the cessation of hostilities, b) accompany and support 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in South Lebanon, c) coordinate its activities with the 
Governments of Lebanon and Israel, d) extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian 
access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons and f) 
assist the Government of Lebanon in securing the border and preventing the entry of arms or 
related materiel (UNSC, 11 August 2006). UNIFIL’s new mandate socialised potential troop 
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contributing countries into more robust peacekeeping behaviour by diffusing standards of 
appropriate behaviours along a broader range of tasks including the support to the Lebanese 
Government and the implementation of a demilitarised zone. Paragraph 12 enhances UNIFIL 
II’s robustness by authorising ‘all necessary action … to ensure that its area of operations is 
not utilized for hostile activities’ (Makdisi et al, 2009:23). Makdisi (2011) contends that the 
language of Resolution 1701 leaves room for two contrasting interpretations of UNIFIL II’s 
role(s). On the one hand, UNIFIL II continues to function as a ‘traditional operation’ having 
removed references to enforcement instruments from the previous proposal (Makdisi, 
2011:15). However, UN discourse was permeated with US ‘war on terror’ narrative with the 
effect of ‘de- naturalising’ Hezbollah as a legitimate actor and legitimising UNIFIL as ‘a 
new stabilisation’ force (Makdisi, 2011:6-14). The argument goes that ‘although UNSCR 
1701 was a Chapter VI resolution, its text includes Chapter VII language that clearly recalls 
the earlier, defeated 5 August draft’ (Makdisi, 2011:15). 
A major element of the enhanced mandate was the inclusion of a provision dedicated 
to protecting civilians. The high human cost of the confrontation made it necessary to 
incorporate peacekeeping strategies in UNIFIL II designed to mediate the dramatic effects of 
war on populations. Previous mandates had failed to specifically call for civilian protection 
(Murphy, 2012:375). In Lebanon, 1200 civilians were reported dead, thousands injured and 
around one million displaced. Women and children were the most affected (UNSC, 18 
August 2006). The impact on Lebanese infrastructures and economy was extensive as a large 
number of homes and transport routes were destroyed. Hezbollah’s rocket fire killed 170 
Israelis including 52 civilians (Murphy, 2012:376). The scale of the crisis underscored the 
continued failure of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians from targeted attacks and 
collateral damages (Smith et al, 2011:27). It was a reminder of the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon during which civilian suffering became a major concern in light of Israeli heavy- 
handedness. The bombing of Beirut and the Shabra Massacre, perpetrated under the implicit 
support of Israeli forces, shocked the international community and drew its attention to the 
vulnerability of civilians. UNIFIL’s responsibility towards civilians was again thrown into 
the spotlight in 1996 when 100 Lebanese were killed by an Israeli shell as they sought refuge 
inside the Fijian UNIFIL headquarters (Nachmias, 1999:105). Nonetheless, the absence of 
mandate, capabilities and willpower to enforce a cease fire meant that UNIFIL peacekeepers 
incrementally shifted their role to providing humanitarian aid to local populations (Murphy, 
2012:382). Until 2006, UNIFIL’s main success had been the delivery of a wide range of 
humanitarian services representing a vital lifeline to many Lebanese communities (Makdisi 
et al, 2009:18). 
UNIFIL II’s stronger humanitarian mandate illustrates a broader normative change 
within UN peacekeeping whereby civilian protection has been given greater emphasis (Smith 
et al, 2011:28). This development is grounded in ‘the norm that civilians are not legitimate 
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targets in war and should be protected from the consequences of violent conflict’ (Smith et 
al, 2011). Surprisingly, civilian protection has not always been high on the UN’s agenda and 
has figured little in peacekeeping mandates, if at all. Peacekeepers’ inability to prevent 
deliberate attacks on civilians in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti and East Timor amongst 
other theatres demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping tasks were no longer effective in 
creating safe environments for populations (Smith et al, 2011:31). It took until 1998 for UN 
reforms to reach a breakthrough when new Secretary-General Annan recognised civilian 
protection as a ‘humanitarian imperative’ (Smith et al, 2011:32). The norm gained further 
acceptance during the 2005 UN World Summit as member states pledged their support to the 
idea of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) with which civilian protection shares normative 
underpinnings. The adoption of Resolution 1674 confirmed the Security Council’s 
commitment to R2P only four months prior the conflict and Resolution 1701 (Williams, 
2010:13). Williams (2010) argues that, as civilian protection became central to UN 
peacekeeping, the capacity to operationalise it effectively has come closely intertwined with 
the legitimacy of the overall UN system (p.5). Annan established the link between civilian 
protection and UN legitimacy in the Lebanese-Israeli context by complaining that Resolution 
1701 took too long to materialise ‘while civilians suffered such a terrible, unnecessary pain 
and loss’. He assessed that ‘this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world’s faith in 
its [the UN’s] authority and integrity’ (quoted in Makdisi et al, 2009:22). This statement had 
a powerful socialising effect on actors considering a participation in the enhancement of 
UNIFIL. It affirmed that those who are serious about upholding UN’s legitimacy as the main 
actor in international security are expected to commit themselves to protecting civilians on 
the ground. 
The objective is now to assess the impact of this emerging normative framework and 
socialising forces on Belgium’s role selection during the crisis. The UN needed to socialise 
European states into GSCs as incentive to contribute troops. Although Belgium did not have 
the diplomatic clout to participate in negotiations over a ceasefire, Belgian officials ‘kept a 
close eye on ongoing events’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:123). Even though a formal 
decision was delayed until 25-26 August, it was clear that the Verhofstadt coalition was 
considering deploying blue helmets when it transpired that the EU and NATO options were 
unfeasible. As early as 25 July, Defence Minister Flahaut stated that a contribution to an 
international force ‘was not excluded’, but that any formal commitment was ‘premature’ 
until the mandate and conditions for deployment were established (Le Soir, 25 July 2006). 
Belgian interest in contributing to a resolution was confirmed when the Commission of 
External Relations held an Exchange of Views on 2 August to debate options. Foreign 
Minister De Gucht took the opportunity to plead in favour of an active role for Belgium 
because ‘if the necessary conditions are met for the formation of a peace force, the countries 
that do not participate will pay the political price and will not be able to make their voice 
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heard in future discussions on the Middle East’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 
August 2006). His preference was for a UN mission as it would allow Muslim countries to 
contribute, thereby dampening claims of European dominance. At the core of the Minister’s 
position was an aspiration to conform to the UN security system in view of Belgium’s 
upcoming entry in the Security Council as non-permanent member. He argued that: 
 ‘As non-permanent member, we will not have as much influence as 
permanent members, but we will nevertheless have a particular responsibility to 
assume. Therefore, we intend on playing an active role in the Security Council, for 
example in the area of conflict and state building (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 2 August 2006; author’s translation with original emphasis). 
Belgium’s early position of activism towards a resolution was driven by a GSC role. The 
prospect of holding a UNSC non-permanent seat was the primary motivation behind this role 
conception, leaving Belgian policy-makers highly exposed to the demands and normative 
requirements of the UN security system. 
Interestingly, the concerns emanating from the commission’s members revolved 
primarily around the role of Belgium in the resolution process (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 2 August 2006). Dirk Van der Maelen (Sp.a), Mohammed Boukourna (PS) and 
Brigitte Wiaux (cdH) pressed the minister to play a greater role in enforcing international 
law upon states that have undertaken disproportionate attacks on civilians. These demands 
converged with De Gucht’s earlier assessment that the violence between Israel and 
Hezbollah had resulted in ‘inacceptable’ consequences on civilian populations (Chambre de 
Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006:2). These exchanges indicate that humanitarian 
concerns had already entered the debate in Belgium. Other members urged the minister to 
assume more active diplomatic functions in concert with EU member states in order to reach 
a ceasefire agreement and gain greater influence inside the Security Council (Chambre de 
Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006). These interventions showed that some members 
had more limited faith in the UN system in light of its ‘withered reputation’ and, therefore, 
demanded a more pronounced RSC role (p.18). However, members were generally in 
agreement with the activist line advocated by the government and did not oppose an eventual 
Belgian deployment (p.16). Its president confirmed the prevailing GSC role by asserting that 
‘Belgium cannot remain on the side line considering it aspires to a seat at the Security 
Council’ (p.16). 
A day after Resolution 1701 was passed, Defence Minister Flahaut decided in 
concertation with Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Minister De Gucht that a Belgian C-130 
plane will undertake the delivery of humanitarian aid provided by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Le Soir, 12 August 2006). This initiative 
demonstrates that earlier concerns for civilians were being translated into action, highlighting 
the humanitarian nature of Belgium’s emerging response. The Verhofstadt government was 
incrementally integrating the norm of civilian protection and developing its role as 
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humanitarian actor in the crisis. Resolution 1701 also came with an intensification of direct 
UN demands for troop contribution, especially as France announced that it would only 
provide 200 troops on the ground that the mandate and rules of engagements (ROE) 
remained unclear according to French authorities (Gross, 2009:53; BBC News, 18 August 
2006). UN Deputy Secretary-General, Malloch Brown casted European states into GSCs by 
insisting that it was ‘now very important that Europeans make troop offers so as to ensure 
that UNIFIL II has a truly multinational character which will strengthen its legitimacy’ (Le 
Soir, 18 August 2006). Belgian officials were under pressure to meet the demand, but 
remained reluctant to do so without a substantial French engagement and clarifications 
regarding the mandate and the conditions of deployment (BBC News, 16 August 2006; Le 
Soir, 22 August 2006). In Brussels, foreign policy makers needed to ensure that a 
participation fulfilled the requirements set out in the 1998 guidelines. Assurances were 
required that Belgian troops would be authorised to use force if necessary and would not be 
required to carry out activities which would position them as belligerents. 
A series of meetings between Belgian foreign policy leaders and Israeli, Lebanese 
and UN officials were critical in casting Belgium into role(s) acceptable to both Belgian 
domestic actors and external socialising agents. On 23 August, Foreign Minister De Gucht 
met his Israeli homologue, Tzipi Livni who, on the same day, pressed EU member states to 
invest themselves actively in the UN mission by not sending ‘spectator’ troops (La Libre, 24 
August 2006). A day later, De Gucht conveyed to Israeli Defence Minister, Amir Peretz, 
Belgium’s intention to assume demining functions arguing that ‘it is a very important 
element’ to guarantee the security of soldiers and populations (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). 
This came with a request to hand over mine maps to Belgian Defence officials. Although no 
record of these meetings exists, they are likely to have been arenas of socialisation in which 
the Belgian government’s choice of role(s) was evaluated by Israeli leaders in light of their 
preference for active troops in containing Hezbollah. Interestingly, Peretz emphasised to De 
Gucht the priority of preventing Iran from reasserting its influence in South Lebanon through 
the delivery of humanitarian aid from Tehran for example (La Libre, 25 August 2006). The 
humanitarian role of Belgian troops proposed by Belgium was accepted by Israel as 
evidenced by De Gucht’s subsequent statement that demining was ‘one of the activities we 
are seriously considering’ and Israeli approval to share maps of the area (Le Soir, 24 August 
2006). From Tel Aviv’s perspective, a Belgian contribution of humanitarian character 
reduced the political effect of Iranian aid. The Belgian proposal was also tolerable to the 
Lebanese government which could not otherwise accept more interventionist activities 
including disarmament. Moreover, UN socialisation of Belgium culminated at a meeting 
between Kofi Annan and Prime Minister Verhofstadt before the Secretary-General attended 
an emergency meeting of EU Foreign Ministers where member states where expected to 
make formal commitments. At a common press conference, Annan socialised European 
 
161 
states by expecting them to assume their role in alleviating the plight of Lebanese civilians: 
‘I have confidence in Europe. I am confident that we will have a successful 
meeting this afternoon and Europe will assume its responsibility and show its 
solidarity with the people of Lebanon and in that region’ (Radio Free Europe, 25 
August 2006). 
In the same allocution, he cast Belgium into a GSC by expressing ‘his confidence to leave 
Brussels with a large number of soldiers, and that Belgium will play its role’ (La Libre, 25 
August 2006). 
On 25 August, an inner cabinet council was convened ‘to decide on a participation, 
troop numbers and the tasks they will accomplish based on UN demands’ (Verhofstadt 
quoted in Le Soir, 25 August 2006). Upon its conclusion, Prime Minister Verhofstadt 
officially announced that Belgium would participate in UNIFIL II by dispatching a task force 
of engineers, medics and mine clearance specialists, amounting to 300 personnel to be 
subsequently reinforced by another 100 (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). It was also decided that 
the Belgian contingent would establish a military hospital in South Lebanon and provide its 
own force protection composed of around 80 personnel. For the Prime Minster, the Rwanda 
Commission should no longer obstruct Belgium from performing its GSC role: 
‘We have drawn the lessons of the past, but the Rwanda Commission has never 
said that we could never participate in a UN intervention. We cannot 
systematically avoid our responsibilities’ (Le Soir, 28 August 2006; author’s 
translation). 
Members of the unit insisted that Belgium’s engagement in demining, medical and 
reconstruction domains responded to specific demands formulated by the UN. It allowed 
Belgian officials to claim that Belgium has ‘taken its responsibilities’ having ‘up until now 
correctly fulfilled all its international engagements’ (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). UN calls for 
greater emphasis on humanitarian aspects of the conflict were met by the Verhofstadt 
government which focused it contribution on ‘reviving activity in the region’ (Le Soir, 24 
August 2006). Highlighting that Belgium was acting on both a GSC and a humanitarian 
actor role, Flahaut stated that the government ensured that this ‘substantial contribution’ was 
‘as useful for the United Nations as for the civilian population’ (Le Soir, 24 August 2006; 
author’s translation). 
It can be argued that UN socialisation was paramount in casting Belgium into these 
two roles. Yet, Belgium may not have re-engaged in UN peacekeeping on this occasion had 
the members of the unit not been receptive to UN norms and demands. Upon his election in 
1999, Guy Verhofstadt initiated a radical foreign policy shift designed to lead an ethical 
diplomacy based on the primacy of human rights (Rosoux, 2014:27). A foreign policy 
grounded in moral principles aimed to improve Belgium’s international image after a series 
domestic scandals, a widening regional divide and a reprehensible colonial past. American 
diplomacy towards Europe after 9/11 had a formative effect on Verhofstast’s foreign policy 
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outlook, strengthening his belief that, if EU member states fail to coordinate, the UN remains 
the ultimate provider of international rules capable of reducing great powers’ influence on 
small states (Rosoux, 2014:28). Ethical diplomacy was synonymous with respect for, and 
promotion of, a rule-based environment. Furthermore, Verhofstadt’s party affiliation 
increased his receptivity to UN socialisation. Belgian Liberal parties tend to be ‘more 
‘interventionist’ than their Socialist counterparts who had controlled the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry in the Dehaene government unseated in June 1999’ (Kelly, 2007-08:72). As a 
Liberal Prime Minister, Verhofstadt led two coalitions inclined to re-interpret the 
conclusions of the Rwanda Commission and intervene abroad. Between 1999 and 2006, 
Belgium pursued a policy of bilateral and multilateral interventions in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Kelly, 2007-08) and another of ‘cautious engagement’ with 
Rwanda (Hayman, 2010). Arguably, an interventionist tendency and a commitment to 
maintain UN legitimacy converged to facilitate a positive response to UN demands for a 
GSC role. As instigator of Belgium’s ethical diplomacy, Verhofstadt identified positively 
with the UN mission of promoting the civilian protection norm and was, therefore, a key 
agent in conceiving the humanitarian actor role during the war. Defence Minister Flahaut 
was the most receptive to UN efforts emphasising the humanitarian dimension of the crisis 
because they resonated extensively with his intention to orient Belgian defence towards 
humanitarian tasks. In this way, Flahaut is perhaps the most influential agent behind the 
humanitarian actor role. Liégeois and Glume (2008) report that the option of sending an 
armoured infantry battalion was deemed ‘too military’ for the Defence Minister who 
believed that ‘patrolling … offered few opportunities to win hearts and minds’ (p.125). His 
focus was on reconstructing, alleviating the living standard of Southern Lebanese and 
reviving the local economy. There is little to suggest that Foreign Minister De Gucht was as 
committed to an ethical diplomacy as his two colleagues and his predecessor. His tenure 
began with a controversy when, after a visit to the DRC, he ‘criticized Congolese 
leaders…for corruption and bad governance’ and threatened to reverse the government’s 
ongoing re-engagement in Africa (quoted in Kelly, 2007-08:79). This episode indicates a 
tendency to emphasise the responsibilities of Belgium’s partners and aid recipients, making 
De Gucht less inclined to intervene unconditionally abroad. One may speculate that his 
position on the Lebanon war is likely to have been influenced by internal pressures to follow 
the government’s line of action and roles following his prior divergence with the coalition on 
the African dossier. 
9.5 European Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions 
 
Belgium’s role conception towards conflict resolution in Lebanon took place in, and 
was influenced by, a framework of European foreign policy cooperation since the Arab- 
Israeli conflict has been a prominent issue on the EU’s foreign policy agenda (Mueller, 
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2013:20). In the early 2000s, the EU was confronted with a number of challenges in its 
Middle Eastern neighbourhood. The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 
September 2000, the Iraq war, the Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian territories and Iranian 
nuclear proliferation put pressure on EU foreign policy actors to foster common positions 
amongst member states, enabling the EU to become a more consequential player in the 
Middle East peace process. Failure to do so threatened to undermine earlier efforts to 
reinforce the EU’s ability to act externally when it created ESDP in 1999 (Mueller, 2012). 
These external and internal developments required ‘the role of the EU … to shift from 
diplomatic and financial support of the Peace Process to largely crisis management and the 
promotion of conflict resolution’ (Altunisik, 2008:110). By 2006, the EU had joined the 
Middle East Quartet designed to coordinate international diplomacy toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, intensified its conflict prevention activities by launching the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and established its first ESDP mission (EU-BAM Rafah) to 
monitor the Egyptian-Gaza border (Altunisik, 2008:112; Mueller, 2013:30). 
The outbreak of violence in Lebanon generated serious concerns amongst EU and 
member states officials who believed that ‘European interests were at stake and the EU 
needed to play an active role’ (Engberg, 2010:412). A common approach to the crisis was 
necessary to avoid undoing the ‘potentially coherent and mutually reinforcing set of policies’ 
developed thus far (Gross, 2009:48). This remained an arduous task given member states’ 
differing national foreign policy positions on the Middle East (Mueller, 2012). As the 
hostilities unfolded, EU states diverged during the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) meeting held on 17 July, over whether to call an immediate ceasefire and 
how to qualify the Israeli intervention. Britain and Germany remained faithful to their 
transatlantic partner. Both joined the US in minimising the intensity of Israel’s intervention 
and were reluctant for the EU to request an immediate ceasefire. In contrast, France led a 
group of smaller EU member states determined to demand a ceasefire having condemned 
Israeli unrestrained actions (Gross, 2009:51). Despite these disagreements, Gross (2009) 
argues that EU-level institutions ‘played a crucial role in building collective will among EU 
member states to make a common contribution to UNIFIL’ (p.51). This argument shows that: 
‘the increasing role played by its [EU’s] foreign policy institutions, particularly 
the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which increasingly serves as locus 
of consensus-finding and socialization, helps explain why the EU was playing a 
more active role in the Middle East; and why member states accepted and 
supported the EU as an important platform for political negotiations and 
decision-making in the crisis in Lebanon’ (Gross, 2009:46). 
Similarly, Mueller (2013) claims that the EU’s Middle East diplomacy during the 2000s has 
been characterised by ‘a further strengthening of the role of supranational actors’ (p.31). 
Morselli (2012) concurs that ‘UNIFIL II was an opportunity for ESDP institutions to 
exercise a certain pressure on member states’ (p.550). These arguments allow the assertion 
that member states experienced significant socialising pressures from EU’s foreign policy 
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institutions to perform a RSC role. EU socialisation and role-taking by member states were 
indispensable in generating the common approach required for the EU to meet its internal 
and external expectations of an enhanced role in resolving the conflict. 
EU interventions in the Middle East have traditionally placed a strong normative 
emphasis on the respect of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law 
(Tocci, 2010:111). Aware that the EU’s credibility in the region rested on its status as the 
main provider of humanitarian aid, the Commission authorised an action plan for 
humanitarian relief to Lebanon of €18 million for reconstruction (Engberg, 2010:411-420). 
Sustained cooperation between member states in the development of the EU as a normative 
actor created incentives for them to act as humanitarian actor and incorporate a humanitarian 
dimension into their conflict resolution approach to the region. It is in this normative context 
that member states were now expected to make significant troop contributions to ensure that 
the EU remained a credible actor. An additional element of EU socialisation has been the 
prominent role played by EU High Representative, Javier Solana. Having visited the region 
on multiple occasions to meet Israeli and Lebanese representatives on behalf of the EU, he 
was in a prime position to liaise with EU Foreign Ministers and foster the political will 
amongst member states to coordinate an active EU participation in conflict resolution 
(Dijkstra, 2011:11-12). Therefore, Solana was a significant alter casting member states into 
RSC role. 
The socialisation of member states into this role was facilitated by their common 
distrust in UN peacekeeping originating from painful experiences in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (Mattelaer, 2009:11). The emerging UN framework meant that European troop 
contributing countries would have limited control over the operation as their personnel 
would remain under UN command (Morselli, 2012:541). European governments shared a 
concern that UN command structure and ROE were inadequate in ensuring troop safety in 
case of hostilities. Furthermore, they resented the UN flexible approach to mission 
conception for providing little strategic guidance on how to carry out the objectives outlined 
in the mandate on the ground (Mattelaer, 2009:15). Thus, the planning process was marked 
by strong tensions between European governments and the DPKO over how to plan and 
conduct peacekeeping operations. Determined to reshape UN peacekeeping, Europeans 
pushed hard to create a new military structure inside the DPKO, the Strategic Military Cell 
(SMC). This new body allowed the Force Commander to bypass the Secretary-General 
Representative (SGR)’s veto on the use of force and increased the oversight capacity of 
European governments as their own officers came to staff the SMC. The influx of European 
military personnel was meant to balance, what they saw as, an overly civilian staff in the 
UNIFIL Headquarters (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:128). Importantly, it imported ‘a 
completely different mindset on how to plan and conduct military operations’ based on 
NATO structures and procedures (Mattelaer, 2009:28). UN officials believed that the SMC 
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‘failed to acknowledge that UN peacekeeping works as a highly decentralised system light 
on top-level bureaucracy’ (Mattelaer, 2009:26). That was precisely what European policy- 
makers were trying to avoid. What they wanted was an additional body able to effectively 
translate in military terms the political orientations emanating from New York and respond if 
troops were to be targeted. While the SMC remains intergovernmental, its establishment 
‘signals a shared military doctrine acquired outside of the EU but used for both national 
aspirations and the strengthening of the EU as a security actor on the international stage’ 
(Morselli, 2012:550). 
The task is now to assess the extent to which the development of the EU’s Middle 
East policy and European bargaining over the mission’s command structure led Belgian 
policy-makers to display ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states 
to build wider communities’ contributing to an effective EU response to the Israeli- 
Hezbollah war (Holsti, 1970:265). In the early 1990s, Belgium was committed to giving the 
EU an active role in the Middle East peace process, but the lack of common foreign policy 
tools meant that it remained a facilitator of dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. The 
emergence of a more coherent EU Middle East policy drove successive Belgian governments 
away from bilateral strategies and tie their foreign policies further to the EU’s multilateral 
approach (Herremans, 2013:81). Kelly (2007-08) argues that ‘a multilateral strategy that 
favors the EU is more beneficial to Belgium’ because the Union has acquired a range of 
instruments from conflict prevention to peace building policies enabling it ‘to play a 
significant role throughout the life of a crisis’ (p.70; Martinelli, 2006:286). This context 
exposed Belgium further to the socialising pressures of EU institutions as they demanded a 
RSC role. In this context, it should be noted that former Foreign Affair Minister Louis 
Michel occupied the post of EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid as the 
crisis emerged. His influence as alter to Belgium’s roles should not be overstated as no 
evidence was found that he explicitly demanded the Verhofstadt government to perform a 
RSC role. Nonetheless, his influence on shaping the humanitarian character of Belgian 
contribution to an overall European effort cannot be discounted. He used his position to 
criticise both Israeli violence on Lebanese civilians and the difficulty of finding a European 
consensus because ‘there are still too many member states which are nostalgic of their 
former power’. Without citing Belgium, he added that ‘some small states are also stuck with 
ambitions for influence when it comes to their external affairs’ (Le Soir, 2 August 2006). 
Verhofstadt unambiguously advocated a RSC role after a GAERC meeting requested 
by France seeking to foster greater European solidarity. He stated that ‘coordination is what 
our country expects’ and assessed that the current situation offers ‘an opportunity to form a 
European force with a real coordination, a prelude to a future rapid reaction force’ (Le Soir, 
22 August 2006). The reasoning prevailing at the time in Belgium was that participating in 
UNIFIL II alongside EU member states would ‘simultaneously consolidate its [Belgium’s] 
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place in Europe and Europe’s place in the world’ (Le Soir, 3 August 2006). When Prime 
Minster Verhofstadt addressed the Parliament to seek approval, both a RSC and a 
humanitarian actor roles were predominant in his justification of the government’s decision: 
‘We wanted to assume our responsibilities. We think that it is essential to stabilise 
the situation in order to end the war and the suffering of the people of South 
Lebanon … and, finally, to ensure that Europe is fully assuming its 
responsibilities. We therefore intend to bring an end to the conflict and enable 
Europe to play a major role in the search of a political solution’ (Chambre de 
Représentants de Belgique, 28 August 2006:4; author’s translation). 
His conceptions of Belgium’s role were broadly accepted by parliamentarians. Fully 
endorsing a RSC role, De Crem (CD&V) insisted that ‘if we want the EU to play a role in the 
world, we cannot remain on the side line in the Middle East’ (p.8). A statement by 
parliamentarian Goris (VLD) clearly reveals the socialising effect of the EU on Belgium’s 
role: 
‘Our contingent of four hundred soldiers meets what we normally expect of us in 
the framework of the common European security and defence policy … This 
participation will give us the right in future decision-making processes, notably 
concerning the future role of our soldiers’ (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 28 August 2006:17; author’s translation). 
The most vocal contestation came from Van den Eynde of the Flemish extreme right party, 
Vlaams Belang, who criticised the government’s ambition to lead, what he perceived as, a 
‘francophile foreign policy founded on friendship links with France and on a nostalgia to 
play a role on the global scene’ (p.8). On a less, but still critical note, Vandenberghe (Sp.a) 
appears sceptical about the way the European role was enacted through military means: 
‘Belgium can be made to play an important role in the European context. A common foreign 
policy being preferable to a common defence, I recommend more diplomacy and less 
soldiers’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 28 August 2006:13; author’s translation). 
A RSC role can also be detected in Belgium’s position vis-á-vis Israel during the 
crisis. Belgium-Israel relations became highly strained from 2002 after an upgrade in the 
Belgian law of universal jurisdiction made it possible for Ariel Sharon to be indicted for his 
role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres (Herremans, 2013:81). From 1999, Verhofstadt I had 
endeavoured to bring Belgian law in line with the Geneva Convention permitting the 
prosecution of individuals suspected of genocide and crimes against humanity. However, this 
dimension of the ‘ethical diplomacy’ caused significant frictions with key partners including 
Congolese President Kabila, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government (La Libre, 
13 July 2003). International and domestic pressures forced Verhofstadt II to dilute the law 
when it took office in 2003. Foreign Minister Michel made important bilateral efforts to 
repair relations with Israel (Le Soir, 17 February 2004). Yet, his conciliatory and ‘balanced 
approach’ was discontinued as new Foreign Affair Minister De Gucht began integrating 
relations with Tel Aviv further into the EU’s legal and multilateral framework (Herremans, 
 
167 
2013:81). De Gucht favoured conditioning the upgrade of EU-Israeli relations upon Israel’s 
respect for international law. The influence of De Gucht was critical in bringing Belgium’s 
position on Israel and a ceasefire in line with a majority of member states, demonstrating that 
Belgium ‘contributes to the EU’s effectiveness as a normative actor’ (Herremans, 2013:90). 
The main obstacle to Belgium performing a RSC role lied in French indecision to 
commit troops. Paris surprised its partners when it pledged only 200 troops, a fraction of 
what was initially offered. President Chirac believed that the UN demand for a total of 15000 
troops was ‘excessive’ and that too many uncertainties remained over the mandate, the chain 
of command and the use of force (The New York Times, 25 August 2006). The 
announcement created a regional dynamic threatening to undermine the whole mission. 
France was unwilling to make a definite commitment until the contributions of other member 
states became clearer. However, these countries were ‘waiting to hear what Paris will decide’ 
(BBC News, 16 August 2006). Highlighting the weight of the French position in Belgium, a 
military adviser to the Prime Minister reported that ‘the French and Italian contribution to the 
force would probably exercise a decisive influence on what the Belgians (and other EU 
members) finally decided to do’ (Embassy Brussels, 16 August 2006). Belgian actors’ 
sensitivity was heightened because their concerns over the conditions of deployment were 
identical to those of France. Belgium did not have the resources to make a contribution 
substantial enough to extract concessions from the UN. Therefore, Belgian officials relied on 
France’s bargaining power towards, and ongoing negotiations with, UN leaders to establish a 
chain of command dominated by member states’ military officers rather than civilian UN 
staff, and bring about the necessary conditions to meet the Rwanda Commission’s 
requirements. Under heavy pressure from Annan and threat to lose its leadership role to Italy, 
Chirac agreed to his initial commitment of 2000 troops saying that France had obtained the 
‘necessary clarifications on the chain of command, which must be simple, coherent and 
reactive’ (BBC News, 25 August 2006). The timing of the Belgian decision to participate, 
which came a day later, confirms that the enactment of a RSC role by the Verhofstadt 
government depended on France assuming its leadership role as a crucial step to generating a 
common European willingness to act. In this context, it can be argued that the Verhofstadt 
government needed to present Belgium as a RSC if it wanted to draw on both French and EU 
political influence vis-à-vis the UN as a way to reshape peacekeeping practices according to 
its own preferences. This is further evidence that small states, including Belgium, are 
becoming increasingly dependent upon wills and preferences of great powers with regard to 
the formats of the operation, which represents a significant new factor to consider.  
A RSC role was not unexpected given that all members of the foreign policy-making 
unit displayed characteristics making them inclined to respond positively to European 
socialisation. Prime Minister Verhofstadt guided Belgium through the Lebanese crisis as a 
fervent advocate of a common security and defence policy. Most significantly, Verhofstadt 
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personally injected new integrative momentum after 9/11 by urging Tony Blair and Jacques 
Chirac to ‘relaunch the idea of a European defence and rekindle the Saint-Malo spirit’ 
(quoted in Haine, 2003:113), and by convening the following ‘Chocolate Summit’ (Amazing 
Strategic Orchestra of Belgian Defence, 2015:41). A press report directly links the 
‘Chocolate Summit’ to the Prime Ministers’s readiness to coordinate a European response to 
the Lebanese crisis (Le Soir, 22 August 2006). Although Flahaut is known for his 
humanitarian activism, his commitment to European defence in influencing the Belgian role 
conception should not be underestimated. Already upon taking office in 1999, he intended 
‘to integrate the Belgian army simultaneously in the new NATO initiative on military 
capabilities and in the ESDP’ through cooperative projects with the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. In this way, Flahaut displayed early signs of wanting to present Belgium as a 
‘small motor in constructing European defence’ (Le Soir, 18 January 2000). He also 
demonstrated an awareness to the highly changing nature of the European context and an 
evident willingness ‘to adapt to what Europe will want to put in place in terms of common 
defence’ (Le Soir, 18 January 2000). Therefore, the Defence Minister was an important agent 
with whom the norms of coordination and humanitarian support advocated by the EU during 
the Israeli-Hezbollah war were likely to resonate strongly. Foreign Minister De Gucht was 
perhaps the least dedicated to the principle of European security and defence integration. 
Rare were his statements about pursuing a coordinated response in order to improve the EU’s 
capacity to act in international affairs. The EU norm that resonated positively with De Gucht 
was the one of conditionality whereby the EU establishes trade and association agreements 
with Middle Eastern partners depending on their progress on human right and peace process 
tracks. As a result, De Gucht was by no means an obstacle to the overwhelming domestic 
consensus around the RSC role. 
 
9.6 Concluding Discussion 
 
The aftermath of the Rwandan failure saw Belgium effectively abandon its roles as a 
UN activist and a former colonial power. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Belgian elite chose to position the country as a partner to the EU and NATO; a choice 
approved by the public who had been shocked by the events. This role selection was 
institutionalised in the Note of General Policy regarding the Belgian Participation in 
Peacekeeping Operations proscribing Belgium from providing troops to UN operations, 
especially those in former colonies. The policy was closely abided by successive 
governments (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Therefore, the foreign policy shift embodied by 
the Verhofstadt government’s decision to make a meaningful contribution to UNIFIL II 
should not be underestimated. It initiated a trend whereby Belgium consistently maintained 
between 130 and 500 troops in various UN operations. This chapter investigated the process 
through which the roles of Belgium in peacekeeping were potentially re-conceptualised, and 
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how this role change influenced the decision to re-engage in UN peacekeeping. The findings 
speak to a growing body of research exploring the capacity of role theory to explain foreign 
policy changes (Harnisch, 2012; Breuning, 2011; 2012; 2016; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). Its 
central assumption is that ‘as role conceptions change, foreign policy change should follow 
as well’ (Breuning, 2012:3). Breuning (2012; 2016) has, utilising works on foreign policy 
change, made significant theoretical and empirical inroads into understanding the conditions 
under which role conceptions change as a basis for policy shifts. One argument proposes that 
foreign policy decision makers in gatekeeping positions are key to fostering or preventing 
role and policy change (Breuning, 2012). It was empirically shown that Belgian State 
Secretary for Development Cooperation, Reginald Moreels, failed to align Belgian roles in 
foreign aid with international norms because of his inability to navigate the political 
institutional context and to frame his proposed role change in a way that resonated with 
political and public actors (Breuning, 2012:15). This argument was later refined by 
contending that Moreels’ attempts to change Belgium’s roles took place through a process 
of horizontal role contestation pitting gatekeepers in favour of retaining a trading role 
against Moreels who advocated a partner in development role. Based on these findings, 
Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) theorised that ‘examinations of the domestic political conflicts 
over roles can provide role theory with the underlying mechanisms to account for the 
changes in roles and foreign policy when the domestic political conditions change’ (p.185). 
The present case found that the political process leading to the formation of UNIFIL 
II involved various international actors diffusing new peacekeeping norms and expecting 
concerned parties, including Belgium, to perform certain roles. These socialising influences 
have encouraged and created openings for the Verhofstadt government to change Belgium’s 
roles towards UN peacekeeping. It highlights the fact that role theorists have overlooked role 
socialisation as an important source of role and foreign policy change. This is surprising 
given that ‘the role concept also captures processes of socialisation and thus provides 
insights into foreign policy change’ (Aggestam 2004:88). Breuning (2012) alludes to the 
possibility of role change as a result of socialisation when reporting that ‘changes in the 
national role conceptions that guide foreign policy decision makers are not independent of 
the changes in international norms’ (p.3). However, echoing a theoretical argument made 
earlier, international norms are unlikely to produce role change if they are not carried and 
expressed by international socialising agents through role expectations. Similarly, the 
effectiveness of role socialisation diminishes if performed outside a normative framework. In 
this way, international norms can be thought of as the message, or content, of role 
socialisation. Socialising agents cannot effectively perform their function if they do not have 
a message with which to socialise other actors into roles. Nor will socialisees be able to 
locate their role(s) in the absence of normative referents indicating the appropriate behaviour 
that is expected of them. This case study has shown empirically that role and norm 
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socialisation complement each other. The main message, or norm, actively diffused by the 
EU and the UN in the context of the Israeli-Hezbollah crisis was that concerned states should 
work to protect civilians caught in the conflict. Belgium’s long tradition of multilateralism in 
both institutions ensured that its elite was receptive to these socialisers and was, therefore, 
highly exposed to the norm. 
Breuning (2012) is accurate to note that role change is difficult to achieve because 
domestic agents ‘must overcome a tendency towards stability and status quo, something that 
is more likely to succeed under unusual circumstances’ (p.5). The cautious approach taken 
by Belgium towards UNIFIL II is evidence of this domestic hurdle. The lessons drawn from 
the Rwandan experience and their institutionalisation in policy constituted the greatest 
obstacle to role change. Long into the force generation process, Belgian policy-makers 
remained sceptical that the operation fulfilled the national requirements for participation in 
UN operations. They were unconvinced that the UN could provide an effective command 
and control structure allowing Belgian planners to retain control over the day-to-day running 
of the operations (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). This was compounded by the lack of French 
leadership on which Belgium relied to bring about the necessary conditions. Yet, ‘unusual 
circumstances’ at the international level created opportunities and incentives for the Belgian 
elite to rethink the country’s role in UN peacekeeping, thereby limiting the constraints of the 
post-Rwanda recommendations. First, the prospect of a non-permanent membership in UN 
Security Council between 2007 and 2008 provided Belgium with an opportunity to act more 
proactively as a GSC by following UN norms. It is likely to have induced the governing elite 
to question whether the post-Rwanda constraints obstructed Belgium from meeting its 
international responsibilities. Second, the crisis led to a Europe-wide cooperative momentum 
at an intergovernmental and supranational levels which had not occurred since the Iraq war. 
Belgian policy-makers were given a ‘window of opportunity’ to re-engage in UN 
peacekeeping while simultaneously showing solidarity with the EU as a RSC role would 
expect. The last-minute input from France which also secured an unusual NATO-like 
command structure for UNIFIL II opened the door for role adaption and Belgian 
participation. The main effect of these opportunities was to intensify the socialising pressures 
on Belgium to recast its roles in favour of GSC and RSC roles. 
The results of this case study substantiate Breuning’s (2012) contention that ‘the 
adoption on international norms by a state depends on the active support of decision-makers 
in key gatekeeping positions’ (p.1). Nonetheless, Belgian decision-makers were unlikely to 
support the humanitarian norm on its own. The norm likely resonated with them because it 
was accompanied by UN and EU demands to perform a humanitarian actor as well as RSC 
and GSC roles. Importantly, the political setting established after the 1999 elections 
enhanced elite resonance in the UN and EU promotion of the norm. This validates the notion 
that foreign policy change may follow the arrival of a new elite receptive to socialising role 
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demands and seeking to promote new roles as a result (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:185). The 
elections removed Socialist Foreign Minister Derycke who had opposed the enactment of 
interventionist roles (Kelly, 2007-2008:86). As Liberal parties gained this key portfolio, 
Louis Michel, an individual eager to re-engage internationally including in former colonies, 
was appointed Foreign Minister. Kelly (2007-2008) argues that his appointment was a 
‘strategic choice’ because it allowed the Liberals to express their ‘interventionist’ leanings 
(p.86). The domestic power shift away from the Socialists but also the Christian Democrats, 
who favoured the traditional interventionist role of former colonial power, paved the way for 
a change in role and foreign policy most evident in Belgium’s Great Lakes policy. Soon after 
becoming Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt ‘officially recognized the responsibility of the 
Belgian state in the negligence…of the international community’ during the Rwandan 
genocide while advocating greater EU involvement in Central Africa (Roosens and Lanotte 
in Kelly, 2007-2008:74). The ethical diplomacy pursued by Verhofstadt ensured that the new 
interventionist-oriented roles aligned with the norms emerging from the international 
community. 
There was limited pressure on Verhofstadt ‘to craft an appealing message’ in order 
to gain support in the unit for new roles given that the humanitarian activism advocated by 
Defence Minister Flahaut provided a natural extension for the roles being pursued (Breuning, 
2012:4; Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Flahaut even took the lead in promoting a 
humanitarian role for Belgium in UNIFIL II with implications for the tasks Belgian troops 
were to perform. Contestation for the roles selected by Verhofstadt and Flahaut was most 
likely to come from Foreign Minister De Gucht who preferred restraint and conditionality in 
international engagements. Having previously deviated from the cabinet’s policy line 
towards Congo and then been overruled by Verhofstadt, De Gucht’s influence on preventing 
a role change towards UNIFIL II was muted by cabinet and party pressures. Furthermore, 
Prime Minister Verhofstadt embodies a dominant leader able to use a charismatic personality 
to centralise authority and push for his/her preferred roles, or at least generate consensus 
(Magone, 2017). When minor contestation emerged in parliament the government took care 
to emphasise that the roles it adopted were compatible with, and fulfilled, the post-Rwanda 
recommendations. It was argued that these should not hamper Belgium from meeting its 
multilateral responsibilities, thereby tapping into Belgium’s deep commitments to 
multilateralism around which a strong consensus exists. Framing the operation as European 
diffused fears that the UN would lead the operations and created support for what is a 
traditionally agreed-upon RSC role. 
Breuning (2016) presented a negative case whereby Belgium’s development 
cooperation policy could not be brought in line with international norms because of a 
gatekeeper’s failure to convince other decision-makers to transition from trading state to a 
partner role (p.73). The present case study has shown that a successful shift from a former 
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colonial power role to humanitarian actor, GSC and RSC roles opened the door for a 
contribution to UNIFL II. This role and policy adaptation would have been improbable in the 
absence of socialisation, through both norm diffusion and role expectations, by international 
actors Belgium is traditionally receptive to. Socialisation peaked when the UN Secretary- 
General directly interfered in the domestic process of role selection during the force 
generation phase. Although the change took place in a different policy-area, Belgium did, in 
time, relinquish roles associated with national self-interests and enacted new ones orienting 
Belgium towards a more value-based foreign policy concomitant with international norms. 
While a campaign to gain a non-permanent seat in the Security Council and European 
cooperation created windows of opportunity, the arrival of a new administration dominated 
by Liberal policy-makers was key to effect this change because they displayed a greater 
propensity to integrate new norms, meet role expectations and conceive new roles. Research 
on foreign policy change has focused on either international or domestic sources of policy 
change. This chapter demonstrated that the interplay between external socialisation and 
domestic receptiveness is critical to better understand foreign policy changes in small states 









This chapter investigates Belgium’s roles in, and contribution to, the international 
effort to end the Malian crisis. It is an interesting case because different types of 
peacekeeping and crisis management frameworks were employed by a variety of 
international actors. The UN was involved early in 2012 passing three resolutions and 
establishing a stabilization mission (MINUSMA) in April 2013. The EU has been active in 
the Sahel since 2008. The Union’s contribution to the region culminated with the deployment 
of a training mission for the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali) in February 2013 (Furness 
and Olsen, 2016:113). As a former colonial power and current defence and economic 
partner, France was the leading force behind all international endeavours towards Mali. Paris 
mobilised extensive diplomatic, economic and military resources in both bilateral and 
multilateral frameworks to shape the character of the international response. In January 2013, 
the government of Francois Hollande launched Operation Serval to defend Bamako from an 
Islamic takeover. These overlapping frameworks make the Malian conflict an adequate 
empirical testing ground to assess the way and the extent to which Belgium was socialised 
into peacekeeping roles. These roles are expected to provide answers to this chapter’s 
empirical puzzle: why did the Belgian government promptly contribute to Serval, an ad-hoc 
coalition led by a great power, while being reluctant to participate in the subsequent EU 
mission? Belgium’s token contribution to MINUSMA adds another intriguing layer to the 
Belgian response. 
 
10.2 Background to the Malian Crisis, the Terrorist Threat 
 
Beset by security, political and economic challenges, the security situation of Mali 
deteriorated rapidly in the first months of 2012. An armed rebellion drove government forces 
out of the country’s northern territories threatening to establish an independent state ruled by 
Islamist principles. The crisis culminated on 21 March 2010 when a military coup in Bamako 
removed President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. How Mali came from being 
regarded as a stable democracy to a failing state is accounted for by conjunction of internal 
and external dynamics. 
A chief contributing factor is the political and economic status of the Tuaregs who 
inhabit large parts of the Sahara in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Mali. On 
the independence of Mali in 1959, the Tuaregs became an ethnic minority governed by a 
central authority which they regarded as illegitimate, irresponsive to their needs and intrusive 
on their way of life (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:162). Resentment turned violent in 1960s, 




reconciliation was pursued in 1992 through the signing of the National Pact. Rebel groups 
consented to disarm in exchange for greater regional autonomy and more financial support 
for the development of the North (Arieff, 2013:6). The failure of the government to deliver 
on its promises of economic and political progress for Tuareg communities, not only 
deepened the country’s ethnic, political and geographical divide between North and South, 
but prompted another uprising in 2006 (Bøås and Torheim, 2013:1284). Although a new 
peace agreement was reached on 4 July 2006, violent confrontations between Tuaregs and 
state factions remained frequent. 
The second dynamic stems from the regional ramifications of the 2011 Arab Spring. 
The fall of Qaddahfi precipitated the return of over 20000 Tuaregs to their homeland in 
Northern Mali, having fought as mercenaries for the Libyan regime (Koenig, 2013:115). 
They brought back military training and large amount of weaponry while straining the fragile 
local economy (Fiott, 2013). Importantly, this influx of military means contributed to the 
formation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and, on 18 
January 2012, to the launch of a new offensive aimed at securing the full independence of 
Azawad from Mali (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:163). By March 2012, the MNLA had 
inflicted the Malian army significant human and territorial losses. In the South, 
dissatisfaction at the government’s handling of the rebellion culminated on 22 March when a 
group of army junior officers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo ousted the civilian government 
of Amadou Toumani Touré from power in a military coup. The army fell further into 
disarray and was ultimately forced out of all northern territories by MNLA fighters (Wing, 
2016:62). Taking advantage of the political crisis in the capital, the MNLA declared the 
independence of the Azawad state on 5 April (Wing, 2016:62; Koenig, 2013:115). 
The crisis worsened following the Tuaregs’ failure to remain united (Bøås and 
Torheim, 2013:1285). The group cohesiveness was weakened by traditional divisions along 
ethnic, family and generational lines. A history of internal competition for power in addition 
to more recent conflicts over the control of trans-Saharan trafficking routes have impaired 
the cohesiveness of the separatist movement from the start (Wing, 2016:62). Islamist groups 
including Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine (‘helpers of 
religion’) exploited these feuds to infiltrate local populations (Bøås and Torheim, 
2013:1286). The extensive financial resources accrued over the last ten years from 
trafficking and kidnapping helped Islamist groups integrate local communities. By late June, 
Islamist rebels took over all of the northern territories that the MNLA had previously 
conquered including the major cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. From then on, Mali 






10.3 The Belgian Domestic Context 
 
The onset of the Malian crisis coincided with the formation of a new coalition 
government (Di Rupo I) in Belgium. On 6 December 2011, the six-party coalition headed by 
Francophone Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo (PS) was sworn in after a record breaking 541 
days of negotiations between Francophone and Flemish parties. The June 2010 federal 
elections were a success for the conservative Flemish-nationalist party (N-VA) and the 
French-speaking social democratic party (PS), both becoming the dominant political force in 
their respective region. However, polarisation of preferences over the constitutional 
arrangement of Belgium meant that no consensus could be found on government formation 
(Abts et al., 2010:448). In the end, the N-VA left the negotiations allowing Di Rupo to form 
a coalition comprising the Socialist Party (PS), Reform Movement (MR), Democrat 
Humanist Centre (CDH) and Christian-Democrat and Flemish (CD&V), Social Progressive 
Alternative (SP.a) and the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD). 
In Belgium, foreign policy decision-making lies primarily at the core of the 
government (Joly and Dandov, 2016:5). Article 167 of the Constitution assigns the power to 
authorise foreign missions to the executive. While the government has the responsibility to 
notify the Parliament, decisions can be made without prior parliamentary approval (Biscop, 
2013:36). The constitution effectively side-lines the Belgian parliament as a ‘peripheral 
actor’ (Reykers and Fonck, 2015:94). Inside cabinet, the foreign policy-making unit 
exercises significant influence on decisions to deploy troops even before formal discussions 
in the overall cabinet takes place (Moyse and Dumoulin, 2011). Leading the incoming unit, 
Elio Di Rupo was the first Walloon and Socialist Prime Minister in over three decades. 
Despite having ended the crisis, Di Rupo was labelled early on as the ‘weakest prime 
minister in Belgian history’ (Independent, 7 December 2011). Didier Reynders was 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs after spending twelve years as Finance Minister. His 
background does not indicate deep commitments to grand principles nor to humanitarian 
issues. His appointment marks a break from the humanitarian legacy left by Foreign Affair 
Minister Louis Michel (1999-2004). In the ministry of defence, Pieter De Crem (CD&V) was 
reconvened in the same function he had occupied under the last four coalitions. De Crem 
came to be known as a fervent supporter of Belgian deployment to missions under NATO 
framework, an orientation rooted in his pro-Atlantic leanings (Coolsaet, 2009; Koops and 
Drieskens, 2012). As these three actors were expected to be most influential on Belgium’s 
policy response towards the instability in the Sahel, the focus should be placed on their level 
of receptiveness to the numerous socialising pressures and how such top-down influences 
have affected the role(s) they have conceived for Belgium with regards to the Malian crisis. 
Moreover, Joly and Dandov (2016) posit that Belgian political parties are influential in 
defining foreign policy (p.17). This argument leads to a consideration of whether the party 




external role demands. 
The Belgian crisis did not mean that political life came to a halt (Devos and Sinardet, 
2012:167). As it became clear that negotiations would endure, a caretaker government led by 
Yves Leterme was granted extensive powers to deal with socioeconomic, finance and foreign 
policy issues (Devos and Sinardet, 2012:169). In fact, major foreign policy initiatives were 
undertaken by the caretaker government. It navigated Belgium through the financial crisis 
and EU bailout packages, held the Belgian Presidency of the EU which incorporated an 
important dimension on common European security and defence, and contributed troops and 
F16s planes to the NATO mission in Libya on humanitarian grounds (Devos and Sinardet, 
2012:169; Rihoux et al, 2012:44-46). These undertakings were not domestically contentious 
because they were seen as unavoidable if Belgium was to keep fulfilling its international and 
European obligations under this unusual state of affairs. In other words, the Di Rupo 
government inherited a rather active foreign policy. 
Upon taking office, Reynders insisted that the foreign policy of the new government 
would be ‘in the same line as the one followed by the previous administration’ (Le Soir, 
2011). The coalition agreement of Di Rupo I reaffirmed Belgium’s role as a RSC (Biscop, 
2011:2). The government also committed itself to maintain the previous Leterme 
government’s position in taking American sensitivities more into account and building 
‘credible partnerships’ with allies, in particular within NATO (Biscop, 2011:37). 
Importantly, it was no secret that the time spent by Defence Minister De Crem in the 
previous administration had been mainly dedicated to positioning Belgium into the role of 
small but reliable partner which has its roots in the loyal ally role (Delcourt, 2013).  
In a similar fashion as in the previous chapters, appendix 4 provides a more 
comprehensive assessment, based on the analysis of the speeches made by the administration 
of Elio Di Rupo at the UN, of the roles that the coalition selected for Belgium and may have 
influenced the cabinet’s peacekeeping response towards Mali. The findings indicate a 
diversity of roles which it has sought to articulate on the international stage while in office. 
Yet, the following analysis focuses only on the Global System Collaborator, Regional 
Subsystem Collaborator and Loyal Ally roles as they are expected to have been most 
influential in assisting the administration’s position with regard to the international efforts 
towards Mali. As it will be shown below, the humanitarian actor role only had a minimal 
influence given that the Di Rupo has offered a different definition of the Malian situation 
indicating that it has sought to act on a different basis than the Verhofstadt cabinet during the 
UNIFIL decision-making process for instance. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, even at 
the UN where multilateralism generally prevails, the administration has chosen to articulate 
the role of loyal ally suggesting an emerging preference for bilateral agreements when 





10.4 UN Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions 
 
The UN should be considered as a primary socialiser because it ‘has often taken the 
lead in building new norms related to international peace and security’ (Björkdahl, 
2006:221). The close link between the security and humanitarian dimensions of the conflict 
made it challenging for the UN to find an appropriate frame (Haysom, 2014:3). Initially, as 
reflected in Resolutions 2056 and 2071, the UN perceived the lack of constitutional order 
and the deteriorating humanitarian situation as the main sources of instability (The Guardian, 
27 September 2012; UNSC, 5 July 2012; UNSC, 12 October 2012). However, the Malian 
Transitional authorities and leaders of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) pressed the UN to consider ‘the seriousness of the terrorist threats in northern 
Mali’ (UNSC, 20 December 2012). They promoted this interpretation to convince the 
Security Council to meet their demand for the deployment of a stabilization force. On 12 
December 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2085 authorising the 
deployment of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Its mandate 
was to support the Malian authorities in strengthening the capacity of Malian defence and 
security forces and in recovering areas in the North (UNSC, 20 December 2012). It marked a 
distinct shift towards greater emphasis on the ‘serious and urgent threat’ posed by the 
‘entrenchment of terrorist groups and criminal networks in the north of Mali’ (UNSC, 20 
December 2012). On 25 April 2013, after the launch of both French and EU operations, 
Resolution 2100 established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a deployment of 12000 UN troops to stabilise key population 
centres and support the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country (UNSC, 25 
April 2013). Peter (2015) argues that the resolution contributes to an emerging trend 
whereby the UN mandates missions to undertake a wider set of activities including the 
‘enforcement of political solutions through support of a government’s state-building 
ambitions … through offensive use of force’ (p.353). This approach is a fundamental 
departure from the traditional peacekeeping norms of consent, impartiality and non-use of 
force and ‘bear resemblance to the stabilization missions in Iraq and – even more starkly – 
Afghanistan’ (Peter, 2015:353). While humanitarian reasons may have activated the UN’s 
initial response, a subsequent re-interpretation of the conflict contributed to the formulation 
of a mandate designed ‘to support the government of Mali … in its fight against Islamist 
rebels’, in other words to stabilise a country through military means (Peter, 2015:355). The 
UN was reshaping the normative context of peacekeeping by discarding traditional norms of 
defensive peacekeeping and embracing ‘stabilization’ through offensive deployments as a 
new peacekeeping norm (Boutellis, 2015:3). 
The norm of African ownership was highly prominent in the UN’s strategy towards 
the crisis. The norm emerged from African states’ determination to find their own solutions 




the Rwandan genocide and the state collapse in Somalia (Kasaija, 2013:121). Interventions 
conducted by external actors even mandated by the UN import foreign political influence 
which has negative consequences on the continent’s military, socio-political and economic 
developments (Mays, 2003). Therefore, the ‘African ownership’ norm found expression in 
UN statements emphasising that ‘the Malian authorities have the primary responsibility for 
resolving the interlinked crises facing the country and that any sustainable solution to the 
crisis in Mali should be Malian-led’ (UNSC, 20 December 2012). Furthermore, the Security 
Council stresses that the ‘responsibility to protect’ falls in the hands of the Malian 
government in cooperation with regional partners (UNSC, 20 December 2012). There are 
some grounds to argue that this UN advocacy socialised concerned European states, 
including Belgium, out of a former colonial power role. The international community was 
requested to merely ‘provide coordinated assistance’ to the Malian forces. In operational 
terms, the developing norm was driven by a reluctance to get directly involved in combat 
operations. 
The objective is now to determine the extent to which the Belgian government was 
receptive to these norms, thereby meeting the UN role demands. Following the failure of 
neutrality to prevent Belgium from being drawn into two world wars, multilateralism became 
the core of Belgian foreign policy (De Wilde, 2014:277; Liégeois, 2016:37; Renard, 2016:7; 
Delcorde, 2010:90). UN membership is the most enduring feature of this commitment. 
Belgian foreign policy-makers are eager to underline the country’s status as founding 
member of, and active participant in, the organisation. This status makes Belgium a deeply 
institutionalised member likely to adopt the roles demanded by the UN. In the early 1990s, 
Belgium had conceived itself as an UN activist (or GSC) which manifested itself in a 
reluctance to decline UN requests for troop contributions (Liegeois and Glume, 2008:118). 
However, Belgium’s roles towards UN peacekeeping changed significantly after the 
Rwandan crisis but were then again re-evaluated in 2006 (see chapter 9). 
Belgium entered international debates on Mali at the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 
26 September 2012) in September 2012. Represented by Prime Minister Di Rupo, Foreign 
Minister Reynders and Minister for Development Cooperation Paul Magnette, the Belgian 
delegation intended to contribute to the issue of Mali and affirms its international roles (La 
Dernière Heure, 25 Septembre 2012). Di Rupo’s speech was distinctly oriented towards 
humanitarian themes including Belgium’s adherence to the principle of ‘responsibility to 
protect victims of violence everywhere in the world based on mutual respect’ (UNGA 26 
September 2012, emphasis added). He also pointed out that Belgium was the fifteenth largest 
contributor to the organisation and stood by its engagements with the UN. According to the 
Prime Minister, such commitments made Belgium ‘a serious and responsible partner’ (La 
Dernière Heure, 25 Septembre 2012; author’s translation). His role expression was relayed 




present themselves as the largest contributors, but we are doing as much’, something 
that Belgium is appreciated for within the UN and should be more vocal about (La Dernière 
Heure, 25 Septembre 2012; author’s translation). 
In the margins of the Assembly, Reynders took part in a high-level meeting 
dedicated to Mali, exposing Belgium further to the UN socialising influence. At the end of 
the meeting, he declared that Belgium was ready ‘to support an international military 
intervention in Mali’ by providing logistical and training assistance ‘while maintaining a 
cautious and critical approach until details are clarified, in particular in the framework of a 
UN resolution’ (Le Soir, September 2012; Sénat de Belgique, 5 December 2012; author’s 
translation). It is worth noting that, at this stage, the UN remained reluctant to authorise a 
military intervention for fear it would exacerbate the humanitarian situation. UN officials 
preferred to insist on a political dialogue despite African demands for a deployment (Sénat 
de Belgique, 5 December 2012). Reynders believed that the challenges in Mali surpassed the 
‘African scene’ indicating his willingness to extend the responsibility to act to the wider 
international community. However, the swiftness with which Reynders positioned Belgium 
on military interventionist track suggests an ambition to play a role more in tune with 
international partners’ demands than with the UN’s preferred line of action of political 
dialogue. 
In Belgium, a strong consensus exists on the need for a UN mandate and EU 
framework as preconditions for taking part in military operations (Coolsaet, 2016:13). The 
historical experiences of being subjugated to the wills of great powers acting outside 
international rules have led Belgium to conceive for itself a role of promoter of international 
law. This role conditions Belgium to attach weight to the legitimacy of UN mandates. 
Nonetheless, in a June 2012 interview on Syria, Reynders asserted ‘he would not exclude an 
intervention outside a UN framework in the case of persistent vetoes inside the Security 
Council’ (Delcourt, 2013). Although the remark was made in the Syrian context and later 
mitigated with commitments to international law, it indicates that the Foreign Minister 
identified less positively with the UN’s mission in security affairs than his predecessors and 
coalition partners. Given the autonomy afforded by Di Rupo to his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, this inclination is likely to make Belgium less receptive to UN role socialisation and 
demands. 
MINUSMA took over the African-led mission in Mali (AFISMA) on 1 July 2013 as 
envisaged by Resolution 2100. This UN operation was granted robust rules of engagement 
and extensive capabilities (UN Peacekeeping Online, 2016; Karlsrud and Smith, 2015:3). 
Interestingly, European states contributed significantly to MINUSMA, which was the largest 
participation of European troops in UN peacekeeping since 1996 (Karlsrud and Smith, 
2015:3). The Dutch contingent was the largest with 380 troops, followed by a Swedish of 




Finland, France and Portugal also made sizable contributions (Karlsrud, 2015:46). However, 
Belgium was virtually absent, committing one police officer who was eventually pulled out 
after two months of deployment (UN Peacekeeping Online, 2016). Karlsrud and Smith 
(2015) argue that MINUSMA presented European governments with an opportunity to 
reorient their armed forces towards other conflict theatres and mission types following the 
end of their presence in Afghanistan (p.3). Yet, Belgium’s withdrawal from Afghanistan 
appeared slower than its European partners. On the same day as the Security Council passed 
Resolution 2100, Germany expressed a wish to see Belgium maintain its military presence 
alongside the Bundeswehr as part of NATO’s ‘Resolute Support’ mission in northern 
Afghanistan. This demand came after a meeting between German Defence Minister, Thomas 
de Maizière and his Belgian counterpart, Pieter de Crem. No formal response was given, but 
Reynders declared that ‘Belgium will remain active in Afghanistan beyond the end of ISAF’ 
(La Dernière Heure, 25 April 2013). By July 2013, it was clear that De Crem favoured 
maintaining Belgian troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (La Dernière Heure, 10 July 2013). 
The following December, France approached Belgium to request assistance in the form of air 
transport to the planned operation in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) (La Dernière Heure, 
4 December 2013). These elements demonstrate that, around the time MINUSMA 
materialised, the Belgian government was under multiple pressures to meet its obligations as 
a European, EU and NATO partner, forcing the Di Rupo government to prioritise. Belgium’s 
non-participation in MINUSMA can be partly explained by Belgian foreign policy actors 
being highly receptive to the socialising influences of EU and NATO allies, leading to the 
enactment of a small but reliable ally role. In contrast, these actors appeared less open to the 
new UN peacekeeping norm of ‘stabilisation’ resulting in a low level of internalisation. The 
lack of domestic debates around an eventual contribution to MINUSMA indicates that this 
UN endeavour never gained any traction domestically; a surprising outcome considering the 
norm fulfilled the conditions for deployment advanced by the Belgian elite after the 
Rwandan crisis. Karlsrud (2015) contends that ‘the escalating violence and tension could put 
the UN in an awkward position, as it is torn between its mandate to be an impartial mediator 
and the charge to help extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country’ 
(p.46). This situation forces contributing countries to play conflicting roles. For Belgium, it 
is reminiscent of Rwanda where Brussels found it impossible to reconcile its UN activist and 
former colonial power roles. Therefore, Belgium’s absence form MINUSMA can be 
interpreted as an elite reluctance to perform contradictory roles in the context of UN 
peacekeeping. Informed by the dramatic consequences of Rwanda, Belgian policy-makers 
continued to perceive a fundamental contradiction between the UN norm of impartiality and 
the concept of external intervention to stabilise an African state. Finally, the operation is 
likely to have been perceived as too risky. Conditions on the ground remained highly volatile 




Belgian contribution conflicted with the pacifist inclinations of the Belgian public (Karlsrud, 
2015:45; Biscop, 2013:36). 
 
10.5 French Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions 
 
As one of the leading military powers in Europe, France is the second key socialiser 
of Belgium’s roles towards Mali (Spiegel Online, 21 January 2014). On 9 January 2013, 
Islamist rebels controlling northern territories launched a military offensive southward to 
overthrow the interim government of Dioncounda Traoré. Fearing the Malian army would 
not be able to withstand the attack, President Traoré made an emergency request to France 
for military assistance. The next day, French President Francois Hollande ordered the 
immediate deployment of troops to stop the advance of terrorist groups (Boeke and 
Schuurman, 2015). On 11 January, the French counter-offensive named Operation Serval 
began (Heisbourg, 2013:10). Soon a coalition of willing partners including the UK, 
Germany, Spain, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, US, Canada and the United 
Arab Emirates was formed, pledging different levels of logistical assistance to the French-led 
operation (Bruxelles2, 26 January 2013). The Belgian government announced on 15 January 
its decision to contribute two C-130 transport planes and two medical evacuation helicopters 
(La Libre, January 2013). This section seeks to understand why the Di Rupo government 
decided in a short timespan to make this relatively large contribution as part of an ad hoc 
coalition led by a great power; a framework Belgium has conventionally sought distance 
from. In fact, the lack of support demonstrated by Belgium’s allies for its colonial policy 
during the Congo crisis has ‘made Belgium turn away from ad hoc coalitions’ (Senior 
official quoted in Houben, 2005:267). 
The influence of France in shaping the international community’s response to the 
crisis should not be underestimated. The above-mentioned UN shift towards a more assertive 
approach was the outcome of an active French diplomacy (Boeke and Schuurman, 
2015:809). Moreover, Paris was the main force behind EU actions by generating momentum 
for a response and shaping its content according to France’s preferences (Furness and Olsen, 
2016:114). The claim advanced here is that France also socialised concerned parties into 
mission partners by diffusing its own threat perception and interpretation of the conflict on a 
bilateral basis. Belgium was on the front line of this process. Domestically, this socialising 
interaction was not obstructed by Belgian foreign policy actors. It resonated with pre-existing 
aspirations to improve Belgium’s credibility towards allies. This made Belgian leaders 
highly receptive to French socialising efforts and consolidated the small but reliable partner 
role. The alignment of external role demands and prevailing role conceptions accounts for 
the speed and intensity of the Belgian involvement. 
One element that raises the expectation of significant socialising influence from 




support. Boeke and Schuurman (2015) emphasises that ‘without the assistance of cargo 
planes from NATO partners the deployment would have been delayed by weeks’ (p.809). 
Furthermore, the Hollande government was keen to claim that France was ‘not alone’ to 
evade criticisms that his government continued to pursue the colonial policy of Francafrique 
(Koenig, 2016:126). Since the early 1990s, it had become increasingly customary for France 
to deploy in Africa within the multilateral framework of international institutions rather than 
unilaterally (Olsen, 2014:294). However, French officials argued that EU decision-making 
was too drawn out and slow to provide a timely response to the emergency. Therefore, 
France counted on like-minded governments to buttress the mission in both legitimacy and 
operational terms. But before they could become loyal allies or reliable partners, these 
governments needed to share the same threat perception and adopt a similar understanding of 
the conflict. Paris perceived a threat in the establishment of an Islamic regime in Mali which 
would harbour terrorist bases (Le Monde, 16 January 2013). French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius explicitly ‘refused to see the country become a safe haven for terrorists’ 
(L’express, 14 January 2013). The prevailing understanding in Paris was that France was 
engaged in a fight against terrorism. President Hollande refuted any claims that the 
intervention was designed to protect national interests (Le Monde, 16 January 2013). French 
diplomacy actively conveyed the idea that the instability in the Sahel represented a security 
threat not just to France but to Africa and the whole of Europe (Furness and Olsen, 
2016:114; Hollande in The Gardian, 27 September 2012). In effect, the French government 
actively securitised developments in Mali and spread a sense of urgency (Koenig, 2016:126). 
Although France did not notify partners of its imminent intervention, informal 
contacts were established early on between French and Belgian officials (La Dernière Heure, 
14 January 2013). These had prepared the ground for a formal demand of logistical support 
submitted on 14 January 2013. Willing to take on most of the burden and risk, France made 
no official request for combat troops. Doing so meant that France refrained from socialising 
Belgium into a former colonial power role, perhaps aware that it would receive little 
domestic acceptance. Importantly, Franco-Belgium defence cooperation had intensified in 
the months leading up to Serval. Both cooperated closely on pilot training and the evacuation 
of citizens from African crisis zones while also envisaging the creation of a common air 
force unit (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012; Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 
11 February 2013). In a September 2012 meeting between both Defence Ministers, Jean- 
Yves Le Drian, casted Belgium into a loyal and reliable partner role most explicitly: 
‘Belgium is our most constant partner, the most loyal, with which we have a cooperation 
without hidden agendas’ (cited in Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). A commentator added that 
‘there is neither rivalry nor extensive ideological discussions between France and Belgium’ 
as ‘their common approach is based on pragmatism’ (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). 




130 plane available on a ‘semi-permanent’ basis for the transport of French troops to and 
from Afghanistan (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). It is an interesting dimension because it 
highly resembles the activity Belgium undertook in Mali. Through this initiative, France was 
able to express the type of function that it wanted to see Belgium fulfil on common security 
endeavours. More broadly, such close bilateral cooperation is expected to be the location of 
significant socialising influence from the larger power onto its smaller partner. Brussels’ 
cooperative relations with France have contributed to internalising French defence culture 
and practices. The rapid response of the Di Rupo government is partly attributable to this 
social process which resulted in Belgium performing a small but reliable partner role. 
Two elements made the members of the foreign policy-making unit open to French 
influence and demands. First, Defence Minister De Crem was seeking to orient defence 
policy away from the legacy of former Minister André Flahaut who had attempted to give 
Belgian armed forces distinct humanitarian and non-military roles (Delcourt, 2013). Second, 
incumbent Belgian leaders positively evaluated the previous administration’s decision to 
make a significant contribution to the NATO operation in Libya because it had reinforced 
Belgium’s credibility within the Alliance (Le Soir, 8 December 2011). Therefore, Serval 
represented an opportunity to demonstrate the army’s ability to deploy in robust missions and 
capitalise on the role Belgium had played in Libya. The prospect of a solid Franco- Belgium 
partnership within the Alliance after France reintegrated NATO in 2009 was not lost on pro-
Atlantic De Crem either. 
On the day of the rebels’ advance on Bamako, De Crem announced that Belgium 
was ‘ready’ to intervene in Mali and that this position had been made clear to French leaders 
(Le Soir, 12 January 2013). However, De Crem’s eagerness was dampened by a more 
cautious approach taken by the ministry of foreign affairs. Following the start of Serval, 
foreign affair officials were more concerned with distinguishing France’s actions and the 
Belgian proposal which they interpreted as a contribution to a common EU response (Le 
Soir, 12 January 2013). Their intention was to distance Belgium from what was seen as a 
unilateral intervention in the context of Franco-Malian relations. At this stage, they perceived 
no urgency to act. Any difference in attitudes between the two ministries appeared to have 
been amended when an inner cabinet council agreed on 15 January to support the French 
forces with air transport and medical assistance (La Libre, 15 January 2013). The official 
justification fully aligned with the views and interpretations emanating from French foreign 
policy circles. Prime Minister Di Rupo identified that ‘a centre of radicalism and terror was 
developing at the heart of the Sahel, very close to Europe’ while Reynders reminded the 
foreign affairs commission that the intervention was ‘for a range of reasons specific to the 
situation in Mali, but also in the context of a struggle against jihadists, and radical groups’ 
(Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:6; author’s translation). Analysts 




the threats to Europe stemming from the region’ (Olsen, 2015:235; Delcourt, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the government insisted that no Belgian troops would be deployed in combat 
zones and that the ultimate objective was to hand over control of the operations to African 
countries as soon as possible (Reynders in Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 
11 February 2013). This indicates that, although the government was playing the role of 
small but reliable partner, it was unwilling to do so beyond the limits imposed by domestic 
audiences and constraints. 
The government informed the parliament of its decision, prompting a resolution and 
an exchange of views within the foreign affairs and defence commissions. Even though the 
government did not require parliamentary approval, no major opposition was mounted by 
any parliamentary group against Belgium’s participation in Serval. Yet, one can still detect a 
range of more or less favourable views evoking Belgium’s roles in this episode. 
Representative of the Flemish extreme right party Vlaams Belang (VB), Annick Ponthier 
was the only parliamentarian in opposition to an intervention as she evaluated that a small 
but reliable partner role served excessively French interests (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 16 January 2013). Others including Flemish Nationalist (N-VA) Francken and De 
Vriendt from the Green Party (Ecolo-Groen) supported the government but would have liked 
to see Belgium taking on a more prominent role in pushing for political reforms and 
dialogue, as well as in delivering humanitarian assistance to the Malian population (Chambre 
de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013). The latter preferred a more restricted 
enactment of the small but reliable partner role so as to avoid being drawn into an expanded 
mandate once on the ground. In the exchange of views held on 11 February, N-VA members 
were most supportive of the role advocated by the government arguing that ‘Belgium is a 
loyal partner and that the demand from France, a NATO ally and neighbour, must be 
considered seriously’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013). Both 
Flemish (Sp.a) and Walloon (PS) socialist parties were more motivated by Belgium’s 
obligation ‘to respect loyally its engagements towards both EU and UN’ (Chambre de 
Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013; author’s translation). A member of the 
Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) also referred to Belgium’s humanitarian 
responsibility highlighting the ‘west has no other choice but to bring assistance considering 
the humanitarian situation and the demands of international norms’ (p.13). 
The weeks after the deployment consolidated the elite’s view that the government 
acted on an appropriate role. Parliamentarian Dallemagne from the French-speaking 
Christian Democratic Party (cdH) expressed that position most clearly: 
‘Even if our participation was limited, we were there. It is important to underline 
that a country sometimes presented as weak was able, in this instance, to assume 
its role at an international level, and even a bigger role than some European 
powers. We have to congratulate ourselves on Belgian international presence … 
Moreover, this was about the security of Europe and of our populations as well as 




2013; author’s translation). 
Further parliamentary discussions after Serval revealed that the government, along with other 
parliamentarians, used the Malian issue to revisit the debate about the Rwanda commission’s 
conclusions. Foreign Minister Reynders was the main proponent of reopening the debate, 
calling on parliament to reconsider the constraints imposed after Rwanda as they did not 
allow Belgium to fully enact a small but reliable partner role. He believed that if Belgium 
was to be credible, it was impossible to ‘intervene actively in Libya with F-16s, be present in 
Afghanistan and undertake demining activities in south Lebanon … and then be satisfied 
with little logistics and training in Mali, but never be in the front line’ (Chambre de 
Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:27; author’s translation). His opinion was that 
Belgium should have adopted an even more prominent role, perhaps, by deploying combat 
troops in Mali. Reiterating the statement of a CEDEAO official that ‘it was an African call 
made by Africans to a former colonial power’, Reynders concluded that Belgium ‘should 
therefore break away from its ‘locks’ and reopen the debate’ (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 20 February 2013:27; author’s translation). 
10.6 EU Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions 
 
Belgium’s peacekeeping roles in Mali were also shaped by the EU’s socialising 
influences. The declining security and humanitarian conditions throughout 2010 prompted 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) to develop a regional strategy. In March 2011, 
the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (Sahel Strategy) was launched. Its 
main objectives are to improve security and development in the region as well as ‘counter 
violent extremism and radicalization’ through a comprehensive approach of hard and soft 
tools (Olsen, 2014:301). However, the EU could not keep up with developments brought by 
the Arab uprisings and numerous terrorist attacks against European interests and nationals in 
North Africa. Although the March military takeover was a major warning for EU officials, 
their response remained limited to diplomatic condemnation and humanitarian aid (Koenig, 
2013:118). France stepped in militarily in early January receiving full support from the EU 
and its member states. An extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council on 17 January established 
the Military Training Mission (EUTM Mali) aimed at supporting Malian armed forces. EU 
personnel were not mandated to participate in combat operations (Coolsaet et al., 2013:3). A 
record breaking twenty-three member states marked their approval with a contribution. The 
largest contributors were France, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Britain and Belgium 





Under the Lisbon Treaty, member states renewed their commitment to coordinate 
their external policies to achieve greater EU foreign policy coherence. The post of high 
representative for foreign and security policy as well as the EEAS were designed to bring 
differentiated approaches under common institutional frameworks (Menon, 2011:78). 
Member states’ leaders have deepened their identification with this European endeavour 
facilitating the integration of EU foreign policy norms at state level. This raises the 
expectation they have increasingly seen their state playing a RSC role, motivating them to 
provide a Europeanised response to the Malian conflict (Furness and Olsen, 2016:108). One 
indicator of a RSC role being performed in EU capitals consists of statements acknowledging 
the Malian instability as a threat to Europe. By doing so, policy-makers refrain from 
perceiving the threat in purely national terms and locate the responsibility to act within 
Europe (Coolsaet et al., 2013:3). 
Member states’ participation in EU framework generated pressures to follow three 
norms encapsulated in the Sahel Strategy. First, a strong emphasis was placed on the 
comprehensive approach to crisis management. It demands the coordinated use of 
humanitarian, development, diplomatic, civilian and military policy instruments to address 
the intertwined challenges of Sahel (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:160). Analysts have 
underlined that ‘the comprehensive approach that is thus called for is exactly what the EU 
Strategy for the Sahel envisages’ (Coolsaet et al., 2013:2). Second, the EU believes that the 
coherence of its external actions can be enhanced if security and development are pursued 
simultaneously (Furness and Olsen, 2016:108). The Sahel Strategy re-emphasises that 
neither security nor development can be improved without developing the other (Keukeleire 
and Raube, 2013:558). Third, the Sahel Strategy aligns with international normative 
development by advocating the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ which has 
translated into debates about the types of assistance that should be provided to African actors 
if European troops are not to be directly engaged (Olsen, 2014:293). 
Scholars tend to agree that the EU was unable to fully implement the comprehensive 
approach to the Malian crisis and therefore failed to provide a truly Europeanised response. 
Of the more positive analyses, Rouppert (2014) evaluates the Sahel Strategy as a success 
because, for the first time, twenty-seven member states had agreed on a wide ranging and 
coordinated approach to a specific region (p.9). It enabled the launch of two civilian missions 
including EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya and a military one (EUTM Mali). Furness 
and Olsen (2016), in turn, argue that the comprehensive approach was partially implemented 
as the EU only responded when ‘a direct threat’ was identified and ‘a key member state has 
taken the lead in mobilising the rest of the EU’ (p.106). Koenig (2013) concurs by asserting 
that ‘it was not the Union’s best demonstration of collective action’ (p.133). Bello offers an 
altogether more critical approach by arguing that the Sahel Strategy focuses excessively on 




military power’ (quoted in Koenig, 2013:121). A key factor affecting the EU’s effectiveness 
remains the fundamental divergences of approaches towards, and interests in, Africa 
amongst member states (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:174). 
What we need to assess is whether Belgium enacted a RSC by integrating the 
comprehensive approach. Based on Belgium’s foreign policy traditions, there is a high 
expectation that its response to the Malian conflict would be informed by a RSC role. 
Belgium is a founding member of the EU and a major proponent of a deeper European 
defence and security integration. Its foreign policy is likely to be deeply institutionalised by 
EU rules, norms and practices. The role has been prominent in guiding Belgian foreign 
policy since the 1990s and has not met any major domestic contestation. Additionally, the 
presence of a European framework is one of two key conditions for the deployment of 
Belgian troops. Nonetheless, Belgium has increasingly come under criticism for not 
performing this role consistently through participation in EU frameworks (Biscop, 2011:1). 
When it comes to the RSC role the country has sometimes fallen short of meeting words with 
deeds (see Breuning, 1995). In this way, Belgium has, at times, hampered Europe’s search 
for foreign policy cohesion and coherence. 
Belgian policy-makers repeatedly expressed their intentions to internationalise an 
intervention in Mali ever since September 2012 when the EU became actively involved. This 
commitment was reaffirmed immediately after the decision had been taken to participate in 
Serval. The initiative to freeze all development aid to Mali in response to the military coup in 
March 2012 was an early sign of Belgium adopting a European role. Minister of 
Development Cooperation, Paul Magnette justified his decision by emphasising that it 
‘complies with the European line’ which demands the return of constitutional order (Le Soir, 
27 March 2012). Furthermore, Belgium was part of a group including France, Spain and Italy 
which acted as catalyst to the deployment of civilian missions in the region (Rouppert, 
2014:9). In December 2012, a parliamentary note on Belgium’s general foreign policy 
declared, in light of the successful launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger, that ‘Belgium will 
continue to translate in actions its political engagements in favour of CSDP by participating 
in a range of EU operations’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 21 December 
2012:12). Significantly, numerous statements were made by Belgian leaders referring to the 
Malian crisis as a threat to Europe. Belgian elites from all parties perceived stability in Sahel 
as being in the common European interest. 
The force generation conference for EUTM Mali began on 29 January 2013. Its 
outcome was unexpected as almost all member states announced a contribution, and many 
committed more than initially promised. Even EU members with traditionally low interest in 
Africa such as the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic insisted on participating 
(Bruxelles2, 29 January 2013). Yet, a lack of enthusiasm remained when it came to forming 




troops, pressure began building on Belgian leaders to make a contribution (Bruxelles2, 2 
February 2013). However, the government continued to delay a formal decision while 
expressing further support for Serval (Bruxelles2, 5 February 2013). Reports emerged 
suggesting that tensions between Reynders and De Crem were behind the government’s 
indecision. It would appear that the Defence Minister had taken the decision to engage 
Belgian armed forces in Serval with little prior consultation with coalition partners, an 
initiative which was not well received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bruxelles2, 5 
February 2013). Furthermore, De Crem is generally not a fervent supporter to the idea of a 
‘European pillar’, preferring to invest Belgian defence resources in NATO financing and 
operations (Bruxelles2, 21 May 2012). This made De Crem, who at the time was also 
candidate to the post of NATO’s Secretary-General, one of the least receptive governmental 
actors to EU norms and expectations (Bruxelles 2, 25 October 2013). In general, coalition 
ministers from all six parties were unwilling to make a substantial contribution because of 
budgetary concerns, indicating reluctance within the governing elite not to accept a RSC role 
(La Libre, 5 February 2013). 
Reynders argued in parliament that Belgium could not be expected to carry most of 
the responsibilities while others’ contribution remained limited: ‘A demand was issued to us. 
We replied that we are ready to bring a complement. We do not wish to be on the front line 
leading this protection force, but in the case of a contribution, it will be proportional to 
others’ commitments’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:22; 
author’s translation). He added that: 
‘We cannot argue for European defence and not step in an operation like this one. 
Belgium needed to be present, but … the government wanted a proportional 
contribution. Some countries announced five, ten trainers. We are already present 
in more substantial ways’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 
2013:5; author’s translation). 
His argument resonated well within some members of parliament. Christophe Lacroix (PS) 
supported the government’s position on the ground that: 
‘We have to be proactive and act in solidarity to these missions, in particular when 
defined by Europe, but in a proportional way. We have already done a lot. It is 
necessary that interventions be proportional and that we are not taken advantage of 
by those who do not assume European defence’ (Chambre de Représentants de 
Belgique, 20 January 2013:7; author’s translation). 
This feet-dragging was met with intensified efforts from external actors to socialise Belgium 
into a RSC role. The EU’s high representative at the time, Catherine Ashton, sent a letter to 
Belgian officials formally demanding Belgium’s participation. Both French President 
Hollande and Foreign Affairs Minister Fabius contacted their respective counterparts in 
Belgium insisting on a complementary contribution. A compromise was eventually reached 
between France, Belgium and Spain whereby responsibility for forming and leading the 
protection force would be shared among the three member states. External socialisation 




who exercised pressure on the government by commenting that: 
‘In Libya we figured amongst the first countries (accepting to participate). 
Concerning EUTM Mali, however, Belgium ranks amongst the last. I condemn 
this because our country enjoys a good reputation in this domain. What concerns 
me is the difference of strategy between operations led by France, or the one in 
Libya, and European operations. If it takes Belgium time to be considered by other 
states as a reliable partner within European defence, it takes much less to lose that 
confidence’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 January 2013:6; author’s 
translation). 
 
The following statement by De Crem indicates a clear change of role position as a result of 
EU socialisation. De Crem who is not a fervent supporter of European defence, at least not at 
the expense of NATO loyalty, was now affirming that: 
‘We cannot continue to argue in favour of a deployment and a Belgian 
participation within a common European and then remain on the side line … In 
this way, we demonstrate again our positive spirit to the development of a 
European defence’ (Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 20 January 
2013:11; author’s translation). 
 
This is further evidence of small states’ weakness in the context of modern peacekeeping 
when confronted with the combined socialising influence of a regional institution, along with 
its rules and norms, and the leadership of a great power seeking to multilaterise its 
peacekeeping operations through such institutional framework. 
 
10.7 Concluding Discussion 
 
This case reinforces the notion that small states’ commitment to peacekeeping is not 
unconditional and can vary from one institutional platform to another and over time. A key 
dynamic contributing to this pattern is the emergence of a plethora of international actors 
seeking to deploy different peacekeeping instruments and strategies. In Mali, ECOWAS, the 
UN, the EU and a great power mobilised resources to contain the violence through 
stabilisation, combat and state-building instruments. From the perspective of small states, 
this has generated numerous understandings of what is appropriate peacekeeping behaviour 
and produced multiple institutional frameworks within which to perform peacekeeping 
activities. Crucially, it has intensified the socialisation of small states into a wider range of 
peacekeeping roles. To understand the effects of these multi-directional socialising pressures 
on Belgium’s role selection, the ways Belgian policy-makers have received and interpreted 
role expectations emanating from external actors and institutions in the context of the Malian 
conflict have been examined. The socialisation of Belgium was influenced by how domestic 
agents’ interpretations interacted with their own ideas about Belgium’s place in 
peacekeeping within a context of coalition decision-making. 
The main finding indicates that, whether the UN, the EU or France acted as a 
socialiser of Belgium’s roles regarding the Malian crisis, no major role contestation emerged 




expectations that coalitions are too fragmented to reach consensus and make meaningful 
policy decisions. As no single actor has the authority to commit the decision unit without the 
approval of others, foreign policy analysts anticipate coalitions to be highly constrained in 
their ability to achieve agreement. Consequently, they tend to be ‘internally deadlocked and 
unable to act’ (Hagan et al., 2001:173). Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) argue that ‘role 
contestation that is institutionalized in political parties may surface in the cabinet—the 
primary body for making foreign policy decisions—if the cabinet is a multiparty coalition’ 
(p.13). This body of research raised expectations that Belgian domestic actors would 
disagree over the role(s) that Belgium should adopt, especially as numerous socialisers 
demanded different roles. The prospect of contestations was high given that parties are key 
actors shaping Belgium’s foreign policy (Joly and Dandov, 2016:17) and that the Di Rupo 
coalition was highly fragmented with three different parties occupying the main foreign 
policy posts. 
However, Prime Minister Di Rupo, Foreign Minister Reynders and Defence Minister 
De Crem formed a solid consensus around Belgium acting as a small but reliable partner. 
The implication was that there was no contestation over the decision not to pursue a UN 
activist role, accounting for Belgium being minimally socialised by UN role demands, and its 
limited presence in MINUSMA. Similarly, scepticism towards EU plans was shared within 
the unit. When the decision was taken to partially enact a RSC role following socialising 
pressures from EU partners and concerns in the opposition that Belgium’s reputation was 
being tarnished, no member of the unit or the cabinet challenged it. The decisions to deflect 
UN and EU socialising demands were heavily influenced by a prior ambition in the unit to 
perform a small but reliable partner role, encouraging a participation in Serval. The role was 
introduced early, was uncontested and dominated the decision-making process. This case 
offers an opportunity to tease out the factors which may contribute to a fragmented coalition 
reaching a consensus on the role(s) that a small state should play in peacekeeping crisis. 
Before a consensus was formed, the role had first to be introduced into the decision- 
making process. Although Foreign Minister Reynders and Defence Minister De Crem 
initially disagreed over EUTM Mali, the disagreement was more about the latter’s assent of 
French role expectations without prior consultation with the former than a fundamental 
difference in role preferences. This indicates that De Crem acted as ‘role entrepreneur’ as he 
previously advocated of the role and managed to impose it on the domestic negotiation 
process (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:178). Although De Crem did not have the Prime 
Minister’s authority, as one would expect for a role entrepreneur (Cantir and Kaarbo, 
2016:178), his re-appointment in the Di Rupo coalition from the caretaker government, 
where he had established a solid foreign policy line based on a small but reliable partner 
role, likely reflects the new coalition’s approval of his role preference while strengthening 




evidence that ‘the party with the largest influence on foreign policy is the party of the 
defence minister’, indicating significant influence of this actor on Belgian foreign policy 
compared to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister (p.22). To understand why Di 
Rupo and Reynders agreed to follow his role position in Mali, we can turn to clues provided 
by Hermann and Hermann (1989) as to what factors affect the likelihood of a ‘prompt group 
consensus’ (p.367). A key element is that ‘group members share a common ideology … in 
other words, a common set of values and beliefs with regard to the problem at hand’ 
(Hermann and Hermann, 1989:367). While Reynders and De Crem belonged to different 
parties, party families and regions, neither appeared averse to deploying troops to 
challenging missions abroad. They also shared a rejection of the value-based and 
humanitarian foreign policy which had seen their predecessors re-engage in UN 
peacekeeping in 2006. Given the view of the francophone Socialist Party that UN 
peacekeeping is the ‘conditio sine qua non’ for participation in more robust operations, 
Prime Minister Di Rupo was the most likely to oppose a small but reliable partner role 
opening the door for participation in ad hoc coalitions (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). His 
acceptance should be seen in light of his institutional role as Belgian Prime Minister who 
traditionally ‘does not impose decisions or solutions by means of authority, but settles 
disagreements through consensus, to maintain the stability of his coalition’ (Dewachter in 
Dandov and Joly, 2015). Di Rupo’s experience in negotiating the coalition agreement which 
ended the Belgian political crisis likely strengthened his credentials as ‘a political broker 
whose most important skills are those of conciliation, compromise, and consensus-building 
among powerful colleagues’ (Baylis, 1989:89; Kaarbo, 1996:511). In fact, no cabinet or unit 
member had an interest in threatening the coalition’s stability after a year and a half of 
deadlock. Moreover, there is domestic agreement that ‘participation [in crisis management] 
must not constitute a political risk to the stability of the coalition at home’ (Houben, 2005). 
As the political crisis had received much international media coverage which damaged 
Belgium’s image abroad, political leaders converged in their ambition to rebuild the 
country’s reputation. A small but reliable partner role precisely served that purpose. 
Socialising pressures do not, on their own, explain a small states’ pattern of 
peacekeeping contribution. Role socialisation of small states may be more likely when an 
agent first introduces a role on which an agreement, through ideological proximity and 
consensus-oriented norms and leader, is then formed. This creates a role disposition which 
increases or decreases a small state’s susceptibility to be socialised by different socialising 
agents. Once a ‘prompt consensus’ is achieved and a small state becomes inclined towards a 
role, agents in the unit ‘reinforce each other’s predispositions and feel secure in their 
collective decision’ (Hermann and Hermann, 1989:367). They will have no incentive to 
consider alternative roles. This may explain why a rapid agreement in the Di Rupo unit that a 





Decision-making dynamics in Belgium regarding its involvement in Mali cannot be 
fully understood without references to at least two historical analogies, or precedents. 
Historical analogies shape foreign policy choices as policy-makers use past events to identify 
successful and unsuccessful courses of action and gain clues about what is be done in a 
present case (Brunk, 2008:303; Khong, 1992). They contribute to a learning process whereby 
lessons are drawn from past cases perceived to be similar to the situation at hand. This strand 
of research allows the hypothesis that historical analogies influence role selection by helping 
policy-makers determine the roles that were either appropriate or inappropriate in a similar 
past. In this way, roles act as a template for action. Beneš and Harnisch (2014) have already 
advanced that roles can be learned through the ‘historical self’ which ‘may play the role of 
the significant other’ or main socialising agent (p.6). In Belgium, the trauma of Rwanda ‘still 
marks Belgian political discourse, public perception and strategic thinking related to UN-led 
peacekeeping’ (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). It is a ‘readily available referent’ for domestic 
actors as to what must be avoided in peacekeeping, namely contributing to under-resourced 
UN missions in former colonies operating under poorly-defined rules of engagements and an 
ineffective command structure (Brunk, 2008:304). Belgium’s reluctance to fully re-embrace 
its UN activist role in Mali was surprising given that MINUSMA had far more military 
resources, a wider mandate and permissive rules of engagements. The crux is that Belgium 
does not shy away from greater use of military instruments, but its elite is reluctant to do so 
under UN command. In fact, ‘based on the negative experiences in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda, but also on their experience during Belgium’s 2007-08 membership of the UN 
Security Council and its recent experiences during UNIFIL, many questions whether 
progress has been achieved in terms of reforming the UN’s command and control structures’ 
(Koops and Drieskens, 2012). This explains why NATO and the EU are perceived as ‘more 
natural partners’; a view very much associated with De Crem (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). 
There is ground to suggest that the Belgian contribution of F-16 fighter jets and a 
frigate to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya served as a precedent for the Serval 
operation in Mali. To be sure, the two operations differed in their objectives and conduct. 
The former sought to implement a no-fly zone for humanitarian purposes without the 
deployment of ground troops while the latter was designed as an anti-terrorist operation. Yet, 
in the eyes of Belgian policy-makers, both were seen as initiatives led by European military 
powers to which visible contributions could be made outside UN command (Koops and 
Drieskens, 2012). The case for a Belgian presence in both was headed by De Crem’s 
ambition to orient the armed forces towards ‘offensive’ functions; an important step towards 




cabinet and opposition members who shared a desire to be ‘on the front line’ (Rtbf Online, 
18 March 2011). French socialisation of Belgium in the context of Serval prompted Belgian 
actors to think about the lessons of Rwanda and Libya. An important one questions the 
continuing value of post-Rwanda roles which have imposed restraint on peacekeeping 
deployments. Increasingly, doubts are being raised about whether these roles are preventing 









This PhD project began with the proposition that changes in the doctrine and practice 
of international peacekeeping have had significant consequences for troop contributing 
states. Small European states, in particular, have increasingly been confronted with dilemmas 
involving difficult choices over their roles as peacekeeping contributors. The main objective 
was to examine how the governments of small European states have dealt with these changes 
and re-conceptualised the roles their states play in international peacekeeping. The primary 
aim was to contribute to the study of International Relations by bridging structure and 
agency as a way to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this category of states and 
their behaviour in the policy-area of peacekeeping. This concluding chapter reviews the key 
theoretical and empirical findings, and considers how they advance small state, FPA role 
theory and IR research at large. 
 
11.2 The Roles of Small States in International Peacekeeping 
 
This project has challenged the notion that small states participate in peacekeeping 
operations driven by a single uncontested perception of themselves as international 
entrepreneurs of peaceful norms. Small states have gradually found their traditional role of 
norm entrepreneur to be at odds with the intrusive, robust and multi-dimensional nature of 
modern peacekeeping. It has become difficult for small states’ governments to ensure that 
their troops remain neutral, act upon consent and use limited force, when operations now 
require defending a regime from rebel attacks, building state institutions, protecting refugees 
and containing violence from neighbouring civil wars. All four case studies have exposed the 
complex political processes unfolding at the international level when international actors 
agree to mount, and generate forces for, a modern peacekeeping operation. This partly 
explains why none of the decisions taken by Austria or Belgium were straightforward as 
governing elites could no longer rely on a norm entrepreneur role to guide them through this 
complexity. The insistence by governments to decide participation on a case-by-case basis is 
further evidence of the uncertainty prevailing amongst small states over the position they 
should occupy in international efforts to manage crises. 
An important finding suggests that small states have confronted this new 
environment by playing a wider range of roles as part of more fluid role sets. This means that 
small states have sought to take on a diversified set of peacekeeping responsibilities, but that 
these responsibilities vary significantly from one peacekeeping scenario to another. In the 
past, the role of norm entrepreneur used to provide a one-size-fits-all formula for the 




prominent role adopted by Austria and Belgium is the Global System Collaborator (GSC) 
role, indicating that Austrian and Belgian governments have contributed to peace operations 
because of their aspiration ‘to undertake far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other 
states to support the emerging global order’ (Chafetz et al., 1996:734). This is an expression 
of small states’ deep commitment to international rules and multilateral solutions to 
resolving crises. It is also a manifestation of their belief in the UN system and their ambition 
to contribute to it. While such role taking may be unsurprising, this role was unavailable to 
small states during the cold war while successive peacekeeping failures in the early 1990s 
have left some governments reluctant to perform it. In fact, Belgium has placed more 
extensive conditions on enacting a GSC role than Austria owing to the Rwandan episode, 
despite a long-seated commitment to multilateralism. 
Second, Austria and Belgium have both positioned themselves as a regional 
subsystem collaborators (RSCs) indicating that small states are engaging in new 
peacekeeping operations to support the development of regional institutions into more 
assertive peacekeeping actors. This is a new pattern reflecting the proliferation of regional 
bodies and command structures undertaking a wide spectrum of peacekeeping tasks 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2005:167). The findings highlight that small states actively 
contribute to this pattern. An illustrative example is Belgium’s re-engagement in UN 
peacekeeping, which would have been less likely had the prospect of a co-ordinated 
European effort been absent. A reluctance to see the EU fail to deal with the Chadian refugee 
crisis also partly motivated the Austrian decision to participate in EUFOR Chad. At other 
times, both small states have sought to distance themselves from the EU as an appropriate 
framework to channel their peacekeeping effort as shown most by Austria’s and Belgium’s 
attitude in UNDOF and EUTM Mali, respectively. While the Faymann government feared 
being entrapped in an EU-wide move to militarise the Syrian civil war, the Di Rupo coalition 
complained that Belgium was pulling a disproportionate political and military weight relative 
to other member states. 
Third, a self-perception as humanitarian actor has been a driver behind Austria’s 
and Belgium’s deployments between 2006 and 2013. Importantly, a humanitarian actor role 
is the most similar to the one of norm entrepreneur given that it expresses a rejection of 
power politics and self-interests pursued through military means, in favour of a value-based 
and civilian approach to international relations and peacekeeping. A desire to alleviate the 
suffering of civilians in war zones has become an important motive for small states to engage 
in peacekeeping missions. This trend has been complemented by international actors who 
placed deployments for humanitarian purposes higher on their agendas. In the same way as 
the other roles, it has not been unequivocally embraced by Austria and Belgium. While a 
humanitarian role influenced the Verhofstadt coalition to partake in UNIFIL II, Belgium 




provided logistical support to a great power’s fight against terrorism in Mali. Austria chose 
not to enact a humanitarian role when it withdrew from UNDOF despite a large number of 
civilian casualties caused by violent clashes between the Syrian regime and opposition 
militants. 
The fourth role informing the peacekeeping decisions of Austria and Belgium is the 
one of a neutral. For small states, it has long been a source of peacekeeping activism 
alongside a norm entrepreneur role. However, in the new peacekeeping setting, it now 
implicates restraint when activities jeopardising troop impartiality and/or demanding the use 
of force are involved. A neutral role provided the Faymann government with grounds to 
withdraw from UNDOF. Although it has not been articulated in the same way as in Austria, 
the neutral role has informed successive Belgian governments to refrain from participating in 
UN peacekeeping missions between 1994 and 2006. Whilst initially this role gave them a 
good reputation as peacekeeping actors, its enactment now damages their reputation. 
Fifth, all case studies have revealed that Austria and Belgium have committed troops 
to various operations motivated, to varying degrees, by an ambition to act as a reliable 
partner. Each crisis under investigation has uncovered French leadership in crafting, 
initiating and/or carrying out peacekeeping endeavours. Austrian and Belgian policy-makers 
have perceived these peacekeeping missions as opportunities to demonstrate their reliability 
to Paris, thereby seeking to maintain good relations and foster security and defence 
cooperation with a great power. This important finding challenges previous research arguing 
that small states are primarily committed to multilateral efforts towards peace in a formal 
institutional context. This is a valid claim. Nonetheless, it is shown here that small states’ 
preoccupation with maintaining sound bilateral relations with a proximate great power 
remains an influential factor driving their foreign policies and peacekeeping behaviours. 
The main conclusion emerging from this project’s role examination is that roles on 
their own account less for small states’ peacekeeping adaptation than the combination of 
roles selected by small states to overcome the dilemmas presented by new ways of doing 
peacekeeping. For instance, a humanitarian actor role dominated Austrian decision-making 
towards EUFOR Chad. Yet, it is uncertain whether Vienna would have been such a keen 
participant had the opportunity to partner with France not existed. There is no single 
peacekeeping formula that can be applied to manage different crises. Therefore, as 
peacekeeping norms and practices are continuously being renegotiated with each operation, 
so too are small states’ roles and behaviours likely to diversify and fluctuate. Only through 
role analyses can we capture this diversity and effectively explain the peacekeeping 






11.3 Small State and Role Theory Research: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship 
 
11.3.1 What the Roles of Small States Tell us about their Foreign Policies 
 
The choice to concentrate on the roles of small states as opposed to their external 
material constraints, vulnerability, national identity or bargaining strategies in multilateral 
institutions, for example, was made because of IR theories’ lack of explicit efforts to connect 
various, yet valuable, understandings of how small states behave in international affairs, let 
alone in a fast-changing peacekeeping environment. Whether a (neo-)realist, liberal or 
constructivist lens is applied, one is confronted with a lack of dialogue surrounding how 
perspectives on whether small states are weak or influential international actors, whether 
their foreign policies are driven by material or ideational factors and whether such factors 
emerge outside or inside the state, can be reconciled. 
Scholars interested in small states argue that we cannot effectively understand how 
the international system is structured without exploring the foreign policies of those actors 
which numerically dominate it. A close connection between interest in small states and a 
concern for the system, in conjunction with the fact that small state size is an inherently 
structural variable (Breuning, 2011), illuminate why structural explanations have long been 
at the forefront of the small state research agenda. Yet, studying small states is also a state- 
centred endeavour which can only benefit from an approach stressing ‘the role of the central 
decision-making unit and the subjective understandings of leaders as funnels for other 
international and domestic factors’ (Kaarbo, 2015:191). In other words, small state research 
straddles IR and FPA scholarships. Therefore, this project drew on a role theoretical 
perspective which incorporates both an IR focus on international structures and a FPA 
interest in agency (Breuning and Thies, 2012). The overarching contribution of role theory to 
this project was to theoretically explain and empirically show how structure and agency 
interact to influence small states’ foreign policy adaptation to new forms of peacekeeping. 
Integrating structure and agency through a role theoretical framework aimed to rejuvenate 
small state research and make it a field visited by both IR and FPA scholars (see Long, 
2017). 
Closer structure-agency integration in the study of small states was pursued 
primarily by considering how small states are socialised into peacekeeping roles. Small state 
research benefits from a theoretical framework which moves away from competition as the 
process through which structures affect behaviour because it evades the assumption that 
small states are weak international actors (Thies, 2013). Yet, it retains a structural emphasis 
yielding to the contention that small states are highly exposed, and respond primarily, to 
international structures. Realists’ emphasis on the constraints imposed by the distribution of 
power was taken into account by recognising that differences in peacekeeping resources 




entrepreneur argument overlooks the fact that small states do not have the capabilities to be 
initiators of peace operations. The four case studies have shown that great power(s), 
conflicting parties and international institutions are the prime movers in mounting 
operations. However, the framework moves beyond material structures by proposing that 
these actors also set the parameters for crisis management, thereby socialising other actors 
into acceptable roles. Thus, the peacekeeping choices made by small states’ governments are 
not exclusively determined by the possession of inferior capabilities. A key claim of this 
doctoral project is that role expectations generated from prevailing norms and diffused by 
socialisers condition small states’ roles and influence their governments’ decision over troop 
deployment. Chapters 6, 9 and 10 show that Austria and Belgium were unlikely to have 
participated in the missions had strong socialising pressures not been applied on their 
leaders. Neither Austria nor Belgium had extensive interests in the Chadian and Malian 
crises respectively. Yet, they responded present when a regional power and the institutions in 
which they were embedded in became active and requested their participation. EU and UN 
socialisation was highly influential in inducing Belgium’s 2006 decision to re-engage in UN 
peacekeeping. 
The use of social constructivism to explain the activism of small states in 
peacekeeping has downplayed international structures as relevant factors. From a 
constructivist perspective, small states appear to be unconstrained actors able to shape the 
international normative order through active peacekeeping participation. Research has 
ignored the socialising influence which the political process prior to deployment can have on 
small states when considering a participation. This project’s socialisation argument advances 
our understanding of small states’ foreign policies by uncovering the simultaneous effects of 
material and ideational structures on their peacekeeping choices. These structures constrain 
the peacekeeping actions of small states through the diffusion of norms and role expectations 
by active socialisers at the international level. This proposition improves upon the norm 
entrepreneur argument by suggesting that there is nothing intrinsic in small state size driving 
small states to be active contributors of peacekeeping troops. Small states’ attitudes towards 
new peacekeeping missions are, to a significant extent, the products of social interactions 
with external socialising agents generating expectations of appropriate peacekeeping 
behaviour. 
To establish a better connection between structure and agency, this project has 
theorised and empirically investigated the processes through which agents inside small states 
respond to external socialising influences. This was made possible by recent developments in 
the role theory scholarship which has emphasised that agency exercised by domestic actors 
within their own domestic context can have a significant impact on external processes of role 
location (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016; Brummer and Thies, 2015). Role theory provided the 




states, thereby contributing to the work of scholars who have already indicated the influence 
of internal factors and processes on small states’ foreign policies (Doeser, 2011; 2017; Hey, 
2003). A contribution was made by showing that domestic debates over peacekeeping troop 
deployments in small states are both stimulated by external expectations for certain roles and 
grounded in domestic actors holding different ideas about what role(s) their state should play 
in peacekeeping. It underlines the notion that small state research will not be able to fully 
understand the effects of international structures until it examines the ways agency is 
exercised domestically vis-à-vis structural constraints. This project took a step in this 
direction considering how small states’ agents have responded to the pressures of role 
socialisation as they re-learn their place and responsibilities in peacekeeping. The case 
studies have exposed policy-makers, principally in the foreign policy-making unit, exercising 
agency as they perceive, interpret and respond to what is expected of their state. Chapters 6, 
9 and 10 exhibited agents positively identifying with external demands for their states to be 
become humanitarian actors, reliable allies and/or global as well as regional collaborators in 
peacekeeping. Conversely, chapter 7 was a case of domestic agents seeking to defy evolving 
structures as Austrian officials rejected international requests for Austria to take on more 
extensive peacekeeping responsibilities as part of UNDOF’s adaptation to new realities. 
It was posited at the outset of this project that determining whether small states’ 
agents form a consensus around, or contest, the roles expected of them by international 
actors was an empirical task. Results from the case studies indicate that a more extensive 
consensus was achieved amongst Belgian actors than by policy-makers in Vienna. In 
Brussels, no one disputed the decision of the Verhofstadt cabinet to meet the expectations for 
a GSC, RSC and humanitarian actor roles. Defence Minister De Crem was unconstrained in 
enacting a small but reliable ally role as expected by France when intervening in Mali. On 
the contrary, the Austrian political opposition and public criticised the Gusenbauer 
government for pursuing a humanitarian role because it represented a positive response to 
European and French role expectations. They feared that the cabinet was pursuing a hidden 
agenda involving roles threatening neutrality. In 2013, bureaucratic agencies attempted to 
bring the Faymann government in line with external role expectations by contesting the 
selection of a neutral role as a basis for withdrawing from UNDOF. Interestingly, neither 
case of role contestation succeeded in swaying the governing elite to change its initial role 
position. These findings contribute to the small state scholarship by both challenging and 
supporting the argument that foreign policy decision-making in small states is characterised 
by consensus. While we should not assume that external pressures to adopt certain roles lead 
domestic actors to form an agreement, the argument cannot be dismissed altogether. The 
point here is that to understand the conditions under which consensus or contestation over 





Each case study offered the opportunity to gain a more refined understanding of 
foreign policy decision-making in small states. It was uncovered that decision-making could 
be affected by the interactive effect of the electoral cycle and the public aversion to 
casualties. Emphasising further the impact of domestic politics on small state foreign policy, 
it was found that leaders in small states could divert the public from difficult domestic 
conditions by taking safe foreign policy actions. Another finding indicates that Prime 
Ministers were not as extensively involved in decision-making processes as expected. This 
was the case of Belgian Prime Minister Di Rupo and Austrian Prime Minister Gusenbauer 
who chose a removed, conciliatory approach to decision-making to ensure the continuation 
of their fragmented and fragile coalitions. However, Prime Ministers Verhofstadt and 
Faymann exercised greater leadership and influence on their government’s decision to re-
engage in, and retreat from, UN peacekeeping respectively. Chapter 6, 9 and 10 suggest that 
Defence Ministers in small states are actively engaged in decision-making on the 
deployments of troops abroad. Each Defence Minister held a firm vision of what the role of 
armed forces should be. Darabos oversaw the re-organisation the Austrian armed forces 
which, he believed, should involve closer cooperation with new partners. De Crem was 
determined to position Belgium as a small but reliable partner in sharp contrast to Flahaut 
who, in 2006, had been committed to orientating Belgian armed forces towards humanitarian 
tasks. Bureaucratic interests in achieving these visions through peacekeeping deployments 
account for the Ministers’ attempts to shape decision-making. 
The cases tracing Belgian decision-making exposed the weight of historical 
precedents on small states’ agents when conceiving roles and making peacekeeping 
decisions. It was also identified that international calls for more active roles could prompt 
domestic agents to reinterpret the lessons of past failures and rethink the domestic constraints 
imposed in their aftermaths. The cases did not exhibit evidence that publics in small states 
seek to mount strong opposition to the peacekeeping decisions of their governments. When 
they did, they were unsuccessful in inducing change. The Belgian public did not interfere nor 
contest the decisions of the Verhofstadt and Di Rupo cabinets to participate in UNIFIL II and 
the international effort in Mali respectively. In 2008, the Austrian public opposition failed to 
obstruct the Gusenbauer government’s plan to take part in EUFOR Chad. The only 
indication of public influence comes from Austria when the Faymann government pulled out 
from UNDOF anticipating that the Austrian public would not accept casualties and the 
abandonment of a neutral role. Even in this case, the public never campaigned for the 
government to withdraw. These findings implicate that agents in the foreign policy-making 
unit effectively lead decision-making and can insulate themselves from public demands. 
Thus, a key conclusion suggests that the interactions between agents in the foreign policy- 





Examinations of small states’ decision-making have underlined the relevance of 
national self-interests for policy-makers when deciding on peacekeeping deployments. The 
Belgian and Austrian respective decisions to participate in UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad 
were largely motivated by the prospect of gaining an UN Security Council non-permanent 
seat. This incentive explains why policy-makers sought to position their small states as 
GSCs. Similarly, the political and military benefits involved in cooperating with a regional 
power in peacekeeping deployments were not lost on Austrian and Belgian leaders when 
choosing to enact a reliable partner or ally role. European interests in developing the 
capabilities of the Union to act outside of its borders also motivated Austria’s decision 
towards EUFOR Chad and Belgium’s participation in UNIFIL II. The Faymann government 
brought Austrian troops home primarily in the national interest of protecting Austrian 
peacekeepers and for political survival at home. The key implication for the small state 
literature is that investigations looking inside the state should not exclusively focus on 
national identity as other more self-serving incentives may also drive small states to 
contribute to peacekeeping operations. Rather than suggesting that identity is irrelevant, the 
findings show that it is only one source of roles agents may or may not turn to as they 
navigate the dynamics of role negotiation within, and set in motion by, outside expectations 
for certain roles. While the Faymann government was concerned with the troops’ safety, it 
also relied on neutrality as an element of national identity to confront changing structures at 
the expense of its interest in international reputation. 
Explanations of small states’ foreign policies have for too long adopted an ‘either 
or’ approach. The have either been preoccupied with the effects of inferior capabilities or 
explored a range of material and ideational domestic factors including perceptions (Gvalia et 
al., 2013), identity (Ingebritsen, 2002; Wivel, 2005), public opposition (Doeser, 2017) as 
well as bureaucratic size and skill (Panke, 2012; Thorhallsson, 2000; 2012), independently of 
structural pressures. The scholarship has also extensively assumed that small states do not 
pursue self-interests when contributing to peacekeeping operations, overstating the influence 
of national identity on agents instead. Consequently, the impacts of structure-agency 
interactions on their foreign policies and peacekeeping choices have largely been overlooked 
and under-theorised. By looking at how roles are both externally expected and internally 
negotiated, the approach presented in this project contributes to the norm entrepreneur 
argument and the wider small state scholarship by unpacking the processes through which 
multiple international structures interfere in decision-making dynamics. In turn, the 
motivations of agents and their responses to structural constraints can be more effectively 
identified. Through role theory, this research enhances the compatibility of structural 
explanations with a number of domestic factors in accounting for small states’ foreign 
policies. This bridge between structure and agency can generate better understandings of 




humanitarian actors, as well as reliable allies. 
11.3.2 Contributing to Role Theory through Small States 
 
The observations made in the case studies contribute extensively to the development 
of role theory. For the same reason that role theory was an effective tool to inspect what 
small states do internationally, the category of small states is a valuable subject on which to 
observe and theorise the workings of roles on foreign policies. Numerous role analyses have 
been undertaken on great, regional and emerging powers, but the roles played by the smaller 
members of the system have often been overlooked. This is a serious omission since our 
knowledge of leadership will remain imperfect until we understand those who are led. The 
consideration of small states provides an opportunity to analyse simultaneously alter and ego, 
and their interactions, given that structural and agential factors have been shown to be 
equally relevant in influencing small states’ foreign policies. This should encourage role 
theorists to move beyond a tendency to abstract either internal role dynamics when interested 
in how states locate their role(s) internationally or the influence of alters when focusing on 
ego’s internal processes. 
Attention to mission operationalisation and force generation processes has uncovered 
various ways in which alters have intervened into egos’ role selection. The primary functions 
of alters was to stimulate ego to think about its role(s) in an emerging crisis and elicit certain 
roles. This happened diffusely as UN agents called on UN members to meet their 
responsibilities in maintaining international peace. It took on a more direct form when 
DPKO officials applied pressures on European states to send resources to UNIFIL II. The 
UN, as an alter, interfered most directly in ego’s role selection when Secretary-General 
Annan communicated in person to the Belgian Prime Minister his expectation that Belgium 
should play an active role in UNIFIL II. The French diplomatic round of European capitals 
was designed to achieve a similar purpose and led to domestic debates about whether it was 
appropriate for Austria to play the role of partner supporting French objectives in Chad. As 
regional institutions have become peacekeeping actors and small states increasingly turned to 
them to perform peacekeeping duties, institutional expectations have made their way into, 
and increasingly affected, domestic debates over roles. Belgium’s decision-making vis-à-vis 
EUTM Mali underscored the fear of some in the Belgian elite that the country would become 
isolated if the government rejected calls for European solidarity. Importantly, alters often 
influence internal role dynamics through domestic agents determined to meet external role 
demands. 
Chapter 7 showed that outside events can place small states’ agents into 
predicaments over roles and, as a result, intensify role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo, 
2016b:183). The Syrian civil war forced Austrian officials to think about how to sustain a 




undermining Austria’s reputation was highly contested by the foreign ministry and sections 
of the military. All the case studies have revealed that alters articulated role expectations by 
relying on key peacekeeping norms. This finding corroborates Breuning (2016) who found 
that roles entering domestic negotiations often originate in international norms. Additional 
research needs to be undertaken on the relationship between outside events and norms on the 
one hand, and external role expectations generated by alters on the other. Nonetheless, this 
research has established that outside events and norms are unlikely to impact domestic role 
negotiations if active alters are absent to push for certain roles and activate ego’s role 
conception. The above findings show that alters can take different forms and be more or less 
direct in articulating their expectations. However, it does not remove the fact that ‘alters can 
become yet another factor’ in role negotiation dynamics (Kaarbo and Cantir, 2016b:182). 
This project went a step further using the case studies to tease out the policy-making 
processes set in motion by alters’ expectations, thereby influencing role selection. This 
contributes to role theory by shedding light on the conditions under which ego meets or 
defies the expectations emanating from different alters. The case studies exposed mixed 
results about the importance of public opinion for the domestic negotiation of roles. The 
Austrian and Belgian publics were expected to be important players in selecting roles given 
their deeply-seated pacifist inclinations. Outside pressures for Belgium to be an active player 
in UNIFIL II and an ally to France in Mali were not perceived as threats to country’s 
pacifism by the Belgian public. The Belgian public remained a passive decision-making 
player in both cases. Conversely, French and European demands for Austria to take on a 
humanitarian role as part of EUFOR Chad awakened public fears of entanglement in 
dangerous foreign ‘adventures’. Developments on the ground and intensifying international 
efforts to widen UNDOF’s mandate increased the aversion of the Austrian public to 
casualties. In both cases, the public acted as an active constraint on governmental plans to 
deviate from a neutral role. While the Gusenbauer cabinet managed to bypass public 
opposition, public opinion was a primary concern for the Faymann government and directly 
affected its ability to meet external expectations. All the cases also shed light on elite 
interactions during role negotiations, some of which were conflictual. An important finding 
is that cabinet actors often advocated roles along bureaucratic interests. Austrian foreign 
ministry officials wanted to return to a GSC role because of concerns that Austria’s 
international diplomatic image was being tarnished following the government’s decision to 
implement a neutral role vis-à-vis UNDOF. Also, several Defence Ministers pushed for roles 
they perceived as enabling a specific orientation and significant benefits for the armed 
forces. These observations allow the assertion that external role expectations are more likely 
to find domestic resonance and acceptance if they align with the bureaucratic interests of one 





The cases have also uncovered internal dynamics previously unreported by role 
theorists, but potentially significant for the domestic selection of roles. For one, electoral 
cycles can influence the roles that agents prioritise and, therefore, the likelihood that a state 
will meet external expectations especially if it involves an issue salient to the public. As an 
election approaches, a government may enact a role traditionally held by the public and 
abandon those demanded by outside actors in order to divert public attention away from poor 
domestic performances. It was also found that policy-makers rely on historical precedents to 
conceive and select roles. Specifically, external expectations for certain roles can be an 
incentive for agents to rethink domestically-entrenched roles and convince reluctant 
constituencies to perform a role change. In fact, attention to the interactions between role 
socialisation and negotiation has helped refine our understanding of what drives state agents 
to transition to new roles. The likelihood of role change increases when a domestic role 
entrepreneur in a decision-making position is receptive to external demands, can overcome 
institutional hurdles and is effective at framing his/her proposal in a way that resonates with 
other decision-makers. Chapter 6 showed that external expectations can generate consensus 
amongst the members of the foreign policy unit, enabling this governing elite to limit further 
debates and insulate itself from contestation. Underlining further the importance of electoral 
calculations in role selection, elite consensus decreases the electoral incentive of enacting 
alternative roles requested by opposition and public actors. 
Importantly, this finding makes a much-needed contribution to the role theory 
scholarship as it emphasises the value of the foreign policy unit as an analytical tool linking 
alter and ego. The unit mediates the effects of role socialisation on internal processes of role 
negotiation. Whether broad role contestation emerges at a domestic level, and affects the 
final selection, is to a significant extent dependent on what happens in the unit. Public and 
opposition actors rarely initiate contestation without the governing elite first expressing its 
intention to perform a certain role. Unit members may choose not to seek parliamentary 
approval for the role(s) they intend to enact when not legally required to do so. Chapter 9 
revealed that a dominant leader, personified by Guy Verhofstadt, could impose his/her 
preferred role, limiting the ability of other actors in the unit and the wider domestic scene to 
contest his/her chosen role(s). On the other hand, a less dominant leader may provide more 
opportunities for contestation. Additional research is needed to identify the circumstances 
under which individuals in the unit, and initial role dynamics amongst them, influence 
domestic consensus or contestation over roles. However, role theorists can benefit from 
focusing on different foreign policy units because it is where initial perceptions of what is 
expected of the state are formed and where the governing elite frames their chosen role(s) 
and strategizes to achieve domestic acceptance. 
Finally, the case studies have emphasised the relevance of national interests in role 




define their interests (Ifantis et al., 2015:3; Le Prestre, 1997:5-6). Belgian policy-makers 
enacted a GSC role because it improved Belgium’s international reputation and increased the 
country’s chances of getting elected at the UN Security Council. Austria and Belgium sought 
to appear as reliable partners in Chad and Mali as their elites perceived significant 
reputational and material benefits from cooperating with Paris. The findings underline the 
need for further work focusing on the relationship between roles and interests. Nonetheless, 
the existing hypothesis that roles and interests interact reciprocally in a way that interests are 
also an important source of roles has been supported by some of the findings (Thies, 2013). 




11.4 Contributions to the Study of International Relations 
 
The findings have wider consequences for how we understand some important 
theoretical issues of International Relations beyond the integration of structure and agency. 
First, they add to the growing literature on the supply-side of peacekeeping exploring why 
states contribute to peacekeeping operations (Meiske and Ruggeri, 2017). When small states 
are concerned, it is generally argued that domestic ideas motivate their participation in 
peacekeeping. This project strengthens this scholarship by taking into account more 
immediate, mission-specific and political factors associated with the formation of peace 




troops operate, and how these are negotiated at the international level prior deployment, are 
becoming increasingly salient for policy-makers at home. Understanding the evolving 
concerns of policy-makers in troop-contributing countries is essential to ensuring the 
continuing provision of peacekeeping troops to an increasing number of peace operations. 
Second, I have argued that a norm entrepreneur is a role amongst others that small 
states may choose to play on the international scene. The findings of this research speak to 
research on the emergence and influence of norms in world politics by spelling out the 
mechanisms propelling some states to become norm entrepreneurs. Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) argue that the origins of norms are primarily domestic (p.893). States hosting such 
normative development are endowed with ‘strong notions about appropriate or desirable 
behaviour in their community’ and, therefore, incentives to convince other international 
actors to follow suit (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896). It is through these processes that 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that a state becomes a norm entrepreneur. Yet, evidence 
presented here indicates that, in conjunction with pre-existing domestic norms, prior social 
interactions between outside actors (alters) and a prospective norm entrepreneur (ego) as 
well as policy-making dynamics in both are significant in consolidating a state’s position as a 
norm entrepreneur and ensuring effective norm promotion. This study highlights the social 
and policy-making foundations of norm entrepreneurship. 
Third, the findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of 
asymmetrical relationships. Through this, the present thesis contributes further to small state 
research because it heeds Long’s (2017) call for relinquishing ‘size’ as analytical device in 
favour of relationships between states (p.145). Long (2017) argues that analyses of 
asymmetrical relationships should explore how material disparities shape the definition of 
agendas and interests on both sides (p. 155). Such valuable research could be complemented 
by examining negotiations over roles, and how these are affected by agency in both sides. It 
is a reminder that roles are predominant and vital features of asymmetrical relationships. 
Thus, IR research into asymmetry would benefit from exploiting the concepts of role 
location and altercasting whereby ‘smaller’ states bargain over, and attempt to sway 
preponderant powers to accept, their chosen role(s) (Thies, 2016; Harnisch, 2016; Cantir and 
Kaarbo, 2016b:182). 
Fourth, the insights of this project can add to our knowledge about how alliances 
form and persist by shedding additional light onto the bonds between alliance members. 
Specifically, focusing on role can help analysts to determine when small states are likely to 
bandwagon with a great power because it considers the ideational and social underpinnings 
that make alliances between materially unequal units possible or impossible. Bailes et al. 
(2016) introduced the useful concept of alliance shelter defined as an ‘alliance relationship 
with a great power or regional or international organisation whereby the small state yields 




vulnerabilities of being small (p.10). However, the availability of shelters, the interests of 
small states in seeking them as well as the likelihood of great powers and institutions to 
provide them could be more thoroughly understood through role analyses. Finally, it has 
been theoretically and empirically shown that roles are deeply embedded in institutions 
(Aggestam, 2006:15) and that small states have ambivalent relationships with them. Thus, 
the roles of small states towards and within regional and international institutions are critical 
to understanding both the trajectory of these actors’ integration in institutions and how the 
social order that underpins institutions is maintained. 
Fifth, many of the roles reported in this study were pursued by policy-makers with 
an eye on sustaining a particular reputation suggesting a likely relationship between the roles 
that a state plays and its international reputation. The function of reputation in international 
relations has long been studied as a mechanism used by states to communicate information 
about resolve (Crescenzi and Donahue, 2017; Schelling, 1966, Press, 2005), and as a factor 
contributing to cooperation and coordination (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Researchers of 
small states often refer to reputation as a foreign policy objective pursued to compensate for 
material inferiority. Small states want to develop a good international reputation, so they can 
be relied upon to perform certain tasks and, therefore, exercise disproportionate influence. 
Yet, reputation from a foreign policy angle remains under-studied and under-conceptualised, 
especially as it pertains to small states. Common roots in social psychology (Mercer, 1996) 
and shared emphases on perceptions and interactions underline the value of dialogue 
between research on role theory and reputation. In fact, much like a role, a reputation is both 
an image that one pursues, and that others perceive. In particular, the above chapters provide 
initial evidence that a focus on roles could illuminate how reputations are formed and altered 
as agents carefully consider the implications of enacting certain roles for their state’s 
international reputation. It may also be hypothesised that gaining a good reputation is based 




Several points of criticism may be levied against the assumptions and findings of 
this research. One limitation is that the effects of role taking by states on international 
structures have been overlooked. Harnisch (2012) argues that ‘the “role taking capacity of an 
actor”’ functions ‘as the “causal” mechanism for understanding the stability of the social 
structure of international relations’ (p.54). To be sure, the project effectively analyses the 
phenomena of peacekeeping troop provision by exploring small states’ roles and choices 
when faced with new peacekeeping practices. Nevertheless, this research fails to address the 
implications of small states’ role taking for regional institutions’ ability to undertake 
operations, the UN’s continuing legitimacy in peacekeeping or the operations’ effectiveness. 




states affects the overall peacekeeping system. The feedback loop on the above figure 2 
shows an awareness of the effects of such structuration processes. However, the decision was 
made to concentrate on how agents perceive and interact with international structures, both 
materially and socially defined, and on what this meant for small states’ learning process. 
This is understood here as a necessary first step before any examination of structuration can 
take place. 
Scholars of small states could contend that I underestimated the agency, influence 
and/or power that small states can exercise at the international level by overstating the extent 
to which small states’ foreign policies are structurally determined. Two reasons provide 
clarification for this. First, there is an agreement that small states are more constrained than 
larger states, by the distribution of power, institutional rules and international norms, 
although constructivists have not sufficiently recognised that normative structures also shape 
what small states do. Thus, there was a need to bring together material, institutional and 
normative pressures into one framework, to better appreciate the interactions between 
different structures and the multi-dimensional constraints under which small states’ foreign 
policies are performed. Second, a structural emphasis was necessary to question 
Ingebritsen’s argument without rejecting it altogether. I do not contest that small states can 
modify international structures through norm entrepreneurship, but there was a need to 
investigate different processes to determine whether and how small states come to be norm 
entrepreneur in the first place. 
Another shortcoming is that the findings of this research are only relevant for small 
European states with parliamentary democratic systems. In this way, the thesis fails to heed 
Gibert and Grzelczyk’s (2016) call for ‘looking at cross-sections of small non-Western states 
from a comparative perspective and/or at considering how their international behaviour on 
the international scene may be changing’ (p.2). Given that non-Western small states are 
‘doubly peripheral’, we should not assume that these states locate, conceive and play the 
same roles, and through similar processes, as those revealed in these pages. Yet, a role 
theoretical framework is well suited for future research to study how non-Western small 
states’ own ‘historical characteristics’ have shaped the negotiations of their roles at different 
stages of state emergence (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016:3). 
Having chosen not to abstract internal role dynamics or considerations of external 
actors, the findings may be revealing too many uncontrolled variables. Consequently, one 
may be left uncertain about what really lies at the heart of small states’ peacekeeping 
adaptation. Knowledge accumulation regarding small states’ foreign policy behaviour may 
also be negatively affected by this. I would argue that it was the inevitable consequence of a 
necessary task. Both small state and role theory research agendas suffered from imperfect 
structure-agency integration despite much potential. Therefore, intellectual progress in these 




are, in a fundamental sense, dynamically interrelated entities and hence [that] we cannot 
account fully for the one without invoking the other’ (Carlsnaes, 2007:16). The benefit was 
to expose variables, and interactions amongst them, previously unexplored by either role 
theorists or small state scholars. It forms the foundation for future research dedicated to 
testing these variables in more controlled environments. 
A final limitation lies in the lack of a more systematic and rigorous methodology for 
observing roles. The absence of better-defined criteria means that this research may have 
overestimated the presence of certain roles and/or overlooked others. Role theory remains 
imperfect in laying out a common bench mark for role identification, which remains too 
reliant on researchers’ own judgements. Yet, the inductive and flexible approach used here 
may have allowed the detection of some roles which would have remained concealed had 
narrower and pre-defined criteria been used. Moreover, it has been found that roles may be 
articulated by alters and ego in various ways. An agent does have to be expressing a role 
explicitly for role taking to be present and inform decision-making. More research is 
required to assess how role expectations and conceptions interact with notions of 
responsibility and values, for instance, and how they are communicated to other actors. 
Importantly, there is a pressing need to update Holsti’s categorisation along agreed-upon 
standards so that role theory research remains up-to-date, generalisable and replicable in the 
fields of IR and FPA. This project could have used other sources including parliamentary 
debates in a more systematic manner. This would have enabled stronger claims based on 
quantifiable indicators to be made about the roles that Austria and Belgium have chosen to 
play at the expense of others. Nonetheless, the value of parliamentary debates for case 
studies of decision-making which unfolds over a short time span is lesser than for 
longitudinal role analyses. One may also dispute the use of WikiLeaks as a data source for 
roles. However, Wikileaks documents proved a valuable source of primary evidence, 
frequently discussing issues of peacekeeping and international engagement. From a role 
theory perspective, these effectively contributed to assessing alters’ (primarily the US’s) 
perceptions and expectations of small states. Methodologically, they benefited this project’s 
purpose by providing key pieces of the puzzle that is small states’ engagement in 
peacekeeping. The use of interviews would have also reinforced the findings, something that 






11.6 Future Research 
 
The contributions and limitations of this thesis highlight interesting avenues for 
future research. Students and scholars should continue to study small states, but not from a 
point of departure that emphasises either weakness or agency. This research has confirmed 
the value of an emerging trend which places dynamics of asymmetrical relationships at the 
heart of small state studies (Long, 2017). Making the case that roles are unavoidable 
components of asymmetrical relationships underscores the need for future research to 
analyse simultaneously their material and social foundations. It would enable researchers to 
consider different asymmetrical relationships between alter and ego, and through 
comparison, assert the scope available to small states for exercising influence. In this way, 
this project’s findings should be used to identify and devise strategies through which small 
states can be influential international actors. A role approach is well equipped to determine 
when and how small states can make their mark on international relations. Subsequent 
research questions may include: What roles should small states pursue to exercise influence? 
How can small states use role socialisation to their advantage? What diplomatic strategies 
can they employ towards a range of alters to ensure the enactment of their roles? Should 
small states’ policy-makers display a common front to deal with role socialisation? 
Relatedly, innovative research on small states should pay attention to their ‘networks 
of relationships’ as a basis for comparison rather than take a purely state-centric approach 
(Long, 2017). Partly to counter isolationism, small states maintain denser networks of 
relationships across a wider range of policy-areas than usually recognised. The implication is 
that the socialisation of small states by different alters overlap, forcing policy-makers to find 
ways to accommodate different expectations. Great powers may use international institutions 
to socialise small states as shown by France which acted through European institutions to 
cast partners into roles. A similar scenario recently unfolded when the United States 
threatened to halt aid transfers to many small states if they did not remain loyal to 
Washington at the UN even though it undermined the UN system (The New York Times, 20 
December 2017). Additional work should explore how small states resolve role conflicts 
generated by overlapping expectations from different alters. Moreover, we need to better 
understand how small states’ roles in one policy-area are affected by decisions in another. 
This thesis left unexplored the impacts of foreign aid policies on peacekeeping choices 
although the two are closely connected. Also, ‘networks of relationships’ as a new ‘structure 
of comparison’ can help small state research go beyond its Western centrism allowing 
comparisons of asymmetrical relationships to be made across regions (Long, 2017). 
A focus on roles has emphasised the significance of perception in interactions 
between small states and great powers. Yet, there is a need to learn more about how foreign 
policy agents in great powers perceive small states and their roles in the international system. 




smaller states to determine how perceptions and expectations of small states as allies, 
mediators and/or regional collaborators emerge. This would be beneficial to researchers of 
both small states and great powers, and contribute to a dialogue between the two. It is also a 
call for role theorists to pay more attention to the dynamics inside alter. An interesting 
avenue for future research is to analyse how such dynamics influence decisions to socialise 
other actors, perceptions of socialisees’ roles and socialisation strategies. 
It follows that if role theory is to effectively contribute to IR research through novel 
insights into international structures, it must refine its understanding of different alters. First, 
there should be greater awareness that role socialisation can be undertaken by a wide range 
of actors. Second, the importance of international norms for role socialisation should not be 
underestimated. Role theorists must clarify the relationship between norms and roles in 
international relations. There is a pressing need to clarify how norm integration and role 
expectation interact and affect foreign policy behaviour. A key question is to what extent and 
how do alters use norms to socialise other actors into roles? In essence, subsequent role 
theoretical work on the structural side should explore other ways in which states are 
socialised into roles, and how these other types of socialisation combine with the one 
advanced by role theory. Third, it will be important for role theorists not to focus excessively 
on successful cases of socialisation. Future work should comparatively and systematically 
investigate the conditions under which socialisation fails. To strengthen the bridge between 
structure and agency through role theory, this additional research should analyse how 
domestic actors and policy-making processes contribute to the success or failure of different 
types of role socialisation. 
Our knowledge about the influence of domestic actors, institutions and processes as 
determinants of small states’ foreign policy behaviours remains limited. Thus, researchers 
are invited to test the domestic variables uncovered in this thesis, through approaches that do 
not necessarily rely on role theory, to corroborate or refute the findings. Further work must 
be undertaken to assess how small states’ foreign policy choices are affected by the 
individual policy-makers, bureaucratic agents, public opinion and political opposition. The 
decision-making approach used by FPA scholars, through in-depth case-studies in particular, 
has not been the norm in small state research. Yet, it offers much potential for uncovering the 
policy-making processes responsible for shaping small states’ foreign policy trajectories 
while making analytical room for international structural factors. It is critical that research on 
the domestic factors does not evolve independently of structural processes and variables. 
Research questions include how does foreign policy decision-making influence the outcome 
of small states’ asymmetrical relationships? To what degree is decision-making also 
conditioned by these relationships? What are the decision-making factors enabling small 
states to exercise international influence? These questions must be addressed to reinforce the 





Our understanding of agency through role theory’s focus on ego has progressed 
rapidly in the last few years. Yet, there should be greater awareness that state agents do not 
receive external expectations nor negotiate roles at home independently of their political 
background and ideology which likely predispose them to select certain roles over others. In 
the case studies, attempts were made to tease out the main characteristics of key agents’ 
foreign policy orientation, but this should be undertaken more thoroughly and systematically 
along pre-defined criteria. An individual level of analysis may be a promising way forward 
for those interested in asserting the effects of political parties on role conception. 
Furthermore, based on a common assumption that individual decision-makers matter for 
conceiving roles and making foreign policy decisions, a dialogue between role theorists and 
political psychologists should be more actively pursued. It would allow valuable analyses to 
be carried out into how agents’ beliefs, leadership styles and personality traits affect 
domestic role contestation and their receptivity to external role demands. A focus on 
individuals may become increasingly needed as role theorists continue to devise analytical 




This PhD project has not provided definite answers as to how small states behave in 
international relations and peacekeeping, therefore allowing the formulation of readily- 
available recommendations for policy-makers. However, its main achievement has been to 
expose previously ignored interactions between a range of structural and agential variables, 
commanding the foreign policy trajectories of small states and their peacekeeping choices. 
This research has taken a step back from the tendency of small state research to generalise 
across cases. This was necessary to allow scholars and policy-makers to understand, first and 
foremost, the conditions conducive to small states shaping the normative order, allying with 
a great power or ensuring survival. The main finding reveals that, as all social phenomena in 
International Relations, the actions of small states are the products of the relative importance 
of structure or agency. What matters for explaining states’ foreign policies regardless of their 
size, is the interaction between the material and ideational structures of the international 
system and different state agencies. Given that these interactions are highly variable, it is 
unsurprising that small states display many variations in their peacekeeping contributions 
and foreign policy paths. The behavioural patterns, their structural and agential origins, and 
processes observed in small states do not differ significantly from those characterising other 
states’ foreign policies around the world. Small states rely on roles to conduct foreign policy 
as much as middle and great powers do. Therefore, while we should keep researching small 
states, it is essential to relinquish the idea that they form a distinct analytical category 




peacekeeping, this PhD thesis goes some way to re-positioning interest in small states at the 
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A1 Summary of Role Articulation by Gusenbauer Government 








‘Based on our long-standing engagement for 
the principles and values of the United Nations, 
I pledge that Austria will be a responsible and 
reliable partner as a non-permanent member of 
the Security Council for the term 2009-2010. 
We hope that the Members of the United 
Nations will entrust Austria with that 
responsibility, which we stand ready to 
shoulder to shoulder in a spirit of true 








‘We Europeans want each and every person in 
Kosovo to live in dignity, freedom and 
security. The international organizations 
concerned, including the European Union, 










‘A just and effective international order needs 
to be based on rules applicable to every 
member, big or small, strong or weak. Respect 
for the rule of law is indispensable if we want 
to prevent conflicts and promote peace and 
sustainable development. Austria has therefor 
consistently promoted efforts to develop 
international relations based on the principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and all the 
other instruments that form our international 






‘A consistently growing number of States is 
rallying behind our call for the adoption by 
2008 of a legally binding instrument to prohibit 
cluster munitions, which cause unacceptable 
harm to civilians. Austria is determined to 
continue leading this process by example, with 







‘Austria has a long experience in promoting 
dialogue among civilizations, religions and 
cultures, and we will continue our activities in 





‘To this end, Burkina Faso and Austria will co-
host a conference in Ouagadougou in 
November on how to create sustainable peace. 
This meeting will unite participants …in an 
endeavour to provide common input to the 
Lisbon summit – by furthering policies of good 
neighbourliness, the rule of law and good 
governance; by fighting the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons; by creating 
employment for young people; and by actively 




A2 Summary of Role Articulation by Faymann Government 





















































































‘Austria has 50-year-long track record of 
contributing to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. And we will continue our 
engagement’ (GA, Sep. 2011). 
‘Austria remains greatly concerned about the 
ever more desperate humanitarian situation in 
the Gaza Strip and its effects on the civilian 
population (GA, Sep. 2009). 
‘I have made it one of my foreign policy 
priorities to position Austria even more firmly 
as a platform for peace and dialogue’ (GA, 
Sep. 2009). 
‘Austria, as Co-Chair, together with Costa 
Rica, of the 2007 Conference on Facilitating 
the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and co-leader of the 
process for the past two years, is proud to have 
contributed to bringing the Treaty closer into 
force’ (GA, Sep. 2009) 
‘Austria will continue to help establish the 
economic foundation and the institutional 
infrastructure of a future Palestinian State. It 
will also, within the framework of the 
European Union, contribute to the efforts to 
promote a dynamic and results-oriented peace 
process’ (GA, Sep. 2009). 
‘Significant efforts are under way to ensure 
and sustain UN peacekeeping as an essential 
tool for achieving the goals of the UN ... 
Austria fully supports the ongoing 
peacekeeping reform and stands ready to play 
its part in a renewed global peacekeeping 
partnership’ (GA, Sep. 2010). 
‘As a medium-sized country and a strong 
supporter of multilateralism, Austria attaches 
particular importance to the rule of law, 
including at the international level’ (GA, Sep. 
2011). 
‘Since peacekeeping and peacebuilding must 
be approached in an integrated manner, we 
strongly support the enhanced interaction of 
the Security Council with the Peacebuilding 
Commission throughout conflict cycle’ (GA, 
Sep. 2010). 
‘For many years, Austria has maintained close 
and friendly relations with all the countries of 
the Middle East’ (SC, Jan 2009). 
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A3 Summary of Role Articulation by Verhofstadt II Government 




K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs  
‘Only through constant commitment will we 
make the United Nations the primary instrument 
for international relations…We must once again 
make the United Nations the instrument par 
excellence of our strategy to build a more stable 
and prosperous world for all…Belgium is willing 
to rise to that challenge and shoulder its 
responsibility’ (GA, Sep. 2005). 
‘As a member of the Security Council, Belgium 
has had the opportunity to be at the heart of the 





K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs  
‘As for the European Union, it has supported 
MONUC’s effort in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. It will also contribute to curbing the 
humanitarian crisis in Chad and in the Central 
African Republic by sending a military force to 
support the United Nations missions in the region. 
Belgium will participate in this effort … [and] 
welcome this regional input’ (GA, Oct. 2007). 
Multilateral Actor 
K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 
‘In July 2007, Belgium organized, in the presence 
of the Secretary-General…That was a new 
opportunity to demonstrate our firm multilateral 
commitment’ (GA, Oct. 2007). 
‘Belgium believes that only through close 
cooperation and enhanced multilateralism will we 




G. Verhofstadt, Prime 
Minister 
‘My country wishes to express its full support to 
the speedy establishment of the Human Rights 
Council. We are pleased that the concept of 
“responsibility to protect” has finally been 
recognized. Let us all hope that henceforth this 
should enable us to avoid tragedies like the one in 
Rwanda in 1994 (GA, Sep. 2005). 
Norm 
Entrepreneur 
K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 
‘That clearly illustrates the urgent need the 
develop mechanisms that break the link between 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources and 
conflict. This issue was the central theme of our 
presidency of the Security Council last June (GA, 
Oct. 2007). 
UN Reformer
 K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 
‘We must improve and strengthen the UN 
apparatus. We fully support the Secretary-
General’s efforts in this difficult task. At the same 
time, we believe that the United Nations system 
should better reflect the new international 
realities’ (GA, Sep. 2004). 
Peace and Nation 
Builder 
K. De Gucht, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 
‘While the Congolese authorities are preparing for 
elections, which will strengthen democratic 
culture across the country, they need our full 
support. Belgium will continue to mobilise the 
attention of the international community on this 






A4 Summary of Role Articulation by Di Rupo Government 




E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister 
 
‘No one can end a famine or stop a tyrant alone. 
Peace is a shared responsibility. That is why 
there is no alternative to multilateralism and 
politics, if we seek to improve humankind. That 
is what motivates Belgium’s commitment, which 
is political, financial and at times even military, 
as the fifteenth most significant contributor to the 
United Nations’ (GA, Sep. 2013). 
Humanitarian 
Actor 
E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister 
 
‘My country participates actively in efforts to 
provide assistance to populations that have been 
victims of fighting’ (GA, Sep. 2013). 
‘For my country, respect for life and human 
rights is fundamental’ (GA, Sep. 2012). 
Norm 
Entrepreneur 
E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister 
 
‘As a crossroad of many cultures, Belgium has 
always been one of the most open countries in 
the world. It has a high standard of living … 
That is largely due to the civil support, which is 
organized by the Belgian State…Belgium, like 
the European Union, is moving on a path of 
solidarity with peoples who are encountering 
difficulties’ (GA, Sep. 2014). 
Mediator 
Integrator 
E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister 
 
‘Going to war, building walls and curtailing 
rights is always easier than building bridges and 
keeping the peace…That is why Belgium 
supports the efforts of Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, 
Joint Special Representative of the United 
Nations and the League of Arab States, as he 
seeks to bring the parties to the negotiating table 
(GA, Sep. 2013). ‘Members of the Assembly 
may rest assured that my country will continue to 
do everything it can to bring people together’ 






E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister 
 
‘When we work together, we achieve results. 
Mali is a proof of that’ (GA, Sep. 2013). 
‘Beyond the humanitarian support it has already 
brought to the Iraqi people, Belgium recently 
decided to send six F-16 fighters in support of 
the fight against terrorism in Iraq. My country 
wants to strengthen cooperation among States. 
Belgium wants to intensify the exchange of 
information at the European level and within 
NATO’ (GA, Sep. 2014). 
‘I welcome the American initiative to launch a 
process of reflection on the role of the United 
Nation peacekeeping (GA, Sep. 2014). 
 
